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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**Active-Reserve Integration
in the Coast Guard**

John R. Brinkerhoff
Stanley A. Horowitz, Project Leader

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PREFACE

This document was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) under a task entitled "Active/Reserve Integration." The objective of the task is to evaluate alternative active-reserve integration policies for meeting the military requirements of US national security strategy. This document examines the integration of the active and reserve components of the US Coast Guard into a single entity. This work is part of a larger effort to study active-reserve integration throughout the US Armed Forces.

This document did not undergo formal technical review within IDA. Captain Ron Hindman, Chief, Office of Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, US Coast Guard, informally reviewed a draft of the report and provided comments that improved the accuracy of its contents.

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I. INTRODUCTION AND IMPLICATIONS

The United States Coast Guard has re-engineered itself by integrating its Active and Reserve Components into a unified organization called Team Coast Guard. Coast Guard personnel of several different kinds—regulars, reserve program administrators, selected reservists, and civilian employees—work together on the full range of Coast Guard missions, share a common administrative system, and, with the exception of three reserve port security units, are assigned to the same units.

Integration was not achieved easily, nor did it occur overnight. But Active-Reserve integration is now a fact in the Coast Guard, and it is an essential feature of the Coast Guard's strategic plan to accomplish with diminished resources in the twenty-first century its wide range of maritime safety, law enforcement, and national security missions. Considering that twenty-five years ago the Congress was intent on taking the Coast Guard Reserve from the Coast Guard and transferring it to the United States Navy, this is an amazing accomplishment.

To appreciate how the Coast Guard was able to reinvent itself, it is necessary to appreciate how the Coast Guard developed in the nearly two centuries of its existence. The 1996 integration can be considered a logical outcome of the way that the Coast Guard itself was formed in 1915, the manner in which the Coast Guard used reservists starting in 1939, and the combination of reduced budgets and high operational tempo that became the norm after the Cold War ended in 1989.

A. AN ORGANIZATION FORMED BY INTEGRATION

The Coast Guard has a long history of successful integration of disparate organizations into a unified military organization. The present-day Coast Guard was in fact formed by successive integration of four major agencies and several smaller functions. The Revenue-Cutter Service and the Lifesaving Service were integrated in 1915 by the act creating the Coast Guard. The Lighthouse Service was integrated into the Coast Guard in 1939. Chapter II explains how those services were integrated. The Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation was integrated in 1946. Air-sea rescue, weather ships, icebreaking (from the Navy), the Great Lakes Icebreaking Patrol, and many other maritime-related activities were also integrated. The Coast Guard's multiple functions are

grouped into three major areas in Chapter II: law enforcement, national security, and domestic marine safety.

B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Integration of the Coast Guard in some respects is unique, but there may be some lessons in this achievement of value to the Department of Defense (DoD), the other Armed Forces, and their Reserve Components as they also strive to cope with the complexities of the twenty-first century.

The Coast Guard experience is but one path to integration, but that path may not be entirely appropriate for the other Reserve Components. The Coast Guard is significantly different from the other four Armed Forces. The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force exist primarily to fight wars, and although they may be used for operations other than war, including domestic emergencies, only a small part of their resources are so employed. The Coast Guard, on the other hand, uses almost all of its resources daily during peacetime to accomplish a broad range of missions, most of which have little to do with war.

Another difference has to do with the composition of the other six Reserve Components. The Army National Guard, Air National Guard, Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and about half of the Naval Reserve consist mostly of organized units that augment the Active Components as organized units. The Coast Guard model of integration is inappropriate for providing organized reserve units.

On the other hand, the Coast Guard model *is* appropriate for providing individual reservists to augment active units. This is the mission of the half of the Naval Reserve that augments active ships and squadrons, the individual ready reservists of the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve, and the Individual Mobilization Augmentees of all of the Armed Forces. The present practice is for these individuals to be administered, trained, and tasked with missions separately from the active units they are to augment. Reservists usually are assigned to separate augmentation units, a practice that results in both duplication of administrative effort and operational isolation. The situation is compounded for joint headquarters and joint operating activities, which may have separate units and separate administrative systems for each Armed Force and for each component of each Armed Force. There is no reason why the other Armed Forces could not follow the Coast Guard's example and assign these individual reservists directly to the active unit they augment. This would improve the mobilization process, provide better

training for wartime duties, simplify administration, and increase the utility of the augmentees for peacetime operations.

The feature of the Coast Guard model that has the most direct and immediate application to the Department of Defense is the consolidation of administration into a single system. The other Armed Forces tend to have separate, distinct, and parallel systems for administration of their active and reserve components. These separate systems are justified by reference to law and regulations, but in reality they exist because of turf and budget rivalry. The Coast Guard showed that it is possible to consolidate active and reserve administrative systems without much difficulty simply by doing it. Moreover, the Coast Guard showed that consolidated administration provides improved service at lower cost and comes in handy during mobilization.

Another important lesson for the DoD from the Coast Guard experience is that it is possible for Active and Reserve Components to work together for the common good. Within DoD, there are still some feelings of mutual distrust and lack of confidence among the components that hinder active-reserve integration. These vestiges of the past existed also in the Coast Guard to differentiate the regulars and the reserves, but the Coast Guard recognized that the old attitudes have outlived their usefulness and fostered new attitudes more suitable for the present.

The most important lesson for the DoD is that the Coast Guard experience shows that active-reserve integration is possible and can be fruitful.

II. HISTORY OF INTEGRATION IN THE COAST GUARD

In its formative years, the Coast Guard followed generally the same integration process for each successive integration. The new organization was maintained initially as a distinct entity with its own structure and procedures, and the facilities and personnel of the new organization were realigned to match the Coast Guard's structure. Next, the civilian employees of the new organization were converted to military status. Finally, the personnel, equipment, and duties of the new organization were simply absorbed into a larger Coast Guard structure, which was itself modified to accommodate the new missions.

Here we look first at how the Revenue-Cutter and Lifesaving Services were integrated to form the Coast Guard and then at how the Lighthouse Service was integrated into the Coast Guard.¹ The same general pattern has been followed in the 1990s to integrate the Active and Reserve Components of the Coast Guard.

A. INTEGRATION OF THE REVENUE-CUTTER AND LIFESAVING SERVICES

The United States Coast Guard was created in 1915 by combining and integrating two separate agencies, the Revenue-Cutter Service and the Lifesaving Service. Each of these agencies had a long and illustrious history, and each initially resisted the combination.

The Revenue-Cutter Service (originally called the Revenue Marine) was formed at the behest of Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton to stop smugglers from bringing goods into the United States without paying customs tariffs. On 25 February 1799, Congress authorized the President to place in the Naval Establishment vessels employed as revenue cutters. That was the legal basis for the Coast Guard's national security mission of fighting alongside the Navy during wartime [1, p. 2]. The law enforcement mission changed during the next 115 years, but the role of coastal security and enforcing the law at sea continued.

¹ Our primary sources for the history of the Coast Guard were References [1] and [2].

As the years went on, additional missions were assigned to the Revenue-Cutter Service. In the 1830s, the maritime safety mission was added when the Secretary of the Treasury ordered some cutters to assist vessels in distress and help save lives, and Congress authorized several vessels to patrol the coast in severe weather and help ships in distress. The Revenue-Cutter Service also helped settle Alaska after its purchase from Russia in 1867 [1, pp. 3-4].

The service also provided seamen and vessels to augment and support the Navy. Cutters of the Revenue-Cutter Service assisted the Navy in the Seminole War, Mexican War, Civil War, and Spanish-American War. The Revenue Cutter *Harriet Lane* fired the first shot of the Civil War by putting a warning shot across the bow of the steamer Nashville in Charleston Harbor in April 1861, just before the start of the bombardment of Fort Sumter. While assisting the Navy, the Revenue Cutter-Service carried out its civil missions as well. The nature of the missions has varied from enforcing tariffs to halting the slave trade, fighting pirates, enforcing embargoes and neutrality laws, intercepting rum-runners, stopping illegal immigrants from entering the United States by sea, and stemming the flow of illegal drugs.

The Lifesaving Service started out in the early nineteenth century as a civilian, voluntary effort to save the lives of mariners caught up in the frequent wrecks at sea or along the coasts. Sustained by private contributions, lifesaving stations were erected slowly and intermittently along the coasts. The lifesaving program was given a small boost in 1848 when Congress provided funds to construct eight small boathouses along the New Jersey coast. Other lifesaving stations were added on Long Island and gradually on all coastlines.

The work of the Lifesaving Service at its inception and for a long time afterwards was done by volunteers serving on a part-time basis. The government provided facilities and boats for lifesaving stations but no funds for the personnel to run them. After years of relative neglect, the United States Lifesaving Service was established by Congress in 1878 as an agency of the Department of the Treasury. While the Lifesaving Service was a civilian organization, officers and petty officers of the Revenue-Cutter Service assisted in the construction and repair of lifesaving stations, vessels, and the training of the troops.

Integration of the two services was a delayed consequence of a Commission on Economy and Efficiency appointed by President Taft. The commission actually recommended that the Lifesaving Service be merged with the Lighthouse Service in the Department of Commerce and that the Revenue-Cutter Service be disbanded, but events

turned the recommendations around. The Secretary of Commerce wanted to retain the Lighthouse Service. The Secretary of the Navy wanted the vessels and enlisted personnel of the Revenue-Cutter Service but not the officers. The Secretary of the Treasury and Captain-Commandant Ellsworth Price Bertholf of the Revenue-Cutter Service pointed out that abolition of the Revenue-Cutter Service would require each department interested in some aspect of maritime law enforcement—Treasury, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor—to form its own maritime police force. The Navy would require additional personnel to do the additional work. Moreover, only the Revenue-Cutter Service was trained and available to perform rescue missions at sea. An intensive program of education and the loss of the *Titanic* persuaded a majority of Congress that it would be unwise to do what the commission and President Taft wanted. In response to the need for greater economy, however, the Secretary of the Treasury decided to merge the Revenue-Cutter Service and the Lifesaving Service at some later time.

In 1915, when Congress finally acted on a merger proposal that had been submitted by the Department of the Treasury in 1913. Congressional approval was won by the personal intervention of President Woodrow Wilson. The military personnel of the Revenue-Cutter Service experienced little change, but the civilian employees of the Lifesaving Service found themselves placed into military service. Surfmen who manned the lifesaving boats became enlisted personnel. The lead surfmen at each station were appointed as petty officers; station keepers became warrant officers; and district superintendents became commissioned officers. What had been a part-time local effort was transformed into a full-time military organization with an organized hierarchy. The change did not occur all at once, and it was not until World War I that the surfmen were finally placed on full-time, year-around duty [2, pp. 32–33].

The result of this initial integration was a unique organization that was explained by Captain-Commandant Bertholf in 1915 as follows:

The Coast Guard occupies a peculiar position among other branches of the Government, and necessarily so from the dual character of its work, which is both civil and military. Its organization, therefore, must be such as will best adapt it to the performance of both classes of duties, and as a civil organization would not suffice for the performance of military functions, the organization of the service must be and is by law military. More than 120 years of practical experience has demonstrated that it is by means of military drills, training, and discipline that the service is enabled to maintain that state of preparedness for the prompt performance of its most important civil duties, which ... are largely of an emergent nature [2, p. 33].

During World War I, the Coast Guard was transferred to the Navy Department and augmented the Navy with 200 commissioned officers and 5,000 warrant officers and enlisted personnel, while performing its civil functions at a heightened workload.

After the Armistice of World War I, the Navy tried to keep the Coast Guard under Navy control. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, abetted by Assistant Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt, wanted to keep all government vessels under the Navy. The Navy again wanted the Coast Guard's missions, vessels, and enlisted personnel, but not its officers. The Coast Guard wanted to revert to the Department of the Treasury and get back to its business as soon as possible. Both sides marshaled their forces, and a bruising political battle ensued. In a passage that remains relevant today, Captain-Commandant Bertholf made the following argument for an independent Coast Guard:

... the fundamental reasons for the two services are diametrically opposed. The Navy exists for the sole purpose of keeping itself prepared for ... war. Its usefulness to the Government is therefore to a large degree potential. If it performs in peace time any useful function not ultimately connected with the preparation for war, that is a by-product. On the other hand, the Coast Guard does not exist solely for the purpose of preparing for war. If it did there would then be, of course, two navies—a large and a small one, and that condition, I am sure you will agree, could not long exist. The Coast Guard exists for the particular and main purpose of performing duties which have no connection with a state of war, but which, on the contrary, are constantly necessary as peace functions. It is, of course, essentially an emergency service and it is organized along military lines because that sort of an organization best enables the Coast Guard to keep prepared as an emergency service, and by organization along military lines it is invaluable in time of war as an adjunct and auxiliary to the Navy ... while peace time usefulness is a by-product of the Navy, it is the war time usefulness that is a by-product of the Coast Guard [2, p. 33].

B. INTEGRATION OF THE LIGHTHOUSE SERVICE

On 1 July 1939, the Lighthouse Service was transferred into the Coast Guard. A military service with just over 10,000 officers and enlisted personnel had to integrate an organization consisting of over 4,000 full-time and 1,100 part-time civilian employees.

Many of the personnel of the Lighthouse Service were not enthusiastic about joining the Coast Guard. The Lighthouse Service operated 30 lightships, 400 lighthouses, and 30,000 aids to navigation (buoys and channel markers); it operated sixty-four tenders ranging from 72 to 200 feet in length. The civilians of the Lighthouse Service had little desire to accept military discipline and Coast Guard customs. The Lighthouse Service had

its own distinguished record and was about to celebrate its 105th anniversary when it was transferred. The Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral R. R. Waesche determined that all Coast Guard personnel would be military, and boards were appointed to determine which of the civilian employees would be offered commissions, warrants, or rates in the Coast Guard. Light-keepers were appointed chief or first-class petty officers, junior officers on tenders became warrant officers, and a few senior administrators became lieutenants or lieutenant-commanders. Many of the former employees of the Lighthouse Service resented the abolition of their own service and resisted conversion to military status. Only 466 of them accepted petty officer ratings. However, the integration saved money because of the consolidation of administration and logistical support and because higher-paid civil servants were replaced by Coast Guardsmen.

During the integration process, the Coast Guard realigned its own organization to eliminate overlap and confusion and accommodate the new workload. Existing Coast Guard divisions and districts and the Lighthouse Service districts were replaced with thirteen new Coast Guard Districts that were responsible for all Coast Guard missions within a specified area. The lifesaving, aids to navigation, and boating safety activities were placed under a single station in each locality. As time passed, the new workload shifted gradually to Coast Guard personnel and became part and parcel of the work of Coast Guard districts and stations [2, pp. 162-165].

After the addition of the mission to maintain lighthouses and other aids to navigation, the Coast Guard picked up additional missions. During the mobilization for World War II, the Coast Guard took over the job of inspecting commercial vessels for safety and of qualifying merchant seamen and officers to man these vessels. After the war, the Coast Guard, which had provided icebreaking patrols during the war, assumed the entire mission from the Navy. At that time, the Coast Guard maintained weather ships on station at sea to assist ships and aircraft. The Coast Guard also developed and still operates a global navigational system—LORAN—to aid mariners. The Coast Guard has grown by accumulating missions related to maritime activities that were either not being done or were transferred from another agency.

C. CURRENT MISSIONS OF THE COAST GUARD

The Coast Guard's many missions may be grouped into three major mission areas: law enforcement, national security, and domestic marine safety.

- **Law Enforcement.** As a statutory law enforcement agency, the Coast Guard has four principle missions:
 - *Interdiction of Contraband* is the major law enforcement mission and was the reason for the original formation of the predecessor agencies to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard works with the Customs Service and other agencies to intercept, search, and seize contraband to prevent its entry in the United States or to assure that proper duties are paid. The largest program in this mission area is drug interdiction.
 - *Interdiction of Alien Migrants* is designed to prevent illegal entry into the United States by ship or boat. In recent years, this mission has involved operations to intercept and turn back or detain Cubans and Haitians trying to travel by sea to the United States. The Coast Guard also patrols the Pacific Coast to intercept illegal immigrants from Asia.
 - *Enforcement of Maritime Safety Regulations* is designed to assure that ships are equipped and operated in accordance with United States law. Coast Guard personnel inspect ships and cite offenders for safety violations.
 - *Protection of Living Marine Resources* is the new term for the traditional mission of fisheries protection and is designed to secure marine life habitats and enforce adherence to relevant international treaties and domestic laws and regulations.
- **National Security.** The Coast Guard's national security mission is to augment the United States Navy with its armed vessels and aircraft and with certain special capabilities, such as port security. The Coast Guard is a statutory Armed Force, and in time of a National Emergency or War, the President may transfer the Coast Guard to the Department of the Navy, as was done during World Wars I and II. Although the Coast Guard was not transferred to the Department of the Navy during the Korean War, Vietnam War, Persian Gulf War, or lesser military operations of the 1980s, Coast Guard ships, aircraft, and personnel did augment the Navy in these operations and stand ready to do so again in future conflicts.
- **Domestic Marine Safety.** The Coast Guard is responsible for several non-law enforcement domestic responsibilities, including marine safety, boating safety, aids to navigation, waterways management, polar and domestic icebreaking, and search and rescue.

In its early years, the Coast Guard accomplished all of these missions with its active duty forces. During World War II, it resorted to the expedient of using reserve volunteers to perform some of the work.

III. THE GENESIS OF THE COAST GUARD RESERVE

The Coast Guard Reserve was formed as a consequence of mobilization for World War II, and the seeds of future integration were sown by the demobilization after World War II.

A. THE COAST GUARD AUXILIARY

True to the tradition of the maritime services, the Coast Guard had relied on volunteers—fishermen, merchant sailors, and yachtsmen—for augmentation during periods of high activities. The first formal recognition of the need for augmentation was the formation of the Coast Guard Auxiliary.¹ The Coast Guard Reserve and Auxiliary Act was passed on June 23, 1939, it provided for an organization of civilian yacht and motorboat owners for the advancement of marine safety.

The Coast Guard Auxiliary consists of yachtsmen and boat owners who volunteer to promote boating safety. They contribute their time and their vessels to conduct safety inspections, teach boating safety classes, and perform search and rescue.

The formation of the Coast Guard Auxiliary was in response to the great increase in recreational boating in the 1930s, both on the coasts and on the inland waterways—including man-made lakes resulting from the construction of large dams during that era. The Coast Guard had the job but lacked the resources, so it turned to experienced private boat owners. On June 30, 1940, the Coast Guard Auxiliary had 2,600 boaters and 2,300 boats, organized into flotillas under Coast Guard District headquarters [2, p. 160–191]. By June 1942, the Coast Guard Auxiliary had 11,200 members with 9,500 boats organized into 44 flotillas.

As the war tempo increased and port security responsibilities grew, it became evident that the civilian status of the Auxiliary would prevent the most effective wartime use of its personnel. Not only did the Auxiliarists

¹ In this paper, we use the names of the various components as they are today. The Coast Guard Auxiliary was originally the Coast Guard Reserve. What is now the Coast Guard Reserve started out in 1941 as the Temporary Reserve, and the Regular Reserve consisted of military personnel on active duty who held reserve commissions or were enlisted in the reserve—what we would now consider, along with regulars, to be the Active Component.

lack military authority, but going out on antisubmarine patrol subjected them, if captured, to being executed as spies. Besides, in some flotillas the yachting spirit still predominated. The need for militarization was very apparent, and accordingly the majority of Auxiliarists were later enrolled in the Coast Guard Temporary Reserve [1, p. 20].

After World War II, the Coast Guard Auxiliary continued as a separate, volunteer organization engaged in helping the Coast Guard on boat safety. Today, the Coast Guard Auxiliary has over 34,000 personnel who conduct safety patrols, perform courtesy examinations of recreational boats, provide education on recreational boating safety and marine environmental issues, and provide search and rescue services with their own boats. Coast Guard auxiliarists each day save an average of one to two lives of recreational boaters who get into trouble somewhere in United States waters [3]. These volunteers are still performing a vital service to the nation.

B. THE REGULAR RESERVE

The Regular Reserve was formed to facilitate the massive expansion of the Coast Guard to meet the demands of World War II.² In September 1939, the Coast Guard consisted of 11,384 military personnel and 5,638 civilians, 332 vessels and 50 aircraft organized into 818 field units. By August 1941, the Coast Guard had 19,026 military personnel—613 officers, 764 warrant officers, 17,450 enlisted personnel, and 199 cadets [2, p. 195]. In June 1944, the Coast Guard had, at its peak wartime strength, about 175,000 military personnel—regulars and regular reservists—on active duty, augmented by over 51,000 temporary reservists [1, p. 8–9]. Almost all of the additional 150,000 active duty military personnel were regular reservists. The regulars and regular reservists manned 406 ships at peak levels of activity with over 80,000 personnel.

On February 19, 1941, a new law was passed that converted the original Coast Guard Reserve into the Coast Guard Auxiliary and created a new Coast Guard Reserve modeled after the Naval Reserve. In December 1941, the Coast Guard Reserve had 245 officers and 1,366 enlisted personnel, consisting of both regular and temporary members.

Mindful of the personnel problems experienced after World War I when the Coast Guard reverted to a much smaller strength, Coast Guard expansion was accomplished

² A national emergency was declared by President Roosevelt on September 8, 1939, and additional measures were approved on June 27, 1940. On May 27, 1941, an Unlimited National Emergency was declared. Coast Guard operations in Hawaii were transferred to the Secretary of the Navy by an Executive Order dated August 16, 1941. On November 1, 1941, Executive Order 8929 transferred the entire Coast Guard to the Department of the Navy, where it stayed until January 1, 1946.

mostly by adding reservists who had no tenure and could be released quickly at the end of the war. After regular enlisted personnel strength grew to about 30,000 by the end of 1941, regular enlistments were suspended on February 1, 1942, until August 7, 1945, so that the Coast Guard would not have to deal with a large number of personnel with unexpired 3-year enlistments at the end of the war. Thereafter all volunteers or draftees were accepted into the regular reserve on short-term enlistments. Similarly, most of the increase in officers and warrant officers was accomplished by granting commissions or warrants in the regular reserve [2, pp. 195-196]. Except for graduates of the Coast Guard Academy, new commissioned officers were given reserve commissions.

The Women's Reserve (SPARS) was formed in November 1942. On June 3, 1944, the SPARs had 770 officers and 7,600 enlisted personnel. Like their male counterparts, these Coast Guard women served to expand the active Coast Guard to meet wartime demands.

The Regular Reserve did not exist before the war and was in reality an expedient method for increasing the strength of the active duty Coast Guard. It never was, nor was it intended to be, a real Reserve Component as existed in the other Armed Forces. There was no command structure, no administrative system, and no way to train members on a continuing basis. As will be seen, this lack of a pre-war Reserve Component affected how the Coast Guard Reserve was organized after the war.

C. THE TEMPORARY RESERVE

The real Reserve Component of the Coast Guard in World War II was the Temporary Reserve, but, unlike the other Armed Forces, the Coast Guard did not call up its reservists but used them instead to perform operational missions on a voluntary, unpaid, part-time basis.

Early in the build up for World War II, the Coast Guard found itself short of personnel to provide port security and ships' crews while continuing to perform peacetime civil functions. A solution was provided by the modifications to the Auxiliary and Reserve Act enacted in June 1942. In this act, the original Coast Guard Reserve was renamed the Coast Guard Auxiliary, and two new classes of reservists were established. The Regular Reserve was created to accommodate the officers and enlisted personnel serving on active duty with the regular Coast Guard to perform the expanded wartime role. The Temporary Reserve was created to provide additional personnel who volunteered to serve either full or part time, mostly without pay.

Commander Malcolm F. Willoughby, the premier historian of the Coast Guard in World War II, describes the rationale for the Temporary Reserve as follows:

The primary purpose underlying the entire temporary reserve activity was the release of regulars and regular reservists for duty at sea and in combat areas. Yet, this demand could not be met at the expense of the security of our ports, through which vast amounts of war materials, equipment, munitions, and men were pouring to the battle areas. There could be no stoppage through fire, sabotage, or neglect along our waterfronts. Therefore, the port security program was immensely important, and it became one of the Coast Guard's major wartime efforts. It related not only to shore patrol and harbor patrol protection for the waterfront facilities so vital to shipments overseas, but to every phase of the safety of vessels in port. For proper prosecution, it initially required large numbers of regulars and regular reserve personnel. Gradually this work was taken over by the great majority of the 50,000 temporary reservists [1, p. 9].

The Temporary Reserve performed a variety of tasks in World War II. The Coast Guard Police provided security for shipyards and war plants. The Coastal Picket Fleet was composed of boats and crews (many from the Auxiliary) who served for specific tours of active duty—usually 3 to 5 months—to patrol coastal areas often on their own boats. The Temporary Reserve also included harbor pilots, civil service employees working on Coast Guard missions, and Merchant Marine Inspectors. The Volunteer Port Security Force was a major organization staffed to a great extent by volunteer reservists to secure moored vessels and port facilities against sabotage and natural disaster. The major focus of the Temporary Reserve during World War II was port security, and this became the major focus of the Coast Guard Reserve after World War II.

The wartime Temporary Reserve was a unique organization unlike those in the other Armed Forces, whose reservists and guardsmen had been incorporated entirely into their regular establishments at the start of the mobilization. Temporary reservists could serve full or part time with or without pay. Although most of the personnel serving in the Temporary Reserve did so without pay, some of them—pilots, civil servants, and marine inspectors—were paid by their regular employers or the Coast Guard. While on active duty, the temporary reservists had all of the authority, rights, and responsibilities of full military status [2, p. 200]. Many of the temporary reservists had been members of the Coast Guard Auxiliary; others who were ineligible for full-time military service and often had boating experience also joined [1, pp. 8–9]. In June 1944, there were 51,173 temporary reservists, of whom 44,307 were serving part time without pay. An estimated

8,250 full-time Coast Guard personnel were made available for duty elsewhere by the temporary reservists [1, p. 9].

As the post-war demobilization got underway, because of its World War II experience with the Temporary Reserve, the Coast Guard alone among the Armed Forces had some experience with volunteers serving part time to perform a broad range of missions.

D. POST-WAR DEMOBILIZATION AND ORGANIZATION

For two decades, from 1950 to 1970, the Coast Guard Reserve was wearing Coast Guard uniforms but was drilling to a different drummer than the active Coast Guard [4, Introduction].

At the end of World War II, the Coast Guard had to reduce to its authorized peacetime strength of 3,500 officers, 1,400 warrant officers, and 30,000 enlisted personnel [2, p. 258]. This meant that well over 100,000 personnel would have to be released from active duty. Many of these personnel, however, wanted to be retained in the Coast Guard Reserve, and the Coast Guard saw that it would need to have additional personnel available for future wartime expansion [2, p. 260-261].

The Coast Guard found itself in 1945 with 100,000 Ready Reservists but no training organization. In the late 1940s the pool of Ready Reservists began to decrease dramatically as wartime enlistment contracts expired, but there was no way to induce veterans to reenlist or to recruit and train new reservists [4, Appendix D].

In 1950, the Coast Guard requested and Congress appropriated some funds for reserve training, and the Coast Guard established training policies and a reserve structure. Reserve units were formed without any consideration of aligning them with active Coast Guard activities. The initial approach was to form Organized Reserve Training Units (ORTUs) in population centers where there were large numbers of reservists and good recruiting potential. ORTUs were formed in Wheeling, Phoenix, Denver, Spokane, Syracuse, and Bakersfield. These particular units were disconnected from the Coast Guard's centers of activity and became isolated. Other units were located closer to active Coast Guard facilities. The Coast Guard Reserve initially was organized and located without much thought to its long-term role as part of the Coast Guard [4, Appendix D].

During the war, most of the regular reservists were used to provide crews for Coast Guard boats and larger vessels. Most of the temporary reservists were used for port

security. After the war, the two missions of the Coast Guard Reserve were ship augmentation and port security—both related to the national security mission of the Coast Guard to augment the Navy in time of war. The ORTUs were designated as either vessel augmentation units or port security training units [4, Appendix D].

In the 1960s, some steps were taken to improve the training and effectiveness of the Coast Guard Reserve. Port security training units were assembled notionally into Organized Reserve Port Security Units to provide self-contained deployable units. However, these existed mostly on paper and seldom trained together with all of their elements [4, Appendix D].

During this era, the Coast Guard Reserve structure was separate but not equal. The focus was on the traditional reserve missions of port security and boat crew augmentation inherited from World War II. Those missions were of little interest to an active Coast Guard trying to cope with peacetime duties. The reserve structure was not aligned with the active structure. Reserve units trained wherever they could get the space—National Guard Armories, Naval Reserve training centers, Army Reserve Centers, and other government facilities. They trained almost entirely in the classroom, and training was conducted in such a way as to isolate the reservists from their active counterparts.

E. THE CRISIS: USE THE RESERVE OR LOSE IT

Both members and outside observers (including Congress) noticed the Coast Guard Reserve's isolation from the active Coast Guard, its complete orientation toward augmenting the Navy in time of war, and its lack of involvement in the day-to-day civil missions of the Coast Guard. In 1969, the House Appropriations Committee responded to the situation with the following warning to the Coast Guard:

A peacetime mission must be found for the Coast Guard Reserve. Presently its only peacetime mission is training for its wartime role. Training and missions in the civilian or peacetime activities of the Coast Guard would provide tangible benefits to the taxpayers for their investment in the Coast Guard Reserve and improve the motivation and career enhancement of the individual reservists.³

³ Cited in Reference [5], the work of a study group headed by Rear Admiral Bennett S. Sparks, USCGR, and composed of a mix of active and reserve officers.

The warning went unheeded, and in 1972 the House Appropriations Committee found it necessary to issue an ultimatum to the Coast Guard: either use the Coast Guard Reserve or lose it. The exact wording was as follows:

The [President's] Budget proposes to phase out the Coast Guard Selected Reserve training program by June 30, 1972. The proposal contemplates that after that date the support needed to meet any requirements currently the responsibility of the Selected Reserve will be funded as an element of the Navy Reserve appropriation [5, p. 2-3].

The threat of losing the Coast Guard Reserve surprised the leadership, and generated some long-overdue action. Losing the Coast Guard Reserve might not be so bad, but losing it to the Navy was unthinkable. It took a concerted effort by the Coast Guard, the Department of the Treasury, and outside groups, such as the Reserve Officers Association, to obtain a stay of execution so that the Coast Guard could devise a response that would satisfy the Congress and diminish the criticism of the reserve training program. It was a close call that could have gone either way [5, p. 2-3]. The congressional threat in 1972 set into motion the events that led ultimately in 1996 to the integration of the two components of the Coast Guard into a single unified team.

IV. CREATING AN INTEGRATED TEAM COAST GUARD

Team Coast Guard did not happen overnight. Although to outsiders it may appear to have emerged full-blown in 1996, in reality it was the result—perhaps the inevitable result—of a series of events that started in the 1970s and moved, slowly at first but gradually gathering speed, through the stages of augmentation, alignment, consolidation, and finally integration.

A. AUGMENTATION

The Coast Guard's response to congressional wrath exhibited in the early 1970s was to expand the Coast Guard Reserve mission to include augmenting active units. Over the next 20 years, the Coast Guard slowly and fitfully started using its reservists to perform day-to-day civil missions. However, augmentation was left largely up to the initiative and discretion of local active and reserve commanders and was worked locally to solve specific problems. The main focus of the reserve hierarchy continued to be on preparing for the big war.

One reason why augmentation progressed slowly was continued stress on the Coast Guard's role in augmenting the Navy in the event of a global war with the Soviet Union and its allies. In 1987, the Coast Guard's Wartime Personnel Allowance List (WPAL) added up to 65,500 personnel that the Coast Guard needed to meet its global war missions. The Coast Guard intended to meet the WPAL goals with 38,500 active-duty personnel, 5,000 retirees, 10,000 Individual Ready Reservists, and 12,500 Selected Reservists. Concern that the number of Selected Reservists was too low led to plans to increase the Selected Reserve incrementally to reach an ultimate strength of 18,750. At an authorized strength of 12,500, 80 percent of the Selected Reservists would be dedicated to port security and the other 20 percent to ship augmentation. The WPAL set the tone for the Coast Guard Reserve, providing the basis for organizing units and establishing the skills to be recruited and the training to be performed [6]. If these global war missions were to be met, there was little time left for reservists to perform peacetime augmentation.

The SPARCS Study (1989), named for the study director, Rear Admiral Bennett S. Sparks, USCGR, marked the culmination of the augmentation era. The SPARCS Study

was tasked to "identify and evaluate future national security missions" for the Coast Guard Reserve. The tasking limited the ability of the group to deal with the real issue of whether the Coast Guard Reserve should be trained for war or for civil functions in peacetime. SPARCS wanted to use the reservists for the full spectrum of Coast Guard operations but felt constrained by custom and law to abide by the legal role of the Coast Guard Reserve, which was (and is) "to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in time of war or national emergency and at such times as the national security requires" [7].

The SPARCS study pointed out that while there were many instances of the use of reservists to augment the active Coast Guard, these were local in origin and had no overall logic or consistent application across the entire Coast Guard [5]. Reservists were augmenting crisis action centers and operations, providing liaison to other government agencies, supporting NASA space operations, operating search and rescue stations for the boating season, providing boarding teams for maritime safety offices, supervising loading of explosives, relieving active cutters with reserve boats, and running operations centers, maritime safety offices, and stations on weekends—including watchstanding and boat crews. SPARCS suggested that additional civil missions for reserve augmentation could include aids to navigation, maritime law enforcement, security of offshore assets (oil platforms), icebreaking, and emergency response. Since these suggestions were not obviously related to national defense, SPARCS also proposed that the Coast Guard Reserve assume a larger role in port security, coastal defense, mine countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare, providing crews for Navy landing craft and amphibious ships, training boat crews for other Armed Forces or allies, and performing military liaison.

Unwilling (or unable) to choose between civil and military functions, the SPARCS study simply combined the two by expanding the definition of national security to include whatever the Coast Guard did in peacetime. According to SPARCS:

Everything the Coast Guard does contributes to national security, including aids to navigation, environmental protection, marine pollution response, waterfront facilities inspection, law enforcement. In a time of national mobilization there will be a need for significantly greater support capability than currently exists. Reserve augmentation in Coast Guard civil mission areas contributes both to peacetime Service capability and mobilization readiness [5, p. i].

The key finding of the SPARCS study is found in the study's definition of augmentation for training:

Any activity performed by reservists in an inactive or active duty status that supports Coast Guard active forces in performance of their regular missions. It is intended to train them for their mobilization assignment.

This definition is valid only if mobilization assignments of reservists are to perform peacetime missions. On-the-job or formal training for peacetime missions does not necessarily provide proper training for wartime missions, such as manning landing craft, providing port security, or engaging in antisubmarine warfare.

The SPARCS study missed the point that the peacetime role of the Coast Guard was becoming its wartime role. During World War I, the Coast Guard had been used by the Navy as a source of trained seamen to do Navy work. In World War II the Navy used the Coast Guard's specialized capabilities to support military operations. In military operations after World War II, the Coast Guard continued its civil operations and provided some of its specialized capabilities in support of military operations. In the Persian Gulf War some Coast Guard Reserve port security units were deployed and used for their intended mobilization missions. With a few exceptions; however, the Coast Guard no longer has a separate, distinct wartime mission.

However, by asserting that everything the Coast Guard did was for national security, SPARCS set the stage for the next step in the evolution to integration. Before SPARCS the premise was that the Coast Guard Reserve could do either mobilization or augmentation. SPARCS suggested that the Coast Guard Reserve could do both, simply by asserting that augmentation was *for* mobilization. As the peacetime mission became the wartime mission, this premise came true, and the synthesis of these two choices turned out to be integration, which was achieved slowly, in three overlapping but more or less distinct stages. The first stage was to align the active and reserve units into separate but parallel structures. The second stage was to consolidate supporting administrative systems. The third and final stage was to place all Coast Guard personnel into a single organizational structure.

B. ALIGNMENT

The next stage of development was a gradual modification of both active and reserve organizational arrangements to achieve separate but parallel structures in which reserve units were co-located with and under the operational control of the active units

they augmented. This is the same alignment process that the Coast Guard had used earlier to integrate the Lifesaving Service and the Lighthouse Service. Alignment was given credibility and momentum by a series of studies that paved the way for progress toward integration.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 brought good news and bad news for the Coast Guard. The good news was that the requirement to maintain a capability to provide 65,500 trained personnel to support the Navy in a global war with the Soviet Union went away. The bad news was that while Coast Guard personnel authorizations and budgets were reduced because of the end of the Cold War, peacetime workload did not diminish. For the Coast Guard Reserve, the news was even worse. Although the strength of the other Reserve Components had been increased about 28 percent from 1982 to 1985 during President Reagan's defense buildup, Coast Guard Reserve strength had increased only 7 percent. Nonetheless, the Coast Guard Reserve was expected to share in the general reduction of reserve strengths. So, just when the Coast Guard Reserve could concentrate on augmenting the active Coast Guard for peacetime missions, its capability to do so was diminished.

During the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 the Coast Guard Reserve demonstrated that it could not only provide units for military missions but also provide substantial augmentation to the active Coast Guard. About 1,600 Coast Guard Reservists were mobilized to support the Persian Gulf War, providing security at domestic and overseas ports. Three port security units with about 600 reservists secured the ports of Dammam and Al Jubayl in Saudi Arabia and ports in Bahrain. About a thousand reservists secured ports in the United States. In addition, almost 3,000 reservists participated in military exercises in 1991. That same year, reservists contributed over 375,000 man-days of augmentation support for the active Coast Guard, including 35,000 man-days to support clean up of the *Exxon Valdez* oil spill in Alaska [8]. The active Coast Guard wanted more reservists but, faced with declining budgets and strength reductions, was unable to obtain them.

Table IV-1 shows the Coast Guard active and selected reserve authorized strengths and total and reserve program budgets from 1981 to 1996. During that period the Individual Ready Reserve stayed at about 5,000 until 1990, when it increased to just over 9,000 in 1994 and then went down to about 7,500.

The necessity to adapt to significant strength and funding cuts while maintaining a high operating tempo was the basic reason for moving past augmentation to integration.

After a long period of relative stability in strength and funding during the final decade of the Cold War, the Coast Guard faced lower strengths and budgets starting in 1992. The Coast Guard considered its options and adopted a strategy of making more and better use of its part-time personnel in the Coast Guard Reserve for ordinary requirements, while retaining them as potential full-time personnel to meet extraordinary requirements.

Table IV-1. Coast Guard Budgets and Strength

| Fiscal Year | Authorized End FY Strength | | Appropriated Funds (\$ millions) |
|----------------|-------------------------------|---------|--|
| | Active | Reserve | Total Reserve |
| 1981 | 39,666 | 11,700 | 49.5 |
| 1982 | 38,095 | 12,000 | 50.9 |
| 1983 | 38,577 | 12,000 | 50.1 |
| 1984 | 38,773 | 12,500 | 54.8 |
| 1985 | 38,216 | 12,500 | 58.8 |
| 1986 | 35,638 | 12,500 | 68.9 |
| 1987 | 36,408 | 12,500 | 64.4 |
| 1988 | 38,058 | 12,850 | 62.9 |
| 1989 | 38,080 | 14,000 | 67.0 |
| 1990 | 38,180 | 13,000 | 71.6 |
| 1991 | 38,788 | 15,000 | 74.3 |
| 1992 | 39,050 | 12,700 | 75.0 |
| 1993 | 39,297 | 15,150 | 73.0 |
| 1994 | 38,563 | 10,000 | 64.0 |
| 1995 | 37,741 | 8,000 | 65.0 |
| 1996 | 36,989 | 8,000 | 62.0 |

Source: Reference [3].

In 1992, the Department of Transportation made a serious effort to cut the funding and strength of the Coast Guard and Coast Guard Reserve in the FY 1993 Budget. From 1993 to 1996, the Coast Guard's active-duty-strength appropriation was reduced from 39,297 to 36,989. Additional downward pressure was anticipated. The Coast Guard Selected Reserve, which had a funded strength for the end of FY 1987 of 13,700, was programmed to go down to a strength of only 7,000 at the end FY 1995. The crunch came in the FY 1993 budget, when Congress authorized the Coast Guard Reserve a strength of 15,150 personnel, but the Department of Transportation funded only 10,500 spaces [9]. Although the thrust to cut the Coast Guard Reserve came from Department of Transportation officials, the active Coast Guard leadership, perhaps in an attempt to save

what it could of its active funding, may have been sympathetic to and supportive of this drastic reserve cut.

The 1992 threat to the Coast Guard Reserve evoked a reaction from reservists and reserve associations. The Reserve Officers Association, which had helped save the Coast Guard Reserve 20 years earlier, prepared a White Paper and spearheaded a campaign to achieve a higher strength [10 and 11]. The ROA paper stressed the value to the national security of the Coast Guard Reserve and pointed out that the cuts were made without an assessment of the requirement for Coast Guard Reservists in the post-Cold War era. The upshot was that Congress held Coast Guard Reserve strength at 8,000—a number which satisfied no one but at least provided some stability for future planning.

Although strengths and budgets were cut, workload did not go down and in fact was going up as the drug war intensified, illegal immigration increased, and the Federal role in environmental and natural disasters grew. The Coast Guard had to find out how to do more with less. Active commanders and office chiefs who had not been inspired to pay much attention to the reserve before, suddenly discovered that the reserve could be a source of additional effort to perform operational missions. Several studies were initiated by local commanders or functional program managers to find a way to gain greater access to reservists and use them more.

1. The Pacific Area Reserve Conference

In 1992, the Pacific Area Reserve Conference recommended that reservists be integrated into active-duty units, that they be removed from the bulk of “monthly administrative burden, that reserve training be the responsibility of active commands, that active commanders schedule and assign reservists to duties, and that reserve commanders be rated by the active commanders of the units being augmented. The study also provided, however, that reserve units retain their identity. This study was the initiative of Vice Admiral Bruce Beran, Commander of the Pacific Area, and it was meant to apply only to the units in theater area, who were “requested” to implement the recommendations on in “designated pilot units” [4, Appendix B-2].

2. The Coast Guard Reserve Policy Board

During 1992 the Coast Guard Reserve Policy Board (RPB) addressed the matter of integration. The report containing the RPB’s recommendations and the Commandant’s

actions was published on April 18, 1993.¹ The RPB for this important report consisted of Rear Admiral F. S. Golove, USCGR, one active and nine reserve officers (including five Reserve Program Administrators), and two Master Chief Petty Officers, one active and one reserve.

The RPB wanted to expand the scope of augmentation to mean "any activity that supports development and employment of reserve officers and enlisted personnel for meeting requirements across the full spectrum of Coast Guard missions" [12]. The RPB concluded that augmentation would enable the "entire" Coast Guard to respond to surge needs, such as humanitarian missions, oil spills, chemical releases, earthquakes, hurricanes, and other disasters, as well as a military threat. The public and the maritime industry would be provided the level of service they require, while the Coast Guard would be paying only for the level of service actually provided. The Louisville Vessel Management Reporting System was cited as an example of an activity that is operational only during periods of high water, and for which the after-hours staffing could be provided by reservists who are paid only when activated.

The RPB also said that an intermixed, fully challenged, work force would have vastly improved morale, much greater diversity, and an increased capability to meet rising public expectations. Through the application of new training technology, this "new" work force could readily be provided just-in-time training, which focuses on current assignments. Rising training costs might well be leveled as talent developed by the private sector in our reservists and auxiliarists was applied to Coast Guard missions. The RPB found that:

The full-time Component would enjoy a more humane working environment marked by objectives which could be attained within a "normal" work week. Part-time and volunteer Components would enjoy a much higher sense of job satisfaction and experience true job enrichment [12].

The RPB recommended revising the Coast Guard's Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System (PPBES) to require program and support directors to show how alternative personnel and technological mixes could be employed to balance effectiveness and cost. The RPB said that Resource Change Proposals should be required to address employment of the total mix of resources available to program and support directors as an integral part of alternative solutions. Although the Commandant of the

¹ Reference [12] provides an annual report of these actions.

Coast Guard approved this recommendation of the RPB, the PPB process has not been changed to require consideration of alternative force mixes.

According to the RPB, Coast Guard personnel should be provided the opportunity to move back and forth between active and inactive reserve status depending on their personal situations and the needs of the service. For example, the parental leave sabbatical program would fit well into this paradigm if active-duty personnel were offered the opportunity to move to inactive status and assumed reserve affiliation and participation rather than separating from the Service. An inactive force consisting of personnel with extensive active-duty experience would offer a much more qualified surge force in the event of emergency recall. The active Coast Guard would benefit from the varied experiences of officer and enlisted personnel gained through their civilian occupations.

The RPB also addressed the matter of work force diversity. They found that Coast Guard Reservists are typically middle-aged, white male, public sector employees that do not reflect the society they serve and are unlikely to understand its broad range of needs and expectations. The Coast Guard and Coast Guard Reserve were found to have been much more successful at attracting minorities than retaining them. Because most Coast Guard Reservists would mobilize to support the port safety and security missions, a significant minority of the members are recruited from local police and fire departments. Enlistment of mostly personnel with prior service or with civilian skills makes it hard to increase diversity. It also increases the age and cost of reserve personnel. The RPB noted that warfare is a young persons' business and that pre-deployment training of port security personnel for the Persian Gulf War showed a direct correlation between age and failure to pass the course. The RPB suggested recruiting young people directly into the reserve. In reality, the RPB pointed out, the Coast Guard Reserve has little equipment of its own and is a staffing pool for the Active Component. About 85 percent of the \$75 million annual appropriation for reserve training is spent on direct personnel costs.

3. The Natural Working Group Studies

In 1993, two natural working groups² addressed expanded reserve augmentation by reservists for the Office of Marine Safety and the Office of Navigation Safety and Waterways Services, respectively. These missions are marginal to national security, and

² A "natural" working group is formed by members of staff offices that relate naturally in the normal course of business to the subject matter under study.

the motive for each was presumably how to get those offices' undiminished workload done with diminishing active strengths and budget.

The Natural Working Group on Reserve Support of Marine Safety Missions identified and quantified surge requirements for this program area that could be met by trained and qualified reservists. The final report, submitted in January 1994, had 28 recommendations. The Marine safety units wanted to use reservists but were frustrated by lack of control over them, claiming that "reserve administration duties prevent many reservists from training on surge/contingency billet skills," and that "there seems to be a misalignment between augmentation and mobilization billet requirements." The Natural Working Group favored one chain of command, with reserve units subordinate to active units they were augmenting. Other recommendations were to establish a reserve career field for marine safety, stabilizing reservist's tours of duty in the field, and providing training and support for reservists so assigned. Although this study addressed only one, relatively narrow function, it had significant influence on the outcome [4, Appendix B-2].

The Natural Working Group on Navigation Safety and Waterway Services examined and made recommendations for improvement of reserve support for the missions and units engaged in this program. As did the other working group, this group found that active units "have little or no ownership of co-located Reserve units." Reserve support was found to be sporadic and unduly dependent on the personalities of the active and reserve personnel involved. Location of reserve units has been based on availability of reservists and not on the best and fastest way to augment active units. Administration of reserve units and personnel conflicts with mission performance. This working group recommended that the reserve resources needed for augmentation be identified, that active units have "ownership of reservists and co-located reserve units," and the reserve be aligned with the Coast Guard. The ownership recommendation meant that the augmenting reserve units should be under the operational control of the active units they are augmenting [4, Appendix B-3].

4. Reserve Field Organization Quality Action Team

In 1993, the Chief of Staff of the Coast Guard chartered the Reserve Field Organization (RFO) Quality Action Team (QAT) "to recommend a service-wide standard organizational structure and support system for the Coast Guard Reserve." Rear Admiral Rudy Peschel, then Ninth Coast Guard District Commander, headed the team. Because "diversity of geography, demographics, and tasking among the districts made it difficult to define an absolute standard organization," the QAT focused on developing a standard

organizational philosophy that could be applied flexibly and locally [4, Appendix B-4]. The RFO-QAT defined the desirable state for the reserve field organization and recommended that:

- most reserve units be co-located with active units, except for a few reserve units with specific missions in support of major commands;
- active units be responsible for training and employment of reservists in co-located units;
- active commanders have operational control of reserve personnel and units;
- a reserve administrative system be developed that provides sufficient support with minimum loss of training and operational time; and
- a dedicated oversight infrastructure be maintained to ensure protection of reservists and continued viability of the reserve program.

The RFO-QAT study repeated the findings of the other working groups, but added a new finding that some consideration had to be given to assuring fair treatment for reservists who were in effect joining active units and to attracting and maintaining qualified reservists under the new conditions.


5. The Reserve Organization Study

The Reserve Organization Study (ROS) was the culminating study effort of the alignment phase. The study, which was published in April 1994, focused on the field organization of the Coast Guard. At that time, the Coast Guard was organized into 2 major area commands, 2 maintenance and logistics commands, and 10 district offices, each commanding numerous smaller units. The Coast Guard Reserve was organized into 311 units under 51 groups. The reserve field organization linked into the Coast Guard field organization at the district level [13].

The ROS presented five general options for the field organization of the Coast Guard.


Option 1. Figure IV-1 illustrates this option, the traditional organization in which reserve units are subordinate to reserve groups and do their own administration. Reserve units report to reserve groups, which in turn report to the Chiefs of the Readiness and Reserve Divisions of the districts. Coordination between Active and Reserve Components depends on the personalities involved. There is a strong reserve identity. Most reserve middle grade and senior officers are used exclusively in reserve administration.

Option 2. In this organization, shown in Figure IV-2, active units have operational control, and reserve units have administrative control. Reserve units and group staffs provide



Source: Reference [13].

Figure IV-1. Field Organization of the Coast Guard: Option 1



Source: Reference [13].

Figure IV-2. Field Organization of the Coast Guard: Option 2

administrative support, but day-to-day assignment of work comes from active-duty supervisors and commanders. Some Active Component commands evolved into this pattern before the study, and close working relationships developed as reserve commanders began to appreciate that their main responsibility was to support their active-duty counterparts.

Option 3. Figure IV-3 shows the organization option in which active units have operational control of reserve units, and administration is performed by Regional Management Support Activities (RMSAs) or District Readiness and Reserve Divisions, instead of the reserve units. This option was developed in one district before the study.





Figure IV-3. Field Organization of the Coast Guard: Option 3

Option 4. In this organizational option, shown in Figure IV-4, active units have both operational and administrative control, and active and reserve administration is integrated. Active unit commanders are dual-hatted as commanders of both the active and the associated reserve units. This option was tested on a limited scale in one district.


Option 5. The organization in Figure IV-5 shows active units having both operational control and administrative control, and—except for a few all-reserve deployable units—there are no reserve units. A separately managed reserve program

disappears at and below the group level, and reservists are assigned against the same personnel allowance list as active-duty personnel and civilian employees.



Source: Reference [13].

Figure IV-4. Field Organization of the Coast Guard: Option 4



Source: Reference [13].

Figure IV-5. Field Organization of the Coast Guard: Option 5

The commanders of the Coast Guard Districts were asked to provide their views on the Reserve Organization Study, and eight of the nine districts submitted comments [14 through 22]. The responses fell into one of three groups. Three districts opposed reorganization and favored Option 1, with a separate, distinct reserve identity and separate reserve administration, albeit with some centralization. Two districts favored Option 3 (or a blend of Options 3 and 4), separate identity, and centralized but separate reserve administration. Three districts favored Option 5, with provisions for retention of reserve identity (for budgeting), and using the same system for active and reserve administration. There was even less unanimity in the details.

Status Quo. Some of the views of the commands favoring the status quo (Option 1) were as follows:

- The main reason for having a Coast Guard reserve is to meet surge requirements, not peacetime augmentation. However, peacetime augmentation is the best way to provide training to perform Coast Guard missions. Using the reserve for augmentation could lead to more cuts in both active strength (because of reserve availability) and reserve strength (because of lack of credit for peacetime augmentation).
- Reorganization is not needed to pursue close involvement of reservists with active-duty commands. Augmentation support agreements to maximize training and employment value are sufficient solutions and generally improve reserve performance and morale. A new process is needed; overlaying a new organization on top of an old process is like "pouring soured wine into new bottles."
- Alignment and integration of the reserve with the active component should be done keeping a identifiable Reserve Component. There will be no clearly defined mission for the reserve program without personnel to manage, without authorized organizations, and without mobilization orders. The reserve structure should mirror the active structure but continue to exist. Whatever organization is recommended, reserve officers must continue to have the opportunity to command a unit.
- AC units should not be burdened with Reserve Component administration and training. Centralized personnel administration (e.g., Reserve Management Support Activities) can minimize reserve unit administrative responsibilities and workload. Active units have inadequate resources to perform their own administration and cannot accept additional workload. Training is not a function of active units, particularly training of reservists.

Middle-of-the-Road. Some of the views of the commands favoring a middle-of-the road approach (Options 2 and 3) were as follows:

- Active and reserve commanders found some aspects of the first four reorganization options applicable to their own situations. There was absolute unanimity, however, from active and reserve commands alike, that Option 5 with the merging of active and reserve operational facilities was unacceptable.
- The bottom line is having flexibility to design Coast Guard Reserve units that fit local demands. The reserve organization can be viewed as an administrative mechanism to pay and account for reserve personnel at centralized activities with sufficient funding and personnel to do the work. Training time (can be committed to active-duty commands.
- There will be a loss of reserve identity and opportunity for command. However, this may not be bad. Reserve identity creates a climate of separateness and difference rather than of unity and collaboration.
- Although belief in the Total Force concept is alive and well, conversations with active-duty augmented commands also stir up a cultural bias that needs to be recognized before placing more training responsibility on the active-duty commands.
- The Department of Defense Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program (which assigns selected reservists to active units) would be close to Option 5. This approach would work well for relatively isolated active units in localities where there are few reservists to form a separate reserve unit.
- Reservists assigned to deployable, special-purpose reserve units will have a narrow career path, be unavailable for peacetime augmentation, and be expensive.

Radical. Some of the views of the commands favoring the most radical approach (Options 4 and 5) were as follows:

- Options 4 and 5 offer the best promise for streamlining the interaction of the two military components and consolidating command and control under one commander.
- Dual redundant structures are not supportable in a climate of downsizing, restructuring, and redesigning government. The only way to create organizational relationships that will work regardless of potential changes in force composition is by fully integrating reservists into the active command structure, both operationally and administratively. The Coast Guard cannot continue to try to merge two separate organizations to meet crises.
- Active ownership of reserve resources is necessary.

- There should be the “closest possible integration of reservists into active-duty organizations.” Active-duty organizations should include reserve billets. Routine missions should be accomplished with a mixture of active-duty and reserve personnel, and the recall of the part-time work force would provide a surge capability for a crisis. The IMA concept should be expanded.
- Modern technology will permit the creation of a single administrative system for both components.
- Option 5 is the best approach ultimately, but a modified Option 2 with a single reserve unit per district should be used as an interim measure until a unified administrative system can be established.
- Separate reserve identity should be retained for budgeting, planning, and oversight. In addition, there should be an independent advocate for the reservists when problems arise that prevent a full commitment to the Coast Guard, such as meeting demands of civilian employment.

The Reserve Organization Study recommended adoption of Option 3 as an interim measure, and this is the course of action that was approved by the Commandant. Even the people favoring complete integration realized that Option 5 was not yet possible because having separate administrative systems and procedures created barriers that made more integration almost unworkable. The critical task at this point was to set a new direction for the reserve program so that new administrative processes, computer programs, and policies could be established that would permit movement toward complete integration.³

C. CONSOLIDATION

While budget pressures were putting reservists to work with active units, other pressures were forcing the Coast Guard to consolidate its two sets of administrative systems for pay, billets, and personnel information. Before consolidation, there were two separate administrative systems for the active and for the Selected Reserve with different rules, procedures, and technology. Starting in 1982, efforts were started to combine these two systems, and in 1996 the Coast Guard achieved a single administrative system that serves all military members of the Coast Guard—active and reserve.⁴

³ Reference [19] makes this point.

⁴ The section on administrative consolidation is based on the documents cited and on interviews with key personnel in this action (References [23 through 25]). Although civilian personnel management is also the responsibility of the Coast Guard Personnel Command, it is performed by a separate administrative system.

The initial steps toward consolidation of administration began about the same time as the movement to reserve augmentation of active units. Consolidation was not a prerequisite for augmentation, which proceeded despite the existence of two separate administrative systems. In fact, it appears that the movement to augmentation gave active commanders a stake in making best use of reservists, and may have made consolidation easier to accomplish than would have been the case when the reserve had a separate set of missions. It appears, however, that administrative consolidation was necessary to allow the Coast Guard to go beyond augmentation to integration.

The movement to a consolidated administration system was initiated and driven primarily by information resource managers in the information resource office of the Office of Readiness and Reserve for a variety of reasons. Some saw that new technology would make such a consolidation feasible—even easy. Others wanted to eliminate the waste and redundancy inherent in maintaining two distinct administrative systems. Still others reacted to the pressures of declining funds by promoting a single system.

Reservists supported administrative consolidation. Over the years, the Coast Guard Reserve had built a complete command and administrative structure, and much of the time and effort of reservists went into administering themselves. One of the key goals of the consolidation was the desire to relieve reservists of their burdensome administrative duties. If a large reduction of personnel was to be managed without a commensurate reduction in workload, something would have to give. The activity that could give without reducing output was overhead.

Active commanders were not as enthusiastic about assuming the additional workload of administering and training reservists. Active commanders believed that they had too few resources to administer their own personnel properly and that training reservists was something they did not know how to do. As one district commander commented, "How can we worry about reserve administration when we don't have the people we need to keep up with our own paperwork?" [21]

1. Consolidation of Pay

The first of the administrative systems to be consolidated was the pay system. In 1982, the Coast Guard Reserve was issued some 286 computers to be used for pay and personnel management, but these machines were not used much, and most of the work was still done manually in the units. In 1985, the active Coast Guard converted to the Joint Uniformed Military Payroll System (JUMPS), and consolidation of the pay systems

began in earnest. Although the Pay and Personnel Center (PPC) in Topeka, Kansas, had processed all Coast Guard pay, the PPC had separate organizations and systems for active and reserve personnel, and the two systems were incompatible. Reserve pay had serious problems in delays and errors because the input was manual and processed through intermediate points before arriving at PPC. In 1987, the reserve community started advocating the integration of reserve pay into JUMPS. This was done incrementally and it was slow at first, until the experience of the Persian Gulf War gave ample evidence of the inefficiency of separate systems. During that war, the Coast Guard had difficulty bringing reservists to active duty and back to inactive status.

The experience of the Persian Gulf War spurred movement toward consolidation of pay systems. What had been a largely manual operation was converted to an automated operation. Drill pay was done first, in 1992, then annual training pay and active duty for training pay, in January 1993. As a result, all Coast Guard personnel use the same pay system, and reserve pay errors and delays have diminished. Like their active colleagues, reservists are paid twice monthly for the pay they earned by participating in training or operational missions; all reservists get leave and earnings statements; and over 90 percent of them have their pay deposited automatically in their bank accounts. The pay system also computes and reports to reservists the retirement points they have earned and accumulated.

Consolidation of pay was not a major technological problem, but it took a long time to achieve because the reserve personnel system data had to be checked to eliminate errors and fill gaps. Some of the rules in the overall pay system were found to be faulty and had to be corrected to accord with the law. Some participants believe there were also delays due to turf protection and resistance to change on the part of both active and reserve personnel. With strong support from successive commandants and chiefs of staff, these bureaucratic problems were overcome.

2. Consolidation of Billet Files

Once the pay systems were consolidated, it was necessary to deal with the billet files, which establish the appropriated manpower spaces for the Coast Guard. There were three files. The Personnel Allowance List (PAL) established billets for active military and civilian personnel. The Reserve Personnel Allowance List (RPAL) established billets for the Selected Reserve, including full-time support. The Contingency Personnel Allowance List (CPAL) established billets that would be required for a full mobilization, and would be filled by individual ready reservists and retired personnel.

Consolidation was an internal management problem instead of a technical problem. The numbers and types of billets to be authorized for Coast Guard units and headquarters is a compromise between work-related and overhead requirements generated from the bottom up, and strength and funding constraints imposed from the top down. The task of consolidating the PAL, CPAL, and RPAL involved patiently working out differences, primarily among policy makers at Coast Guard Headquarters. The process has taken time, and the work continues. The Coast Guard's Chief of Staff has the responsibility to manage the three personnel requirements lists and, in coordination with the Operations and Human Resources Directorates, to achieve a consolidated Human Resource Requirements List, which is scheduled to be accomplished by the end of 1996.

3. Consolidation of Personnel Management Information Systems

The next step was to integrate the personnel management information systems of the two components. This was the activity that consumed most of the time for reservists in the units, and this was the consolidation that was most important in facilitating integration of the active and reserve components. There were two approaches to this problem. One was technical; the other was organizational.

The essence of personnel management information systems is to collect and record all changes to the status of a military member. These consist of personal data (such as marital status), military data (such as grade), educational status, training accomplishments, skill qualifications, and physical condition. The record of personnel data provides a basis for actions on pay, promotion, education, training, assignment, and separation of individuals. While the database does not constitute personnel management, it provides the necessary information for personnel management. Maintaining an accurate record of the data is a tedious task that requires care and persistence.

The Reserve Personnel Management Information System (RPMIS) had traditionally been maintained separately from the active Personnel Management Information System (PMIS) at the unit level by reservists, using largely manual methods. The two systems were so different that reservist administrative personnel augmenting active units were unable to operate the active systems without considerable additional training. During the Persian Gulf War, there were great problems in moving personnel from RPMIS to PMIS and back. Even during peacetime, a military person leaving active duty and joining the reserve would have to start over as if he or she had never been in the Coast Guard at all [24].

Initial efforts were to improve each system separately. In 1988, the Coast Guard Reserve fielded a Unit Management Information System (UMIS) to enable reserve unit commanders to perform administration at the units, districts, and headquarters. However, UMIS did not work well, and the reserve units were overwhelmed by the job of keeping current the personnel data on their members. At the same time, the active Coast Guard had developed the Source Data Automation System I (SDA-I) software suite for its own use on personal computers, and SDA-I was gradually expanded to take care of some reserve functions, such as pay and retirement points.

The traditional system was for the reserve units to collect pertinent personnel data (changes) and pass it on to one of 53 Personnel Support Reserve Units (PESRUs) for input to the Pay and Personnel Center and a separate mainframe computer that held reserve data. In addition to providing data for RPMIS and JUMPS, reserve units were tasked with many administrative jobs, such as documentation of training, roster preparation, and general administration. The workload was driven basically by the number of personnel and could not be reduced, so the emphasis then was on doing the work more efficiently by using full-time personnel at RMSAs.

RMSA Seattle opened for business as a test on November 30, 1992, and assumed responsibility for all administration done previously by the reserve units [20]. This freed up for other assignments those reservists formerly doing administration. Each reserve unit retained one yeoman to handle any residual administrative work. This move resulted in a 35% increase in personnel available for augmentation of active units for operational work. Customer satisfaction with the new arrangements was over 88 percent after 3 months, and RMSA Seattle was judged a success. It allowed a transition from the cumbersome unit-centered system to a centralized system providing customer-oriented service on a routine basis. Some other RMSAs were established, but the entire idea, which might have survived in a less-demanding fiscal environment, did not last. Although the RMSAs were more efficient than the older system of decentralized reserve administration, they were still operating a reserve system that was separate and different from the active system.

As strengths went down and budgets shrank, the Coast Guard exerted pressure for even more savings from consolidation. The next step was the development and fielding in May 1995 of Source Data Automation II (SDA-II), a new software suite that was designed to handle both active and reserve personnel data. In effect, SDA-I was expanded incrementally to take care of reserve-unique entries, such as drill pay and retirement

points. SDA-II was fielded with 53 PESRUs and served as the basis for complete integration. By the end of 1995, consolidation of administration was a fact.

D. INTEGRATION

Once the barriers to a common administrative system were all but eliminated, it was time to move to the next phase, which was essentially Option 5 from the ROS. Integration was achieved in three steps. The first step was to integrate the existing field organization. The second step was to reorganize the district headquarters, and the third step was to reorganize Coast Guard Headquarters.

1. Field Organization

Integration of the field organization went into effect on September 15, 1994, when the Commandant of the Coast Guard announced in Instruction 5310.2 [26] new policy and procedures to achieve the following:

- restructure the Coast Guard Reserve at the field level to place reservists under the direct operational control of the active command augmented,
- integrate Active and Reserve Component administrative control structures,
- eliminate Reserve Unit Commanding Officers except in units to be activated intact,
- develop an RPAL that assigns each Selected Reserve billet a unique identifying number, and
- integrate district Readiness and Reserve Division functions into other staffs.

Before implementing the first step, the Coast Guard had conducted tests of integration in the Eleventh and Thirteenth Coast Guard Districts. The results of the tests showed that the concept was viable, and the decision was made to proceed.

Instruction 5310.2 prescribed revolutionary changes in the Coast Guard field organization. Although well-camouflaged in re-invention rhetoric, the purpose of the integration comes through as streamlining to do as much as possible with fewer resources. Plans were to be fully executable by 1 October 1994, and proposed billet savings were to be submitted by that date. A reduction of 15 percent in full-time support billets was mandated for each district. Most importantly, all reserve units were to be co-located with an active command or detachment unless there was a "clear, overriding operational or support mission" that demanded a separate non-co-located reserve unit. The interim goal of step one was to have a reserve operational facility (OPFAC) at each

active command being augmented. The ultimate goal was to integrate "reservists into the same OPFAC as the active command they serve."

The effect of this instruction was to merge the active and reserve components into a single military force with one set of missions, one command structure, and one administrative structure. Active commanders were provided "a mix of well-trained, full-time and part-time military personnel to respond to any contingency, while more effectively and efficiently executing day-to-day missions" [26]. Though it retained reserve units as separate elements for a time, the field organization of the Coast Guard became integrated into a single Team Coast Guard.

The impact on the active units was profound. They assumed responsibility for reserve personnel, property, administration, training, and operational missions; scheduled the work and training of reservists; and—except for the deployable reserve units—took over all reserve controlled spaces and personal (unit) property, including small boats. Active units prepared RPALs, provided support for both active and reserve personnel, and managed non-resident school requirements and requests for quotas for reservists in the same manner as for active members. Active-duty units became the sole authority to task reservists to perform operational missions.

The impact on the reserve was also profound. Reserve units became subordinate to the augmented active units and existed only for accounting purposes. Except for the deployable port security units (PSUs), they were later eliminated altogether.

As reservists were integrated into active units, provisions were made for supervision of their work and evaluation of their performance. Enlisted reservists were integrated into the normal evaluation process, based on their work assignment. Reserve officers were required to have at least one active-duty officer in their rating chain, either as supervisor or reporting officer. The rule was established that, except in unusual circumstances, the senior reserve member assigned to an organizational element would be junior in grade to the senior active member.

Administrative support was consolidated. The active-duty personnel service unit that services an active command provides support also for reservists integrated into the command. Using the SDA-II system, integrated active personnel service units perform all reserve personnel functions. Reserve personnel support units and reserve management support activities were phased out. All reserve enlisted administrative personnel were integrated into the active-duty administrative support structure and were not allowed to be segregated into a separate subelement, such as a "Reserve Department" of the active unit.

2. Deployable Reserve Units

Deployable reserve units were also part of the reorganization. About 400 of the 8,000 Selected Reserve billets were used for three deployable port security units composed entirely or predominately of reservists. Three additional port security units are planned and will be formed when funds are available. Each of these PSUs consists of 115 personnel and are equipped with boats and weapons tailored to provide port security in an overseas theater. These units are assigned to the Maritime Defense Forces for the Atlantic and Pacific. Because of previous uncertainty about availability of involuntary callup authority, the Coast Guard has designated some active-duty personnel to be placed on a battle roster to augment one of these reserve units to provide an immediate response capability when they are needed for an operation [27 and 28].

3. District Headquarters

Integration of district headquarters went into effect on January 23, 1995, when the Commandant issued additional guidance to disestablish the district Readiness and Reserve Divisions and assign responsibility for reserve aspects of staff functions to other divisions. A new Force Optimization and Training Branch was established within the District Administrative Division to conduct for both active and reserve personnel the personnel, planning, analysis, and training functions formerly accomplished by the Personnel Branch and the Readiness and Reserve Division. Reserve Branch Personnel and logistical support was integrated into the Personnel Branch and the Finance Branch, and the Law Enforcement Branch of the Operations Division took over the ordnance function from the Reserve and Readiness Division. A Contingency Plans, Exercise, and Evaluation Staff was formed to perform readiness functions, formerly the responsibility of the Readiness and Reserve Division. This reorganization was accompanied by a 15-percent reduction in funded personnel billets and the relocation of billets from the district staff to units augmented by reservists to assume the portion of administrative work that migrated from the Reserve Branch and reserve units to operational commanders. The transition to the new standard district organization was completed by June 1, 1995 [28].

4. Coast Guard Headquarters

Reorganization of Coast Guard Headquarters was completed in April 1996 as the last major part of the integration process. The position of Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve, an active rear admiral who had commanded the US Coast Guard Reserve, was eliminated. A new staff position, Director of Reserve and Training, was created to plan

and oversee all Coast Guard active and reserve training and to provide a staff office at Headquarters to represent the Coast Guard Reserve. The Director of Reserve and Training is responsible for the five Coast Guard Training Centers, has staff elements for program and facilities assessment and for forecasting and systems, and oversees the Office of Training and Performance Consulting and the Office of Reserve Affairs [30].

The functions of the new Office of Reserve Affairs are to provide a visible reserve presence at the headquarters, manage the reserve appropriations in the Coast Guard Budget, and provide staff oversight of reserve-unique programs. The Office of Reserve Affairs is responsible for direction and description of the reserve program, surge and mobilization planning and preparedness, reserve personnel policy, reserve selection boards, senior reserve officer assignments, reserve recruiting and strength management, reserve schooling, active-duty training management, officer training, the reserve training plan, management of reserve quality attainment, reserve pay and allowances, drill pay management, and external representation with the Reserve Forces Policy Board, the Reserve Officers Association, and other organizations [31].

Some common administrative functions that had been performed for reservists by the Office of Readiness and Reserve were transferred to Coast Guard activities that took care of administration for the active Coast Guard. The Coast Guard Personnel Command assumed responsibility for reserve personnel management, and the Coast Guard Pay and Personnel Center continued to have responsibility for reserve pay. Responsibility for readiness planning and exercises was transferred to the Operations Directorate. The effect of the headquarters reorganization has been the distribution among the headquarters directorates and program offices of staff oversight and management for both active personnel and reservists. Offices that formerly did things for either the active or the reserve now do for both. There remains, however, a flag-level advocate for Coast Guard Reservists and an identifiable staff office to deal with reserve-unique issues [27].

As another safeguard for the reserve program, the Force Optimization and Training Divisions of the Integrated Support Commands (ISCs) were allocated a critical mass of Reserve Program Administrators to manage the reserve programs for which they were responsible. The ISCs provide routine administrative support services to units within specified geographical areas, and act as consultants to operational and district commanders. They also perform force optimization studies and analyses to help commanders decide on work force mix and utilization [32]. The role of the ISCs in strategic and tactical force optimization makes them the focus of efforts to preserve reserve identity and protect reserve funding. In effect, the ISCs were designated to

perform reserve program management for the field organization when responsibility for reserve program management—as opposed to command of reservists in units—was shifted from the district offices.

The Force Optimization and Training Divisions of the ISCs perform a wide range of functions related to reserve management. Resource management functions are to manage the Personnel Allowance List, distribute billets, manage reserve assignments, and perform financial management, to include monitoring budget execution. Training functions are to allocate reserve training funds, evaluate training, and improve the reserve training system. Personnel functions are to process reserve training orders, manage reserve personnel evaluations, establish policies on reserve assignments and rotation, and determine the best use of personnel resources. The divisions also provide information on reserve activities, publish reserve newsletters, and provide training on reserve administration [33].

V. CHALLENGES OF COAST GUARD INTEGRATION

Integration of the Coast Guard Reserve into the Coast Guard was completed in early 1996. The Coast Guard now has a single set of missions, a single chain of command, and a single administration system.

However, as is the case with all significant institutional changes, integration has had its problems, pitfalls, critics, and supporters. Hardly anyone can fault the sentiment behind Team Coast Guard, but there are divergent views on exactly what that sentiment is supposed to mean. Operational and administrative issues have been resolved—or at least are relatively uncontroversial. The main issues still to be resolved have to do with active-reserve relationships. Having been separate for so long, the two components have found it difficult to become intimate instantly. The major challenges for integration are reserve career management, reserve full-time support, reserve identity, and Coast Guard culture.

A. RESERVE CAREER MANAGEMENT

The goal of reserve career management is to attract good people to the Coast Guard Reserve and keep them for a full career while they learn and advance in rank and responsibility. The elements of a satisfactory career are interesting work, respect, and promotion. The Armed Forces of the United States are unusual in allowing enlisted reservists to achieve senior chief petty officer positions and reserve officers to be promoted to commander, captain, and flag officer. This practice provides incentive for reservists to stay in, work hard, and strive for promotion. It also raises concerns about the comparability and linkage between the active and reserve promotion systems. Thus, one of the major points yet to be resolved is how to blend the career management programs for commissioned and petty officers of the Coast Guard Reserve with those of the active Coast Guard. This is hard even when the two components have separate identities, but it is much more difficult when they are integrated.

The assignment of reservists to active units means that command is no longer the path to promotion in the reserve. When all reservists served in reserve units, reserve noncommissioned and commissioned officers achieved promotion by serving successfully as unit commanders. Career planning focused on command, and the best and brightest were tested and gained experience by commanding at successively higher echelons of

command. The old reserve had 250 command positions, many of them small stations commanded by chief petty officers or first class petty officers. The integrated reserve has fewer than 20 commands, nearly all in the deployable port security units and insufficient in number to serve as the basis for the entire promotion system.

The question is how to provide interesting career progression for reservists without command positions. Reservists can and are being used as reserve advisors, deputies, and staff officers. The key is to provide real authority and real jobs for senior reserve officers and enlisted members. This requires active-duty personnel to share their authority and give up a dominant position in the interests of improving the total Coast Guard work force. Since active promotions depend heavily on good performance in positions of authority, this is not an easy thing to do.

The solution to this problem may well require overturning two long-standing personnel systems: the up-or-out system and the running-mate system. An up-or-out personnel system sets limits on the amount of time a military member may serve in a grade until he or she is either promoted to the next grade or forced to retire or leave the service. All of the Armed Forces enforce the up-or-out system to promote youth and vigor in commanders and to assure promotion rapid enough to satisfy younger petty officers and officers and keep them striving for advancement. The goal of the up-or-out system is to provide at the top a few well-qualified persons to serve as senior petty officers and flag officers.

In order to be credible and avoid charges of stagnation of superannuation, the Reserve Components also use the up-or-out system, even though their members manifestly serve fewer days on active duty. The linkage between the active and reserve promotion system is made through the running-mate system, in which each reserve officer is paired with a counterpart active-duty officer—the running mate. Reserve officers are declared eligible for consideration, selected for promotion by boards, and promoted on roughly the same time schedule as are their Active Component running mates. This policy assures that reserve personnel are not left behind because of their reserve status.

The up-or-out and running-mate systems work well when the Active and Reserve Components are separate, but they do not work as well for an integrated force. The Coast Guard experience indicates that many reservists may not aspire to the top and would welcome a system that allows them to gain longer service while giving up rapid promotion. Their role, after all, is an avocation and they might relish becoming really good at their Coast Guard jobs instead of moving frequently to fill in the boxes on the

typical active career progression chart. Because of the part-time nature of their service, reservists take longer to qualify for complex duties. The Coast Guard estimates that it takes an active-duty officer a year to experience the wide range of events necessary to become a fully qualified watchstander in a Captain of the Port's office and as many as 3 years for a reservist. As long as the two sets of officers were separate and did not do the same work, these differences did not matter, and the forced pace of up-or-out could wreak the same havoc on each system. For an integrated system, it is important that reservists be allowed the time to learn their jobs before being forced to either pass the next promotion gate and move up to a new job or leave the Coast Guard. If the inexorable pace of up-or-out is relaxed for reservists, it may no longer make sense to have a running-mate system.

This is obviously a major issue, the solution to which is going to be controversial because it could threaten to take away some of the safeguards that were put in place to assure equal treatment for the reservists.

An elitism that exists in the active Coast Guard serves as a semi-permeable barrier that prevents migration between active and reserve status. A key pressure which discourages free migration for officers is the up-or-out promotion system. This system drives personnel policy which has a bias toward active service rather than the broader total force. If the Coast Guard, including its reserve, is to compete successfully as the employer of choice in the competition for members, it must offer incentives that differentiate it from its competitors. For reasons as diverse as pregnancy, children in college, a responsibility to care for elderly parents, or the desire to grow educationally, members of the active service often prefer a hiatus from the rigors of daily service. As these situations change, these same high-performing people would like to return to active service. Likewise, reservists who want a new challenge, who are in the midst of career change, or who want to increase their contribution to the Coast Guard desire active service, perhaps not as a career, but for an extended period of time. An organization that provides part-time/full-time flexibility certainly has a competitive edge over other employers. Also, such an organization has a much greater opportunity to surge and shrink in response to either internal or external conditions [12].

No real consensus has emerged on what ought to be the career development pattern for officers and petty officers in the new, integrated reserve.¹ Positions as deputies are one way to use the reservists, but this solution has problems because it denies to those

¹ The Report of the Coast Guard Reserve Policy Board, due in July 1996, is supposed to address this issue.

serving part time a real opportunity for command and leadership. Using reservists as subordinate commanders, however, does the same harm to active-duty personnel. It is likely that the Coast Guard, with its long history of successful integration of different kinds of personnel, will find solutions to the problems of job satisfaction and effective utilization of the reservists.

B. RESERVE FULL-TIME SUPPORT

Like the other Reserve Components, the Coast Guard Reserve has reservists who serve on active duty full time to administer and train the Selected Reserve.² Unlike the other Reserve Components, the Coast Guard Reserve has no full-time enlisted reservists at all and no full-time officer reservists in reserve units. Full-time support for the Coast Guard Reserve has been provided entirely by Reserve officers serving on headquarters staffs to manage the reserve program.

At the climax of the Cold War, the Coast Guard reserve program included about 700 full-time support (FTS) billets—about 6 percent of the total Selected Reserve strength of about 12,000. Just over 10 percent of the FTS billets (about 73) were filled by members of a special corps of officers called Reserve Program Administrators (RPAs). There were also a few FTS billets filled by Selected Reserve officers serving on temporary tours of active duty for fewer than 3 years. The remaining FTS officer billets and all of the enlisted billets were filled by Active Component personnel.

Integration of missions and units and consolidation of administrative systems evidently reduced the need for many of the FTS billets to administer the reserve. This was a major reason why the consolidation was done. In fact, the number of FTS billets was reduced 15 percent as a consequence of consolidation, freeing up these active and Selected Reserve personnel for assignment to operational missions. Future requirements for full-time reservists to administer the reserve or perform operational missions are being worked out.

What remains to be determined is who is to manage the reserve program by providing staff oversight of the allocation and use of reserve funds and personnel among the Coast Guard units. Reserve program management is a different function than

² The text on full-time support is based on References [34] and [35]. Additional insight was obtained from an interview with Captain Douglas E. Clapp [36], who conducted a study of the Reserve Program Administrator program in 1989.

administration of reserve personnel, which has already been assumed by the active Coast Guard.

The issue with respect to reserve program management is the future of the RPA corps, which currently manages the reserve program as staff officers in Coast Guard Headquarters and in the field organization. Elimination of the RPA corps would de facto make reserve program management the responsibility of regular officers who would be assigned to this duty as an occupation field and rotate in and out of reserve program management assignments. RPA officers believe that few high quality, regular officers would select reserve program management as their primary career field because they would perceive that their opportunities for advancement to senior rank would be limited. The RPA officers also contend that regular officers would lack the degree of understanding and dedication to the reserve program provided by the RPA corps, which consists of Reservists.

The RPA program started in 1954 when the Department of the Treasury, in accordance with the Armed Forces Act of 1952, appointed 37 officers of the Coast Guard Reserve to serve on active duty to train and administer the Coast Guard Reserve. Since that time, the program has remained small; only 73 RPA officers were serving in 1995. About a third of the total are in grades O-1 to O-3, another third in grade O-4, and the rest in grades O-5 and O-6. Eight captains are authorized at the top of the RPA corps. Most RPA officers serve at Coast Guard Headquarters, the ISCs, and the district headquarters to manage the administration and training of the Selected Reserve units.

All small, special-category personnel programs are tough to manage. Since its inception, the RPA program has been troubled by the challenge of finding a promotion system that would promote these special category officers rapidly enough to retain them while keeping them on roughly the same promotion schedule as Active Component officers. In 1964, RPAs were excluded from the active-duty promotion list and placed on a separate promotion list where the criteria for promotion was being fully qualified and only one failure to be selected was cause for separation. This was difficult to manage, and currently, RPA officers are promoted on a best-qualified basis at the same pace as their assigned active-duty running mates.

The RPAs as a rule are very capable. Only a few new RPAs are admitted each year, and the standards for admission are very high. The RPAs constitute a body of officers with considerable active-duty experience as well as familiarity with the Selected Reserve. The Coast Guard has employed RPA officers in operational assignments to

increase their understanding of the Active Component, but in recent years the use of RPAs in rotational assignments outside the reserve program has increased more than desired by the reserve program managers. There is also an increasing tendency among RPAs to request integration into the Active Component, based perhaps on the perceived lack of viability of the RPA program because of, first, augmentation and then, integration.

Although the RPAs were created to administer the Selected Reserve, they serve only in reserve divisions and branches of active headquarters and on rotational assignments with active units. This is markedly different from the other Reserve Components, whose full-time counterparts to the RPA program serve in the reserve units themselves. Not all of the Selected Reservists value the RPA corps highly [37]. The RPAs have been accused by some Selected Reservists of being out of touch with the drilling reservists and serving "mainline" careers like Active Component officers.³ The RPAs, however, consider themselves to be reservists and to be the proponents and advocates for the reserve program. It was the RPAs at Coast Guard Headquarters who first identified and then successfully marketed the need to retain a Reserve Component identity at Coast Guard Headquarters when integration discussions leaned heavily toward an integration model that would subsume all aspects of the Reserve Component into the Active Component.

The future of the RPA system has been under study almost continuously over the past 10 years. Before integration, studies concentrated on ways to improve the RPA program rather than alternatives to the program. The most recent study, completed in May 1995, examined alternative ways to manage the reserve program and concluded that the "RPA corps provides the best overall management source for the Coast Guard Reserve Component" [34]. However, the study failed to make a specific recommendation on this topic, and the Commandant directed that a fresh analysis of this issue be initiated in the fall of 1997 [38].

The RPAs maintain that, despite the consolidation of the administrative systems, they have a real mission as reserve program managers and advocates, and as the keepers of a distinct reserve identity. They point out that integration has made it both more difficult and more essential to maintain a distinct reserve identity. Since almost all

³ This same complaint about the full-time personnel is made by the drilling reservists of the other Reserve Components, and it is probably true to an extent. However, if it is good to have reservists represented by other reservists, albeit full-time reservists, there is no way around this problem other than periodic tours back in the units—something no other full-time support program requires.

reservists are assigned to active units, they no longer automatically have a separate identity. Yet, maintaining reserve strength depends on having enough of an identity to attract quality young people to join the Coast Guard Reserve. Also, it is necessary to manage the reserve program funds as an entity and to assure that reservists are treated equitably and supported well by their active units. The de facto solution to date has been to retain the RPA corps for use in the new/old role of reserve program managers and as Selected Reserve advocates and ombudsmen.

C. RESERVE IDENTITY

The Coast Guard is very conscious of its unique identity. As a relatively small sea service with a wide range of duties, the active Coast Guard developed an identity that differentiated it from the Navy by emphasizing the unique nature of its peacetime missions. From its inception, the Coast Guard Reserve also had a distinct identity based on a different set of missions focused exclusively on wartime augmentation of the Navy. The two components developed separately along parallel paths with little interaction for 40 years. Then within a decade the situation changed drastically, and the reserve was integrated into the Active Component with a common set of missions. This change was driven primarily by money—or lack of money, and cannot be attributed to heartfelt desires on either part. Integration was a victory, perhaps, of rationality over emotion.

Senior reservists believe that maintenance of a reserve identity at the level of the individual reservist and at the program level for PPBES should be an important factor in any realignment scheme [39]. They fear that without a distinct identity, they would become merely part-time help rather than full members of the team. This fear is indicated in no uncertain terms in the following document prepared by a reservist:

Management of the Reserve Program is almost an exclusive province of Active duty personnel at Headquarters. In September of 1993 RADMs Merrilees and Sloncen sent a joint letter to G-R noting that they had been left out of the Reserve downsizing process and asking that they be involved. Despite their letter things have not changed. Virtually all matters impacting the Reserve program or Reservists come out of Headquarters with no [Selected Reserve] input creating decisions which are controversial and poorly understood. RPAs, with one foot in the Reserve, are supposed to provide the Active-Reserve link. But virtually none of the RPAs outside of Headquarters feels that the system is working. Most RPAs have very mainstream careers with no more exposure to Reserve issues than a typical line officer passing through a Readiness assignment. This issue is exactly the type of problem [Total Quality Management] can be best at solving.

Improved communications with the Reserve community and [Selected Reserve] input into decision making are key [39, enclosure].

Some selected reservists believe that the Coast Guard Reserve should continue to focus on wartime missions. They believe that only by having their own military units can reservists fulfill their statutory function of augmenting the active Coast Guard in time of war. This group believes that the Total Force Policy enunciated in 1975 by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird requires that the Reserve Components be organized into their own units and that integration as individuals into active units violates that policy. While not objecting to occasional augmentation by reservists, this group believes that habitual use of individual reservists to perform peacetime work destroys the ability of the reserve to be a wartime reserve. These reservists place the highest priority on the direct national security defense that have been the primary responsibility of the Coast Guard Reserve.⁴

Both of these concerns are heightened by a visible loss by reserve leaders of authority and responsibility. In a very real sense, integration disempowers the reservists, particularly senior petty officers and officers. Instead of being in charge of their own admittedly second-priority units, reservists are now merely part-time personnel in active units. To many reservists, there is merit in being separate, even when separate means unequal.

The ease with which the reservists adjust to their new status depends on the regulars. At the moment, integration is working at the unit level, where both kinds of Coast Guard personnel are working together well, but there are indications that the active Coast Guard, which participated passively in achieving integration may be carrying the process too far, demonstrating that a good thing can be overdone.

Integration was initiated by reservists. The impetus came from Coast Guard districts on the West Coast seeking innovative solutions to their problem of too few resources and too many missions. Then integration was picked up and pushed by RPAs in Headquarters and some of the districts. During that process, at least during the early stages, the impression is that the active leadership of the Coast Guard took a passive position, allowing movement to integration to proceed but not providing much overt, positive support. In the traditional manner, actions that involved the reserve were regarded

⁴ Captain Joseph F. Manfreda is a spokesperson for the Selected Reservists who oppose the loss of reserve units and favor retaining a separate reserve structure with meaningful missions and training [40].

as the sole province of the Director of Readiness and Reserve, and the real Coast Guard had more important things to consider.

This attitude changed when Admiral Robert E. Kramek became the Coast Guard Commandant in 1994. Admiral Kramek has been an active supporter of reserve integration and of Team Coast Guard. He believes in Team Coast Guard and personally made the key decisions to integrate the Coast Guard Reserve into the Active Coast Guard.

There is no consensus, however, on the exact form integration finally should take. The responses from district commanders about the Reserve Organization Study [14 through 22] indicated a wide range of views on the form integration should take. At least some of the Coast Guard flag officers were not particularly enthusiastic about integrating the reservists into their units. The approved new field organization structure has been in effect only a short time, but additional changes are being proposed.

One change with potentially major implications has been proposed by the Pacific Area Command. This command, which was the source of much of the original impetus for augmentation and alignment, is continuing to innovate and carry integration to a point that worries some reservists. Under the official scheme approved by the Commandant, the Force Optimization and Training Divisions at the ISCs were allocated a number of reserve program managers sufficient to assure that reserve identity was maintained and reserve funds used for reserve programs. The Pacific Area Command proposes instead to reassign the reserve program managers from the ISC and assign one to each district headquarters as a reserve advocate and advisor [41]. Reserve program managers fear that this reallocation of reserve program managers will dissipate their influence and believe that it is better to retain a "critical mass" of reservists at the ISC level to ensure that sufficient attention and resources are paid to Selected Reservists among the districts of an area. The issue has not yet been resolved. The Chief of Staff will compare the new organization of the Pacific Area with the organization of the Atlantic Area (which adheres to the original scheme) to see which organization is better at providing a well-trained, optimized force in which the identity and funding for the Selected Reservists is maintained [42].

D. COAST GUARD CULTURE

Ultimately, of course, the future of Team Coast Guard depends on whether a new culture that incorporates both active personnel and reservists can be realized. This will not be easy, for culture is a conservative thing that resists change.

The Coast Guard has achieved structural integration and administrative integration, it remains to be seen whether it can also achieve cultural integration.

Some reservists believe that the Coast Guard has been resistant to implementing Team Coast Guard concept, primarily because the availability of part-time reservists would bring about more reductions in Active Component billets. If true, that resistance will be a serious barrier to true cultural integration. A truly integrated Coast Guard would examine billet allocation objectively to achieve the best mix to perform peacetime missions while retaining a capability to surge during operational emergencies and wartime.

The officer corps of the active Coast Guard is a tight-knit group still dominated at the top by graduates of the Coast Guard Academy.⁵ But these officers do not have a tradition of being an exclusive group. Captain-Commandant Berthold's real reason for resisting incorporation into the Navy after World War I was because he did not want the 200 Coast Guard officers of that era to become "mustangs" that would be put down by the elitist Naval officers of that era [2, p. 59]. Based on his record of incorporating the personnel of the Lifesaving Service into the culture of the Revenue-Cutter Service, Captain Berthold would undoubtedly have been an enthusiastic support of incorporating reservists completely into the culture of the Coast Guard.

The very act of integration has already removed many of the barriers in the Coast Guard between the Active and Reserve Components, and in the operating units both regulars and reservists are working together for the common good with a minimum of fuss and turmoil. The Coast Guard still has some problems to solve, but they are relatively minor compared to the problems that existed before integration.

The Coast Guard appears to be serious about creating a Team Coast Guard that incorporates a variety of personnel. The Coast Guard has been a leader in integrating women and minorities into its ranks and into its leadership. It also appears to be serious about making best use of its Selected Reservists. Time will tell, but most of the signs are good, and if history is a guide, true integration will occur. After all, the Coast Guard was created by integration; it was expanded by integration; and in an era of austerity and cutbacks, it hopes to thrive through integration.

⁵ In 1996, 24 of the 28 flag officers of the Coast Guard were graduates of the Coast Guard Academy.

E. CONCLUSION

The last word has not been written on integration. Integration has yet to pass the scrutiny of Congress, which has intervened before in matters concerning the Coast Guard Reserve. The question of whether to integrate the Coast Guard auxiliary in a similar manner remains to be addressed. The best way to retain reserve identity and provide for reserve advocacy is not yet settled. More work has to be done.

Team Coast Guard has gone beyond being merely a slogan. Whether it will become a complete reality depends on the tact and sensitivity of the leadership of the Coast Guard toward the beliefs and aspirations of both its regulars and its reservists.

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ABBREVIATIONS

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| | |
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| CPAL | Contingency Personnel Allowance List |
| DoD | Department of Defense |
| FTS | full-time support |
| IDA | Institute for Defense Analyses |
| IMA | Individual Mobilization Augmentee |
| ISC | Integrated Support Command |
| NASA | National Aeronautics and Space Administration |
| OPCON | operational control |
| OPFAC | operational facility |
| ORTU | Organized Reserve Training Unit |
| PAL | Personnel Allowance List |
| PESRU | Personnel Support Reserve Unit |
| PMIS | Personnel Management Information System |
| PPBES | Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System |
| PPC | Pay and Personnel Center |
| PSU | port security unit |
| QAT | Quality Action Team |
| RFO | Reserve Field Organization |
| RMSA | Regional Management Support Activity |
| ROS | Reserve Organization Study |
| RPA | Reserve Program Administrator |
| RPAL | Reserve Personnel Allowance List |
| RPB | Reserve Policy Board |
| RPMIS | Reserve Personnel Management Information System |
| SDA-I | Source Data Automation System I |
| SDA-II | Source Data Automation II |
| UMIS | Unit Management Information System |

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