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WHITE PAPER ON VIETNAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the State Department's white paper on Vietnam underscores what able American journalists have been reporting for some time: that there has been a new and higher level of North Vietnamese military involvement in the conflict in the South. This is the second time that the Department has seen fit to issue what amounts to an official confirmation of this kind. It will be recalled that in December, 1961, a white paper was issued on the same subject. At that time, the issuance coincided with a marked increase in our indirect military and economic aid to South Vietnam. The present white paper coincides with still another major—a geometric increase in American aid.

In my judgment, the white paper does not set forth a new policy. It confirms the necessity of what has been undertaken to date by this Government. It is a new explanation, not a new prescription.

The paper helps to make clear why this Nation has been compelled to take steps which it has taken in recent weeks, if South Vietnam is not to be abandoned, if the United States is to honor its commitment to help the Vietnamese of the south to retain a degree of choice in their future. In that respect, it should satisfy those who have been insisting that the President should address an explanation to the American people as to what is involved in Vietnam. The President, so far as I can see, is trying to keep a lid on a dangerous volcano in southeast Asia. He is not seeking to blow it off. Insofar as information is concerned, we have had the white paper, statements from Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Stevenson, and many other distinguished members of the administration as to what we are doing, and why. American press coverage of the situation has been exceptionally extensive and well informed. Insofar as our policies are concerned, the President is receiving a wealth of advice from his administration and from Senators who have participated in the highly useful debate on Vietnam—and all of them may I say are to be commended for participating.

The truth of the matter is that the President has a policy in Vietnam, and it is not expressed in any single action or nonaction. He is trying to prevent a great war in Asia, and he is trying at the same time to meet a commitment to the people of South Vietnam of many years standing in a situation which changes constantly. He seeks to aid the South Vietnamese people to find a solution to their difficulties, as did his two predecessors in office. And he seeks a peace in which freedom in that part of the world will not become a dead letter. That is all, even though it is a great deal.

The paper also emphasizes, indirectly, the need for an end to the jealous rivalries, military, and others, which have led to coup on coup in Saigon since the unfortunate and most deplorable assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem. If

we are to aid the people of South Vietnam in a situation such as is detailed in the white paper, there must be a dedicated and responsible leadership in South Vietnam, through which they can be aided, through which their choice, whatever it may be, can be expressed, and their right to a choice defended.

This Nation—no nation can supply an alien leadership where only an indigenous leadership can suffice in this day and age in Asia. Despite the serious intensification of the military conflict, the problem in all Vietnam is still primarily a Vietnamese problem.

I thank the Senator from Wisconsin for yielding.

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, I am happy to have yielded to the majority leader on this subject. My speech is on the same subject. The majority leader has discussed the white paper, which I also intended to discuss.

President Johnson's Vietnam policy is to restore peace and to help the South Vietnamese defend their country from subversion and attack by the Communists.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at this point? I wish to say something about what the majority leader has said.

Mr. PROXMIER. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I hope to be in the Chamber for all practical purposes throughout the Senator's speech. I consider him one of the most thoughtful Members of the Senate. I want very much to hear how he feels about this subject.

I should like to say about the majority leader's statement, just read, that it raises a serious question, which is: Do the Vietnamese people really want to fight for freedom, and do they want us there? We cannot hold plebiscites in Vietnam; nonetheless, it is essential that this question be before us, because I believe it is basic to every other question as to whether we stay in South Vietnam or not. I therefore express the hope that the President and his spokesmen in Congress, such as the majority leader, will keep us apprised, so far as information on this situation is available to us which ought to be made public. It is a subject that is under constant review and is of constant concern to the American people.

I have read the speech of the Senator from Wisconsin; and, of course, we know the position of the majority leader. I, too, have supported the President. I do not go along with those who seek negotiation as a way to get out. We must fight this problem through until there is some result consonant with our objectives. I know there are tragic losses, and that we all must bear them. As the Senator feels, and as I know I do, we only wish we could go there and do the job ourselves. It would be so much easier than standing here and saying that the struggle must go on. However, I feel that essentially there is a majority in South Vietnam who are interested in fighting for freedom, and that they want us there.

I again address an appeal to the President. I do not do so to imply that he is

not taking action or will not do so. However, what the Senator from Montana has said bears so heavily on the subject that I hope we shall be kept, as far as possible, closely in touch with that aspect of the matter.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. PROXMIER. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have been considering what the distinguished senior Senator from New York said on Thursday, February 18, at which time he raised similar questions which I think are entitled to an answer.

One of those questions was, of course, whether the President should take to the airwaves to inform the American people on the situation in Vietnam and our policy with respect thereto. I have stated since, and I reiterate, that in all honesty I cannot see the need or desirability for such a course of action and statement at this time. But getting down to specifics, if the Senator from Wisconsin will allow me, I would recall that on Thursday, 10 days ago, the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. JAVRS] joined in a debate on the Vietnamese situation.

As the Senator from New York knows, I hold him in the highest esteem and I have great respect and admiration for his knowledge and judgment in questions of foreign relations. We have from time to time engaged in colloquies on certain subjects in this particular field, and I have invariably emerged from them with an enrichment of my own understanding. So what I say is not in criticism of the recent remarks of the Senator. It is for purposes of clarification.

The Senator will recall other colloquies which we had a year or so ago. Unfortunately, I do not have the Records here covering these colloquies, but they are in my office. When I sought to examine certain premises and policies with respect to Vietnam or southeast Asia, the Senator's great concern was not so much with what I was suggesting, but rather with the possibility that it might be misconstrued.

The Senator noted, as I recall, that my remarks might erroneously be interpreted as an advocacy of a pullout or the abandonment of solemn commitments. With all due respect, I would suggest that a similar misconception could be placed on the remarks of the Senator in his talk on February 18, although I personally did not so interpret them. But, lest there be any doubt that the Senator from New York stands foursquare behind the President, I would point out that he did vote for the Vietnamese resolution on August 7, 1964, as he has stated many times. Part of the resolution reads:

The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President as Commander in Chief to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

As I said, the Senator from New York voted for that resolution. So there ought

to be no doubt that he supports fully and completely the military actions which the President has felt compelled to take in Vietnam.

With that as background, I should like to commend the Senator for raising certain questions on February 18 with respect to the present situation in Vietnam.

First, the Senator from New York asked the President whether the majority of the people in South Vietnam are determined to fight for their freedom. This is very pertinent indeed, for, as President Johnson has said, our objective in South Vietnam is to help the people of that country defend their freedom. May I say in all frankness that the inability of their leaders to form a stable government, as evidenced by at least 13 coups, or attempted coups, in less than 16 months, the last being about 2 weeks ago, is not a source of encouragement.

I would say to the distinguished Senator from New York the hour now is late for his question. I would ask him: How do you find out now, while the American forces are becoming the prime targets of the Vietcong, whether the Vietnamese people are determined to fight for their freedom, especially when their leaders compound the difficulty by their feuds and struggles for prestige and power? Do you take a Gallup poll? Do you have a congressional investigation? This is a very serious question. But how in the present circumstances do you set out to answer it? And if the answer could be obtained and if it were found that the Vietnamese people are not determined to fight for their freedom, what would the Senator suggest that the President do? Would he have the President negotiate out, or simply pullout, or move in further?

The Senator could make a great contribution, I think, not only by raising the questions, but also by exploring the implications of the answers.

Second, the distinguished Senator from New York asked whether the people of South Vietnam actually want the United States in their country. This, too, is a vital question. But I would most respectfully suggest that it is difficult to consider this question now, while the guns are being fired at Americans, and Americans are losing their lives in increasing numbers. The time to have examined this question with the dispassion that it warrants was months ago.

But the Senator, as far as I can recall, generally expressed the view in his colloquies with me a year ago that the examination of any such vital questions would invariably introduce worldwide doubts as to our steadfastness. How much more would that be the case in the present circumstances?

So I would say to the Senator with all due respect that his question is likely to remain rhetorical unless he can also focus attention on it and suggest to the President ways in which it can be intelligently answered while the fighting is in progress.

Third, the Senator from New York asked whether the United States has

done everything possible to get our Asian allies—Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and so forth, to help in the fighting. Here the answer is plain. Everything possible has been tried as it was in 1954, when President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles were confronted by a similar problem, as it was in 1961, by the late President Kennedy, with respect to a crisis in Laos at that time. The response has been very meager in so far as military assistance to Vietnam is concerned.

So I would say to the Senator that if he feels we must have significant international or Asian support as a condition for remaining in Vietnam in a limited conflict, there is little sign that it is going to materialize. In present circumstances, sacrifices of life and resources insofar as they are borne by other than Vietnamese are going to be continued to be borne almost wholly by the United States, as they have been for a long time.

Finally, the distinguished Senator from New York asked that if the United States is willing to negotiate, will it negotiate with dignity, and not at the expense of the South Vietnamese people. The phrasing of the question reveals an uncertainty in the mind of the Senator, which I must confess I do not understand, and which I find somewhat disturbing.

I cannot imagine President Johnson, or any President, entering into negotiations other than with dignity and honor. Did not President Truman negotiate with dignity and honor in Korea? Did not President Eisenhower, when he continued these same negotiations which led to a cease-fire, insist upon dignified and honorable negotiations? Does the Senator from New York really doubt that President Johnson, if he felt negotiations desirable, would negotiate with any less dignity and honor, or with less awareness of the realities in the Vietnamese situation?

I do not believe that the Senator from New York thinks that the President would repudiate our obligations to the Vietnamese people. Who has suggested that we should?

Certainly, the senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] made clear in his recent speech, for example, his support of the President's military actions, as did the Senator from New York. In his argumentation in this Chamber a few days ago, Senator CHURCH stated explicitly that, "Having made a solemn commitment to Saigon, we intend to keep it."

To suggest that negotiations be considered, is not to break a commitment, as the Senator from New York well knows; in some situations, negotiations may well be the best way to keep a commitment. And despite the possibility of misconception, I would say to the Senator from New York that any suggestions which he may have as to how negotiations, both dignified and honorable, may be applied in this situation to bring the bloodshed to an end would be welcomed.

I, for one, would urge him to make such suggestions.

In summary, Mr. President, I would like to commend the senior Senator from New York for the questions which he raised ten days ago because I have for him the highest admiration and affection. The Senator has made an effective contribution to the debate on Vietnam.

I express the hope that he will elaborate his thoughts, as I am sure he will, and that he will shed further light on how we may best go about finding the answers, not only to the questions which he raises, but also to the larger questions of a durable peace in Vietnam and southeast Asia, as a whole.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield so that I may respond?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I shall yield, but I shall yield very briefly.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I have asked witnesses many questions in my day. On occasion, I have been asked questions, and sometimes as a lawyer I have said, "I am glad you asked me that question."

I am very much reminded of that, as the Senator has made a very well prepared statement in response to a question which I asked him.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield briefly, these remarks were prepared a week ago Friday, in response to questions raised the preceding day by the Senator from New York on this floor.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank my colleague, but I am prepared to deal with this question. I should like to do so very briefly.

I believe there are ways of finding out about and reporting to the American people the will to resist by the South Vietnamese. We hear of more or less sporadic attempts to resist in one area or another in South Vietnam, but they are quite diffused. We do not see an accurate map of areas of resistance. I think the President, or his spokesmen, could do something about locating these areas, so it could be pointed out to the American people just how much of this country is really controlled by the Vietcong and what other areas are in control of the South Vietnamese. Just how much is there left of the strategic hamlet program, for example, which we have supported with a considerable amount of money? This is a very important question?

In addition, there is a large complex of activity to get us out which certain Buddhists have engaged in that affects the results as far as the Americans are concerned and as far as the South Vietnamese are concerned.

I believe a finding on the will to resist in South Vietnam would be very convincing to me, and I think to the American people. I would credit the President with the greatest good faith in respect to such a finding so far as policy is concerned. The question of whether the South Vietnamese want the United States in could very well be answered in much the same way by the degree to which the country still remains in control of the South Vietnam people, as important proof of their will to resist.

Some proof of their will to resist is what remains to them in control. It determines the question of what degree of cooperation the United States gives, whatever may be the regime in power at the moment. Considering the emanations of opinions, the great number of correspondents who are there, and the many visitors who come here and go there, I think a window can be kept open on the country. The central point of my remarks is that I affirm a need for a finding of fact by the President, based on his information.

The Senator from Montana has asked what I would suggest we do if the South Vietnamese people are behind the resistance movement. If it is found that a majority of the people are for resistance, and that finding is made by the President, we would be behind that finding. If a majority of the people have lost the will to resist, there is a serious question as to how long the United States can continue the struggle at this large cost in money and cost in lives.

With respect to Asian allies giving help, I did not mean that the President is not trying. The President may be trying, but is the U.S. diplomatic machinery trying enough, giving enough emphasis and priority to this aspect? As long as the President tries ardently that would be fine. Essentially, my point was raised not with respect to whether the President has tried, but with respect to the actual efforts of our Asia and southeast Asia allies. We are entitled to receive from them more help than we are getting.

Finally, on the question of negotiation, the Senator from Montana had before him reference to my recent remarks. Memory is always poorer than the words themselves, but my desire and intention was not to say if the Nation is willing to negotiate, let it negotiate with dignity, but rather, that we are ready to negotiate at any time. If I did not say it, I apologize to the Senator for that. I think I used somewhere former President Eisenhower's analogy that we should walk the extra mile—provided our negotiations are not in a frame of reference which would sell out the South Vietnamese people. I would like to see an announcement made, since there is such confusion about our willingness to negotiate. I have endeavored to indicate that if the United States will negotiate, it will be only on the understanding that it was absolutely sure there are no sell-outs of the hopes of the South Vietnamese people.

That, it seems to me, represents a summation of my thinking in reply to the Senator's questions.

I will accept his suggestion that I state in greater detail my views on this matter, but I thought I should reply to the Senator's questions at this time.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Oregon, without losing my right to the floor.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I am deeply sorry that I shall not be able to remain in the chamber to hear the speech of the Senator from Wisconsin. I find myself in deep disagreement with him. I shall have remarks to make on the subject later in the week. I am on my way downtown to make a speech on the "white paper," which can be described as Swiss cheese with holes in it made by the lips of the administration people to the Foreign Relations Committee who said time and again that was a civil war fought by South Vietnamese rebels largely with equipment captured from the government. Now we are excited because in recent weeks the North Vietnamese are going in on a big scale. Why should they not go in?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an editorial in the New York Times of yesterday and Mr. Reston's column in the New York Times be inserted at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorial and article were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STORM SIGNALS OVER ASIA

The Johnson administration seems to be conditioning the American people for a drastic expansion of our involvement in Vietnam. The State Department's white paper accuses North Vietnam of intensified aggression and stresses that military efforts aimed solely at the Vietcong guerrillas in the south no longer suffice.

The logic of all this is that the United States, which only last week moved from the role of "adviser" to active and undisguised combatant in South Vietnam, now feels free to strike at will—whether by air, sea, or land—at any targets it chooses in North Vietnam. In the 3 tense weeks since the Vietcong attack on Pleiku, American policy has plunged dangerously beyond the one enunciated then by the President and Secretary McNamara of limiting ourselves to retaliatory action and shunning a wider war.

And what has happened to alter our policy? The assertion that North Vietnam is a principal supplier of men and munitions to the Vietcong is certainly not new, nor is the charge that the extent of its support is increasing. Such activity by Hanoi constitutes the sole reason for our being in South Vietnam, and has since the United States moved into the vacuum left by the French withdrawal in 1954.

Apparently, the major new evidence of a need for escalating the war, with all the hazard that this entails, was provided by the sinking in a South Vietnamese cove earlier this month of a 100-ton cargo ship loaded with Communist-made small arms and ammunition. A ship of that size is not much above the oriental junk class. The standard Liberty or Victory ship of World War II had a capacity of 7,150 to 7,650 tons.

Page after page of similarly minuscule detail about Communist infiltration from the north merely raises anew the question of whether massive air strikes would accomplish anything except large-scale civilian casualties in industrial centers and ports. The question is made sharper by the absence of any stable government in Saigon to fight or even to speak in the name of the South Vietnamese people.

Communist China, the nation whose imperialist ambitions the world has most to worry about, will be a clear gainer from the ill timing and judgment of our warning to North Vietnam. It comes just as the Soviet Union is about to begin an international

meeting of Communist parties in Moscow—a meeting originally called to pronounce Feiping a renegade from Marxist-Leninism. Washington is now doing precisely what that most sophisticated of Kremlinologists, George F. Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, cautioned against his Senate testimony Friday: Forcing the Soviet Union to come down on the side of Communist China.

Washington and Feiping are in bizarre tandem as the only major capitals in the free or Communist worlds openly resistant to seeking a negotiated settlement of the Vietnamese conflict now. It is not too late for the President to make it plain that the United States is ready to talk as well as fight, and thus leave China isolated as the obstructor of any attempt to achieve a sound and enforceable peace.

WASHINGTON: PRESIDENT JOHNSON UNDER PRESSURE

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, February 27.—President Johnson is making no excuses for anything he has done in Vietnam, and is visibly irritated with the critics of his policy.

He knows he is now up against the most difficult policy decision of his life, and that all the options open to him in Vietnam are risky, but this is all the more reason, in his view, for the country to back the President and stop the critical chatter.

This is not a new attitude on the part of Lyndon Johnson. When he was majority leader in the Senate, he often criticized President Eisenhower's domestic policies but invariably backed him without a murmur on major foreign policy questions.

THE CONSOLING POLLS

Accordingly, his attitude toward Democratic Senators who have differed with him publicly on Vietnam has not been to assume that they are expressing what they believe to be a better course of action, but to charge them with letting him down—sometimes merely to get themselves in the headlines.

He is particularly sensitive to charges that he is not talking enough to the American people about the complexities and risks of the Vietnamese war. He carries around in his pocket a series of private polls that purport to show that the vast majority of the people not only know what he is doing but approve what he is doing.

NO EAR FOR CRITICS

The mail coming into the congressional and newspaper offices here does not support his polls, but when anybody ventures to mention this criticism, he insists that the polls are right, the people understand his problems better than the newspapers, and besides, the Congress authorized the action he has taken, with only two opposing votes.

Lyndon Johnson has gone through other hard times in his career but nothing like this. He sat in on the two Cuban crises with President Kennedy, but he did not have primary responsibility for the decisions.

The decision to bomb the bases of the Communist torpedo boats after their attack on the American Navy was difficult for him in only one respect. One of the bases was very close to the Chinese Communist coast, and in the end he gave the order to hit it. But he was elaborately calm all through that night of decision and, anyway, he felt he had no honorable option but to retaliate.

His present situation is different. All his opinions now seem unsatisfactory and even dangerous. If he doesn't keep up the military pressure on North Vietnam, his advisers fear that his first attacks on North Vietnam will seem a bluff. But if he does, every day that passes raises the prospect that new Communist antiaircraft weapons and defensive fighters will be added to the battle.

Usually he is at home with middle-of-the-road policies, but the middle of this road is full of dangers. He does not want to talk

out on negotiations because this might impair the morale of the South Vietnamese, and also because he feels it is difficult to speak about negotiations without setting conditions that might make negotiations all the more difficult.

Johnson is a poker player and he knows that the man who raises is always in a more difficult position than the man who calls. In Vietnam, it is Johnson who is raising, and the stakes get higher in this game with every succeeding play.

In recent days, he has spent a great deal of his time defending his policies to groups of Congressmen and newspapermen. He has, indeed, been running a series of seminars, with Secretary of Defense McNamara defending the military policy, Secretary of State Rusk defending the diplomatic process, and Vice President HUMPHREY and himself appealing for understanding and unity.

His faith in polls is astonishing, maybe because the polls were so accurate in predicting the size of his own electoral victory last November.

CHURCHILL'S ADVICE

"Nothing is more dangerous," Churchill once said, "that to live in the temperamental atmosphere of a Gallup poll, always taking one's pulse and taking one's temperature. There is only one duty, only one safe course, and that is to try to be right and not to fear to do or say what you believe to be right."

President Johnson is undoubtedly doing that, but it is an agonizing problem for a man who is not accustomed to losing and not yet at ease with the devilish complexities of foreign affairs.

Every American President since the war, however, seems to have faced a frightful foreign policy decision early in his administration. For President Truman it was whether to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. For President Eisenhower it was whether to expand the war or negotiate a truce in Korea. For Kennedy it was the Bay of Pigs adventure in Cuba. And for Johnson it is Vietnam.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President—
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I wholeheartedly support the President's policy. I admire the restraint and perseverance he has shown in carrying it out.

The present policy offers the best chance for us to achieve an enduring peace in this enormously complex situation.

Mr. President, this policy has been under serious attack lately.

In his statement as modified last week, the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, charged that although the American people are the best informed in the world, he doubts that even in the United States it is possible to receive fully balanced information on Vietnam. The Secretary General said that Americans are not sufficiently aware, and these are his exact words, "of the serious risks and dangers implicit in a war course without political efforts to bring the war to an end."

Other Senators have seriously questioned our Vietnam policies. My visits in recent weeks with hundreds of Wisconsin people convince me that this protest is widely shared by the American people.

WHY ARE WE IN SOUTH VIETNAM?

Mr. President, why are we in South Vietnam? Why are we pouring so much of our taxpayer dollars into this remote,

far-off land? Why have we ordered thousands of American soldiers to risk their lives and, indeed, hundreds have laid down their lives in this distant corner of Asia? Why?

Do we want South Vietnam or any part of it?

The question is so ridiculous that even the Chinese Communists have not accused us of it.

It is transparently clear that we have no desire for any territorial aggrandizement in any part of the world, certainly not in remote southeast Asia.

Why, then, are we in South Vietnam at such painful cost?

Do we seek any economic advantage there?

Has anyone, even the North Vietnamese or the Vietcong, accused us of economic exploitation? Are we pursuing dollar diplomacy?

The answer again is a resounding "No."

From an economic standpoint, America would be far better off if there were no Vietnam. We have poured literally billions of dollars as well as the priceless lives of some of our finest young men into South Vietnam.

We will get nothing in return, not a penny.

Mr. President, if any nation's hands can be said to be clean, ours are clean in South Vietnam.

We seek no power, no territory. We want no money, no oil, no food, no resource of any kind in this distant nation.

Why, then, are we there? Why? Why?

We are there for one very simple reason, Mr. President. We were invited by the Government of South Vietnam to come. We were asked to help. So we did. The Geneva accords formally recognized South Vietnam as a nation. Its sovereignty is established by solemn agreement, ratified by the principal powers of the world.

That sovereignty has been challenged by an invasion from outside its boundaries. The fact of aggression has been proved beyond any doubt, repeatedly—and of course, most recently, by the white paper released over the weekend by the State Department which documented the facts in great detail and over a period of time.

It has been proved over and over and over again virtually every day for more than 10 years now.

SINGLE AMERICAN MOTIVE: PEACE

But why should we, the U.S. Government, become so involved? What is our motive, if our hands are so clean, if we desire no territory, no power, no economic advantage? What do we want?

Mr. President, we want peace.

Our record proves that we want peace. Every action we have taken has been taken to prevent aggression and restore peace. Every pound of food—and we have sent millions of tons—every man-hour of education in peaceful pursuits—and we have poured in thousands of man-years in such education—every dollar spent to provide health facilities, build schools, construct roads and improve agriculture—and we have spent hundreds of millions of dollars for these

purposes—has been directed toward our peaceful goal of building a solid and stable South Vietnam.

For years our Vietnam policy has been carefully, and sometimes painfully, designed to avoid overt military action by American soldiers. This has been done in spite of the most serious and continuous provocation.

Even following the Tonkin Gulf and Pleiku incidents the President had confined our retaliation in size. He has limited it to military targets and he has limited its duration and made it appropriate to the provocation.

These are not the reactions of a President or an administration interested in extending the war, or of developing a big war. It is the obvious reaction of an administration deeply interested in securing peace. Above all, he has announced that the retaliation was for the sole purpose of preventing further aggression.

LONG RECORD OF NORTH VIETNAM AGGRESSION

To understand what is happening in Vietnam—and what is at stake in the whole of southeast Asia—it is necessary to go back to the fundamentals of the situation: to the history of Communist efforts to capture South Vietnam and our commitment to prevent this from happening.

The root of the problem is well known. From the time of the Geneva Conference in 1954, the Communist authorities in North Vietnam planned and expected to take over the area south of the 17th parallel. At first, they probably believed South Vietnam would fall to them like an overripe fruit, theirs for the plucking, as a result of failure to achieve internal stability and unity in the South. But their fond hopes were thwarted by the progress achieved by South Vietnam in the areas of political stability—this was at the beginning—and economic development.

In these fields, the South soon outstripped the North. From the first, it was clear that whatever internal problems South Vietnam had, they were united in their opposition to falling under the Communist domination of Hanoi. By 1958, South Vietnam had become a self-governing republic and had assumed its place in the family of nations.

Thwarted in their initial hopes of easy conquest, the Communists undertook a campaign of terror and subversion aimed at undermining the South Vietnamese Government and social structure. By 1959, a war of covert aggression was well underway. Without openly declaring war, the Hanoi government began to infiltrate guerrilla fighters and military equipment from the north, supplementing a base of loyal Communists who had stayed behind and gone underground after the 1954 accords. Any thought that this was a small effort which would soon end was quickly shown to be false.

In this confusing situation, we cannot argue—and I do not believe that any person devoted to the administration has argued—that all the invasion is from outside. There are fifth columnists living in South Vietnam. They, too, include a substantial and significant part of the Vietnamese population.

In 1960 and 1961, the situation in South Vietnam grew more critical. As one measure of its seriousness—and of the character of the attack—over 3,000 civilians, in and out of government, were killed, and another 2,500 kidnaped in those 2 years.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. As usual, the Senate is listening to a thoughtful and constructive address by the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE] on one of the major problems facing this country today.

I am glad to note at the end of the Senator's remarks—which I had the privilege of reading earlier—that he mentions a speech made by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, William Bundy. That talk was made in a country town in my State. Although it was given considerable publicity in the metropolitan newspapers, it is also important that the problem be disseminated throughout the country so that the American people will understand the problem better than they do today.

I am impressed with some of the facts and figures the Senator is giving today which, to be frank, I did not know.

I would ask the Senator inasmuch as he emphasizes the fact that the reason why we are in South Vietnam is that we were asked to come in to help preserve their freedom—what does the Senator believe would be our course of action if one of the many South Vietnamese governments—and I believe there have been 13 or 14 since the death of Diem—suggested that it could handle the situation better if we left?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I may say to the distinguished Senator from Missouri that one of the implications of his question, which should be noted, is the fact that not one of the 13 or 14 governments, some of which have had Buddhist representation, and various kinds of representation, has requested us to leave South Vietnam.

It is clear, of course, that there may be circumstances beyond our control which would make it necessary for us to leave. It is not inevitable, and it is not written in destiny, that we are sure to win. Of course, if the South Vietnamese Government were to ask us to leave our position would be seriously weakened. It would be tragic. However, what would happen under those circumstances would be a decision that the President would have to make, considering all the factors and considering what would be the attitude of the people of South Vietnam and the attitude of the armed forces.

However, I believe it is significant that the Senator's question implied that not one of these governments has asked us to leave; in fact, they have all been anxious to have us stay there.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank my friend from Wisconsin for the speech he is making. It is further clarifying some of the problems we face in Vietnam, and I also thank him for his kindness in yielding to me.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the distinguished Senator from Missouri, whom I very greatly admire, not only as one of the outstanding experts in this country on our military position, but also as a true statesman, who is an expert on our foreign policy and on our foreign policy position.

The Senator from Missouri is one of the few Senators who have been Cabinet officials. He is also a member of both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, and has taken in informed and constructive position constantly in our foreign policy.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am grateful for the remarks of the Senator from Wisconsin.

COMMUNIST TERROR CAMPAIGN AGAINST SKILLED, EDUCATED

Mr. PROXMIRE. The Communists concentrated their attacks on the skilled and educated: teachers, doctors, engineers, government officials. By this method, they spread terror and severely damaged the nation's social fabric by eliminating individuals crucial to the functioning of civilized society. Infiltration from the north increased.

We must remember that this is a new kind of war. This is an entirely different kind of situation than we have ever experienced in the past. It is not the kind of clear-cut situation with which we are accustomed to dealing in our military conflicts. It is very hard to find any historical precedents for the situation which confronts us here.

People in many areas came under Communist control and had to provide food and supplies for the guerrillas.

It was obvious that the peacekeeping machinery created by the Geneva Conference had failed. The United States had been assisting South Vietnam from the start, and at its urgent request in 1961, our military and economic assistance was increased.

But it is important to bear in mind that the basis of our presence was entirely different from that of the French. The French were in Vietnam seeking to reestablish a colonial empire.

Many critics of our Vietnamese position have asked, if the French could not stay there with several hundred thousand troops, how can we expect to stay there?

Mr. President, we are in South Vietnam on an entirely different basis. The Vietnamese know that we do not intend to exploit them, that we do not intend to use them to enrich our own country in any way. We are there to assist them and to support them. We are just as far from being a colonial power as any country could be.

On the other hand, the infiltrators, the invaders from the north, are certainly in the old tradition of the empire builders.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I do not have the exact figures at my fingertips, but I believe the Record shows that there are about 600,000 Vietnamese troops fighting for South Viet-

nam at this moment, compared with 26,000 Americans over there. Furthermore, for every casualty we have suffered, the South Vietnamese themselves have suffered at least 10 casualties. Also, it should be remembered, that for every South Vietnamese soldier who has been wounded or killed in combat, the South Vietnamese soldiers have killed or wounded two Vietcongs.

When some people say that the Vietnamese are not fighting for their country, it seems to me that statement is disproved by the ratio of their killing or wounding two Vietcongs for every casualty that they suffer. To me that indicates that the South Vietnamese are doing a pretty good job of fighting for their country.

Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator is absolutely correct. I might point out, also, that not only have the South Vietnamese engaged in this very difficult war for many years, but they have also suffered the infiltration and intimidation and terror that is so remote from any experience that we have ever had, in which the mayors or the leaders of their little hamlets are tortured and murdered, and even the South Vietnamese children of local officials are tortured and murdered to break the continued will to resist.

We must not lose sight of this kind of terror, torture, and murder.

As the distinguished Senator from Louisiana has said, the South Vietnamese soldiers are fighting and are fighting well and inflicting more casualties on the infiltrators and invaders than they are themselves suffering. That is not the conduct of people who are not willing to support their friends and defend their nation. This, I believe, is the real answer to the question raised by the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS].

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If our country should pull out, we would be running out on hundreds of thousands of courageous fighting men who are fighting on our side, with the result that those people would have no hope of being able to continue their fight against the Communist aggression.

Red China knows that it would confront the United States if it got into the war. Does the Senator have any doubt that Red China would be using every method of subversion and infiltration available to that country if they felt the United States would stay completely out?

Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator from Louisiana raises an excellent point that I had not thought of. If it were not for our presence in South Vietnam, there is no question that the rich ricefields of South Vietnam and its potentially very rich economy would induce the hungry Chinese to move down, in view of their philosophy that war should be an instrument of foreign policy.

The Red Chinese have a very militant kind of government, which would not hesitate to do exactly what the Senator has suggested, if it were not confronted with the kind of language it understands, and that is the language of real military power.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I have had an opportunity to read through the first part of the Senator's

speech, and I regret that I have not had an opportunity to read all of it. I agree with the portion of the speech that I have been able to read, and I am sure that I would also agree with the Senator's entire presentation.

I should like to ask the Senator this question. If we were to pull out and start running, can the Senator tell me where we are supposed to fight, in view of the fact that we have been trusted by people who have 600,000 men fighting in this war, in behalf of a cause that is very dear to our heart?

Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator raises a good point. It would be far better, in my opinion, if the war were to end in a stalemate in South Vietnam, or if it were necessary for us to stay there 5 or 10 or 15 years, than to retreat and fight elsewhere. If the Communists can win this kind of war of intimidation and violence and infiltration, they will not stop. Why should they stop, when they will have been rewarded? They will continue. Our present policy of standing up to the Communists is by far the best way to achieve peace.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If we proceed to limit ourselves to fighting the war on the enemy's terms, after we have suffered two or three hundred American casualties, and then proceed to say the price is too high and desert this friendly government and put it in the position of being forced to surrender the 600,000 well-armed troops into the hands of the enemy, can the Senator from Wisconsin tell me what the attitude of the Communists would be the next time they started to infiltrate a friendly nation? Would they not say, "If we inflict a few casualties on the Americans"—and they have been relatively light casualties, if we relate them to the kind of casualties that we have been accustomed to suffering when we have decided to fight—"they will lose their nerve and courage"?

Is it not true that the Communist doctrine is to take over the whole world, including this country, and that that doctrine, particularly on the part of the Chinese Communists, which is voiced by Hanoi, is that there must be no coexistence, that they must stop at nothing until they have taken over the whole world, and that the sooner they do it the better?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I could not agree more with the distinguished Senator from Louisiana. These are dangerous policies on our part, but any policies that we could follow would be dangerous. We are making a sacrifice. It is a terrible thing when American men lose their lives. The expense is very great. But after all, considering the strength and wealth of this country the burden is on us in Vietnam is relatively light, not heavy. If we must give in, if we cannot win under those circumstances, light as this burden is, if we have to complain of a burden when we have tax cuts at home, when our personal income has never been higher, when the foreign aid bill is being cut, and the defense budget is being cut—if we cannot bear this kind of burden, the Communists will not be stopped. Of course, they will continue.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I am delighted to yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. SIMPSON. I have had the advantage of reading the script of the speech of the Senator from Wisconsin. In the main, I agree with him wholeheartedly. He has done his usually good job. He is very articulate and persuasive.

One portion of his speech disturbs me, and I should like to have the Senator address himself to that portion. The Senator stated:

Even following the Tonkin Gulf and Pleiku incidents the President has confined our retaliation in size, limited it to military targets, limited its duration and made it appropriate to the provocation.

And above all, he has announced that the retaliation was for the sole purpose of preventing further aggression.

Does the Senator believe that we can only fight up to the strength of opposition and then lie by waiting for the enemy to gain new strength? Let us take the example of a prizefighter in the ring. He does not merely retaliate in kind. He pours on the heat and tries to win the bout by his own force. In the instance about which we are speaking, it would be the full force of arms.

It seems to this cat-and-mouse business is bad for America. If we are in a war, why do we not conclude it? We have the strength and power to do so. Why do we not conclude it and restore peace to South Vietnam, even at the risk of a great loss to the North Vietcong?

Mr. PROXMIRE. The question of the Senator from Wyoming is very helpful. It is helpful because it defines what I believe is the position taken by the administration under the circumstances and the position taken by other people who feel that we should undertake an all-out effort and do whatever is necessary in order to win, even if winning should mean an invasion of North Vietnam—and, in my judgment, it might very well under those circumstances mean drawing China in and being involved in a major war on the continent. There are many well-informed and able people like the Senator from Wyoming who take that position. I do not take that position. It seems to me that is clearly not the position at the present time of the administration. The position of the administration at the present time appears to be that we are not trying to win unconditional surrender of North Vietnam, let alone China or Russia. Many people feel we should never have settled for the qualified termination of hostilities that we did in Korea, and that we should have insisted on unconditional surrender in Korea.

Others—and I think more, wisely—have felt that that was the only way we could settle the problem without involving ourselves in a catastrophic war on the continent of Asia that would have been endless or would have required our use of nuclear weapons.

I am inclined to feel that the position which the administration is taking in South Vietnam is a halfway position. It is not a position that would go all out and use all of our weapons, including our nuclear weapons, and whatever else is necessary, in order to win. The administration is taking a position that we

should not do that, and I agree with that attitude.

Mr. SIMPSON. I thank the Senator from Wisconsin for his learned discussion. In the main I agree with his entire speech, but I am in disagreement with him on this particular point.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the distinguished Senator from Wyoming very much.

We are there in response to the request of a native, indigenous government seeking to preserve itself against aggression. We are not involved in Vietnam in pursuit of national military aims. Secretary of State Dean Rusk recently pointed out that in 1959 "no foreign nation had bases or fighting forces in South Vietnam. South Vietnam was not a member of any alliance. If it was a threat to North Vietnam it was because its economy far outshone the vaunted Communist paradise to the north."

Much of this progress represents the fruits of economic aid furnished by the United States. While there has been much discussion of military aid we have sent to South Vietnam, it is important to recognize that our military aid has been defensive in nature. Our forces there have been advisory. Until the provocations of recent months, American servicemen were engaged almost exclusively in training and advisory positions.

When American forces participated in any combat action, with the exception of the limited air strikes, their efforts were defensive. The air strikes themselves were defensive in that they were designed to deter further aggression, not to expand the war.

Last night at the Leipzig Trade Fair Soviet Premier Kosygin said:

I haven't read the American white book. It cannot be a white book, but rather a black book. The dirty acts of the Americans in Vietnam cannot be put down in a white book.

Mr. President, disregarding the dirty acts of the Soviet Union, with which history is replete ever since the Soviet has been in power in Russia, what is the real American story in Vietnam? Our record in South Vietnam is a great record. Of course, it has not been talked about by Premier Kosygin, the Red Chinese, or the Red North Vietnamese. But the tragedy is that it has not been talked about much by U.S. Senators either. It is a peaceful record, an amazingly peaceful record, for which the only precedent is the American people's peaceful attempts at international assistance and our answer to appeals from other nations in the world since World War II.

SOLID U.S. RECORD OF PEACEFUL AID

A study of our record in South Vietnam shows clearly our peaceful intentions—and more than intentions—a remarkable working for peace.

Much of our effort there has been economic and technical, to build the country's agricultural and industrial economies.

Our support in South Vietnam has stressed education, health, and community development. Since 1962 alone we have spent more than \$228 million in food-for-peace shipments to South Vietnam—and Kosygin talks about a dirty

record and about a black book of American performance in South Vietnam.

During the same period, counting estimated expenditures for this year, our economic aid will total \$599,800,000. And since 1955, again counting estimated expenditures for 1965, we have committed \$2.8 billion in nonmilitary economic aid.

Compare that with the record of the Soviet Union anywhere in the world. This is a record of generosity, a record of help and peaceful, constructive assistance.

What programs are these funds supporting? Do they represent a threat to the security of North Vietnam?

DETAILS OF U.S. AID

Illustrative of the social and economic activities being implemented with United States help are—

Introduction of improved varieties of pigs and construction of improved pigpens. This is the kind of thing that helps the peaceful agriculture economy in South Vietnam.

Teaching the primitive Montagnard tribal people how to use water buffalo as beasts of burden rather than as sacrificial animals. The Montagnards are people somewhat different from the rest of the South Vietnamese. They are more primitive people, and from all records they have a deep affection, admiration and gratitude to the American people. They are also fine fighters.

Developing and helping build a variety of simple, economical and practical devices which will improve the life of rural people, such as water wheels for irrigation purposes.

Introduction of wooden windmills.

Introduction of cheap, locally made hydrojet well drilling rigs.

Helping the Vietnamese to build simple and inexpensive hamlet school buildings.

Assisting hamlet leaders in planning, selection and mobilization of support for self-help projects.

Training teachers in agricultural methods.

When I said thousands of man-years, I meant that. Thousands of man-years have been spent to help the economy of South Vietnam. These teachers will then form demonstration teams to teach improved agricultural practices to peasants.

Introduction of fertilizer, which has often doubled yields.

Introduction of improved varieties of crops which are suited to the climate and soil, such as onions, sweetpotatoes, and corn. That is the American record of South Vietnam.

In addition to stimulating rural progress, the economic aid has laid the groundwork for substantial economic, educational and social progress in urban areas.

U.S. EDUCATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Some of these achievements include—

Vocational education: This American Nation of ours has built and equipped a central polytechnic institution and three secondary-level polytechnic schools in South Vietnam. The United States has reequipped six other vocational schools. We have provided technical assistance for nine rural 2-year trade schools. In 1955, there were only 1,700 students.

Now there are 7,000 students enrolled in vocational schools receiving American assistance in South Vietnam.

General education: America has helped build four teacher-training schools—one at Saigon, two in the provinces and one designed for Montagnard teachers. Americans are right now engaged in helping train more than 2,000 prospective teachers in these schools.

We have helped build some 900 hamlet classrooms since mid-1962. We helped build 3,500 elementary classrooms and 282 secondary classrooms earlier. Over 1,000 teachers have attended a 90-day training course with American help. We have helped train over 4,000 teachers at vocational workshops. Enrollment in elementary schools has increased from 300,000 in 1955 to 1,400,000 in 1963. More than 3 million textbooks have been published.

That is the kind of record that Kosygin calls a dirty record, best reflected in a "black book."

U.S. HEALTH AID

Health: This American Nation of ours in pursuit of a strong, peaceful South Vietnam has helped establish and stock 12,500 villages and hamlets. Each station has been staffed with a local person trained with American help in first aid and health courses. A malaria eradication program, financed by the United States, has resulted in a drop in the malaria incidence rate from 7.22 percent in 1958 to .77 percent in 1962.

That was in only 51 years. In other words, a 7 percent malaria incidence was reduced to less than 1 percent, thanks to an American-financed health program.

Public administration: With American help the National Institute of Administration, which will graduate some 350 qualified civil servants annually, has been built and staffed. We have assisted in establishing training centers for village officials in 21 provincial centers.

U.S. INDUSTRIAL ASSISTANCE

Transportation: With American help substantial progress has been made in all areas of transportation. We have helped build 272 miles of roads in South Vietnam. A \$7.7 million United States' loan financed the purchase of equipment for the Vietnam National Railway system. American funds provided eight dredges to keep water arteries open. We financed a 10,000-foot jet runway at Saigon airport.

Water supply: Americans helped to drill more than 1,400 wells that will provide clean, fresh, sanitary water for 750,000 rural inhabitants. Thanks to America, fresh water will be supplied to some 500,000 urban dwellers through the installation of water systems in 35 cities.

Electric power: In pursuit of an independent, peaceful South Vietnam, we have helped provide the chief province and district towns with the electric power of 162 diesel generating units. We will step up this program.

This is the kind of peaceful, strong economy we are building in South Vietnam. The reason why the Communists are invading is that they cannot afford to have another show window for the West, a window to show how people can prosper when they have the kind of

peaceful, prosperous, growing economy free of Communist domination.

A \$12.7 million AID—American—loan is being used to construct a 33,000 kilowatt powerplant in the Saigon metropolitan area. When the plant is completed shortly it will be a boon to industrial users who are now often dependent on costly individual diesel generators.

Industry: About 13,000 workers are employed in 50 new factories, built with American aid. South Vietnam is now largely self-sufficient in the spinning and weaving of cotton textiles as a result of this U.S. program.

Communications: We have helped build a national network of seven major radio stations. With American help 6,000 community listening centers were established. A modern microwave telecommunication system is nearing completion, which will give Saigon telephone connection with the principal towns of the Delta provinces.

What a brilliant and proud record of constructive contributions to peace this story of American services in South Vietnam represents. We have devoted ourselves unstintingly to education and health, to the patient, peaceful development essential to independence for this country.

This is the story that has not been told in the headlines of violence, murder, coups, and retaliation in South Vietnam. But this is the big American story.

U.S. PEACEFUL AID VS COMMUNIST TERROR

I detailed these programs to point out that not one of them—not a single one—can be in any way interpreted as providing a threat to the North Vietnamese Government or people. There should be no doubt of this.

Let there be no doubt on another score. The Communists in North Vietnam are responsible for the aggression against South Vietnam. They direct and supply it; if they desire they can bring it to an end. Recent evidence makes it clear that a majority, possibly as much as three-fourths, of hard-core Vietcong strength in South Vietnam comes from the north.

North Vietnam provides nearly all the more sophisticated weaponry used by the Vietcong, such as high-caliber guns, mortars, and antiaircraft weapons. The evidence is that the flow of men and equipment from North Vietnam increased in 1954, and continues to increase.

Those who have been criticizing our policy in South Vietnam are quick to argue that, after all, the Americans have installed more weaponry in South Vietnam than North Vietnam has sent in, more than the Vietcong has supplied. Of course we have. But what a difference: We are sending in our weaponry to defend South Vietnam because its duly constituted governments have asked us to do so. The other side is supplying theirs to subvert, dominate, overwhelm, and control that country.

Along with the men and equipment comes command and strategy, and the basic training and guidance in the sordid arts of guerrilla warfare. Hanoi's supplies, direction, support and inspiration are crucial to the continuation of the Vietcong campaign against the south.

Faced with this kind of attack it is hardly surprising that the fledgling country of South Vietnam has had its share of problems. It is hard enough for a new nation to govern successfully under the best of conditions. Fighting a counterinsurgency war imposes enormous additional burdens.

POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The weakest part of the situation in South Vietnam is its political instability. This is a really vulnerable position. The distinguished Senator from New York is correct in asking the question. It is a question that is extremely difficult to answer. How can we determine whether the people of South Vietnam really support our position? But, of course, this is what the Communists are working toward.

One consequence of the difficulties has been the chronic political instability of the central government in Saigon. A succession of coups has installed one government after another, creating an impression that is both bewildering and disturbing to those of us who are used to having our governments assume office as a result of elections, not coups—and every 4 years, not eight times in 16 months.

This political instability is a serious matter, both because it interferes with successful prosecution of the war against the Vietcong and because it makes it harder to build a better life for the people of South Vietnam. We are doing what we can to aid the cause of political unity and stability in South Vietnam—but this is an area in which we can play only a limited role.

Mr. MCGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. PROXMIER. I am glad to yield.

Mr. MCGEE. I commend the Senator from Wisconsin for the focus of his comments on Vietnam. So much information is on the loose today that it seems to me that an attempt is being made to reduce the question to very simple terms—to jump to the conclusion, for example, that the people in South Vietnam do not approve of the government in Saigon. Like the Senator from Wisconsin, I share the view, first, that we cannot know for certain. There is no way we can measure in South Vietnam. It is difficult enough to measure here, sometimes; but as Winston Churchill once reminded us, we are not conducting a foreign policy with a thermometer in one hand and a George Gallup poll in the other. We have to take policy positions because they are fundamental in the national interest.

I doubt very much whether the position of the Montagnards, vis-a-vis the United States, is not to operate their own government.

The instability of the Vietnamese Government is a headache. Its uncertainties create frustrations for us. But it seems to me that that is not the major criterion. The black marketeers and the monarchy were headaches to us in Greece. But that did not deter us from holding off the Communists so that the Greek people themselves could improve their lot and improve their position.

I say that we ought to get our ducks

in the right kind of order, to borrow an old cliché; that is, to put first things first. The first thing is to keep the forces from the north from forcibly intruding their influence and the impact of their force on the land to the south.

I suspect that the mistake we made, in part, was in trying to equate Saigon with Washington, in a political sense; trying to imagine that because we have democracy, the Vietnamese can have democracy. They have only recently emerged from generations of colonial domination by one great power after another. On the other hand, democracy is one of the most difficult, sophisticated, and complicated arts of government.

We have been working at it for nearly 200 years ourselves. We still have a little way to go. We tried to spoon-feed democracy to the Germans, who were a very sophisticated political people following World War I. The Weimar regime went down the drain. Democracy is something that one must learn. One must grow up with it.

I submit that the ingredients for democracy will not be present in Vietnam for a long time to come. Probably we shall see in the Senator's lifetime, and mine, little but a succession of one kind of dictatorship after another, in that part of the world.

While we do not like that, in comparison with our own experience, I think it is a fair substitute to achieve that kind of success, to win them over to preserving their national independence.

I think the Senator has done well to place stress on the importance of keeping first things first.

I have been to Vietnam only twice. Both times I was in the jungles, and in the areas where the fighting was going on. I was struck by the warm reception and almost the worship that many of these Montagnards have for the Americans who are living with them, and helping them meet their day-to-day problems. This is the kind of story that we are not relating frequently enough. I have talked to American boys who have just come back from some of the Vietnamese villages. They want to go back again.

These are matters that are often omitted for the sake of tradition and having a contrast between "good guys" and "bad guys," truth and falsehood, and peace and war. Most of the story is important in that area.

I hope the Senator will pursue, on other fronts, the approach he has taken in the Senate to stress what happens to have gone right in Vietnam; what happens to have been on the constructive and historical side of the picture in terms of making improvement in Vietnam.

These people were not expected to last beyond 1954, when they became independent. They were given 12 months time, and then they were expected to fold up. But here we are, nearly 11 years later. They are still going forward, and I suspect from the kind of determination that is theirs, and the kind of determination that President Johnson has manifested with regard to his own policy position, that they will be there for all time to come.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Wyoming. He has been an outstanding leader in support of the administration's position. He has an unusual understanding of the situation in Vietnam and has taken a remarkably deep interest in our foreign affairs for many years.

The points made by the Senator from Wyoming are correct. I am delighted that he supports my position in this matter.

I stress the main point that I seek to make here. It is a partial answer to the senior Senator from New York; the fact that we have engaged in vast, far-reaching, and successful efforts to help education, health, transportation, and so forth in South Vietnam. This assistance is not the kind of thing that enrages or infuriates people. When they know that they have worked with Americans who helped them train thousands of teachers, develop a pure water system, stop malaria, and so forth, it seems to me that this is an ingredient for support of their position.

The important thing—and here we are in agreement with the Vietnamese—is not to let the problems in Saigon sap our efforts in the deeper struggle against the Communists. The two problems are, of course, related. Victory over the Communists is hard to achieve even with a strong central government. But let us not fall into the Communist propaganda-trap of thinking that a coup in Saigon means the South Vietnamese people would rather be governed by the Communists in Hanoi.

This is a mistake which we make because there is a coup resulting from a sharp difference of opinion among military leaders, all of whom agree on vigorously opposing the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. Certainly it seems to me it is not a basis for assuming that our position in South Vietnam is not supported by the South Vietnamese.

It would be the peak of irony if our own will were to weaken as a result of South Vietnam's internal political problems, for this would deliver to the enemy precisely what they desire. The Communists' methods of conquest are political as well as military. Whatever the means, the result is the same, as far as they are concerned: the takeover of South Vietnam, a goal they have sought—and we have opposed—for over 10 years.

If the Communists can take over in South Vietnam by an infiltration, by the Buddhists seizing the Government, they will do it that way. And they are trying to do it that way. If they can take over South Vietnam through a succession of coups, and this discourages us and makes us feel that South Vietnam is not interested enough, that is a Communist victory.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I compliment the Senator from Wisconsin on what I consider to be one of the finest contributions to an understanding of this problem ever made in this Chamber.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin, who has obviously given much knowledgeable thought to the problem in Vietnam, and whose remarks on it will be most helpful in leading the people of this country toward a consensus in support of the actions now being taken there by the President.

Further, it seems obvious to me that those who would make history must first study it. The United States is now making history in its actions in South Vietnam. We are faced there with a new type of Communist offensive of infiltration, subversion, and guerrilla activities supported externally. The long view of the study of history indicates that appeasement or withdrawal in the face of aggression has never been conducive to the establishment of a lasting peace.

As the Senator from Wisconsin has so ably pointed out, in our dealings in Vietnam, we must again apply the principle that unless we are willing, now, to take the risks involved—and we are all cognizant of the risks involved—in drawing the line in South Vietnam, we shall have to draw it somewhere. I, for one, would like to see it drawn in South Vietnam, rather than in Thailand, in Malaysia, in the Philippines, in Hawaii, or in San Francisco and Seattle.

For those who have questioned the policy of this country, I believe that it would be well for all Senators, as well as for the people of this country, to recall that Congress in Public Law 88-408, last session, set forth, in speaking of the attacks in South Vietnam:

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of our freedom;

In the "Resolved" part of the resolution it is further stated:

The United States is, therefore, prepared as the President determines to take all necessary steps including the use of armed force to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

That is what we are doing. As to the question that has been asked as to what we will do in the future, the resolution further states, in section 3:

This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

The peace in that troubled sector is not secure. The President of the United States is doing what must be done there. The President has clearly pointed out that our policy is one in which we seek no wider war. Over and over again, the President has stated that he will go anywhere, any time, to talk with anyone when there is reasonable hope of success in any kind of peace negotiations or discussion. It is clear to us, or it should be, that negotiations can be fruitful only where, first, we have someone willing to negotiate. In my judgment, we do not have such a situation now. Nor has

there been any evidence that there is any intent on the part of our adversaries to arrive at any kind of honorable and dignified solution as a result of negotiations.

Furthermore, there is no sense in negotiation unless there is some reasonable assurance that the people with whom we negotiate toward an agreement will carry out the agreement.

It is obvious from the study of the history of that problem that all that is necessary for peace to come to that troubled area of the world is for the Communists in Hanoi and elsewhere to fulfill the agreements they entered into in 1954 and again in 1962.

Therefore, for one, wish to uphold the hand of the President of the United States, who is the leader of the free world. He has a full understanding of the facts, which perhaps many of us do not have, because he has the means by which he can learn them. Furthermore, I am confident that he understands the grave and serious meaning of what is going on in southeast Asia as it relates to the protection of this country's interests and to the protection of the peace and security of the world.

Therefore, I am happy to have the opportunity to associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin, and to commend him for the very lucid explanation of the problem in that area and its history and what needs to be done about it.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. HARRIS] for a remarkable statement, impromptu and off the cuff, very thoughtful and well organized, and certainly most appropriate. I deeply appreciate his support in this matter.

AMERICAN GOALS

What then are our goals? As I see it, Mr. President, they are three in number:

First, Peace—an end to the fighting and terror in South Vietnam.

Does anyone question that goal? Why are we there? The only other reason why countries engage in this kind of war is that they want to annex territory, or to gain some kind of economic advantage. We do not want anything of that kind. Does anyone believe that President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, or President Johnson had any other objective at all except to achieve peace and freedom, recognizing that if we do not fight there we shall have to fight elsewhere?

Second, Preservation of the freedom of the South Vietnamese people to develop according to their own wishes, free from outside interference.

No one can say we are dominating the Government of South Vietnam. If we had dominated it, perhaps there would not have been all the coups that have taken place.

We have not attempted to dictate to the Government. No one can charge us with trying to interfere.

Third, An end to the spread of communism by force in southeast Asia—a program fostered and supported by Red China and one which poses a serious threat to our American security.

And this, our own American security, is the final reason, a very practical and the main reason, why we are expending this enormous amount of \$2.5 billion over a period of years and losing hundreds of American lives and endangering thousands of American lives in the future.

NO PEACE IN WITHDRAWAL

Mr. President, there are some who suggest that peace can be restored only if we withdraw from South Vietnam. I ask them—peace for whom? For the South Vietnamese? For the millions of others in southeast Asia who have thus far resisted Communist subversion? For the United States, which is committed by treaty to come to the aid of some of the very countries in that part of the world which will undoubtedly be the next target for this type of warfare?

How then can peace be achieved? It can come swiftly just as soon as the other side decides it is in their interest to make it happen. There should be no doubt on this point. Whether or not the authorities in Hanoi actually order each tactical operation—and it is my understanding that to a large extent they do—the key element is that they have the authority to bring the attack to an end.

They direct, supply, organize, and inspire the insurgency; they have the power to halt it. Peace will come when they learn to leave their neighbors alone, in South Vietnam, in Laos, and elsewhere.

Our goal is peace; theirs is conquest. After the years of struggle brought about by these conflicting aims, we have resorted finally to a means that has long been at our disposal, but which we have long refrained from using.

STRICTLY LIMITED U.S. MILITARY ACTION

It was hoped that the threat of airstrikes against North Vietnam would be sufficient to encourage sober thoughts in Hanoi.

Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Alaska has said, the mere presence of our 7th Fleet there indicates our power and gives us a strong position from which to negotiate. But the presence of any military power can give us no negotiating power unless the other side knows that we have the will to use that power. That is a grim fact, but it is a fact of life.

There had been hints, many of them obviously authoritative, that airstrikes north of the 17th parallel were under consideration. The Communists who rule North Vietnam knew that we had the airpower to inflict grave damage on them. But apparently the lesson had not sunk in.

The scale and frequency of Communist attacks in recent months continued to increase. The rate of infiltration of cadres from the North mounted ever higher. The new boldness took the form of attacks at American facilities. Our ships in the Gulf of Tonkin, the airfield at Bien Hoa, and, most recently, the attack at Pleiku and the destruction of the barracks at Qui Nhon, where 23 Americans lost their lives.

Faced with this escalation by the other side, the President ordered the measured response of U.S. airstrikes at Communist military facilities in North Vietnam.

This was not a case of all-out saturation bombing. It was aimed at specific staging areas and depots used by the Communists to reinforce and supply the Vietcong. And the message it carried to Hanoi was clear: "Watch out, you're playing a dangerous game, and there are serious risks for you as well."

On Wednesday, February 24, it was announced that since Thursday, February 18, U.S. jet bombers have attacked the Vietcong. The crews were indeed solely American. Once again the objective was military, strictly and exclusively military. Jet attacks are limited in duration and in size. They are confined to Vietcong, identifiable enemy concentrations, hostile foreign concentrations within South Vietnam territory.

Indeed, we are more directly involved. But once again the involvement is measured, restricted, military in its nature; and, in my judgment, it is consonant with our basic purpose of taking whatever action we have to take—painful as it may be—to achieve the peace.

Mr. President, it was helpful on the part of the distinguished Senator from Wyoming [Mr. SIMPSON] to ask, "Why should we not move in all the way with our military force? Why should we not end the war by using the full force of our Navy, Air Force, and Army, to end it?"

This gives us a chance to emphasize that this is not the policy of the President of the United States, that this Johnson administration policy is a limited effort to do all we can to achieve peace, which will have to be a negotiated and compromised peace, because we will not take over North Vietnam.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR WAR EXPANSION: NORTH VIETNAM

I find it odd that the President should stand accused of "expanding" the war. This war was long since expanded—from the north to the south. These airstrikes were undertaken, in the words of the White House statement, "in response to direct provocation by the Hanoi regime."

Responsibility for the provocations lies north of the 17th parallel. Up to now, our efforts have been concentrated in South Vietnam. Our actions of past weeks have served to make those responsible for the war aware of the consequences it could have for them if it continues unabated.

On August 7, 1964, at the time of the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin, the Senate by a vote of 88 to 2 adopted a joint resolution with the stated purpose: "To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia."

The resolution saw the attacks in the Tonkin Gulf as "part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors" and stated, "That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."

What else has the President done? This was a resolution passed with as much unanimity as it is possible to ex-

pect on a controversial situation. The vote was 88 to 2. The President is doing precisely what the resolution seeks to do. Virtually every Senator subscribed to that position.

CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION SUPPORTED PRESIDENT

How can we in the Senate now ask why we are in South Vietnam? The Senate resolution states it clearly. This is our determination—Republican and Democratic, Liberal and Conservative. A vote of 88 to 2 on any matter is pretty overwhelming and in the case of Vietnam, it surely represented a resounding endorsement of President Johnson's policies.

While we pursue these goals, we must continue to make clear, as President Johnson has repeatedly stated, that our fundamental purpose is peace. We seek no wider war.

What we seek in South Vietnam is no more than a peaceful settlement spelled out in the 1954 Geneva accords which guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of South Vietnam. But this time we would like to see the accords supported by more effective enforcement machinery, to see that peace will stick. These are the basic ingredients for an end to the fighting.

It does not take a lot of diplomatic sophistication to understand our position. It is logical; it is simple. Above all, it is peaceful. Of course it means an end to the pattern of external aggression carried on by the Hanoi regime from the time it came to power.

CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS

There may be a time to talk; all wars end in talk. But for talk to be fruitful the other side must acknowledge the heavy responsibility that is theirs. They must show by their actions that they want peace and will end the aggressive conduct that prevents it.

It would be a grim mistake to move to the conference table before such indications are present. Perhaps the worst outcome of all would be a conference that ended in failure. The war would resume without even the glimmer of hope that the possibility of peace talks always offer.

This is a fact that has not been recognized by those who are pressing for negotiations.

We must be ready always to talk—but we must insist that the conditions for talk are present. We cannot take part in a conference that merely ratifies the fruits of aggression.

Mr. President, we must be prepared to look forward, not merely to many more months, but to many more years, of hard service in South Vietnam, with years of sacrifice and work and dangers and loss of life, years in which we work to assist the people of South Vietnam to build a strong and independent country.

This effort in South Vietnam, if we continue it—and I hope and pray that we do—will not be more popular in the future with the American people. It will become less and less popular. It will take more and more patience. It will take more leadership and courage on the part of Senators and other leaders to speak out to the American people.

The real division is not between those who say get out of South Vietnam now with negotiation, and those who say end the war now by blasting Hanoi and all of North Vietnam off the face of the earth. The realists are on neither side of this argument. The realists oppose both solutions. The realistic policy is to prepare to stay in South Vietnam for years and years and years—no matter how long it takes, to outlast the Communists, to outeducate them, to outwork them, to outserve them in the cause of peace.

The difference is between those who think we have done too much in South Vietnam and the time has come to get out of to mount a full-scale invasion of the North and those who think we have not done enough, and that we have to broaden and deepen our commitments—especially our economic and social commitments in Vietnam.

Mr. President, if we are going to stop Communists in South Vietnam or in Cambodia or Burma or Malaysia or South Korea or the Philippines, it is not going to be easy. Throughout our lifetime and very likely throughout the lifetime of our children there will be no end of struggle and sacrifice, of danger and heavy cost. Not because America wants war, now or ever, in South Vietnam or anywhere else, but because the Communists and especially the Red Chinese have made it clear that they will use war to achieve their ends whenever it suits their purpose and because we will oppose this gradual Communist conquest in defense of freedom.

This world contest against communism is a struggle we are not sure to win. We could lose. But certainly if we help this independent country of South Vietnam to maintain its independence, we enhance the prospect of freedom and of peace surviving.

Which is better, Mr. President, to stay and slug it out in stalemate in South Vietnam or to give in, give up, retreat, fall back, and have to slug it out elsewhere in Asia against an encouraged and victorious Communist enemy?

Does any Senator honestly think that the Communists will stop with South Vietnam, if we give it to them? Does any Senator really think that such a course will discourage the Communists from continuing this successful course until they have all of Asia and push on from there?

And where, Mr. President, is the basis for our negotiation now. What do the Communists offer? Indeed, what will they offer, when they are convinced they are winning?

The plain and perhaps brutal truth, particularly to those who have urged the President to negotiate a settlement, is that the Communist camp has given us nothing to negotiate short of U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam which would open the door to a takeover by the Hanoi regime.

This is an ultimatum, not a feeler to begin negotiations. The stage for negotiations will be set when the reign of terror—brought about by infiltration,

subversion, bombings, and murders—is brought to an end by the North Vietnamese. A truce or cease-fire—call it what you will—brought about by the North will set the stage for talks that can be fruitful.

It seems clear that these conditions do not now exist. So we must carry on with firmness and resolution. We must meet force with force. We must show with patience and determination that we mean to stay in Vietnam—not for a week, or month, but for 1 year or 2 years or 10 years, whatever is required to achieve our goal and carry out our commitment.

And above all, we must be willing to take the military measures necessary to drive home this determination to the North Vietnamese and their Chinese Communist overlords. This can only be done by making their aggressive ventures into South Vietnam so painful and so unprofitable as to be discouraging. If broader airstrikes are required, they must be made. If more determined ground action to cut off infiltration appears necessary, we must be willing to make the sacrifice. If greater use of our superior seapower will meet our needs, then so be it.

It is my view and I believe the view of the administration, that cries for negotiation now have a very, very bad effect on our South Vietnam allies and a highly encouraging effect on the Vietcong.

Let us never forget that our goal is peace. Peace is the clear aim of this administration.

President Johnson's course is not the course of massive full-scale war against North Vietnam. And it is not the course of negotiating now—a negotiation that could only ratify a Communist victory.

It is a harder and wiser course than either. It offers us the best prospect of peace and the best prospect of freedom.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that several recent White House statements, Ambassador Stevenson's February 8 letter to the President of the Security Council, and a most cogent speech by Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East William Bundy, be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD together with the Department of State's white paper—the statement on aggression from the north—the record of North Vietnam's campaign to conquer South Vietnam, omitting the appendix, and the excellent letter from Adlai Stevenson delivering this white paper to the U.N. They state these points—our commitment to peace, our willingness to use whatever means are necessary to achieve it—with more eloquence than I have mustered in this statement.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BASS in the chair). Is there objection?

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Office of the White House Press Secretary, Feb. 7, 1965]

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Following meetings with the National Security Council, I have directed the orderly withdrawal of American dependents from South Vietnam.

It has become clear that Hanoi has undertaken a more aggressive course of action against both South Vietnamese and American installations, and against Americans who are in South Vietnam assisting the people of that country to defend their freedom. We have no choice now but to clear the decks and make absolutely clear our continued determination to back South Vietnam in its fight to maintain its independence.

In addition to this action, I have ordered the deployment to South Vietnam of a Hawk air defense battalion. Other reinforcements, in units and individuals may follow.

[From the Office of the White House Press Secretary, Feb. 11, 1965]

THE WHITE HOUSE.—On February 11, U.S. air elements joined with the South Vietnamese Air Force in attacks against military facilities in North Vietnam used by Hanoi for the training and infiltration of Vietcong personnel into South Vietnam.

These actions by the South Vietnamese and United States Governments were in response to further direct provocations by the Hanoi regime.

Since February 8, a large number of South Vietnamese and United States personnel have been killed in an increased number of Vietcong ambushes and attacks. A district town in Phuoc Long Province has been overrun, resulting in further Vietnamese and United States casualties. In Qui Nhon, Vietcong terrorists in attack on an American military billet murdered Americans and Vietnamese. In addition, there have been a number of mining and other attacks on the railway in South Vietnam as well as assassinations and ambushes involving South Vietnamese civil and military officials.

The U.S. Government has been in consultation with the Government of South Vietnam on this continuation of aggressions and outrages. While maintaining their desire to avoid spreading the conflict, the two Governments felt compelled to take the action described above.

[From the Office of the White House Press Secretary, Feb. 17, 1965]

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD AT THE SHERATON-PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C.

I should like to end this visit with you with a word on the very serious situation in Vietnam, which I know must be on the mind of each of you.

As I have said so many, many times, and other Presidents ahead of me have said, our purpose, our objective there is clear. That purpose and that objective is to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country.

We have no ambition there for ourselves. We seek no dominion. We seek no conquest. We seek no wider war. But we must all understand that we will persist in the defense of freedom, and our continuing actions will be those which are justified and those that are made necessary by the continuing aggression of others.

These actions will be measured and fitting and adequate. Our stamina and the stamina of the American people is equal to the task.

Thank you.

LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1965, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honor to inform you of the following acts which have further disturbed the peace in Vietnam.

In the early morning of February 7, Vietnamese time, Vietcong forces carried out coordinated attacks on South Vietnamese air bases in Pleiku and Tuy Hoa, on two barracks installations in the Fleiku area, and on a number of villages in the area of Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. Numerous casualties were inflicted, and at least one village was burned.

These attacks by the Vietcong, which operates under the military orders of North Vietnamese authorities in Hanoi, were a concerted and politically timed effort to sharpen and intensify the aggression at a moment designed for broader effect in the field of international politics, and to test the will of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States to resist that aggression.

The Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the Government of the United States immediately consulted and agreed that it was necessary to take prompt defensive action. Accordingly, on the afternoon of February 7, Vietnamese time, United States and South Vietnamese air elements were directed to take joint action against certain military facilities in the southern area of North Vietnam. An attack was carried through against Dong Hoi, which is a military installation and one of the major staging areas for the infiltration of armed cadres of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam in violation of international law and of the Geneva accords of 1954.

The Vietcong attacks of February 7 related directly to the central problem in Vietnam. That central problem is not one of a struggle by one element of the population in South Vietnam against the Government. There is, rather, a pattern of military operations directed, staffed, and supplied in crucial respects from outside the country. Up to 34,000 armed and trained soldiers have infiltrated into South Vietnam from the north since 1959. In addition, key items of equipment, such as mortars of the type employed in the attacks of February 7, have come from North Vietnam. During 1964, the infiltration of men and equipment has increased sharply, and virtually all of those now coming in are natives of North Vietnam.

Infiltration in such numbers can hardly be labeled "indirect aggression"—though that form of aggression is illegal, too. What we are witnessing in Vietnam today is a sustained attack for more than 6 years across a frontier set by international agreement.

Members of the Security Council will recall that we discussed in the Council, in August 1964, aggression by the Hanoi regime against naval units of the United States in the Gulf of Tonkin. At that time we described these attacks as part of a pattern which includes the infiltration of armed personnel to make war against the legitimate Government of South Vietnam, the arming of terrorist gangs in South Vietnam, the assassination of local officials as an instrument of policy, the continued fighting in Laos in violation of the Geneva agreements—a pattern, in short, of deliberate systematic and flagrant violations of international agreements by the regime in Hanoi which signed them and which by all tenets of decency, law, and civilized practice, is bound by their provisions.

The Republic of Vietnam, and at its request the Government of the United States and other governments, are resisting this systematic and continuing aggression. Since reinforcement of the Vietcong by infiltrators from North Vietnam is essential to this continuing aggression, countermeasures to arrest such reinforcement from the outside are a justified measure of self-defense.

Mr. President, my Government is reporting the measures which we have taken in accordance with our public commitment to assist the Republic of Vietnam against aggression from the north.

We deeply regret that the Hanoi regime, in its statement of August 8, 1964, which was circulated in Security Council document S/5888, explicitly denied the right of the Security Council to examine this problem. The disrespect of the Hanoi regime for the United Nations adds to the concern which any United Nations member state must feel about Hanoi's violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Nevertheless, I would remind you, and through you other members of the Security Council and of the United Nations, that our mission in southeast Asia is peace and that our purpose is to insure respect for the peace settlement to which all concerned are committed.

We, therefore, reserve the right to bring this matter to the Security Council if the situation warrants it.

In a statement issued this morning on behalf of President Johnson, the U.S. Government once again emphasized that "we seek no wider war. Whether or not this course can be maintained lies with the North Vietnamese aggressors. The key to the situation remains the cessation of infiltration from North Vietnam and the clear indication by the Hanoi regime that it is prepared to cease aggression against its neighbors."

Our objective is a peaceful settlement. This would require both the self-restraint of the regime to the north and the presence of effective international peacekeeping machinery to make sure that promises are kept.

This is our purpose. But we will not permit the situation to be changed by terror and violence and this is the meaning of our action this weekend.

Accept, etc.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Address by the Honorable William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, before the Washington Chamber of Commerce, Washington, Mo., Saturday, January 23, 1965)

INTRODUCTION

When my old friend, Senator Symington, relayed your invitation to come here, I was delighted to accept. I shall make only one partisan statement tonight, and that is to say how fortunate you in Missouri are in your distinguished senior Senator. For the rest, I would like to speak on the topic you have chosen—American Policy in South Vietnam and southeast Asia—totally without regard to partisanship. That topic and the issues it raises concern all of us, as Americans.

I shall talk, if I may, to three related sets of questions:

I. How did we come to be in South Vietnam? How does what we are doing there relate to our wider purposes in the world, to our specific purposes in Asia, and, in a word, to our national interests?

II. What has been the course of events in Vietnam that has brought us to the present situation?

III. What are the key problems, and what can we do to help in solving them and in achieving our objectives?

I.

The first question requires a look at history.

Even when the Far East was much more distant than it is today, we Americans had deep concern for developments there. Americans pioneered in trade and missionary effort with China and in opening up Japan to Western influence. In 1898 we became in a sense a colonial power in the Philippines, but began almost at once to prepare the way for independence and self-government there—an independence promised by act of Congress in 1898 and achieved on schedule in 1946. By the 1930's, we had wide interests of many

types in the Far East, though only few direct contacts in southeast Asia apart from the individual Americans who had served over decades as political advisers to the independent Kingdom of Thailand.

Events then took a more ominous turn. We became aware that the ambitions of Japanese military leaders to dominate all of Asia were a threat not only to the specific interests of ourselves and other Western nations, but to the peace of the whole area and indeed of the world. China, in which we had taken a lead in dismantling the 19th century system of foreign special privileges, was progressively threatened and large parts overrun. We ourselves were finally attacked at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. We responded to aggression by conducting with our allies a major Pacific war that cost the United States alone 272,700 casualties and over \$100 billion.

In the end Japanese militarism was defeated, and the way apparently cleared for an Asia of free and independent national states that would be progressively freed of colonialism, that need threaten neither each other nor neighboring states, and that could tackle in their own way the eternal problems of building political and economic structures that would satisfy the aspiration of their peoples.

That kind of Far East was a pretty good definition of our national interests then. It is equally valid today. We cared about the Far East, and we care today, because we know that what happens there—among peoples numbering 33 percent of the world's population, with great talent, past historic greatness, and capacity—is bound to make a crucial difference whether there will be the kind of world in which the common ideals of freedom can spread, nations live and work together without strife, and—most basic of all—we ourselves, in the long run, survive as the kind of nation we are determined to be. Our basic stake in the Far East is our stake in a peaceful and secure world as distinct from a violent and chaotic one. But there were three great flaws in the 1945 picture after the defeat of Japan.

1. In China, a civil war had been raging since the 1920's between the Government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist movement. After a brief and edgy truce during the war against Japan, that civil war was resumed in circumstances where the Government had been gravely weakened. We assisted that Government in every way possible. Mistakes may have been made, but in the last analysis mainland China could not have been saved from communism without the commitment of major U.S. ground and air forces to a second war on the Asian mainland. Faced with a concurrent threat from Soviet Russia against Europe and the Near East, we did not make—and perhaps could not then have made—that commitment. And there came to power on the mainland, in the fall of 1949, a Communist regime filled with hatred of the West, with the vision of a potential dominant role for China, but imbued above all with a primitive Communist ideology in its most virulent expansionist form.

2. In Korea, a divided country stood uneasily, half free and half Communist. With our military might sharply reduced after the war, as part of what may have been an inevitable slackening of effort, we withdrew our forces and reduced our economic aid before there was in existence a strong South Korean defense capacity. With Soviet backing North Korea attacked across the 38th parallel in June 1950. With the Soviets then absent from the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. was able to condemn the aggression and to mount a U.N. effort to assist South Korea. The United States played by far the greatest outside role in a conflict that brought 157,530 U.S. casualties,

cost us at least \$18 billion in direct expenses, and in the end—after Communist China had also intervened—restored an independent South Korea, although it left a unified and free Korea to be worked out in the future.

In retrospect, our action in Korea reflected three elements:

A recognition that aggression of any sort must be met early and head on, or it will have to be met later and in tougher circumstances. We had relearned the lessons of the 1930's—Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia.

A recognition that a defense line in Asia, stated in terms of an island perimeter, did not adequately define our vital interests—that those vital interests could be affected by action on the mainland of Asia.

An understanding that, for the future, a power vacuum was an invitation to aggression, that there must be local political, economic, and military strength in being to make aggression unprofitable, but also that there must be a demonstrated willingness of major external power both to assist and to intervene if required.

3. In southeast Asia, finally, there was a third major flaw—the difficulty of liquidating colonial regimes and replacing them by new and stable independent governments. The Philippines became independent and with our help overcame the ravages of war and the Communist Huk rebellion. The British, who had likewise prepared India and Burma and made them independent, were in the process of doing the same in Malaya even as they joined with the Malaysians in beating back a 12-year Communist subversive effort. Indonesia was less well prepared; it gained its independence too, with our support, but with scars that have continued to affect the otherwise natural and healthy development of Indonesian nationalism.

French Indochina was the toughest case. The French had thought in terms of a slow evolution to an eventual status within some French union of states—a concept too leisurely to fit the postwar mood of Asia. And militant Vietnamese nationalism had fallen to the leadership of dedicated Communists.

We all know the result. Even with substantial help from us, France was unable to defeat the Communist-led nationalist movement. Despite last-minute promises of independence, the struggle inevitably appeared as an attempt to preserve a colonial position. By 1954, it could only have been won, again, by a major U.S. military commitment, and perhaps not even then. The result was the settlement at Geneva. The accords reached there were almost certainly the best achievable, but they left a situation with many seeds of future trouble. Briefly:

1. North Vietnam was militantly Communist, and had developed during the war against the French an army well equipped and highly skilled in both conventional and subversive warfare. From the start, North Vietnam planned and expected to take over the south and in due course Laos and Cambodia, thinking that this would probably happen by sheer decay under pressure, but prepared to resort to other means if needed.

2. South Vietnam had no effective or popular leadership to start with, was demoralized and unprepared for self-government, and had only the remnants of the Vietnamese military forces who had fought with the French. Under the accords, external military help was limited to a few hundred advisers. Apart from its natural self-sufficiency in food, South Vietnam had few assets that appeared to match those of the north in the struggle that was sure to come.

3. Cambodia was more hopeful in some respects, more remote from North Vietnam, with a leader in Prince Sihanouk, a strong historical tradition, and the freedom to accept external assistance as she saw fit. From the start Sihanouk insisted, with our full

and continuing support, on a status of neutrality.

4. Laos, however, was less unified and was left under the accords with a built-in and legalized Communist presence, a disrupted and weak economy, and no military forces of significance.

Such was the situation President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles faced in 1954. Two things were clear—that in the absence of external help communism was virtually certain to take over the successor states of Indochina and to move to the borders of Thailand and perhaps beyond, and that with France no longer ready to act, at least in South Vietnam, no power other than the United States could move in to help fill the vacuum.

Their decision, expressed in a series of actions starting in late 1954, was to move in to help these countries. Besides South Vietnam and more modest efforts in Laos and Cambodia, substantial assistance was begun to Thailand.

The appropriations for these actions were voted by successive Congresses, and in 1954 the Senate likewise ratified the southeast Asia treaty, to which Thailand and the Philippines adhered, along with the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan. Although not signers of the treaty, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia could call on the SEATO members for help against aggression.

So a commitment was made, with the support of both political parties, that has guided our policy in southeast Asia for a decade now. It was not a commitment that envisaged a U.S. position of power in southeast Asia or U.S. military bases there. We threatened no one. Nor was it a commitment that substituted U.S. responsibility for the basic responsibility of the nations themselves for their own defense, political stability, and economic progress. It was a commitment to do what we could to help these nations attain and maintain the independence and security to which they were entitled, both for their own sake and because we recognized that, like South Korea, southeast Asia was a key area of the mainland of Asia. If it fell to Communist control, this would enormously add to the momentum and power of the expansionist Communist regimes in Communist China and North Vietnam, and thus to the threat to the whole free world position in the Pacific.

I have come at a statement of our policy in the Far East by the route of history, for policy is the fruit of history and experience, seldom of some abstract design from a drawing board. In essence, our policy derives from (1) the fact of the Communist nations of Asia and their policies; (2) the lessons of the thirties and of Korea; (3) the logical extension of that fact and these lessons to what has happened in southeast Asia.

It is possible to define our total policy in Asia, as it has existed at least since 1954, in quite simple terms.

1. Our objectives are those of the free nations of the area—that they should develop as they see fit, in peace and without outside interference. We would hope that this development will be in the direction of increasingly democratic institutions, and that there will be continued and expanded ties of partnership and contact with ourselves and with the other nations of the free world. Yet we know that Asia will develop as the leaders and peoples of Asia wish it to develop, and we would not have it otherwise.

2. Asia confronts two central problems: the threat of Communist nations whose objective is domination and enslavement, and endemic economic and political problems that would exist in any case. If these two problems cannot be solved over time, the Asia of the future will be the breeding ground of ever more direct threats to our na-

tional interest and could be the source of a third world war.

3. To deal with these central problems; the free nations of the area need the help of the United States and of our major allies. Outnumbered in population and in military forces by the Communist nations as they are—by nearly 2 to 1 if you leave out India—the free nations of Asia cannot do the job alone. We cannot do it for them, but we have the resources and the military power to play a crucial role.

4. The peace and security of east and southeast Asia are indivisible. If the Communist powers succeed in aggression, they will be encouraged, free nations discouraged, and the inevitable process of evolution toward moderation within the Communist countries themselves postponed or perhaps prevented altogether. We have seen the dynamics of Hitlerite Germany and militarist Japan checked and defeated, and the West Germany and Japan of today emerge as respected major nations of the world. Thanks to NATO, our handling of the Cuban crisis, and other actions, something like the same process may be underway with Soviet Russia today. Such a process of moderation will come eventually for the Communist nations of Asia if they are checked. It cannot come if they are not—and any loss of free nations makes the future task that much, and perhaps immensely, more difficult.

So much, then, for how we came to become involved in South Vietnam and how that involvement relates to our wider policies and purposes. In simple terms, a victory for the Communists in South Vietnam would inevitably make the neighboring states more susceptible to Communist pressure and more vulnerable to intensified subversion supported by military pressures. Aggression by wars of national liberation would gain enhanced prestige and power of intimidation throughout the world, and many threatened nations might well become less hopeful, less resilient, and their will to resist undermined. These are big stakes indeed.

II

Let us now wind the reel back to South Vietnam in 1954 and trace the course of events to the present.

From 1954 to 1959, great progress was made. In Ngo Dinh Diem, a staunchly nationalist and anti-Communist leader was found. Against all odds, including the opposition in 1954-55 of old-line military leaders and religious groups, he took hold. Under his rule the nationalist feeling of the newly formed country—which does differ to a significant degree from the north—was aroused, and it soon became and has remained clear that, whatever the extent of their attachment to particular governments in their own country, the great mass of the people of South Vietnam do not wish to be ruled by communism or from Hanoi.

On the economic and social front, education was vastly expanded, major land reforms carried out, and the economy grew at a rapid rate, far outstripping what was happening under the Communist yoke in the north. Instead of decaying and dropping by default into Communism, South Vietnam was in a fair way toward becoming really able to stand on its own feet.

In all this, the United States played a major helping role. On the military side we helped to create a fairly decent army almost from scratch, with a normal military assistance advisory group of a few hundred men. That army was never big enough to threaten the north, nor was it meant to be; it may well have been too much oriented to conventional warfare and not to the handling of a sophisticated guerrilla aggression.

Then, beginning roughly in 1959, two trends got underway that are still today at the heart of the problem.

First, the Diem government, instead of steadily broadening its base and training key groups for responsibility, began to narrow

it. More and more the regime became personal in character. Opposition parties, which had previously been active in relatively free elections, were driven underground, and there began a process of repression which, while never drastic by the standards we should apply to governments in new nations, much less by those of Communist countries, nevertheless alienated increasing numbers of the all too small pool of trained men capable of helping to govern effectively.

Second, Hanoi went on the march. Seeing itself thwarted in both South Vietnam and Laos, Hanoi began to send trained guerrillas into the south and increasing cadres to assist the Communist Pathet Lao forces in Laos. In South Vietnam there had been from the start thousands of agents and many pockets of Communist influence left behind in the division of Vietnam, and as early as 1957 a campaign of assassination of local officials had begun that tallies on the map almost exactly with the areas under strongest Communist control today. In 1959, such activity was stepped up, guerrilla units formed, and the real campaign got underway.

That campaign is sometimes referred to as a civil war. But let us not delude ourselves. Discontent there may have been, and local recruiting by the Vietcong, largely through intimidation. But the whole campaign would never have been possible without the direction, personnel, key materiel, and total support coming from Hanoi, and without too the strong moral support, and key materiel when needed, provided by Peiping and, up to 1962 at least, by the Soviet Union. Thousands of highly trained men coming from the north, along with the crucial items of equipment and munitions—these have been from the start the mainspring of the Vietcong insurgency. This has been all along a Communist subversive aggression, in total violation of the Geneva accords as well as general principles of international behavior.

Indeed the true nature of the struggle has been publicly stated many times by Hanoi itself, beginning with a 1960 Communist Party Conference in North Vietnam which declared the policy of, as they put it, "liberating the south."

By early 1961, South Vietnam was clearly in difficulty. President Johnson, then Vice President, visited the country in the spring, and we stepped up our military supplies and tried to turn our training emphasis increasingly to the guerrilla front. Then, in the fall of 1961, a series of key assassinations and raids on Government centers brought South Vietnamese morale to a critical point. Something more was needed. President Kennedy considered and rejected the sending of U.S. combat units to fight the Vietcong.

Instead he responded to the request of the South Vietnamese Government for American military advisers with Vietnamese units, and for Americans to furnish helicopter and air transport lift, combat air training, communications, and in short every possible form of assistance short of combat units.

But the military effort was and is only one aspect of the struggle. The economic front was equally important, and a smaller but extraordinarily dedicated group of civilian Americans went into the dangerous countryside, unarmed and often unescorted, to help in the creation of the fortified hamlets that soon became, and remain, a key feature of strategy, and to bring to the villages the schools, fertilizer, wells, pigs, and other improvements that meant so much and would serve to show the Government's concern for its people.

The basic strategy adopted in early 1962 was sound, and was indeed in key respects the same as the strategy that prevailed against communism in Malaya, Greece, and the Philippines. It is a strategy that takes patience and local leadership, and that takes

learning and experience as well. The Vietnamese and we are still learning and changing today, and will go on doing so.

Under the advisory concept, the American strength in South Vietnam rose to 12,000 by mid-1962 (eventually to the present 23,000), and with our help the South Vietnamese began to reverse the slow tide of growing Communist gains. By the spring of 1963, things seemed to be on the upswing, not only in the judgment of senior Americans but in that of experienced observers from third countries.

Yet the unhappy tendencies of the Diem government had persisted, despite all the quiet advice we could give in favor of reforms. The stubbornness and inflexibility which had been his great assets in the early days after 1954 had now become serious drawbacks. The Buddhist uprisings of the spring of 1963 brought the political situation to the forefront again. Now Buddhism as a religion is not nearly as dominant in South Vietnam as it is elsewhere in southeast Asia—Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. The adherents of Buddhism may not be even a majority of South Vietnamese, and there are significant Catholic and other groups as well as large numbers of adherents to older religious beliefs. Nonetheless, Buddhists are the most numerous faith, they are entitled to fair treatment, and they had some case against the Diem government for personal discrimination, though little, according to the findings of a United Nations commission, for true religious persecution. But these grievances might have been met without serious trouble if they had not been fanned by a small group of leaders who were and are, in fact, politically motivated.

Unfortunately, the Diem government refused to compromise or to redress the areas of legitimate grievance, and in August sent the Army into the pagodas of Saigon and other cities, following up with a drastic campaign of suppression against students and a wide circle of political opponents. As a result, by late September—when I personally accompanied Secretary McNamara to Saigon—it was clear that Diem and his brother, Nhu, had aroused wide popular opposition and, perhaps most crucial, had alienated almost to the breaking point the key trained elements within the government structure itself, both civilian and military.

Although Ambassador Lodge continued to urge reforms that might still have saved the government, Diem did not respond, and on November 1, 1963, he was overthrown, he and Nhu—most unfortunately—killed, and a new military government installed by force.

No one could then tell whether the new government would be better. Clearly, it had to be military in the first instance, and the first military group, under General Minh, had considerable popular backing. Yet it was ineffective and tended to throw out the baby with the bath, replacing so many military and provincial officials that the way was opened for major Vietcong gains. Then in January General Khanh took control in a bloodless coup. He showed ability on the military and economic front, but he, in turn, decided to turn over the government to civilian leaders to be selected by consultation among representatives of the key groups—the Buddhists, the Catholics, the military, labor, the religious sects, the various areas including the considerable body of refugees from the north, past political groupings, and so on.

The result was the present government under Prime Minister Huong, a man of determination and character, dedicated to fairness to all groups. He is wrestling today essentially with the same kind of problems that Diem faced and overcame in 1954, but in the far more difficult internal security crisis brought on by the Vietcong aggression, which has been slowly extending the areas of Communist control in the country,

side, and the pace of guerrilla and terrorist activity, even to Saigon itself.

So the political situation today is critical, and its resolution is central to turning the war around and restoring an independent and secure South Vietnam. That task must essentially be done by the Vietnamese people, under Vietnamese civilian and military leaders, all under a Government that unites the divergent political interest groups and that gives orders that can be carried out.

I have dwelt at such length on the political history, because it is this aspect that is today in the headlines, as it is the greatest concern of our representatives in Saigon and of the Vietnamese leaders themselves who must find the answer. (And may I pause here, apropos of the headlines, to say that I think the American people are getting the facts. We in government follow closely what is said in the newspapers and magazines, and on TV; part of our job is to see that these media are properly informed and given access to everything except for those few details that are necessarily matters of security in what is, after all, a war situation. I think we are doing our job, and that the media are doing theirs. The picture that you as thoughtful citizens get is in fact the picture that we have, on all essential points. If that picture is complex or not entirely clear, blame me our picture is the same, for that is the nature of the situation.)

The real point of the political history in South Vietnam is that it should cause us no amazement and no despair. Was it not 7 years between the end of the American Revolution and the making of a lasting constitution, even for a new nation which had united to fight a war and had centuries of British evolution toward democratic self-government behind it? And how many new nations in the world today have found lasting stability in a decade, especially where there had been little preparation under colonialism, where the national historic tradition was remote, and above all where a violent aggressor was striking constantly at the very fabric of government? Take if you will one fact alone—that in the first 8 months of 1964, the Vietcong assassinated more than 400 local officials and kidnaped another 700—and try in your mind to project what an equivalent amount of gangsterism would do to government performance in this country, and then to project that effect in turn, onto the situation in a country such as South Vietnam.

So this is a tough war, and the Vietnamese are a tough people to have stood up under it and to be holding their heads above water after 20 years of violence and uncertainty.

III

How should we now, then, approach this situation, as Americans?

Above all, we must stand firm and be patient. We never thought in 1961, or in 1954, that the task would be easy. North Vietnam had certain advantages:

Experience and sophistication in every aspect of subversion and political warfare;

Dedicated and fanatic agents who for the most part came from the south to fight the French and then returned to areas they knew well;

An open corridor through Laos to keep up the supply of guerrillas and supplies. In the past year, such infiltration has markedly increased, and has included for the first time significant numbers of indigenous North Vietnamese trained in North Vietnam in regular military units;

A numerical ratio of guerrilla forces to Government forces that is well below the ratios of 10 to 1, that have been found necessary for success in past guerrilla wars. There are today in South Vietnam perhaps 85,000 hard-core Vietcong fighters and another 60,000 to 80,000 local Vietcong forces, against roughly 400,000 military and paramilitary

forces for the Government, or a ratio of about 4 to 1;

The internal political divisions and above all the inexperience in government of the south itself.

Yet the balance sheet is by no means all one sided.

Our advisory effort, on all fronts, has done great things and, in the wide personal relationships involved, must stand almost unique in the history of relations between an Asian nation under fire and an outside Western nation.

Although there are from time to time signs of anti-American feeling, working relationships at all levels remain close and friendly.

With our help, the Government has been able to maintain economic stability and to move to help areas secured from the Vietcong.

Our military effort and our equipment, supplied to the Vietnamese, have largely offset the unfavorable numerical ratio favoring the Vietcong.

The Vietnamese military forces continue to fight well. Our own military men consider most of them as tough and brave as any in the world. Though there have been military reverses, there have also been significant victories—which sometimes do not make headlines. On the military front, the Vietcong is not capable of anything like a Dienbienphu.

Above all, the Vietnamese people are not voting with their feet or their hearts for communism.

As to our basic policy, the alternatives to our present courses might be, on the one hand, to withdraw or to negotiate on some basis such as what is called neutralization, or, on the other hand, for the Vietnamese and ourselves to enlarge the war, bringing pressure to persuade Hanoi, by force, that the game they are playing is not worth it.

It is also suggested that the United Nations might be of help. There may emerge possibilities for a U.N. role, but it is not clear that the U.N., which has been unable to carry through commitments such as the Congo, would be able to act effectively to deal with this far more difficult situation in its present form. And this has been the public judgment of the U.N. Secretary General, Mr. U Thant.

As to the basic alternative, so long as South Vietnam is ready to carry on the fight, withdrawal is unthinkable. A negotiation that produced a return to the essentials of the 1954 accords and thus an independent and secure South Vietnam would of course be an answer, indeed the answer. But negotiation would hardly be promising that admitted communism to South Vietnam, that did not get Hanoi out, or that exposed South Vietnam and perhaps other countries of the area to renewed Communist aggression at will, with only nebulous or remote guarantees.

As for enlarging our own actions, we can not speak surely about the future—for the aggressors themselves share the responsibility for such eventualities. We have shown in the Gulf of Tonkin that we can act, and North Vietnam knows it, and knows its own weaknesses. But we seek no wider war, and we must not suppose that there are quick or easy answers in this direction.

The root of the problem, to repeat, is in South Vietnam. We must persist in our efforts there, with patience rather than petulance, coolness rather than recklessness, and with a continuing ability to separate the real from the merely wished for.

As a great power, we are now and will continue to find ourselves in situations where we simply do not have easy choices, where there simply are not immediate or ideal solutions available. We cannot then allow ourselves to yield to frustration, but must stick to the job, doing all we can and doing it better.

The national interests that have brought us into the Vietnam struggle are valid, and they do not become less so just because the going gets rough and the end is not yet in sight. President Johnson said in his state of the Union message: "Our goal is peace in southeast Asia. That will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace. What is at stake is the cause of freedom. In that cause, we shall never be found wanting."

AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH—THE RECORD OF NORTH VIETNAM'S CAMPAIGN TO CONQUER SOUTH VIETNAM

"Our purpose in Vietnam is to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country." (President Lyndon B. Johnson, February 17, 1965.)

INTRODUCTION

South Vietnam is fighting for its life against a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the Communist regime in Hanoi. This flagrant aggression has been going on for years, but recently the pace has quickened and the threat has now become acute.

The war in Vietnam is a new kind of war, a fact as yet poorly understood in most parts of the world. Much of the confusion that prevails in the thinking of many people, and even many governments, stems from this basic misunderstanding. For in Vietnam a totally new brand of aggression has been loosed against an independent people who want to make their own way in peace and freedom.

Vietnam is not another Greece, where indigenous guerrilla forces used friendly neighboring territory as a sanctuary.

Vietnam is not another Malaya, where Communist guerrillas were, for the most part, physically distinguishable from the peaceful majority they sought to control.

Vietnam is not another Philippines, where Communist guerrillas were physically separated from the source of their moral and physical support.

Above all, the war in Vietnam is not a spontaneous and local rebellion against the established government.

There are elements in the Communist program of conquest directed against South Vietnam common to each of the previous areas of aggression and subversion. But there is one fundamental difference. In Vietnam a Communist government has set out deliberately to conquer a sovereign people in a neighboring state. And to achieve its end, it has used every resource of its own government to carry out its carefully planned program of concealed aggression. North Vietnam's commitment to seize control of the South is no less total than was the commitment of the regime in North Korea in 1950. But knowing the consequences of the latter's undisguised attack, the planners in Hanoi have tried desperately to conceal their hand. They have failed and their aggression is as real as that of an invading army.

This report is a summary of the massive evidence of North Vietnamese aggression obtained by the Government of South Vietnam. This evidence has been jointly analyzed by South Vietnamese and American experts.

The evidence shows that the hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Vietnam were trained in the north and ordered into the south by Hanoi. It shows that the key leadership of the Vietcong (VC), the officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians, political, organizers, and propagandists have come from the north and operate under Hanoi's direction. It shows that the training of essential military personnel

and their infiltration into the south is directed by the military high command in Hanoi. (See sec. I.)

The evidence shows that many of the weapons and much of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Vietcong have been sent into South Vietnam from Hanoi. In recent months new types of weapons have been introduced in the VC army, for which all ammunition must come from outside sources. Communist China and other Communist States have been the prime suppliers of these weapons and ammunition, and they have been channeled primarily through North Vietnam. (See sec. II.)

The directing force behind the effort to conquer South Vietnam is the Communist Party in the north, the Lao Dong (Workers) Party. As in every Communist State, the party is an integral part of the regime itself. North Vietnamese officials have expressed their firm determination to absorb South Vietnam into the Communist world. (See sec. III.)

Through its central committee, which controls the government of the north, the Lao Dong Party directs the total political and military effort of the Vietcong. The military high command in the north trains the military men and sends them into South Vietnam. The Central Research Agency, North Vietnam's central intelligence organization, directs the elaborate espionage and subversion effort. The extensive political-military organization in the north which directs the Vietcong war effort is described in section IV.

Under Hanoi's overall direction the Communists have established an extensive machine for carrying on the war within South Vietnam. The focal point is the Central Office for South Vietnam with its political and military subsections and other specialized agencies. A subordinate part of this Central Office is the Liberation Front for South Vietnam. The front was formed at Hanoi's order in 1960. Its principal function is to influence opinion abroad and to create the false impression that the aggression in South Vietnam is an indigenous rebellion against the established government. (See sec. IV.)

For more than 10 years the people and the Government of South Vietnam, exercising the inherent right of self-defense, have fought back against these efforts to extend Communist power south across the 17th parallel. The United States has responded to the appeals of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam for help in this defense of the freedom and independence of its land and its people.

In 1961 the Department of State issued a report called "A Threat to the Peace." It described North Vietnam's program to seize South Vietnam. The evidence in that report had been presented by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to the International Control Commission (ICC). A special report by the ICC in June 1962 upheld the validity of that evidence. The Commission held that there was "sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt" that North Vietnam had sent arms and men into South Vietnam to carry out subversion with the aim of overthrowing the legal government there. The ICC found the authorities in Hanoi in specific violation of four provisions of the Geneva accords of 1954.¹

Since then, new and even more impressive evidence of Hanoi's aggression has accumulated. The Government of the United States believes that evidence should be presented to its own citizens and to the world. It is important for freemen to know what has been happening in Vietnam, and how, and why. That is the purpose of this report.

¹For the text of pertinent sections of the ICC report, see app. A.

I. HANOI SUPPLIES THE KEY PERSONNEL FOR THE ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM.

The hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Vietnam are men trained in North Vietnam. They are ordered into the south and remain under the military discipline of the military high command in Hanoi. Special training camps operated by the North Vietnamese Army gave political and military training to the infiltrators. Increasingly the forces sent into the south are native North Vietnamese who have never seen South Vietnam. A special infiltration unit, the 70th Transportation Group, is responsible for moving men from North Vietnam into the south via infiltration trails through Laos. Another special unit, the maritime infiltration group, spends weapons and supplies and agents by sea into the south.

The infiltration rate has been increasing. From 1959 to 1960, when Hanoi was establishing its infiltration pipeline, at least 1,800 men, and possibly 2,700 more, moved into South Vietnam from the north. The flow increased to a minimum of 3,700 in 1961 and at least 5,400 in 1962. There was a modest decrease in 1963 to 4,200 confirmed infiltrators, though later evidence is likely to raise this figure.

For 1964 the evidence is still incomplete. However, it already shows that a minimum of 4,400 infiltrators entered the south, and it is estimated more than 3,000 others were sent in.

There is usually a time lag between the entry of infiltrating troops and the discovery of clear evidence they have entered. This fact, plus collateral evidence of increased use of the infiltration routes, suggests strongly that 1964 was probably the year of greatest infiltration so far.

Thus, since 1959, nearly 20,000 VC officers, soldiers, and technicians are known to have entered South Vietnam under orders from Hanoi. Additional information indicates that an estimated 17,000 more infiltrators were dispatched to the south by the regime in Hanoi during the past 6 years. It can reasonably be assumed that still other infiltration groups have entered the south for which there is no evidence yet available.

To some the level of infiltration from the north may seem modest in comparison with the total size of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. But one-for-one calculations are totally misleading in the kind of warfare going on in Vietnam. First, a high proportion of infiltrators from the north are well-trained officers, cadres, and specialists. Second, it has long been realized that in guerrilla combat the burdens of defense are vastly heavier than those of attack. In Malaya, the Philippines, and elsewhere a ratio of at least 10 to 1 in favor of the forces of order was required to meet successfully the threat of the guerrillas hit-and-run tactics.

In the calculus of guerrilla warfare the scale of North Vietnamese infiltration into the south takes on a very different meaning. For the infiltration of 5,000 guerrilla fighters in a given year is the equivalent of marching perhaps 50,000 regular troops across the border, in terms of the burden placed on the defenders.

Above all, the number of proved and probable infiltrators from the north should be seen in relation to the size of the VC forces. It is now estimated that the Vietcong number approximately 35,000 so-called hard-core forces, and another 60,000 to 80,000 local forces. It is thus apparent that infiltrators from the north—allowing for casualties—make up the majority of the so-called hard-core Vietcong. Personnel from the north, in short, are now and have always been the backbone of the entire VC operation.

It is true that many of the lower level elements of the VC forces are recruited within South Vietnam. However, the thousands of reported cases of VC kidnappings and terrorism make it abundantly clear that threats

and other pressures by the Vietcong play a major part in such recruitment.

A. The infiltration process

The infiltration routes supply hard-core units with most of their officers and non-commissioned personnel. This source helps fill the gaps left by battle casualties, illness, and defection and insures continued control by Hanoi. Also, as the nature of the conflict has changed, North Vietnam has supplied the Vietcong with technical specialists via the infiltration routes. These have included men trained in armor and ordnance, anti-aircraft, and communications as well as medical corpsmen and transport experts.

There is no single infiltration route from the north to South Vietnam. But by far the biggest percentage of infiltrators follow the same general course. The principal training center for North Vietnamese Army men assigned to join the Vietcong has been at Xuan Mai near Hanoi. Recently captured Vietcong have also reported an infiltration training camp at Thanh Hoa. After completion of their training course—which involves political and propaganda work as well as military subjects—infiltrating units are moved to Vinh on the east coast. Many have made stopovers at a staging area in Dong Hoi where additional training is conducted. From there they go by truck to the Laos border.

Then, usually after several days' rest, infiltrators move southward through Laos. Generally they move along the Laos-South Vietnam border. Responsibility for infiltration from North Vietnam through Laos belongs to the 70th Transportation Group of the North Vietnamese Army. After a time the infiltration groups turn eastward, entering South Vietnam in Quang Nam, Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Kontum, or another of the border provinces.

The Communists have established regular lanes for infiltration with way stations established about 1 day's march apart. The way stations are equipped to quarter and feed the Vietcong passing through. Infiltrators who suffer from malaria or other illnesses stay at the stations until they recover sufficiently to join another passing group moving south.

The map on page 4 [not shown in Record] shows the infiltration route from North Vietnam to the south followed by VC Sgt. Huynh Van Tay and a group of North Vietnamese Army officers and men in September 1963. Tay was captured during an engagement in Chuong Thien Province in April 1964.

Local guides lead the infiltration groups along the secret trails. Generally they direct the infiltrators from halfway between two stations, through their own base station, and on halfway to the next supply base. Thus the guides are kept in ignorance of all but their own way stations. Only group leaders are permitted to talk with the guides in order to preserve maximum security. The men are discouraged from asking where they are or where they are going.

The same system of trails and guides used along the Lao infiltration routes is used within South Vietnam itself. Vietcong infiltrators may report directly to a reassignment center in the highlands as soon as they enter South Vietnam. But in the past year or more some groups have moved down trails in South Vietnam to provinces along the Cambodian border and near Saigon before receiving their unit assignment. Within South Vietnam infiltration and supplies are handled by VC units such as the Nam Son Transportation Group.

At the Laos border crossing point infiltrators are reequipped. Their North Vietnamese Army uniforms must be turned in.

For additional maps of the routes taken by VC infiltrators into South Vietnam, see app. B.

They must give up all personal papers, letters, notebooks, and photographs that might be incriminating. Document control over the infiltrators has been tightened considerably over the past 2 years. A number of Vietnamese infiltrators have told of being fitted out with Lao neutralist uniforms for their passage through Laos.

Infiltration groups are usually issued a set of black civilian pajama-like clothes, two unmarked uniforms, rubber sandals, a sweater, a hammock, mosquito netting, and waterproof sheeting. They carry a 3- to 5-day supply of food. A packet of medicines and bandages is usually provided.

The size of infiltration groups varies widely. Prisoners have mentioned units as small as 5 men and as large as 500. Generally the groups number 40 to 50. When they arrive in South Vietnam these groups are usually split up and assigned to various VC units as replacements, although some have remained intact.

B. Military personnel

The following are individual case histories of North Vietnamese soldiers sent by the Hanoi regime into South Vietnam. They are only an illustrative group. They show that the leadership and specialized personnel for the guerrilla war in South Vietnam consists in large part of members of the North Vietnamese armed forces, trained in the North and subject to the command and discipline of Hanoi.

1. Tran Quoc Dan

Dan was a VC major, commander of the 80th Battalion (sometimes known as the 34th Group of the Thon-Kim Battalion). Disillusioned with fighting his own countrymen and with communism and the lies of the Hanoi regime, he surrendered to the authorities in South Vietnam on February 11, 1963.

At the age of 18 he joined the revolutionary army (Viet Minh) and fought against the French forces until 1954 when the Geneva accords ended the Indochina war. As a regular in the Viet Minh forces, he was moved to North Vietnam. He became an officer in the so-called people's army.

In March 1962 Major Dan received orders to prepare to move to South Vietnam. He had been exposed to massive propaganda in the north which told of the destitution of the peasants in the south and said that the Americans had taken over the French role of colonialists. He said later that an important reason for his decision to surrender was that he discovered these propaganda themes were lies. He found the peasants more prosperous than the people in the north. And he recognized quickly that he was not fighting the Americans but his own people.

With the 600 men of his unit, Major Dan left Hanoi on March 23, 1962. They traveled through the Laos corridor. His group joined up with the Vietcong 1st Regiment in central Vietnam.

The 35-year-old major took part in 45 actions and was wounded once in an unsuccessful VC attack on an outpost. As time passed he became increasingly discouraged by his experience as a VC troop commander. Most of all, he said, he was tired of killing other Vietnamese. After several months of soul-searching he decided to surrender to the authorities of the Republic of Vietnam. He has volunteered to do "anything to serve the national cause" of South Vietnam.

2. Vo Thoi

Sgt. Vo Thoi (Communist Party alias Vo Bien) was an assistant squad leader in the VC Tay Son 22d Battalion. On the night of October 7, 1963, his unit attacked An Tuong village in Binh Dinh Province. After overrunning the village, Vo's company was assigned to set up an ambush against Republic of Vietnam troops rushing to defend the village. In the ensuing fight Vo was seriously wounded. He was picked up by local farmers and turned over to the authorities.

Vo's life and experiences were similar to those of thousands of Vietcong. Born in Quang Ngai Province in 1932, he went through 5 years of school and then worked on his parents' small farm. During the war against the French he joined the Viet Minh forces. When the fighting ended, he was transferred to North Vietnam with his unit, the 210th Regiment. He remained in the North Vietnamese Army until 1960 when he was sent to work on a state farm in Nghe An Province. Vo said 3,000 men and women worked on the farm, of whom 400 were soldiers. In September 1962 Vo was told he must join the newly activated 22d Battalion. All the members of the battalion came from provinces in South Vietnam, from Quang Tri to Phu Yen. But it was not an ordinary battalion; two-thirds of its members were cadre with ranks up to senior captain.

The group was put through an advanced training course that lasted 6 months. The training program included combat tactics for units from squad to company and the techniques of guerrilla and counter guerrilla fighting. There were heavy doses of political indoctrination.

On March 5, 1963, the 22d Battalion received orders to move south. They were transported in trucks from Nghe An Province to Dong Hoi in Quang Binh, just north of the 17th parallel. From there the unit was moved westward to the Lao border. Then the more than 800 men began walking to the south following mountain trails in Laos and the Vietnam border area. They marched by day, rested at night. Every fifth day they stopped at a way station for a full day's rest. One company dropped off at Thua Thien Province. Vo and the remainder of the group marched on to Pleiku Province. Two fully armed companies from a neighboring province were assigned to the battalion. The assignment given to the battalion was to harass strategic hamlets in the Hoai An district of Binh Dinh, to round up cattle and rice, to kill or kidnap cadre of the Government forces, and to recruit local youth for service with the Vietcong.

3. Nguyen Thao

Nguyen Thao was a VC weapons technician. A native of Khanh Hao Province in South Vietnam, he joined the Viet Minh in 1950. He worked at a secret arsenal manufacturing weapons for use by the guerrilla forces. He went to North Vietnam after the Geneva accords were signed in 1954. In North Vietnam he attended a technical school specializing in arms and manufacture. He received special training in foreign small arms and artillery.

At the end of 1962 he was ordered to Ha Dong to attend a special course of political training in preparation for infiltrating into South Vietnam. On completion of the training course he was assigned to a group of 14 men who would move to the south together. Nguyen Thao said the group was composed of four armament specialists, two chemical engineers, and eight middle-level technical cadre.

They left Ha Dong in March 1963, crossed into Laos, and reached their destination in the northern part of South Vietnam in May. Nguyen Thao went to work at a secret VC arsenal near the Quang Ngai border. Fifty men, some local workers, manned the arsenal weapons section. The group manufactured mines and grenades for the VC units in the area and repaired weapons.

Nguyen Thao said he soon realized from talking with the local workers at the arsenal that most of what he had heard in the North about conditions in South Vietnam was wrong. He said the Communists had deceived him. Two months after his arrival at the arsenal he decided to defect. He asked permission to rejoin his family and to work in a national defense factory and continue his studies.

4. Nguyen Viet Le

This VC soldier was born in Quang Nam Province in South Vietnam. He served with the 306th Division of the Viet Minh and moved to North Vietnam in 1954. In April 1961, Nguyen Viet Le and his unit, the 50th Battalion, moved into Laos. He said the unit remained in Laos for 2 months, during which it fought in four battles alongside the Pathet Lao. During these engagements one of the battalion's four companies was badly mauled and had to be returned to North Vietnam.

The other three companies were assigned to South Vietnam. They arrived in Quang Ngai Province in the summer of 1961. For a month they rested and waited for orders. They took part in a major action against an outpost of the Government of South Vietnam in September. Nguyen Viet Le was captured during a battle in Quang Ngai Province in April 1962.

5. Nguyen Truc

Corp. Nguyen Truc was born in 1933, the son of a farmer in Phu Yen Province in South Vietnam. From 1949 to 1954 he served as a courier and then as a guerrilla fighter with the Viet Minh. In early 1955 he boarded a Soviet ship and moved with his unit, the 40th Battalion, to North Vietnam. He remained in the army, but in 1959, bothered by illness, he went to work on a state farm.

In August 1962 Nguyen Truc was notified that he was back in the army and that he was being sent to South Vietnam. He reported to the Xuan Mai training center and underwent 6 months of military and political re-education. His unit was the newly activated 22d Battalion. The training course was completed in February 1963, but departure for South Vietnam was delayed until April.

For infiltration purposes the battalion was divided into two groups. On April 27, Nguyen Truc and his group boarded trucks at Xuan Mai. They went first to Vinh, then on to Dong Hoi, and finally to the Laos-North Vietnam border. There they doffed their North Vietnamese army uniforms and put on black peasants' clothing. The march to the south began, sometimes in Lao territory, sometimes in Vietnam. They passed through Thua Thien Province, then Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai, and finally to their destination, Pleiku. Each day they had a new guide, generally one of the mountain people of the area.

Nguyen said that he and most of the troops who were sent north after the Indochina war wanted to return to their homes and rejoin their families. In August 1963 Nguyen Truc was sent out on a foraging expedition to find food for his unit. He took the opportunity to defect to Government forces at An Tuc in Binh Dinh Province.

6. Nguyen Cam

Cam is the son of a farmer in Quang Tin Province. Born in 1929, he joined the Vietminh youth group in his home village in 1946. In 1 year he became a guerrilla fighter. In 1954, as the Indochina war was drawing to a close, he was serving with the Vietminh 20th Battalion. In May 1955 he went to North Vietnam with his unit.

Ill health caused his transfer to an agricultural camp in 1958. By 1960 he was back in uniform, serving in the 210th Regiment. In May of that year he was assigned to a small group that was to set up a metallurgical workshop. Early in 1961 he was sent to a metallurgical class in Nghe An Province. They were taught a simple form of cast iron production, simple blast furnace construction, and similar skills. Their instructor was an engineer from the Hanoi industrial department.

Their special course completed, Cam and his group of 35 men prepared to go to South Vietnam. They went by truck from their training center at Nghe An to the Lao bor-

der. After 19 days marching through Laos, they arrived in the vicinity of Tehepone. There they waited for 3 days until food supplies could be airdropped by a North Vietnamese plane. Nineteen days of walking took them to the Laos-South Vietnam border.

Delayed en route by illness, Cam finally reached his destination in November 1961. It was a secret VC iron foundry in Kontum Province. Several iron ore deposits were nearby, and the hill people had long used the iron to make knives and simple tools. Cam's job was building kilns to smelt the ore. The Vietcong hoped to use the iron for mines and grenades.

On August 4, 1963, Sergeant Cam went to a nearby village to buy salt for his group. On his return he found his comrades had gone to one of their cultivated fields to gather corn, and he joined them. The group was interrupted at their work by a Vietnamese ranger company. After a brief fight Cam was taken prisoner.

7. Nguyen Hong Thai

Thai, 32 years old, was born and grew up in Quang Nkai Province in South Vietnam. After service with the Vietminh he was moved to North Vietnam in 1954. After 3 years of military service he was assigned to a military farm. In December 1961 he was recalled to his former unit, the 305th Division, and went to the special training camp at Xuan Mai in preparation for fighting with the Vietcong in South Vietnam.

Training began in January 1962 and lasted for 4 months. The training group, designated the 32d Battalion, was composed of 650 men who came from various branches of the North Vietnamese Army—engineers, artillery, airborne, transport, marines, and some factory workers and students. Three-fourths of the training was military (guerrilla tactics, ambushes, sabotage, etc.) and one-fourth was political. In the latter, heavy emphasis was laid on the necessity for armed seizure of power in the south.

Group 32 was divided into sections and began infiltrating to the south on July 14, 1962. It moved in three groups. Thai said it took his group more than 55 days to travel from North Vietnam through Laos to Quang Ngai Province in the south. He reported that all the communications and liaison stations on the route to South Vietnam are now operated by the Army of North Vietnam. Soon after his arrival in South Vietnam, Thai was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. He was made a platoon leader in the 20th Vietcong Highland Battalion. In February 1963 the unit moved from Quang Nam to Kontum Province.

Combat conditions and the rigors of guerrilla life began to depress Thai. He said he wanted only to rejoin his family and live in peace. In September he asked and received permission to visit his family in Quang Ngai. When he got home, he surrendered to a South Vietnamese Army post.

8. Dao Kien Lap

Lap is a civilian radio technician. He has been a member of the Communist Party in North Vietnam since 1953. In February 1963 he was selected for assignment to South Vietnam where he was to work with the Liberation Front. He infiltrated into South Vietnam with a group of about 70 civilian specialists. They included doctors, pharmacists, union organizers, radio specialists, propagandists, and youth organizers. One of the infiltrators in Dao's group was a man named Binh, publisher of the newspaper Labor of the Lao Dong Party. Another was a member of the city soviet of Hanoi.

The specialists in Dao's group received 3 months of basic military training at Son Tay, and then departed for the south in mid-June. Their orders were to report to the central office of the Vietcong in South Vietnam where they would be assigned according

ing to their individual specialties. Dao and Binh were to help run a radio station of the Liberation Front.

They traveled through Laos and along the Vietnam border. They had to stop for several weeks in Quang Nam Province to recuperate from their travels. On October 1 they were directed by guides to a VC station in Ban Me Thuot.

Dao said he had by then decided to defect to the government authorities in the south. He set off with one companion, but they were separated as they crossed a swiftly flowing river. Dao gave himself up at a government post in Ban Me Thuot on October 13, 1963.

9. Tran Ngoc Linh

Linh was a Vietcong senior sergeant, leader of a reconnaissance platoon. He is the son of a middle-class farm family in Tay Ninh Province. He served with the Viet Minh against the French and moved to North Vietnam in 1954. He spent the next 7 years in the North Vietnamese Army. In September 1962 Linh was assigned to the Xuan Mai training center at Ha Dong to prepare for duty in South Vietnam. His group was given a 4-month refresher course in infantry tactics with emphasis on guerilla fighting. Then he received 6 months of special training in the use of machineguns against aircraft. Antiaircraft training has become an increasingly important part of the preparation of North Vietnamese troops assigned to the Vietcong.

Linh and about 120 others made up the 46th Infiltration Group commander by Senior Capt. Nguyen Van Do. They were divided into four platoons. During the final 2 weeks of preparation each member of the group was issued new equipment—black, pajama-like uniforms, a khaki uniform, a hammock, mosquito netting, rubber sandals, and other supplies, including two packets of medicine.

In the early morning hours of July 4, 1963, his group started its journey from the Xuan Mai training center outside Hanoi. The convoy of six Melotov trucks moved south along Highway 21 to Nghe An Province and then on to Quang Binh. On July 7 they arrived at the final processing station near the Laos-North Vietnam border. There they turned in their North Vietnamese Army uniforms as well as all personal papers and anything else that might identify them as coming from the north. But their departure for the south was delayed for several weeks. In August they set off through Laos.

Twice along the way Linh had to stop at liaison stations because of illness. When the infiltrators recovered from their illnesses, they were formed into special groups to continue their penetration into South Vietnam. Linh reported being delayed once for 8 days, and the second time for 10 days.

Finally, in the first week of November 1963, Linh was sufficiently recovered to begin the final leg of his journey to a VC center where he was to be assigned to a combat unit. He and three others who had been similarly delayed by attacks of malaria and other sickness made up a group. They moved through the jungles of Quang Duc Province near the Cambodian border. On the morning of November 9 they crossed the Srapok River. There they ran into a unit of the South Vietnamese Army. One of the infiltrators was killed, Linh was taken prisoner, and the other two Vietcong escaped.

These are typical Vietcong. There are many other officers like Tran Quoc Dan, technicians like Nguyen Thac, and simple soldiers like Nguyen Truc. They were born in South Vietnam, fought against the French, and then went north and served in the army of North Vietnam. They were ordered by the Communist rulers in Hanoi to reenter South Vietnam. Violating the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, they used the territory of neighboring Laos to infiltrate into the South. They are the means by which Communist

North Vietnam is carrying out its program of conquest in South Vietnam.⁵

C. Infiltration of native North Vietnamese

The Communist authorities in Hanoi are now assigning native North Vietnamese in increasing numbers to join the VC forces in South Vietnam. Heretofore, those in charge of the infiltration effort have sought to fill their quotas with soldiers and others born in the south. The 90,000 troops that moved from South Vietnam to the north when the Geneva accords ended the Indochina War have provided an invaluable reservoir for this purpose. Now, apparently, that source is running dry. The casualty rate has been high, and obviously many of those who were in fighting trim 10 years ago are no longer up to the rigors of guerilla war.

In any case, reports of infiltration by native North Vietnamese in significant numbers have been received in Saigon for several months. It is estimated that as many as 75 percent of the more than 4,400 Vietcong who are known to have entered the south in the first 8 months of 1964 were natives of North Vietnam.

Vo Thanh Vinh was born in Nghe An Province in North Vietnam in 1936. He was captured by South Vietnamese forces on May 5, 1964. He described himself as a military security officer. He infiltrated into South Vietnam in April 1964 with a group of 34 police and security officers from the north.

Another native North Vietnamese captured in the south was VC Pfc. Vo Quyen. His home was in Nam Dinh Province. He was a member of the 2d Battalion of the North Vietnamese Army's 9th Regiment. He said the entire battalion had infiltrated into South Vietnam between February and May last year. He was captured in an action in Quang Tri Province on July 4. He told interrogators that the bulk of his unit was composed of young draftees from North Vietnam.

Le Pham Hung, also a private, first class, was captured on July 7 in Thua Thien Province. He is a native of Nam Dinh in North Vietnam. Drafted for military service in May 1963, he was in the 324th Division. His group, consisting solely of 90 North Vietnamese draftees, infiltrated into South Vietnam in May 1964. He reported that another company of the North Vietnamese entered the south at the same time as his unit.

A former member of the 90th VC Battalion reported that his unit had been reinforced by native North Vietnamese troops earlier this year. Le Thua Phuong, an information cadre and a native of Quang Ngai Province in the south, surrendered to Government forces on April 23, 1964. He said that the 90th Battalion had received 80 North Vietnamese replacements in February.

A medical technician named Hoang Thung was captured in Thua Thien Province on July 4, 1964. He said he had infiltrated into the south in late 1963 with a group of 200 Vietcong, the majority of whom were ethnic northerners, 120 of them draftees.

These reports destroy one more notion which the authorities in Hanoi have sought so long to promote—that the fighting in the south was a matter for the South Vietnamese. They underline Hanoi's determination to press its campaign of conquest with every available resource.

D. Infiltration of Vietcong agents

No effort to subvert another nation as elaborate as that being conducted by the Ho Chi Minh regime against South Vietnam can succeed without an intelligence-gathering organization. Recognizing this, the authorities in Hanoi have developed an extensive espionage effort. An essential part of

that effort is the regular assignment of secret agents from the north to South Vietnam.

The heart of the VC intelligence organization is the Central Research Agency in Hanoi. (See sec. IV, C.) Communist agents are regularly dispatched from North Vietnam, sometimes for brief assignments but often for long periods. Many of these agents move into South Vietnam along the infiltration trails through Laos; others are carried by boats along the coasts and landed at pre-arranged sites. A special maritime infiltration group has been developed in North Vietnam, with its operations centered in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh Provinces just north of the 17th parallel.

1. Maritime Infiltration

The following case illustrates the methods of maritime infiltration of secret agents used by the Communist regime of North Vietnam.

In July 1962 a North Vietnamese intelligence agent named Nguyen Viet Duong began training to infiltrate South Vietnam. A native southerner, he had fought against the French and had gone to North Vietnam after the war ended. Selected for intelligence work, he was assigned to the Central Research Agency in 1959.

After a period of intensive instruction in radio transmission, coding and decoding, and other skills of the intelligence trade, he was given false identity papers and other supplies and was transported to the south. His principal task was to set up a cell of agents to collect military information. He flew from Hanoi to Dong Hoi, and from there the Maritime infiltration group took him by boat to South Vietnam. That was in August 1962.

In January 1963 Duong reported to Hanoi that he had run into difficulties. His money and papers had been lost, and he had been forced to take refuge with VC contacts in another province. Another agent was selected to go to South Vietnam. One of his assignments was to contact Duong, find out details of what happened to him, and help Duong reestablish himself as a VC agent. The man selected for the task was Senior Captain Tran Van Tan of the Central Research Agency.

Tan had already been picked to go to the South to establish a clandestine VC communications center. Making contact with Duong was one of his secondary assignments. After intensive preparations Tan was ready to move to South Vietnam in March. He was transferred to an embarkation base of the maritime infiltration group just north of the 17th parallel.

He was joined by three other VC agents and the captain and three crewmen of the boat that would take them south. All were given false identity papers to conform to their false names. They also were provided with fishermen's permits, South Vietnamese voting cards, and draft cards or military discharge papers. The boat captain received a boat registration book, crew lists, and several South Vietnamese permits to conduct business.

The agents and boatmen were given cover stories to tell if captured. Each man had to memorize not only the details of his own story but the names and some details about each of the others. The agents had to become familiar with simple boat procedures so they could pass as legitimate fishermen.

The expedition left the embarkation port on April 4. In addition to the four agents the boat carried six carefully sealed boxes containing a generator, several radios, some weapons, and a large supply of South Vietnamese currency. They also carried some chemicals and materials for making false identification papers. Their destination was a landing site on the coast of Phuoc Tuy Province.

Soon after leaving North Vietnam the VC boat encountered high winds and rough seas.

⁵ See app. C for additional details on military infiltrators.

On April 7 the storm became violent. The boat tossed and threatened to capsizel. Strong northeasterly winds forced it ever closer to shore. Finally the boat captain, Nguyen Xit, ordered that the six boxes be thrown overboard. This was done, and the boat then was beached. The eight men decided to split up into pairs and try to make contact with VC forces. They buried their false papers and set out. Six of the eight were captured almost immediately by authorities in Thua Thien Province, and the other two were taken several days later.

2. Student Propaganda Agents

The student population of South Vietnam is an important target group for VC propagandists. These agents seek to win adherents for the Communist cause among young workers, students in high schools and universities, and the younger officers and enlisted men in the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

Typical of the agents sent into South Vietnam for this purpose is Nguyen Van Vy, a 19-year-old VC propagandist. He is a native of the Vinh Linh District in North Vietnam, just north of the demilitarized zone. He was a member of a Communist Party youth group in his native village. He was recruited for propaganda work in the south in the fall of 1962. He was one of 40 young persons enrolled in a special political training course given by the Communist Party in his district.

The first phase of the training consisted of political indoctrination covering such subjects as the advance of communism, the North Vietnamese plan for winning control of the country, the responsibility of youth in furthering this plan, the war in the south, and the need for propaganda supporting the Liberation Front.

Those who successfully completed the first phase were selected for the second level of training, the so-called technical training phase. In this the trainees were given their mission in the south. Vy was told he should infiltrate into South Vietnam and there surrender to the authorities, describing himself as a defector who was "tired of the miserable life in the north." He was to say he wanted to complete his schooling, which was impossible in the north. He was told to ask to live with relatives in the south so he could go to school. Once his story was accepted and he was enrolled in a school, he was to begin his work of propagandizing other students. He was to wait for 3 or 4 months, however, until he was no longer the subject of local suspicion. He was assigned to work under an older agent to whom he had to report regularly.

A third member of the team was a younger man who was to assist Vy. The three were to infiltrate into South Vietnam separately and to meet there at a rendezvous point.

At first Vy was to do no more than to observe his fellow students carefully, collecting biographical data on them and studying their personalities, capabilities, and aspirations. He was then to select those he thought might be most influenced by Communist propaganda and try to make friends with them.

Once he had selected targets, he was to begin to influence them favorably toward the north and to implant Communist propaganda. He was responsible then for bringing into his organization those he had influenced effectively. These individuals were to be given their own propaganda assignments to work on other students.

Students who wanted to evade military service in the Government forces were considered prime targets. Where possible, Vy was to help them get to North Vietnam. He was also told to make contact with any students who had been picked up by the authorities for suspected Communist activities.

These, too, were to be helped to escape to North Vietnam. Any useful information concerning developments in the south or military activities were to be reported through his superior, Nguyen Van Phong.

In case he became suspect, he was either to make his own way back to North Vietnam or to go into the jungle and try to contact a VC unit.

Vy entered South Vietnam on January 2, 1963, by swimming across the Ben Hai River. He encountered an elderly farmer who led him to the local authorities in Hai Gu. There he told his story but it was not believed. He then admitted his true mission.

3. Other Agents

The Communist authorities in North Vietnam send their agents into South Vietnam by a wide variety of means. A few like Nguyen Van Vy cross the demilitarized zone, more infiltrate by sea, and still more along the infiltration routes through Laos. But there are other methods for entering South Vietnam. VC espionage agent Tran Van Bui attempted one such method.

Bui was a graduate of the espionage training school in Haiphong, North Vietnam. He completed a special 6-month course in July 1962. The training included political indoctrination, but most of the time was spent on such things as use of weapons, preparing booby traps, and methods of sabotage. He was also given instruction in methods for enlisting help from hoodlums, draft dodgers, and VC sympathizers. Once in South Vietnam, he was to organize a small unit for sabotage and the collection of information. On specific assignment by his superiors he was to be ready to sabotage ships in Saigon harbor and to blow up gasoline and oil storage points and Vietnamese Army installations. He was told to be prepared to assassinate Vietnamese officials and American personnel.

In September 1962 Bui was given his mission assignment. He was to hide aboard a foreign ship. When discovered, he was to claim to be a refugee who wanted to escape to South Vietnam. He was given an automatic pistol with silencer, some explosive devices, and a small knife that could inject poison into the body of a victim.

Bui stole aboard a foreign ship in Haiphong harbor. After 3 days at sea—when he was sure the ship would not turn around—Bui surrendered to the ship's captain. When the ship arrived in Bangkok, Bui was turned over to the Thai authorities. They in turn released him to the South Vietnamese as he had requested. But in Saigon his true mission was disclosed and he made a full confession.

II. HANOI SUPPLIES WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND OTHER WAR MATERIAL TO ITS FORCES IN THE SOUTH

When Hanoi launched the VC campaign of terror, violence, and subversion in earnest in 1959, the Communist forces relied mainly on stocks of weapons and ammunition left over from the war against the French. Supplies sent in from North Vietnam came largely from the same source. As the military campaign progressed, the Vietcong depended heavily on weapons captured from the Armed Forces in South Vietnam. This remains an important source of weapons and ammunition for the Vietcong. But as the pace of the war has quickened, requirements for up-to-date arms and special types of weapons have risen to a point where the Vietcong cannot rely on captured stocks. Hanoi has undertaken a program to reequip its forces in the south with Communist-produced weapons.

Large and increasing quantities of military supplies are entering South Vietnam from outside the country. The principal supply point is North Vietnam, which provides a convenient channel for materiel that

originates in Communist China and other Communist countries.

An increasing number of weapons from external Communist sources have been seized in the south. These include such weapons as 57-millimeter and 75-millimeter recoilless rifles, dual-purpose machineguns, rocket launchers, large mortars, and antitank mines.

A new group of Chinese Communist-manufactured weapons has recently appeared in VC hands. These include the 7.62 semiautomatic carbine, 7.62 light machinegun, and the 7.62 assault rifle. These weapons and ammunition for them, manufactured in Communist China in 1962, were first captured in December 1964 in Chuong Thien Province. Similar weapons have since been seized in each of the four corps areas of South Vietnam. Also captured have been Chinese Communist antitank grenade launchers and ammunition made in China in 1963.

One captured Vietcong told his captors that his entire company had been supplied recently with modern Chinese weapons. The reequipping of VC units with a type of weapons that require ammunition and parts from outside South Vietnam indicates the growing confidence of the authorities in Hanoi in the effectiveness of their supply lines into the south.

Incontrovertible evidence of Hanoi's elaborate program to supply its forces in the south with weapons, ammunition, and other supplies has accumulated over the years. Dramatic new proof was exposed just as this report was being completed.

On February 16, 1965, an American helicopter pilot flying along the South Vietnamese coast sighted a suspicious vessel. It was a cargo ship of an estimated 100-ton capacity, carefully camouflaged and moored just offshore along the coast of Phu Yen Province. Fighter planes that approached the vessel met machinegun fire from guns on the deck of the ship and from the shore as well. A Vietnamese Air Force strike was launched against the vessel, and Vietnamese Government troops moved into the area. They seized the ship after a bitter fight with the Vietcong.

The ship, which had been sunk in shallow water, had discharged a huge cargo of arms, ammunition, and other supplies. Documents found on the ship and on the bodies of several Vietcong aboard identified the vessel as having come from North Vietnam. A newspaper in the cabin was from Haiphong and was dated January 23, 1965. The supplies delivered by the ship—thousands of weapons and more than a million rounds of ammunition—were almost all of Communist origin, largely from Communist China and Czechoslovakia, as well as North Vietnam. At least 100 tons of military supplies were discovered near the ship.

A preliminary survey of the cache near the sunken vessel from Hanoi listed the following supplies and weapons:

Approximately 1 million rounds of small-arms ammunition; more than 1,000 stick grenades; 500 pounds of TNT in prepared charges; 2,000 rounds of 82-millimeter mortar ammunition; 500 antitank grenades; 500 rounds of 57-millimeter recoilless rifle ammunition; more than 1,000 rounds of 75-millimeter recoilless rifle ammunition; one 87-millimeter recoilless rifle; 2 heavy machineguns; 2,000 7.95 Mauser rifles; more than 100, 7.62 carbines; 1,000 submachineguns; 15 light machineguns; 500 rifles; 500 pounds of medical supplies (with labels from North Vietnam, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Soviet Union, and other sources).

The ship was fairly new and had been made in Communist China. Documents aboard the ship included three North Vietnamese nautical charts (one of the Haiphong area and one of Hoi An Bay, both in

North Vietnam, and one of the Tra Vinh area of South Vietnam). The military health records of North Vietnamese soldiers were found. One man had a political history sheet showing he was a member of the 338th Division of the North Vietnamese Army. (See app. E.)

Also abroad the North Vietnamese ship were: an instruction book for a Chinese Communist navigational device; postcards and letters to addresses in North Vietnam; snapshots, including one of a group of men in North Vietnamese Army uniforms under a flag of the Hanoi government.

Members of the ICC and representatives of the free press visited the sunken North Vietnamese ship and viewed its cargo. The incident itself underlined in the most dramatic form that Hanoi is behind the continuing campaign of aggression aimed at conquering South Vietnam. It made unmistakably clear that what is happening in South Vietnam is not an internal affair but part of a large-scale carefully directed and supported program of armed attack on a sovereign state and a free people.

There have been previous seizures of large stocks of ammunition and weapons and other military supplies that could only have come from Communist sources outside South Vietnam. In December 1963, a Republic of Vietnam force attacked a VC stronghold in Dinh Tuong Province southwest of Saigon. A large cache of VC equipment was seized. Included in the captured stocks were the following weapons and ammunition, all of Chinese Communist manufacture:

One 90-millimeter rocket launcher; 2 carbines (type 53); 120 rounds of 76-millimeter recoilless rifle ammunition; 120 detonating fuses for recoilless rifle ammunition; 14,000 rounds of 7.62 (type F) ammunition; 160,000 rounds of 7.62 carbine ammunition; 150 fuses for mortar shells; 100,000 rounds of 7.92 Mauser-type ammunition; 110 pounds (approximate) of TNT; two 60-millimeter mortars.

These weapons and ammunition are the same as those used in the North Vietnamese Army. Some of the 7.62-millimeter ammunition was manufactured as recently as 1962.

Material is sent into South Vietnam from the North by a variety of methods—overland, by river and canal, and by sea. In one instance Vietnamese troops discovered a cache in which the 75-millimeter ammunition alone weighed approximately 1½ tons. It has been estimated that it would require more than 150 porters to carry this quantity of ammunition over rough terrain. However, a few sampans, each manned by a few men, could transport it with little difficulty. It is worth noting, in this connection, that the delta where the cache of material was seized has 460 miles of seacoast as well as 2,600 miles of canals navigable by large watercraft and another 2,200 miles of canals over which sampans can move easily. Much of the transport of large stocks of ammunition is undoubtedly waterborne for at least much of its travel into South Vietnam.⁵

Large quantities of chemical components for explosives have been sent into South Vietnam for the Vietcong. During 1963 there were at least 15 incidents in which boats, junks, or sampans were seized with explosives aboard. More than 20 tons of potassium chlorate or nitrate were captured.

⁵On Jan. 29, 1964, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam supplied the International Control Commission with a list of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment of Communist origin captured in South Vietnam since June 1962. The list is summarized in app. D.

⁶Photographs of additional Vietcong weapons and ammunition of Communist origin are contained in app. E.

All these cases were in the delta area, and the majority were on or near the Mekong River. Red phosphorus made in Communist China has been among the chemicals captured from the Vietcong.

The Communists have shown extreme sensitivity to exposure of the fact that war material is going to the Vietcong from North Vietnam, Communist China, and other Communist countries. A secret document captured from a VC agent last year reflected this sensitivity. The document was sent from VC military headquarters in Bien Hoa Province to subordinate units. It ordered them to "pay special attention to the removal of all the markings and letters on weapons of all types currently employed by units and agencies and manufactured by friendly East European democratic countries or by China." It said incriminating marking should be chiseled off "so that the enemy cannot use it as a propaganda theme every time he captures these weapons."

III. NORTH VIETNAM: BASE FOR CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH

The Third Lao Dong Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960 set forth two tasks for its members: "to carry out the socialist revolution in North Vietnam" and "to liberate South Vietnam."

The resolutions of the congress described the effort to destroy the legal Government in South Vietnam as follows: "The revolution in the South is a protracted, hard, and complex process of struggle, combining many forms of struggle of great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower to higher, and taking as its basis the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary power of the masses."

At the September meeting the Communist leaders in the north called for formation of "a broad national united front." Three months later Hanoi announced creation of the "Front for Liberation of the South." This is the organization that Communist propaganda now credits with guiding the forces of subversion in the south; it is pictured as an organization established and run by the people in the south themselves. At the 1960 Lao Dong Party Congress the tone was different. Then, even before the front existed, the Communist leaders were issuing orders for the group that was being organized behind the scenes in Hanoi. "This front must rally"; "The aims of its struggle are"; "The front must carry out"—this is the way Hanoi and the Communist Party addressed the Liberation Front even before its founding.

The Liberation Front is Hanoi's creation; it is neither independent nor southern, and what it seeks is not liberation but subjugation of the south.

In his address to the Third Lao Dong Party Congress, party and government leader Ho Chi Minh spoke of the necessity "to step up the Socialist revolution in the north and, at the same time, to step up the national democratic people's revolution in the south."

The year before, writing for Red Flag, the Communist Party newspaper of Belgium, Ho had said much the same thing: "We are building socialism in Vietnam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution."

In the same vein, the commander in chief of the North Vietnamese armed forces, Vo Nguyen Giap, spoke at the 1960 party congress of the need to "step up the national democratic people's revolution in the south." Earlier in the year, writing for the Communist Party journal Hoc Tap in Hanoi, General Giap described the north as "the revolutionary base for the whole country."

Le Duan, a member of the Politburo and first secretary of the Lao Dong Party, was even more explicit when he talked at the party congress about the struggle in the south and

the party's role. After noting the difficulties involved in overthrowing the existing order in South Vietnam, Le Duan said: "Hence the southern people's revolutionary struggle will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple process but a complicated one, combining many varied forms of struggle—from elementary to advanced, legal and illegal—and based on the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary force of the masses. In this process, we must constantly intensify our solidarity and the organization and education of the people of the south."

Another high official of the Hanoi regime Truong Chinh, writing in the party organ Hoc Tap in April 1961, expressed confidence in the success of the struggle to remove the legal government in South Vietnam because "North Vietnam is being rapidly consolidated and strengthened, is providing good support to the South Vietnamese revolution and is serving as a strong base for the struggle for national reunification."

He outlined the steps by which the Communists expect to achieve control over all Vietnam as follows: The Liberation Front would destroy the present Government in the south; a coalition government would be established; this government would agree with the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi regarding national reunification under one form or another. It takes little imagination to understand the form that is intended.

"Thus," wrote Truong Chinh, "though South Vietnam will be liberated by nonpeaceful means, the party policy of achieving peaceful national reunification is still correct."

The official government radio in Hanoi is used both overtly and covertly to support the Vietcong effort in South Vietnam. Captured agents have testified that the broadcasts are used sometimes to send instructions in veiled code to Vietcong representatives in the south.

Hoc Tap stated frankly in March 1963: "They [the authorities in South Vietnam] are well aware that North Vietnam is the firm base for the southern revolution and the point on which it leans, and that our party is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and people and is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution."

In April 1964 the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party issued a directive to all party echelons. It stated: "When the forces of the enemy and the plots of the enemy are considered, it is realized that the cadres, party members, and people in North Vietnam must * * * increase their sense of responsibility in regard to the South Vietnam revolution by giving positive and practical support to South Vietnam in every field."

Nguyen Chi Thanh, writing in a Hanoi newspaper in May 1963, underlined the importance of the role of the North Vietnamese Army in Hanoi's plans to unify Vietnam under Communist rule: "Our party set forth two strategic tasks to be carried out at the same time: to transform and build socialism in the north and to struggle to unify the country. Our army is an instrument of the class struggle in carrying out these two strategic tasks."

IV. ORGANIZATION, DIRECTION, COMMAND, AND CONTROL OF THE ATTACK ON SOUTH VIETNAM ARE CENTERED IN HANOI

The VC military and political apparatus in South Vietnam is an extension of an elaborate military and political structure in North Vietnam which directs and supplies it with the tools for conquest. The Ho Chi Minh regime has shown that it is ready to allocate every resource that can be spared—whether it be personnel, funds, or equipment—to the cause of overthrowing the legitimate Government in South Vietnam and of bringing all Vietnam under Communist rule.

A. Political organization

Political direction and control of the Vietcong is supplied by the Lao Dong Party, i.e. the Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh. Party agents are responsible for indoctrination, recruitment, political training, propaganda, anti-Government demonstrations, and other activities of a political nature. The considerable intelligence-gathering facilities of the party are also at the disposal of the Vietcong.

Overall direction of the VC movement is the responsibility of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party. Within the central committee a special reunification department has been established. This has replaced the committee for supervision of the youth mentioned in intelligence reports 2 years ago. It lays down broad strategy for the movement to conquer South Vietnam.

Until March 1962 there were two principal administrative divisions in the VC structure in the south. One was the interzone of South-Central Vietnam (sometimes called interzone 5); the other was the Nambo region. In a 1962 reorganization these were merged into one, called the central office for South Vietnam. The central committee, through its reunification department, issues directives to the central office, which translates them into specific orders for the appropriate subordinate command.

Under the central office are six regional units (V through IX) plus the special zone of Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh. A regional committee responsible to the central office directs VC activities in each region. Each regional committee has specialized units responsible for liaison, propaganda, training, personnel, subversive activities, espionage, military bases, and the like.

Below each regional committee are similarly structured units at the province and district levels. At the base of the Communist pyramid are the individual party cells, which may be organized on a geographic base or within social or occupational groups. The elaborateness of the party unit and the extent to which it operates openly or underground is determined mainly by the extent of VC control over the area concerned.

1. The Liberation Front: The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam is the screen behind which the Communists carry out their program of conquest. It is the creature of the Communist Government in Hanoi. As noted above the Communist Party in the North demanded establishment of such a front 3 months before its formation was actually announced in December 1950. It was designed to create the illusion that the Vietcong campaign of subversion was truly indigenous to South Vietnam rather than an externally directed Communist plan.

The front has won support primarily from the Communist world. Its radio faithfully repeats the propaganda themes of Hanoi and Peking. When its representatives travel abroad, they do so with North Vietnamese passports and sponsorship.³ The front's program copies that of the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam.

In late 1961, in still another effort to conceal the extent of Communist domination of the front, the Communists announced formation of a new Marxist political unit, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). This mechanism provided a way to explain the Communist presence in the front while at the same time making it appear that the Communist voice was only one of several affiliated organizations in the front. The PRP itself claimed direct descent from the original Indochinese Communist Party and

from the North Vietnamese Communist Party in Hanoi.

B. Military organization

Military affairs of the Vietcong are the responsibility of high command of the People's Army of North Vietnam and the Ministry of Defense, under close supervision from the Lao Dong Party. These responsibilities include operational plans, assignments of individuals and regular units, training programs, infiltration of military personnel and supplies, military communications, tactical intelligence, supplies, and the like. The six military regions are the same as those of the VC political organization.

The military structure of the Vietcong is an integral part of the political machinery that controls every facet of VC activity in South Vietnam under Hanoi's overall direction. Each political headquarters from the central office down to the village has a military component which controls day-to-day military operations. Similarly, each military headquarters has a political element, an individual or a small staff. This meshing of political and military activity is designed to insure the closest cooperation in support of the total Communist mission. It also gives assurance of political control over the military.

Associated with the central office, believed to be located in Tay Ninh Province, is a military headquarters. Through this headquarters, as well as through other channels, Hanoi maintains direct contact with its principal military units in the south.

In addition to its supervision of the general military effort of the VC, the military section of the central office is believed to have direct command of two regimental headquarters and a number of security companies.

The hard core of the VC military organization is the full-time regular unit usually based on a province or region. These are well-trained and highly disciplined guerrilla fighters. They follow a rigid training schedule that is roughly two-thirds military and one-third political in content. This compares with the 50-50 proportion for district units and the 70 percent political and 30 percent military content of the village guerrilla's training.

The size of the Vietcong regular forces has grown steadily in recent years. For example, the Vietcong have five regimental headquarters compared with two in 1961. And the main VC force is composed of 50 battalions, 80 percent more than before. There are an estimated 139 VC companies. Hard-core VC strength now is estimated at about 35,000; whereas it was less than 20,000 in 1961.

The main force battalions are well armed with a variety of effective weapons including 75-millimeter recoilless rifles and 81-82-millimeter mortars. The companies and smaller units are equally well equipped and have 57-millimeter recoilless rifles and 60-millimeter mortars in their inventory. It is estimated that the Vietcong have at least 130 81-millimeter mortars and 300 60-millimeter mortars. There is no precise estimate for the number of recoilless rifles in their hands, but it is believed that most main force units are equipped with them. In at least one recent action the Vietcong employed a 75-millimeter pack howitzer. This mobile weapon, which has a range of 8,500 yards, will increase the Vietcong capabilities to launch long-range attacks against many stationary targets in the country.

Supporting the main force units of the Vietcong are an estimated 30,000-40,000 part-

time guerrillas. They are generally organized at the district level, where there are likely to be several companies of 50 or more men each. These troops receive only half pay, which means they must work at least part of the time to eke out a living.

Below the irregular guerrilla forces of the district are the part-time, village-based guerrillas.

They are available for assignment by higher headquarters and are used for harassment and sabotage. They are expected to warn nearby VC units of the approach of any force of the legal government. They provide a pool for recruitment into the VC district forces.

The record shows that many of the village guerrillas are dragooned into service with the Vietcong. Some are kidnapped; others are threatened, still others join to prevent their families from being harmed. Once in the Vietcong net, many are reluctant to leave for fear of punishment by the authorities or reprisal by the Communists.

Lam Van Chuoi is a typical example. He was a member of the village civil defense force in his home village in Kien Giang province. In March 1960, he was kidnapped by the Vietcong and kept a prisoner in the highlands for 1 month. There he was subjected to intense propaganda and indoctrination. He was returned to his village but kept under close observation and steady pressure. Finally, he was convinced he must join the VC. Later, he was transferred to a Communist military unit in another province. After learning of the Government's open arms program, he decided to defect from the VC. In May 1964, he walked into a Government outpost and asked for protection.

Money to pay the regular VC units comes from a variety of sources. Funds are sent from Hanoi. "Taxes" are extorted from the local population. Landowners and plantation operators often must pay a tribute to the VC as the price for not having their lands devastated. Similarly, transportation companies have been forced to pay the VC or face the threat of having their buses or boats sabotaged. Officials and wealthy people have been kidnapped for ransom. The VC have often stopped buses and taken the money and valuables of all on board.

For the most part, the VC have concentrated their attention on individuals, isolated or poorly defended outposts, and small centers of population. They have mercilessly killed or kidnapped thousand of village chiefs and other local officials. But over the past year the VC have moved into larger unit operations. Their ability to operate on a battalion level or larger has substantially increased.

C. Intelligence organization

A key element in the Vietcong effort is an elaborate organization in Hanoi called the Central Research Agency (CRA) (the Nghe-n-Cuu Trung-Uong). Though it handles Hanoi's intelligence effort on a worldwide scale, the main focus of its operation is on South Vietnam. This agency is able to draw on the intelligence capabilities of both the Lao Dong Party and the North Vietnamese armed forces for information, personnel, and facilities.

The CRA reportedly operates under the close personal scrutiny of Ho Chi Minh himself. Some of the top officials in the Hanoi government reportedly sit on its directing committee, including Premier Pham Van Dong, Deputy Premier Truong Chinh, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap.

Considerable information on the organization of the CRA has become available from captured Vietcong agents and from the work of intelligence agents of the Republic of Vietnam. Much of this information cannot be made public for security reasons, but it is possible to describe the CRA organization and its operations in broad outline.

³ Pictures of North Vietnamese passports and travel documents used by front officials are in app. F. [Not printed in Record.]

³ For evidence that the People's Revolutionary Party in the south and the Communist Lao Dong Party in the north are one party, see app. G.

The headquarters of the CRA in Hanoi is divided into six main sections, not including a special code unit. The six sections are responsible for administration, cadres, communications, espionage, research, and training. Each section has units to handle the specialized activities of its particular area of responsibility. The research section, for example, has subsections that handle political, economic, and military affairs respectively.

CRA headquarters directs a number of special centers for overseas operations. One such center maintains intelligence channels to overseas areas. It operates through special units at Haiphong and at Hongay.

A second special center is responsible for VC intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos. A third center handles activities along the "demarcation line," the border with South Vietnam. This unit, based in Vinh Linh in southeast North Vietnam, is responsible for sending agents and supplies to the south by sea. It also cooperates with the North Vietnamese army in planning and carrying out infiltration. The CRA maintains intelligence bases in Laos and other countries.

Inside South Vietnam the Vietcong have a large intelligence network. Some of its units are responsible for receiving and sending on agents arriving from the North. They feed and give instructions to groups infiltrating into South Vietnam. They take delivery of equipment and supplies received from the North and relay them to Vietcong units in the south.

Many Vietcong agents have been captured in Saigon. They have exposed the extensive effort by the CRA to penetrate all Republic of Vietnam Government agencies, foreign embassies, and other specialized organizations. Party and military intelligence units and agents work closely with the CRA.

Each of the main centers operating under CRA headquarters has its own sections and units designed to carry out its main functions. The center at Vinh Linh, responsible for the main infiltration effort of the Vietcong, has separate sections for radio communications, coding, documentation and training, and liaison. It also has specialized units for infiltration through the mountains, infiltration by sea, and "illegal action" in the mountain area.

The CRA maintains a large and expanding radio communications network. Agents also are used to carry messages, usually in secret writing or memorized.

Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese intelligence operation in support of the Vietcong is one of the most extensive of its kind in the world.⁸

V. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HANOI'S CAMPAIGN OF AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM

While negotiating an end to the Indochina war at Geneva in 1954, the Communists were making plans to take over all former French territory in southeast Asia. When Vietnam was partitioned, thousands of carefully selected party members were ordered to remain in place in the south and keep their secret apparatus intact to help promote Hanoi's cause. Arms and ammunition were stored away for future use. Guerrilla fighters re-joined their families to await the party's call. Others withdrew to remote jungle and mountain hideouts. The majority, an estimated 90,000, were moved to North Vietnam.

Hanoi's original calculation was that all of Vietnam would fall under its control without resort to force. For this purpose, Communist cadres were ordered to penetrate official and nonofficial agencies, to propagandize and sow confusion, and generally to use all means short of open violence to aggravate war-torn conditions and to weaken South Vietnam's government and social fabric.

South Vietnam's refusal to fall in with Hanoi's schemes for peaceful takeover came as a heavy blow to the Communists. Meantime, the Government had stepped up efforts to blunt Vietcong subversion and to expose Communist agents. Morale in the Communist organization in the south dropped sharply. Defections were numerous.

Among South Vietnamese, hope rose that their nation could have a peaceful and independent future, free of Communist domination. The country went to work. The years after 1955 were a period of steady progress and growing prosperity.

Food production levels of the prewar years were reached and surpassed. While per capita food output was dropping 10 percent in the north from 1956 to 1960, it rose 20 percent in the south. By 1963 it had risen 30 percent, despite the disruption in the countryside caused by intensified Vietcong military attacks and terrorism. The authorities in the north admitted openly to continuing annual failures to achieve food production goals.

Production of textiles increased in the south more than 20 percent in 1 year (1958). In the same year, South Vietnam's sugar crop increased more than 100 percent. Despite North Vietnam's vastly larger industrial complex, South Vietnam's per capita gross national product in 1960 was estimated at \$110 a person while it was only \$70 in the North.

More than 900,000 refugees who had fled from Communist rule in the North were successfully settled in South Vietnam. An agrarian reform program was instituted. The elementary school population nearly quadrupled between 1956 and 1960. And so it went—a record of steady improvement in the lives of the people. It was intolerable for the rulers in Hanoi; under peaceful conditions, the south was outstripping the north. They were losing the battle of peaceful competition and decided to use violence and terror to gain their ends.

After 1956 Hanoi rebuilt, reorganized, and expanded its covert political and military machinery in the South. Defectors were replaced by trained personnel from party ranks in the north. Military units and political cells were enlarged and were given new leaders, equipment, and intensified training. Recruitment was pushed. In short, Hanoi and its forces in the South prepared to take by force and violence what they had failed to achieve by other means.

By 1958 the use of terror by the Vietcong increased appreciably. It was used both to win prestige and to back up demands for support from the people, support that political and propaganda appeals had failed to produce. It was also designed to embarrass the Government in Saigon and raise doubts about its ability to maintain internal order and to assure the personal security of its people. From 1959 through 1961, the pace of Vietcong terrorism and armed attacks accelerated substantially.

The situation at the end of 1961 was so grave that the Government of the Republic of Vietnam asked the United States for increased military assistance. That request was met. Meantime, the program of strategic hamlets, designed to improve the peasant's livelihood and give him some protection against Vietcong harassment and pressure, was pushed energetically.

But the Vietcong did not stand still. To meet the changing situation, they tightened their organization and adopted new tactics, with increasing emphasis on terrorism, sabotage, and armed attacks by small groups. They also introduced from the North technicians in fields such as armor and anti-aircraft. Heavier weapons were sent in to the regular guerrilla forces.

The military and insurgency situation was complicated by a quite separate internal political struggle in South Vietnam, which led

in November 1963 to the removal of the Diem government and its replacement with a new one. Effective power was placed in the hands of a Military Revolutionary Council. There have been a number of changes in the leadership and composition of the Government in Saigon in the ensuing period.

These internal developments and distractions gave the Vietcong an invaluable opportunity, and they took advantage of it. Vietcong agents did what they could to encourage disaffection and to exploit demonstrations in Saigon and elsewhere. In the countryside the Communists consolidated their hold over some areas and enlarged their military and political apparatus by increased infiltration. Increasingly they struck at remote outposts and the most vulnerable of the new strategic hamlets and expanded their campaign of aggressive attacks, sabotage and terror.

Any official, worker, or establishment that represents a service to the people by the Government in Saigon is fair game for the Vietcong. Schools have been among their favorite targets. Through harassment, the murder of teachers, and sabotage of buildings, the Vietcong succeeded in closing hundreds of schools and interrupting the education of tens of thousands of youngsters.

Hospitals and medical clinics have often been attacked as part of the anti-Government campaign and also because such attacks provide the Vietcong with needed medical supplies. The Communists have encouraged people in rural areas to oppose the Government's antimalaria teams, and some of the workers have been killed. Village and town offices, police stations, and agricultural research stations are high on the list of preferred targets for the Vietcong.

In 1964, 436 South Vietnamese hamlet chiefs and other Government officials were killed outright by the Vietcong and 1,131 were kidnaped. More than 1,350 civilians were killed in bombings and other acts of sabotage. And at least 3,400 civilians were kidnaped by the Vietcong.⁹

Today the war in Vietnam has reached new levels of intensity. The elaborate effort by the Communist regime in North Vietnam to conquer the South has grown, not diminished. Military men, technicians, political organizers, propagandists, and secret agents have been infiltrating into the Republic of Vietnam from the north in growing numbers. The flow of Communist-supplied weapons, particularly those of large caliber, has increased. Communications links with Hanoi are extensive. Despite the heavy casualties of 3 years of fighting, the hardcore VC force is considerably larger now than it was at the end of 1961.

The Government in Saigon has undertaken vigorous action to meet the new threat. The United States and other free countries have increased their assistance to the Vietnamese Government and people. Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited Vietnam in 1964, and he promised the Vietnamese: "We shall remain at your side until the aggression from the north has been defeated, until it has been completely rooted out and this land enjoys the peace which it deserves."

President Johnson has repeatedly stressed that the U.S. goal is to see peace secured in southeast Asia. But he has noted that "that will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace."

Though it has been apparent for years that the regime in Hanoi was conducting a campaign of conquest against South Vietnam, the Government in Saigon and the Government of the United States both hoped that the danger could be met within South Vietnam itself. The hope that any widening of the conflict might be avoided was stated frequently.

⁸ Charts of the VC organizational structure are in appendix E.

⁹ For additional details of VC terrorism, see app. I.

The leaders in Hanoi chose to respond with greater violence. They apparently interpreted restraint as indicating lack of will. Their efforts were pressed with greater vigor and armed attacks and incidents of terror multiplied.

Clearly the restraint of the past was not providing adequately for the defense of South Vietnam against Hanoi's open aggression. It was mutually agreed between the Governments of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States that further means for providing for South Vietnam's defense were required. Therefore, air strikes have been made against some of the military assembly points and supply bases from which North Vietnam is conducting its aggression against the South. These strikes constitute a limited response fitted to the aggression that produced them.

Until the regime in Hanoi decides to halt its intervention in the South, or until effective steps are taken to maintain peace and security in the area, the Governments of South Vietnam and the United States will continue necessary measures of defense against the Communist armed aggression coming from North Vietnam.

VI. CONCLUSION

The evidence presented in this report could be multiplied many times with similar examples of the drive of the Hanoi regime to extend its rule over South Vietnam.

The record is conclusive. It establishes beyond question that North Vietnam is carrying out a carefully conceived plan of aggression against the South. It shows that North Vietnam has intensified its efforts in the years since it was condemned by the International Control Commission. It proves that Hanoi continues to press its systematic program of armed aggression into South Vietnam. This aggression violates the United Nations Charter. It is directly contrary to the Geneva Accords of 1954 and of 1962 to which North Vietnam is a party. It shatters the peace of southeast Asia. It is a fundamental threat to the freedom and security of South Vietnam.

The people of South Vietnam have chosen to resist this threat. At their request, the United States has taken its place beside them in their defensive struggle.

The United States seeks no territory, no military bases, no favored position. But we have learned the meaning of aggression elsewhere in the postwar world, and we have met it.

If peace can be restored in South Vietnam, the United States will be ready at once to reduce its military involvement. But it will not abandon friends who want to remain free. It will do what must be done to help them. The choice now between peace and continued and increasingly destructive conflict is one for the authorities in Hanoi to make.

APPENDIX A

FINDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION

On June 2, 1962, the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (ICC) sent a special report to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Soviet Union in their role as cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indochina. The ICC is composed of delegates from India (chairman), Canada, and Poland.

In its report the ICC noted the following finding of the Commission's Legal Committee:

"Having examined the complaints and the supporting material sent by the South Vietnamese mission, the committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the north to the zone in the south with the object of supporting, organizing, and carrying out hostile activities, including

armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and administration of the zone in the south. These acts are in violation of articles 10, 19, 24, and 27 of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.

"In examining the complaints and the supporting material in particular, documentary material sent by the South Vietnamese mission, the Committee has come to the further conclusion that there is evidence to show that the PAVN (people's army of Vietnam) has allowed the zone in the north to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting the hostile activities in the zone in the south, aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the south. The use of the zone in the north for such activities is in violation of articles 19, 24, and 27 of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.

The ICC report then stated:

"The Commission accepts the conclusions reached by the Legal Committee that there is sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt that the PAVN has violated articles 10, 19, 24, and 27 in specific instances. The Polish delegation dissents from these conclusions. On the basis of the fuller report, that is being prepared by the Legal Committee covering all the allegations and incidents, the Commission will take action as appropriate in each individual case."

The full text of the ICC reports is contained in a publication, "Special Reports to the Cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indochina" issued by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State on July 2, 1962.

APPENDIX B

INFILTRATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM NORTH VIETNAM INTO SOUTH VIETNAM

(See sec. I, B.)

(Maps showing infiltration routes not printed in the Record.)

APPENDIX C

DETAIL ON MILITARY INFILTRATION WITH CASE STUDIES

(See sec. I, B, and C.)

The following table shows the scale of infiltration of military personnel from North Vietnam into the South since 1959. The confirmed list is based on information on infiltration groups from at least two independent sources.

Year	Confirmed	Estimated additional	Total
1959-60	1,800	2,700	4,500
1961	3,750	1,650	5,400
1962	6,400	7,000	13,400
1963	4,200	3,200	7,400
1964	4,400	3,000	7,400
Total	19,550	17,550	37,100

Brief case histories of typical Vietcong who were sent into South Vietnam by the authorities in Hanoi follow:

Name: Le Van Thanh.

Alias: Huu Tam.

Date and place of birth: July 12, 1936, Hoa Hao hamlet, Cat Tai village, Phu Cat district (Binh Dinh).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Lieutenant, formerly platoon leader of signal platoon of 3d Battalion, 90th Regiment, 324th Division.

VC position in South Vietnam: Platoon leader of signal platoon of 95th Battalion, 2d Regiment, 5th Inter-Region.

Date entered South Vietnam: Departed November 27, 1961, arrived Do Xa station early February 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied to government at Nhon Loc post, Nghia Hanh district (Quang Ngai), May 24, 1962.

Name: La Thanh.

Alias: Nguyen Ba Tong—La Giao.

Date and place of birth: 1928, Can Tho city (Phong Dinh).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Senior sergeant, formerly squad leader in charge of construction of barracks for 338th Division.

VC position in South Vietnam: Squad leader, 8th Squad, 3d Platoon, 3d Company, 218B Battalion (War Zone D).

Date entered South Vietnam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 15; departed April 4, 1962, arrived War Zone D early August 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Cau Song Be (bridge) post September 8, 1962, with 1 MAS 36.

Name: Le Van Quyen.

Alias: Ho Hai, Hong Thanh.

Date and place of birth: 1929, Tan Binh Than village, Cho Gao district (My Tho).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Lieutenant, formerly assigned to 368th Brigade as instructor on heavy weapons such as 57 mm. recoilless rifle and machinegun.

VC position in South Vietnam: Platoon leader, 2d Platoon, 2d Company, Infiltration Group 15.

Date entered South Vietnam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 15; departed April 3, 1962, arrived Suoi Da (War Zone D) September 10, 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Hieu Liem district (Phuoc Thanh) October 7, 1962.

Name: Nguyen Van Do.

Party name: Thanh Minh.

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Thuan.

Date and place of birth: 1923, Thuan Giao village, Lai Thieu district (Binh Duong).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Senior captain (battalion commander) 1st Battalion, 338th Brigades.

VC position in South Vietnam: Subject was to be appointed commander of Phuoc Tuy Province Main Force Battalion.

Date entered South Vietnam: Commander of Infiltration Group H. 26; departed Xuan Mai, Ha Dong (North Vietnam) July 4, 1963; arrived Ban Me Thout October 23, 1963.

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Ban Don post, Ban Me Thout, October 23, 1963, while guiding Group H. 26 to Hai Yen Zone.

Name: Nguyen Thanh Phi.

Party name: Hung Phuong.

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Tu.

Date and place of birth: November 16, 1926, Thanh Van village, Thanh Chuong district (Nghé An).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Doctor, chief of internal disease section, Tiep Viet Hospital.

VC position in South Vietnam: Doctor, health team leader, 5th Region base construction group (Do Xa).

Date entered South Vietnam: March 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Vietnamese armed forces May 4, 1963, with one 12-millimeter Colt pistol and five rounds.

Name: Le Van Net.

Party name: Le Hung Tien.

Infiltration alias: Le Na.

Date and place of birth: 1924, Tan Hiep village, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong.

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Discharged lieutenant, served in Co Dinh chromite mine (Thanh Hoa) with grade of senior sergeant.

VC position in South Vietnam: Senior sergeant, 6th Squad, 2d Platoon, Infiltration Group H. 26.

Date entered South Vietnam: Late June 1963 with Infiltration Group H. 26.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured November 16, 1963, by inhabitants in strategic hamlet in Ban Me Thout (Darlac) with one Communist Chinese rifle and 70 rounds.

Name: Van Cong Khanh.

Party name: Pham Tien.

Date and place of birth: 1924, An Hoi village, Chau Thanh district (Kien Hoa).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Discharged and reassigned to Co Dinh chromite mine (Thanh Hoa) as senior sergeant.

VC position in South Vietnam: Aspirant, leader of 7th Squad, 3d Platoon, 608th Engineer Company subordinate to Headquarters Region 7.

Date entered South Vietnam: Accompanied Group 49, infiltrated into South Vietnam, March 18, 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: captured November 23, 1962, in Bung Dia hamlet.

Name: Nguyen Thanh Hoa.

Party name: Quoc.

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Quoc Trung.

Date and place of birth: 1917, Phong Coc villages, Ha Nam canton (Quang Yen).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Captain, discharged and reassigned to Chi Ne agricultural camp May 1957.

VC position in South Vietnam: Commander, 4th Main Force Battalion.

Date entered South Vietnam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 52; departed Xuan Mai, April 13, 1961, arrived about August 1961.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Vietnamese Armed Forces with 1 PA 38 (pistol) in Quon Long (Dinh Tuong) August 1962.

Name: Tran van Khoa.

Alias: Tran Hong Hai.

Date and place of birth: 1936, Giong Gach hamlet, An Hiep village, Ba Tri district, Ben Tre Province (Kien Hoa).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Sergeant, formerly driver of Transportation Group 8 of (Hanoi) Logistical Bureau.

VC position in South Vietnam: Member of 46th Infiltration Company; cover designation V. 2 (infiltrated unit).

Date entered South Vietnam: Accompanied the 46th Infiltration Company; departed for South Vietnam, April 17, 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Vietnamese Rangers in ambush (after being wounded) along with one MAS 36, July 7, 1962, in Phuoc Long Province.

APPENDIX D

LIST OF COMMUNIST WEAPONS CAPTURED IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(See sec. II.)

On January 29, 1964, the Government of Vietnam submitted to the International Control Commission a list of weapons and other military equipment which had been captured from the Vietcong. The weapons and equipment came from Communist sources outside South Vietnam and obviously had been introduced clandestinely into the country in support of the Vietcong campaign of conquest directed by Hanoi.

I. Chinese Communist origin.

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
75-millimeter recoilless rifle	1	Sept. 10, 1963	An Xuyen Province.
Do	1	Dec. 22, 1963	Do.
Do	1	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	3		
57-millimeter recoilless gun	1	Nov. 25, 1962	Phuoc Chau in Quang Tin (1 gun and 7 gun carriages).
Do	1	Dec. 5, 1962	Phu Bon (1 gun carriage).
Do	2	Aug. 31, 1963	Province of Quang Ngai.
Total	4		
Shells for 75-millimeter gun (shells bear markings in Chinese characters. On some shells, markings were scratched out and replaced by "American" markings.)	8	Nov. 24, 1963	Province of An Xuyen.
Do	120	Dec. 22, 1963	Operation Due Thang at Dinh Tuong.
Total	128		
Shells for 57-millimeter gun	49	Nov. 25, 1962	Phuoc Chau, Province of Quang Tin.
Do	8	Feb. 20, 1963	Vietcong attack on the post of Ban Heo (Tay Ninh).
Do	33	May 24, 1963	On a Vietcong vessel on the Bassac River.
Do	6	Aug. 31, 1963	Quang Ngai.
Do	1	Oct. 8, 1963	Province of Binh Dinh.
Do	58	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	155		
80-millimeter mortar	1	Mar. 26, 1963	Province of Tay Ninh.
60-millimeter mortar	1	Jan. 7, 1963	Phuoc Thanh.
Do	2	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	3		
Shells for 60-millimeter mortar	18	Sept. 10, 1963	Province of An Xuyen.
Do	168	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	186		
90-millimeter bazooka	1	Dec. 22, 1963	Do.
Caliber 27-millimeter rocket launcher	2	June 10, 1962	Provinces of Quang Ngai and Quang Duc.
Total	3		
Caliber 7.92-millimeter model 98 Maxim machinegun	2	Sept. 10, 1963	Province of An Xuyen.
Do	4	Dec. 21, 1963	Chuong Thien.
Total	6		
MP-82 rocket	142	Apr. 24, 1963	Quang Ngai.
TNT explosives (charges)	353	June 13, 1962	Quang Duc.
Do	43	Nov. 25, 1962	Phuoc Chau (Quang Tin).
Do	29	May 7, 1963	Can Tho.
Do	140	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	577		
Red phosphorous (kilograms)	5	Apr. 10, 1963	Province of Kien Phong.
Potassium chlorate (tons)	17	September 1962	On a Vietcong vessel at Phu Quoc.
Do	2	Apr. 19, 1963	Province of Kien Phong.
Potassium chlorate (kilograms)	150	July 10-18, 1963	Phu Quoc.
Total:			
Tons	19		
Kilograms	155		
Cartridges for 7.92-millimeter machinegun	100,000	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Detonating fuses for 60-millimeter mortar shell	150	do.	Do.

1 Guns plus 8 gun carriages.

II. Soviet origin

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
MP-32 rifle		May 10, 1963	Binh Dinh.
Launching cartridges		do.	Do.
Mossin Nagant carbine (with automatic bayonet)	1	June 13, 1963	Kien Phong.
Do	2	July 13, 1963	Long An.
Do	5	July 20, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Do	7	Sept. 8, 1963	Do.
Total	15		
Rifles	6	Oct. 6, 1963	Long An.
Do	1	Oct. 19, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Do	11	Nov. 6, 1963	Vinh Binh.
Do	1	Nov. 17, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Do	1	Nov. 25, 1963	Hau Nghia.
Do	1	Dec. 6, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Do	8	Dec. 7, 1963	Phong Dinh.
Do	1	Dec. 12, 1963	Kien Tuong.
Do	1	Dec. 13, 1963	An Xuyen.
Do	1	Dec. 16, 1963	Kien Giang.
Do	1	do.	Ba Xuyen.
Do	3	do.	An Xuyen.
Do	1	Dec. 17, 1963	Phong Dinh.
Do	1	Dec. 20, 1963	Kien Hoa.
Do	6	Dec. 21, 1963	Chuong Thien.
Do	2	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	46		
Automatic pistol	1	Oct. 19, 1963	Phan Thiet.
Grenades	5		Long An.
Rifle cartridges	160,000	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Submachinegun (machine pistol)	2	Sept. 28, 1963	Long Xuyen.

III. Czech origin

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
7.65-millimeter automatic pistol	1	Jan. 2, 1963	On person of Vietcong leader arrested at Phu Yen.
K-50 submachinegun	2	Nov. 26, 1962	Quang Tin.
Do	1	Nov. 29, 1962	Phuoc Long.
Do	7	Apr. 24, 1963	Quang Ngai.
Do	2	May 9, 1963	Quang Tin.
Do	2	July 11, 1963	Operation Hau Giang.
Do	3	Aug. 31, 1963	Quang Ngai.
Do	1	Sept. 3, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Do	1	Sept. 16, 1963	Long An.
Do	1	Oct. 17, 1963	Quang Nam.
Do	2	Nov. 18, 1963	Phu Yen.
Do	1	do.	At Hue.
Do	9	Oct. 9, 1963	Binh Dinh.
Do	1		Operation Phuoc Binh Thang.
Do	1	Dec. 30, 1963	Kien Hoa.
Do	1	Dec. 26, 1963	Chuong Thien.
Do	1	Dec. 17, 1963	Long Xuyen.
Total	40		
Rifles	9	Sept. 10, 1963	An Xuyen.
Do	1	Oct. 19, 1963	Chuong Thien.
Do	1	Nov. 6, 1963	Ba Xuyen.
Do	2	Nov. 9, 1963	Chuong Thien.
Do	3	Nov. 18, 1963	Kien Giang.
Do	1	Nov. 17, 1963	Ba Xuyen.
Do	2	Nov. 26, 1963	Hau Nghia.
Do	1	Dec. 2, 1963	Phong Dinh.
Do	6	Dec. 21, 1963	Chuong Thien.
Total	26		
Machinegun cartridges	14,000	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Grenade launcher	1	July 14, 1963	Long An.
8.5 antitank bazooka	1	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.

IV. (a) Weapons and ammunition modified by the Regular Army of North Vietnam

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
Modified MAT-49	16	Nov. 26, 1962	Quang Tin.
Do	2	Dec. 4, 1963	Phu Hon.
Do	6	Nov. 18, 1963	
Total	24		
12.7-millimeter machinegun	2	Nov. 22, 1963	Operation at Due Hoa.

IV. (b) Material and equipment of North Vietnamese manufacture

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
Uniform		Dec. 21, 1962	Phuoc Thanh.
Helmets	16	Oct. 8-10, 1963	Kien Hoa.
Socks	()	Dec. 21, 1962	Phuoc Thanh.
Sweaters (made in Ha Dong)	()		Do.
Belts (made in Hanoi)	()		Do.
Mess Kits (made in Halphong)	()		Do.

1 No number given.

APPENDIX E

PHOTOS OF CAPTURED VIETCONG WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION FROM EXTERNAL COMMUNIST SOURCES

(See sec. II.)

The following are photographs of some of the many weapons and the large stocks of ammunition supplied to the Vietcong in South Vietnam from external Communist sources (not printed in the RECORD).

APPENDIX F

NORTH VIETNAMESE PASSPORTS AND TRAVEL DOCUMENTS USED BY LIBERATION FRONT OFFICIALS

(See sec. IV, A, 1.)

Huynh Van Nghia and Nguyen Van Tien are officials of the "National Liberation Front of South Vietnam." Though they profess to be citizens of South Vietnam, their ties are with and their support comes from North Vietnam and the Communist regime in Hanoi. In 1963, when the two men traveled abroad on front business, they traveled as North Vietnamese with passports and other documents issued by the Hanoi regime.

Photographs of these documents follow (not printed in the RECORD).

APPENDIX G

THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (SOUTH) AND THE LAO DONG PARTY (NORTH) ARE ONE COMMUNIST PARTY

(See sec. IV, A.)

In May 1962 a military force of the Government of Vietnam captured a number of Vietcong documents in Ba Xuyen Province. One of these documents contained instructions from the provincial committee of the Lao Dong Party (Communist Party) in Ba Xuyen to the party's district committees concerning formation of the new People's Revolutionary Party (PRP).

Pertinent sections of the instruction, dated December 7, 1961, follow:

"To D2 and K:

"In regard to the foundation of the People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam, the creation of this party is only a matter of strategy; it needs to be explained within the party; and, to deceive the enemy, it is necessary that the new party be given the outward appearance corresponding to a division of the party (Lao Dong) into two and the foundation of a new party, so that the enemy cannot use it in his propaganda.

"Within the party, it is necessary to explain that the founding of the People's Revolutionary Party has the purpose of isolating the Americans and the Ngo Dinh Diem regime, and to counter their accusations of an invasion of the South by the North. It is means of supporting our sabotage of the Geneva agreement, of advancing the plan of invasion of the South, and at the same time permitting the Front for Liberation of the South to recruit new adherents, and to gain the sympathy of nonaligned countries in southeast Asia.

"The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence; actually, our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam (Vietminh Communist Party), unified from North to South, under the direction of the central executive committee of the party, the chief of which is President Ho. . . .

"During these explanations, take care to keep this strictly secret, especially in South Vietnam, so that the enemy does not perceive our purpose. . . .

"Do not put these explanations in party bulletins."

Another party circular of the same date said:

"The reasons for the change in the party's name must be kept strictly secret. According to instructions of the Central Committee, one must not tell the people or party sympathizers that the People's Revolutionary Party and the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam are one. One must not say that it is only a tactic, because it would not be good for the enemy to know."

A third party circular, dated December 8, 1961, said:

"Study the instructions so that you will be able to execute them. In passing them to D2V, D2, and K, be very careful that the documents do not fall into enemy hands. After D2N/C has passed to the sections, destroy the written documents immediately."

The originals and translations of the above documents were submitted to the International Control Commission by the Government of Vietnam on May 30, 1962.¹

In 1964 new rules and regulations were promulgated for the People's Revolutionary Party. A copy of the new rules was captured from the Vietcong in Chuong Thien Province

in November 1964. A photograph of the captured document appears on the next page. Key portions of the instructions said that new rules and regulations had been approved for the PRP, "but the real nature of those rules and regulations is that they still are the rules and regulations of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party (in North Vietnam)."

The instructions added: ". . . we should realize that our country is one country, that the Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party and the Vietnam Lao Dong Party are one party. . . . There is nothing different between the two parties."

APPENDIX H

CHARTS OF THE VIETCONG ORGANIZATION, NORTH AND SOUTH

(See sec. IV.)

Lines of control, political and military, from the Hanoi regime to the Vietcong in South Vietnam (charts not printed in the RECORD).

APPENDIX I

DETAIL ON VIETCONG TERRORISM

(See section V.)

The following table lists the Government officials and other civilians killed, wounded, or missing as a result of Vietcong terrorist activities during 1964. Combat casualties are not included:

Village, district, and other Government officials

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Killed.....	47	34	49	30	25	31	45	36	46	48	21	24
Wounded.....	14	16	24	9	8	9	14	15	13	10	22	7
Kidnaped.....	93	113	91	67	74	122	93	103	144	69	52	100
Total.....	154	163	164	106	107	172	132	154	203	127	95	131

Other civilians

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Killed.....	111	110	138	115	105	110	181	103	132	100	63	88
Wounded.....	146	174	230	218	163	173	194	122	203	90	94	154
Kidnaped.....	694	590	1,331	947	727	493	964	534	773	477	200	493
Total.....	951	874	1,908	980	925	768	1,539	1,059	1,113	667	360	740

The following table shows the number of forced propaganda sessions, and armed attacks during 1964:

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Attacks.....	223	217	203	220	175	140	184	113	115	83	60	60
Terrorism.....	1,244	1,389	1,632	1,738	1,418	1,390	2,123	1,775	1,938	1,790	1,391	1,719
Sabotage.....	139	201	183	169	217	176	280	315	452	480	247	318
Propaganda.....	174	271	167	167	140	162	224	173	178	197	109	123

Some of the consequences of Vietcong terrorism are shown in the accompanying photographs (not printed in the RECORD).

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. SECURITY COUNCIL

(Signed by A. Stevenson)

(Circular No. 1589, dated February 27.)

For the information of members of the Security Council, I am transmitting a special report entitled "Aggression from the North, the Record of North Vietnam's Campaign To Conquer South Vietnam," which my Government is making public today. It presents evidence from which the following conclusions are inescapable:

First, the subjugation by forces of the Republic of Vietnam by the regime in northern Vietnam is the formal, official policy of that regime; this has been stated and confirmed publicly over the past 5 years.

Second, the war in Vietnam is directed by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party (Communist) which controls the government in northern Vietnam.

Third, the so-called Peoples Revolutionary Party in the Republic of Vietnam is an integral part of the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam.

Fourth, the so-called Liberation Front for South Vietnam is a subordinate unit of the Central Office for South Vietnam, an integral part of the governmental machinery in Hanoi.

Fifth, the key leadership of the Vietcong—officers, specialists, technicians, intelligence agents, political organizers, and propagandists—has been trained, equipped, and supplied in the north and sent into the Republic of Vietnam under Hanoi's military orders.

Sixth, most of the weapons, including new types recently introduced, and most of the

ammunition and other supplies used by the Vietcong, have been sent from North to South Vietnam.

Seventh, the scale of infiltration of men and arms, including regular units of the Armed Forces of North Vietnam, has increased appreciably in recent months.

Eighth, this entire pattern of activity by the regime in Hanoi is in violation of general principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and is in direct violation of the Geneva accord of 1954. Such a pattern of violation of the treaty obligations undertaken at Geneva was confirmed by a special report of the International Control Commission in 1962 and it has been greatly intensified since then.

These facts about the situation in Vietnam make it unmistakably clear that the character of that conflict is an aggressive war of conquest waged against a neighbor—and makes nonsense of the cynical allegation that this is simply an indigenous insurrection.

I request that you circulate copies of the report, together with copies of this letter, to the delegations of all member states as a Security Council document.

In making this information available to the Security Council, my Government wishes to say once more that peace can be restored quickly to Vietnam by a prompt and assured cessation of aggression by Hanoi against the Republic of Vietnam. In that event, my Government—as it has said many times before, would be happy to withdraw its military forces from the Republic of Vietnam and turn promptly to an international effort to assist the economic and social development of southeast Asia.

In the meantime, my Government awaits the first indication of any intent by the Government in Hanoi to return to the ways of peace and peaceful resolution of this international conflict.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I should like to read to the Senate the concluding sentences of Mr. Stevenson. They are very brief; it seems to me they state something which has not been expressed to the world:

In making this information available to the Security Council, my Government wishes to say once more that peace can be restored quickly to Vietnam by a prompt and assured cessation of aggression by Hanoi against the Republic of Vietnam. In that event, my Government—as it has said many times before, would be happy to withdraw its military forces from the Republic of Vietnam and turn promptly to an international effort to assist the economic and social development of southeast Asia.

In the meantime, my Government awaits the first indication of any intent by the government in Hanoi to return to the ways of peace and peaceful resolution of this international conflict.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Nevada.

Mr. CANNON. I congratulate the Senator from Wisconsin for a very fine and excellent outline of our goals in South Vietnam and what we have been trying to do to assist the people of South Vietnam.

Most important of all, the fact is that all we desire is peace, an end to the fighting and terror in South Vietnam, and the preservation of the freedom of the South Vietnamese people or any other people to make their own determination as to the kind of government under which they

wish to live. I agree with the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin that this is no time to talk about negotiation, because even a discussion of the possibility of negotiation leads our allies to believe that we perhaps are getting into a position of thinking about abandoning them and to pull out of southeast Asia. In my opinion, if we were to pull out of South Vietnam and, in effect, turn over all of southeast Asia to communism, it would certainly constitute surrender.

I again congratulate the Senator for a very fine outline and a very fine speech on the subject.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Nevada very much. I deeply appreciate his supporting statement.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SCOTT. While I did not hear the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin deliver his speech, I have had an opportunity to read a considerable portion of it. I commend the Senator from Wisconsin, not only for his forthright approach, but also the fact that he has clarified the big question which people frequently ask. That is, Why are we in South Vietnam?

The question has been asked of me by any number of people. The Senator's speech helps greatly to answer the question. I have discussed the subject with the President. I have had the benefit of the most candid kind of briefing. For the first time in my experience, the present President of the United States not only gave us a briefing, but invited questions, which he offered to answer himself. I think this is better than the equivalent of the British system, under which there is a question period on the floor of Parliament. We were not only complimented by that procedure, but we were immensely helped, because we posed to the President rather pointed questions and we received answers with which I found myself in agreement.

The President has made it perfectly clear—and I am referring, now, not to briefings but to public statements—that he intends to stay in North Vietnam until our responsibilities and objectives have been achieved.

As the Senator from Wisconsin himself has said in his speech, we seek nothing of material advantage. We are there at great sacrifice. Our future policies there must be not only to preserve our commitment but to seek in every way we can to reduce casualties. In my considered judgment—and I ask the Senator if he agrees with it—the surest way to reduce casualties in South Vietnam is not to negotiate from weakness, which is not to say that we may in the future be in a position to negotiate from strength, should the aggressor at some point sue for it. To negotiate from weakness would merely transfer the war from South Vietnam to Thailand, which the Communists have already indicated is next on their list, a country which has been independent for a thousand years, a country which has never been occupied

colonially. If Thailand goes and Burma goes, and if India comes under the guns, the question seems to me to be, When do we stop running?

I do not believe the American people are yet aware that if we withdraw from southeast Asia, the Communists would not give up a single objective, which is to expand their empire—their materialistic, imperialistic empire—to include all of the islands, including the fifth largest country in the world, Indonesia. If that happened, the 7th Fleet would in time retreat. We would be faced with the loss of Okinawa. Under those circumstances, we would have to move our fleet from the area of Formosa and would cease to be a Pacific power. We would then have left the world in a state of the most dangerous imbalance in all history, certainly in all modern history. We would then be forced back upon Guam, as our farthest outpost, and the Hawaiian Islands.

The President has strongly indicated that arguments urging that we withdraw from Vietnam at a time when we are in the worst possible position for negotiation have increased, and the diplomatic corps in Washington tell their nations at home that the President does not have the support of the Senate and the House of Representatives. They are wrong, but I know a number of those ambassadors, and I am aware of what they are saying. Does not the Senator from Wisconsin agree that eventually we shall have to come to a place where we shall have to stop running and stand and face this aggressor?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I agree wholeheartedly with the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania. Also, I am most grateful to him, as I am sure the President is, for his graceful reference to the President's conferences and to his responding to questions. I have also participated in those conferences. They are most informative and helpful.

The Senator from Pennsylvania is an outstanding leader of the Republican Party, and has been for many years. He speaks in a completely bipartisan sense when he says that we must recognize that if we do not stand in South Vietnam, we shall have to fight under worse conditions, under conditions in which we will have encouraged the Communists and on territory closer to home. We shall have to fight under conditions in which they will have been strengthened. Our danger is increasingly this kind of subversive operation. The Communists have the opportunity to send infiltrators into Vietnam according to the new Communist military strategy which Khrushchev and his successors have said is to be the wave of the future, so far as communism is concerned. They may not rely on nuclear weapons; they will move with subversion, terror, and violence. If they can achieve success in South Vietnam with this, we shall be in terrible danger.

Mr. SCOTT. Does not the Senator agree with me that certain things have happened which may demand the careful attention of the American people generally, in that we are moving now, determined, at least, to improve our posi-

tion in South Vietnam? The most important thing that happened recently was the decision to use our planes in South Vietnam. Certainly this will save lives. It will save the lives of the South Vietnamese by protecting them from the people who have terrorized them. Also, by the use of new jet planes, we shall more successfully make a response to the rather damaging sorties of the enemy than we have heretofore.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I agree. It is one thing to have military power; it is something else to be willing to use it.

Mr. SCOTT. Exactly.

Mr. PROXMIRE. No matter how great our power may be, if the enemy thinks we are afraid to use it, that power counts as nothing. The fact that we have used it, used it in a limited way, used it responsibly, and have not tried to extend it in any broad way, but have confined it to military targets, has, I believe, enhanced our position and greatly strengthened the position of the South Vietnamese.

Mr. SCOTT. I have spoken with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as with the President. Without any attempt to quote them, except as they have publicly confirmed some of the things they have said, they have answered to my satisfaction the common, rather unthinking statement that the South Vietnamese people are not with us; that they want us out of their country. Their reply has been quite to the contrary.

I have said, for example, that some have argued that the Vietnamese are a good deal like the Laotian. The Laotian, it is argued, are like Ferdinand the Bull. They want to smell the flowers, have picnics, loiter around the temples, and do things of that kind. Whether that be true of the Laotian or not—and there is some evidence that some of that trait exists—these informed and qualified experts have said to me, first, that the South Vietnamese have some excellent fighting men, as do the North Vietnamese; that there is a trait or a quality of the Vietnamese which makes them good fighting men.

In South Vietnam, hundreds of thousands have escaped from communism, have become refugees, have taken their lives and their future in their hands to defy communism, and are now living in South Vietnam.

If we were to leave the country, we would turn over to the Communists all of those refugees who have "voted with their feet," as the saying goes; who by their actions have rendered themselves vulnerable to total annihilation by an enemy that knows that they are there. So how can we consider abandoning a nation which has opted for freedom, and whose people, in my opinion, except to the degree to which they have been terrorized in the fields, as just as anti-Communist as we are, perhaps even more so? I think the maxim prevails that the closer one is to communism, the more he dislikes the possibility of having to participate in it. I well recall the large numbers of Chinese and North Korean soldiers who defected from the Panmunjom armistice Communists.

It seems to me that we are reading the whole picture wrong in thinking that the Vietnamese do not want to fight, because if we extrapolate, to use a State Department word—and I also know how to use "vis-a-vis"—the casualties sustained in Vietnam, North and South, relating their population to ours, would compare with about 325,000 people in the United States. That is more than the number of casualties we sustained in the Korean war.

It seems to me that not only would a nation that has been willing to fight on and on in the cause of freedom feel abandoned; but the word would get around through all of Asia and probably pretty well through Europe that the Americans are a "paper tiger"; that we make high-sounding statements; that we sign treaties, as we have with Thailand; that we are strong on promises and talk; but that whenever imperialism, that is the Communist menace—really presses us, we say we are no longer interested.

Mao Tse-tung has predicted the same thing. He said to a correspondent not long ago that the Americans will tire and give up. That is obviously what they are waiting for.

I commend the Senator again. I regret that I have taken up so much time. I thank the Senator for the opportunity he has given me—as well as for the excellence of his own statement—to show that the loyal opposition is a responsible opposition.

I have not criticized the President in this Congress in any way on any part of his present foreign policy. As a matter of fact, I have not yet criticized him for any part of his domestic policy. But I assume that in time I shall get around to that.

I speak for every Republican Senator. We support the President and uphold him. We recognize that he has proceeded with dignity and discretion. But, so far as guaranteeing peace is concerned, we have not only the freedom of South Vietnam to consider, but also the freedom of this country. I think that freedom, like peace, is indivisible.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania. I say once again that I deeply appreciate his superlative expression of bipartisan support for the President's position.

I know it makes a difference not only to President Johnson, but also to our forces in southeast Asia, that a leader of the Republican Party, who has freely criticized when he decides the policy is incorrect, is supporting the President.

Senator SCOTT has demonstrated a great capacity for constructive and positive criticism in the past. He is very effective, sometimes too effective for our comfort. But in this crisis, the great spokesman and statesman for the Republican Party has expressed an unqualified and all-out support for the President's policy in South Vietnam.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I have heard the speech of the Senator from Wisconsin, and I have read all of his prepared text. I congratulate the Senator on a very excellent speech and a very significant speech, particularly in view of the fact that the speech is made by the senior Senator from Wisconsin, whom I know to be completely independent. He has not been satisfied to follow anyone's leadership unless he thought it to be right, and he has at times taken that position at considerable cost to himself. He has not been willing to take that lead if he thought it was in error. His speech supporting the administration and the President on Vietnam is especially significant in view of that fact. I congratulate him.

The Senator from Wisconsin has brought out a number of facts which I, even as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, was not completely aware of.

I thank the Senator from Wisconsin for his contribution. I believe his speech will prove to be one of the most constructive contributions to the debate over Vietnam.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I appreciate what the distinguished assistant majority leader has said. It is very encouraging to hear him say that.

THE MESS IN VIETNAM—V

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I congratulate the distinguished senior Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE] for his comprehensive, well organized, well knit, sincere presentation in defense of the course which the administration has been pursuing to date. I do not, as I have sought to make clear for the past year, agree with it and with him.

"What are our goals?" my able colleague asks, and he answers, there are three, and the first is "Peace. An end to the fighting and terror in South Vietnam." Peace.

I recall the words of the prophet who castigated those who cried "Peace, peace, when there is no peace." I refer those who cry "Peace, peace," and support the extension and escalation of the undeclared war and of the fighting not merely in South Vietnam, but beyond, to the fact that we have been in South Vietnam militarily and financially, for 10 years. We continue to cry "Peace, peace, when there is no peace." I have for a year advocated a peaceful approach, a new approach, an effort at least which has never been made to try to enlist the United Nations and to wage peace at least as vigorously as we have waged war.

Now, what has happened in the past 48 hours since the Senate adjourned on Friday?

The State Department has issued a "white paper" over the weekend. It certainly adds no new facts to the already muddied waters of Vietnam.

Of course, North Vietnam is and has been aiding the South Vietnamese Vietcong. That is nothing new. But the fact does remain that we have been aiding the South Vietnamese on a scale far

surpassing the aid given by the North Vietnamese. The fact remains that there is a civil war in South Vietnam, with father fighting son and brother fighting brother. The fact remains that the vast majority of the Vietcong—however much training they have received from the North Vietnamese—are from South Vietnam.

The "white paper" goes to elaborate pains to give the impression that we are fighting a Korean-type war in South Vietnam. This is definitely not the case. In Korea we had the majority of the South Koreans fighting alongside American fighting men. The majority of South Vietnamese—however differently they may have felt when first our so-called advisers were sent to South Vietnam—are not on our side fighting earnestly and fiercely for their freedom. And also, in Korea, it was the United Nations forces with the troops of 11 other nations side by side with ours against the North Koreans—it was not, as it is in Vietnam, Americans only and South Vietnamese against the South Vietnamese Vietcong augmented by some North Vietnamese infiltrators.

In the Saturday Review for February 27, 1965, Mr. Norman Cousins, in his leading editorial entitled "Vietnam and the American Conscience," states:

It is tragic that most of the debate over Vietnam has vibrated between total war and total withdrawal. It is made to appear that the only choice is between absolute victory and absolute defeat. There is an alternative—if our main objective is to promote the stability and security of the area. And that alternative is to involve the United Nations, with all its limitations, to the fullest possible extent.

I have been advocating that course of action since I first spoke on this tragic subject on March 10, 1964—almost a full year ago.

The dangerous course upon which we are now embarked in Vietnam was pointed out in the New York Times on February 28 in an editorial entitled "Storm Signals Over Asia," in which it stated:

Washington and Peiping are in bizarre tandem as the only major capitals in the free or Communist worlds openly resistant to seeking a negotiated settlement of the Vietnamese conflict now. It is not too late for the President to make it plain that the United States is ready to talk as well as fight, and thus leave China isolated as the obstructor of any attempt to achieve a sound and enforceable peace.

In his article in the Washington Post on February 28, 1965, entitled "Vietnam Fallacies," Mr. Drew Pearson noted, as I have done repeatedly, that the crisis in Vietnam is one which President Johnson inherited and which he should not have assumed.

Mr. Pearson notes three fallacies in popular thinking about the situation in Vietnam:

First. He says:

We contend that we are in South Vietnam at the request of the popular government, to protect freedom. This is pure bunk. The government has changed so often that no one can keep track of whether Big Minh, Little Minh, or Minnie Mouse is in power.

Second. Mr. Pearson notes:

We believe that the best way to stop Vietnamese fighting is by retaliatory raids against the North. There are many indications that this also is pure bunk.

Third. Mr. Pearson notes:

The United States has told our allies privately that we are ready to negotiate a settlement in Indochina but that we want to negotiate from strength. Unfortunately, the longer we remain in South Vietnam the more our strength deteriorates.

There has been speculation in the newspapers about what the polls are showing concerning popular support for an escalation of the war in South Vietnam. Of course, part of the validity of any poll lies in the manner in which the questions on the poll are asked. All I know is that my mail runs over 300 to 1 in favor of the position I have taken, that the Vietnam crisis should be taken to the conference table before it escalates into a major or possibly a thermonuclear war.

As further evidence of the feeling of what I believe to be the vast majority of the American people, two open letters to the President were published in the New York Times for February 28, 1965, and March 1, 1965. These letters are signed by faculty members from numerous universities.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the editorial published in the Saturday Review for February 27, 1965, the editorial entitled "Storm Signals Over Asia," from the New York Times for February 28, 1965, the articles by Mr. Drew Pearson, published in the Washington Post for February 26, 27, and 28, and the two open letters to President Johnson published in the New York Times of February 28 and March 1, 1965, printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. INOUE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in its excellent editorial on February 27, 1965, the New York Times ably points out that if we undertake negotiations on the situation in Vietnam at this point we will not be negotiating from weakness, but from strength. As the New York Times puts it:

The United States has an immense concentration of naval and air power close to the coast of southeast Asia. It is capable of expanding that power many times over. This fact, with the potential consequences it implies, is well understood in North Vietnam. It is well understood in Moscow. It is well understood, despite all talk of paper tigers, in Peiping.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial published in the New York Times for February 27, 1965, entitled "Mr. Nixon's Totem Pole" be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

EXHIBIT 1.

[From the Saturday Review]

Vietnam and the American Conscience

Vietnam is profoundly complex, but it is not so complex as to defeat the American intelligence or disable the American con-

science. Some facts and implications are clear, no matter how murky the general situation.

The first fact is that the United States today does not have the backing of the Vietnamese people in whose name it went into Vietnam in the first place and whom it is seeking to save today. The U.S. military forces have had to cope not just with secret agents from North Vietnam but with the growing opposition of the populace as a whole. In briefings of new U.S. military personnel, the point is stressed that most Vietnamese are either sympathizers with or secret members of the Vietcong. The retaliatory bombings by the United States of North Vietnam targets do not meet the problem represented by internal opposition within South Vietnam itself.

The second fact is that most of the military equipment used against American and South Vietnam military forces has come neither from Communist China nor North Vietnam but from the United States. It is ludicrous to talk about bombing supply lines from North Vietnam as a means of shutting off the flow. According to some estimates, up to 80 percent of the military equipment used by the Vietcong originates in the United States. In largest part, it is either captured by the Vietcong or turned over by supposedly loyal South Vietnamese. No one knows how much of the equipment finds its way to Communist China. A Chinese official interviewed in Peiping several months ago said he was almost reluctant to see the Americans leave; they had contributed so heavily to the Chinese arsenal.

The third fact is that the legal justification invoked by the United States for its involvement in Vietnam has long since been nullified. Under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, all foreign forces and military equipment were to stay out of Indochina. The United States came with military force into Indochina, most notably in Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand, declaring it had done so at the request of the governments involved, which was not a violation of the treaty. But nothing in the treaty gave the United States the right to finance revolutionary movements or to participate in undercover subversion. (In Laos in 1960 and 1961, the United States financed and equipped the effort of Gen. Phoumi Nosavan to overthrow the only elected government in the history of Laos. At the same time, the United States continued to pay the salaries of loyalist forces and to furnish their supplies. Thus the United States was in the astonishing position of underwriting both sides of a civil war. Eventually, the situation was restored to its prerévolutionary status, but only after many thousands of civilians were killed or became homeless.)

In South Vietnam, the inability of the Diem government to maintain the support of its own people constituted a severe drag on the war effort. Eventually, the Diem government was overthrown and the Premier assassinated. Later, Frederick E. Moging, Jr., former Ambassador to South Vietnam, said the United States had been directly involved in the anti-Government plot. Whether Premier Diem was or was not authoritarian and backward is beside the point; the American people have never given their Government a warrant to engage in subversion or murder. Since Diem regimes in South Vietnam have come and gone; which of them has enjoyed genuine legitimacy it is difficult to say. In any case, what is the legal basis for our presence now? Our presence was requested by a government no longer in existence, and one that our own Ambassador said we helped to overthrow.

The fourth fact is that our policy in Vietnam in particular and Asia in general has not been of a piece. Basically, an important objective of our foreign policy is to keep the Soviet Union and Communist China from

coming together in a unified and massive ideological and military coalition. But our policy in Vietnam is producing exactly the effect we seek to avoid. Nothing that has happened since the original rupture between the two major Communist powers has done more to bring the Soviet Union and Communist China together again than recent American actions in Vietnam. The Communist Chinese have long argued that the Russian idea of coexistence was an anti-Marxist and antihistorical notion that could only be advanced by naive sentimentalists. They claim war is inevitable because of the nature of capitalism. As evidence, they assert that the United States, despite its claim that it sought only to promote the internal stability of Indochina, was actually pursuing a war against Asian peoples as an extension of the very imperialism Asians had fought so hard to expel. The Soviet Union, which is no less concerned than the United States about Chinese expansion throughout Asia, also has to be concerned about its standing in the world Communist community. It cannot allow itself to appear indifferent to military action involving a member of that community. Any expansion of the war by the United States into North Vietnam would force the Soviet Union to identify itself with North Vietnam and thus with China. In any event, in pursuit of one goal the United States appears to be losing a larger one. If the Communist Chinese had deliberately set a trap for the United States, they could not have more effectively achieved the result they sought.

The fifth fact is that American newsmen have had a more difficult time in getting unmanipulated news out of Vietnam than out of almost any crisis center in recent years. James Reston, associate editor of the New York Times, testifying before a congressional investigating committee in 1963, said the news in Vietnam was being managed in a way inconsistent with the traditions of this society. In the past 2 years there has been some improvement in news policy on Vietnam but the American public has yet to be fully informed about the nature of the American involvement, the degree to which U.S. arms have been sustaining the attackers, the extent of the popular opposition, and the inability of the South Vietnam Government to mount an effective response against the guerrillas.

The sixth fact is that President Johnson has genuinely tried to keep the military lid on in Vietnam, recognizing the ease with which the hostilities could mushroom into a general war; but he has been under extravagant pressure, much of it political, to translate American military power into a dramatic solution. The national frustration about Vietnam has far exceeded the national comprehension of the problem, for much of which the Government has only itself to blame. In any event, there has been comparatively little counterpressure in support of a policy of restraint and an eventual nonmilitary settlement—a falling that the American people have it within their means to change whenever they wish to do so.

The United States is concerned, and properly so, that the loss of South Vietnam would lead to grave consequences—territorial, political, psychological—throughout Asia and indeed most of the world. Already, the fact of developing atomic power in China has made a deep impression on many nations whose histories have pitted them against Western outsiders. American policymakers fear that United States withdrawal from Vietnam or even a reluctance to press the war would weaken or destroy the image of the United States as a resolute, dependable, and successful foe of aggressive communism in the world. These are not illogical or non-historical fears, but it is equally logical and historical to raise questions about the damaged image of the United States that is emerging from the present actions in Vietnam.

There has been an outpouring of anti-American sentiment not just in Asia but throughout the world—and it would be a mistake to charge it all to Communist manipulation or propaganda. Even among our friends in France, Great Britain, and West Germany there has been a sense of shock and outrage. If we thought we were building prestige by taking to the air and dropping bombs in Vietnam, we have built strangely indeed.

It is tragic that most of the debate over Vietnam has vibrated between total war and total withdrawal. It is made to appear that the only choice is between absolute victory and absolute defeat. There is an alternative—if our main objective is to promote the stability and security of the area. And that alternative is to involve the United Nations, with all its limitations, to the fullest possible extent. Any general war growing out of the combustibles in Vietnam would bring catastrophe to most of the world's peoples. On the principle of no extermination without representation, they have a right to ask that they be consulted now, while there may yet be time.

The situation in Vietnam is far more complicated than it was in Korea, but no one can say that no good can come out of a U.N. effort similar to one existing in Korea. Korea has had numerous truce violations and difficulties, but because of the U.N., Korea at least is not a game today. Secretary General U Thant has provided an opening for such an effort by calling not just for restraint but for "shifting the quest for a solution away from the field of battle to the conference table." To the extent that the United Nations could be brought into this quest, the chances for a constructive outcome will be increased.

There are no easy answers to Vietnam. But some answers may be less volatile and more morally imaginative than others. Moreover, at some time soon the United States will have to recognize that a military policy without a full ideological and social program will not only fall short of its goal but may actually boomerang. In any case, the prospect for finding a workable answer to Vietnam will increase, not decrease, in direct proportion to the unblocking of an American conscience and the activation of an informed debate.—N.C.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 28, 1965]

STORM SIGNALS OVER ASIA

The Johnson administration seems to be conditioning the American people for a drastic expansion of our involvement in Vietnam. The State Department's white paper accuses North Vietnam of intensified aggression and stresses that military efforts aimed solely at the Vietcong guerrillas in the south no longer suffice.

The logic of all this is that the United States, which only last week moved from the role of "adviser" to active and undisguised combatant in South Vietnam, now feels free to strike at will—whether by air, sea or land—at any targets it chooses in North Vietnam. In the 3 tense weeks since the Vietcong attack on Pleiku, American policy has plunged dangerously beyond the one enunciated then by the President and Secretary McNamara of limiting ourselves to retaliatory action and shunning a wider war.

And what has happened to alter our policy? The assertion that North Vietnam is a principal supplier of men and munitions to the Vietcong is certainly not new, nor is the charge that the extent of its support is increasing. Such activity by Hanoi constitutes the sole reason for our being in South Vietnam, and has since the United States moved in the vacuum left by the French withdrawal in 1954.

Apparently, the major new evidence of a need for escalating the war, with all the hazard that this entails, was provided by the sinking in a South Vietnamese cove

earlier this month of a 100-ton cargo ship loaded with Communist-made small arms and ammunition. A ship of that size is not much above the oriental junk class. The standard Liberty or Victory ship of World War II had a capacity of 7,150 to 7,650 tons.

Page after page of similarly minuscule detail about Communist infiltration from the north merely raise anew the question of whether massive air strikes would accomplish anything except large-scale civilian casualties in industrial centers and ports. The question is made sharper by the absence of any stable government in Saigon to fight or even to speak in the name of the South Vietnamese people.

Communist China, the nation whose imperialist ambitions the world has most to worry about, will be a clear gainer from the ill timing and judgment of our warning to North Vietnam. It comes just as the Soviet Union is about to begin an international meeting of Communist parties in Moscow—a meeting originally called to pronounce Peiping a renegade from Marxist-Leninism. Washington is now doing precisely what that most sophisticated of Kremlinologists, George F. Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, cautioned against in his Senate testimony Friday: Forcing the Soviet Union to come down on the side of Communist China.

Washington and Peiping are in bizarre tandem as the only major capitals in the free or Communist worlds openly resistant to seeking a negotiated settlement of the Vietnamese conflict now. It is not too late for the President to make it plain that the United States is ready to talk as well as fight, and thus leave China isolated as the obstructor of any attempt to achieve a sound and enforceable peace.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
Feb. 26, 1965]

PLEIKU ATTACK NOT A HANOI PLOT (By Drew Pearson)

Shortly after the Vietcong raid on Pleiku that caused the United States to retaliate with its first definite large-scale bombing raids on North Vietnam, this column reported that the United States had been mouse-trapped and that the Pleiku attack was the result of a Chinese or North Vietnamese plot deliberately staged while Premier Kosygin was visiting Hanoi.

More complete information, now available from the battlefield, shows this column was in error. The Vietcong attack was staged by a bedraggled handful of 100 men, or half a company, which was able to achieve success only because of sheer stupidity and lack of alertness by the Americans and the South Vietnamese. The attackers had no idea that they would be able to penetrate to the very center of the American installation as they did.

That it was no Hanoi-conceived plot is obvious from the fact that Hanoi could not have planned to have all South Vietnamese personnel and all Americans asleep.

A little band of Vietcong passed through two villages before reaching Pleiku. The South Vietnamese in the villages are supposedly friendly to the United States but they sounded no alarm. The attackers cut the barbed wire around Pleiku completely undisturbed, and walked right into the center of the installation to place bombs alongside the barracks where Americans were sleeping and alongside planes which were completely unguarded. They retreated without an American or a South Vietnamese wounding a single one.

SUCCESS UNEXPECTED

There were some Vietcong casualties, but only from their own mortar fire. Their commander had never expected them to penetrate so far inside, therefore aimed mortars into the center of the American installation—an-

other indication that there was no Hanoi plot.

Secretary McNamara, one of the most level-headed executives ever to boss the Pentagon, was mousetrapped when he got out of his sickbed to hold an emergency press conference and defended the American forces as victims of a "sneak attack." Obviously he knew that some of the great military victories of American history have resulted from sneak attacks, as when George Washington sneaked across the Delaware to surprise arousing Hessians in Trenton. McNamara also knew that his own men were being trained in the art of the sneak attack at the very time he held the news conference.

Only on a few occasions have American troops telegraphed their attacks in advance, as when General Pickett sent a Confederate flag at the head of his troops in the famous charge at Gettysburg—a charge, incidentally, in which his defeat turned the tide of the Civil War.

Those who were really mousetrapped as a result of the Pleiku incident were not only McNamara but President Johnson and, momentarily, the State Department. Since then, Acting Secretary of State George Ball has tried to restore some reason and sanity to our mousetrapped thinking, which could have precipitated nuclear world war.

What happened was that Ambassador Taylor, an able but severely harassed man who has seen his hitherto great prestige gradually eroded in Vietnam, seized this opportunity to recommend retaliatory raids. He sincerely believed this was a Hanoi plot. Ordinarily his recommendation might have been discounted in Washington, but it happened that McGeorge Bundy, White House adviser on security matters, was in Saigon at precisely that time.

WHITE HOUSE PRESSURED

Bundy's brother William is Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East and has long advocated a stronger hand in Vietnam, including bombing the North. When McGeorge Bundy, therefore, joined Taylor in rushing back a premature, exaggerated account of the Pleiku raid, the White House finally yielded to advice which the Bundy brothers had been giving for some time and which has now caused serious loss of American prestige, demonstrations against American embassies around the world, even in pro-West counties and eroded the better understanding Mr. Johnson had personally built up with the new leaders in the Kremlin.

What the American public has a right to expect is a congressional investigation or the court-martial of American officers asleep at Pleiku. The Pentagon alibi is that they are highly trained men who are not supposed to stand guard, which is correct. But the fact remains that no one, not even South Vietnamese, was on guard and, as a result, approximately 100 wounded, and several million dollars worth of planes destroyed.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 27, 1965]

UNITED STATES SHOULD GET OUT OF VIETNAM (By Drew Pearson)

When Senator Dick Russell of Georgia visited the LBJ ranch to confer on Vietnam, right after the November elections, he remarked:

"We made a mistake in going in there, but I can't figure any way to get out without scaring the rest of the world."

There are a lot of reasons to support Senator Russell as to why we should get out, one being that the longer we stay in the stronger the Chinese become. For centuries the Chinese were hated and feared in this part of the world. Now it's the United States.

To understand why, consult Father Hoa, the strongly anti-Communist Catholic priest, a Vietnamese, who says:

"How can we explain to a mother when her child is burned by napalm? And how can we claim to be for the people when we burn their homes simply because their houses happen to be in Vietcong-controlled territory?"

Another reason we should get out of Vietnam is because it has caused us to lose the propaganda war abroad.

Another reason supporting Senator Russell is the drain on the American dollar, as pointed out by R. V. Roosa, the man in charge of watching the dollar balance until he recently retired as Under Secretary of the Treasury.

Finally, there is the statement of Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the sincere, harassed American Ambassador to South Vietnam: "Military action outside the country, just as pure military action inside the country, will not win."

With all these factors supporting Senator Russell, the question is how we get out.

While I agree with the Senator from Georgia that the answer is not easy, there are certain factors putting President Johnson in a stronger position than his predecessors.

As Vice President, for instance, he was urging social reforms rather than military support for President Diem at the very time President Kennedy was beating the tomtoms for all-out intervention.

Finally, the President knows as perhaps no other man that the United States has the power to destroy the world but not the power to make it obey us. For the moment, though not for long, he leads from a certain amount of strength. His retaliation against the north has put him in a stronger bargaining position.

SOLUTION FOR VIETNAM

He has, therefore, the following alternatives for getting out of the Indochinese peninsula:

1. He can do what President de Gaulle did in Algeria and pull American forces out without any face-saving formulas, but simply by admitting we made a mistake. When De Gaulle did this he faced rebellion in the French army and was almost assassinated. But France has been stronger, more prosperous, more respected ever since De Gaulle stopped the Algerian drain on French money and manpower.

2. The President can call for the fulfillment of the pledge signed at Geneva in 1954 for an election on the unification of North and South Vietnam. This election, was supposed to be held in 18 months. It has not been held because it was known that the North Vietnamese would win, just as we know that in any German election on unification the West Germans would win.

However, we can't demand an election in Germany yet deny one in Indochina. And even if the North Vietnamese do win, it doesn't necessarily mean the area will line up with the Chinese Communists. There's a lot of Titoism in southeast Asia.

3. The President can throw the Vietnamese problem into the arms of the United Nations and thereby help to resuscitate that gasping organization. A request that the Assembly settle Vietnam while simultaneously demanding that only those nations which have paid their dues can vote would put the Russian and French nonpayers in an extremely awkward position.

Once before when Russia absented itself from the U.N. the Korean crisis came before the Assembly. Russia doesn't want to make that mistake again. Certainly, if so vital a problem as Indochina came before the U.N., which we have always kept away from the U.N. in the past, the Communist bloc nations could not afford to be sitting on the sidelines.

Senator Russell has raised the question of scaring the other nations of the Pacific

which fear the encroachment of Red China. He is right. However, President Johnson has already promised the protection of the American nuclear umbrella to these countries, and he could make this formal by a treaty similar to the NATO pledge of support in Europe. The nations most worried about Chinese encroachment—Thailand, the Philippines, India—already have and can get more American aid and support.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 26, 1965]

VIETNAM FALLACIES—JOHNSON INHERITED SITUATION IN WHICH UNITED STATES IN- STEAD OF FRANCE IS IN TROUBLE

(By Drew Pearson)

There are three important fallacies to be considered regarding the Vietnam crisis which President Johnson inherited.

1. We contend that we are in South Vietnam at the request of the popular government, to protect freedom. This is pure bunk. The government has changed so often that no one can keep track of whether Big Minh, Little Minh, or Minnie Mouse is in power. There have been 14 changes of government since January 30, 1954, which is an average of one government per month. The government is of the military, by the military, and for the military, and Vietnamese civilians have no illusions about it.

2. We believe that the best way to stop Vietnamese fighting is by retaliatory raids against the north. There are many indications that this also is pure bunk. First, the North Vietnamese are led by Ho Chi Minh, a tough guerrilla fighter who battled against the French for 8 years and defeated the cream of the French Army, totaling 380,000 men, backed by \$4 billion of American money. He now has an army of 270,000 men and if he wants to move south our bombing raids would never be able to halt him. History shows airplanes cannot find troops on foot in the jungle.

However, it is highly doubtful that Ho could call off the Vietcong war against us in South Vietnam even if he wanted to. You have to remember that the Vietcong were part of the force that also fought for 8 years, with implacable will, to get the French out of Indochina, and we have merely substituted ourselves for the French. The Vietcong are equally determined today to get all white men out.

After the French evacuated Indochina under the terms of the 1954 Geneva agreement, there were approximately 90,000 Viet Minh pro-Communists guerrilla fighters left. They became the Vietcong. Already tough revolutionaries, they are now doubly effective because they have seized new, modern American arms.

American intelligence shows that very few of the Vietcong infiltrated down from the North until last year. It is estimated that in 1964 between 4,000 and 5,000 men moved in. Therefore, Ho Chi Minh would have little control over them, even if he wanted to yell "uncle" as a result of the U.S. retaliatory raids.

Our intelligence also shows that the Vietcong is composed of about 35,000 hard-core fighters, plus 65,000 militiamen—a total of about 100,000. This is enough, given support from the countryside, to engage in hit-and-run operations indefinitely.

3. The United States has told our allies privately that we are ready to negotiate a settlement in Indochina but that we want to negotiate from strength. Unfortunately, the longer we remain in South Vietnam the more our strength deteriorates.

When we had 1,000 American advisers in Vietnam, as in the early days of the Eisenhower administration, we were probably stronger than today. President Kennedy boosted the number of Americans to 20,000 and President Johnson has raised the total

to 23,500, but we are in a weaker position to negotiate because today the Vietcong occupy about two-thirds of the country.

The real problem of strength is the local South Vietnamese Government, and the more the generals concentrate on their own personal ambition rather than the welfare of the country, the weaker becomes our strength to negotiate.

WHAT NEXT?

The above three points are the heart and soul of the Vietnamese problem. What, therefore, are the alternatives facing the United States?

They are: To place the matter before the United Nations Security Council, which has never been given the Indochina problem in the past; or to continue bombing farther and farther north.

In the latter event, the Communist world is in an extremely strong position to retaliate in four widely separated areas:

1. Ho Chi Minh can move his well-trained army from the north.
2. The Red Chinese could move in on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, which lie only 3 and 12 miles respectively from their coast, and take them fairly easily, since most of the U.S. 7th Fleet is tied up in the Gulf of Tonkin.
3. The Chinese could accelerate hostilities in Korea where South Korea is still protected only by a truce.
4. If the Russians wanted to enter the picture they could exert a squeeze on Berlin with another blockade, thus requiring the United States to divide its attention between Asia and Europe.

These are some of the problems the State Department is beginning to pose for the White House now that Secretary Rusk has recovered from his illness.

The alternative of putting the crisis before the United Nations would put the Russians in an extremely awkward position as to whether they ought to use the veto. The United Nations would probably call for a cease-fire and appoint a commission to study the situation.

The best long-range hope for the United States in Indochina is Titoism. Ho Chi Minh could be another Tito if we don't drive him into the hands of the Chinese as we have been doing. It is important to remember that the Thais, Vietnamese, and Burmese have hated and feared the Chinese for centuries. If given a chance for independence they don't want to come under the domination of the Chinese dragon.

These are not happy alternatives, but this is the situation which the Johnson administration has inherited from 18 years of erosion.

[From the New York Times, Mar. 1, 1965]

AN OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON VIETNAM

Each day we hear fresh news from Vietnam, news both strange and grim. We strike by air in reprisal against North Vietnam because our soldiers, sent as armed technicians and advisers to an army which cannot yet guard them well, have been attacked in their barracks in the very heart of South Vietnam. We have widened the war—how wide will it become?

Fear of escalation of this undeclared war against North Vietnam mounts with each sudden report of renewed violence. Unless the situation is very different from what it appears to be, we have lost the political initiative in Vietnam and are attempting to substitute military actions for political ones. We face grave risks in Vietnam. Americans have faced even graver risks for good and high cause, Mr. President, but we must first understand why we must take such risks. What are our goals in Vietnam? Are they just? Can they be accomplished? Are they truly worth what they are bound to cost in dollars and human lives?

With whom are we allied in Vietnam? Are our soldiers fighting side by side with troops of a representative and legitimate national government, or are we embroiled in defense of an unpopular minority in a fierce and costly civil war? Our representatives assure us that we and the Saigon government have the overwhelming support of the Vietnamese people. How can this be so? On the same day that Mr. McNamara said sneak attacks upon our soldiers cannot be prevented, an American officer on the scene in Vietnam declared that "any of the people in the hamlet over there could have warned us that the Vietcong were around, but they did not warn us." The weapons used against us are most often American weapons, captured from or surrendered by the South Vietnamese Army. Mr. President, we submit that weak field intelligence in South Vietnam and a steady loss of workable weapons to the enemy, are deep symptoms of an unpopular cause.

Why are we fighting in Vietnam? Mr. President, we think we understand why we went into Vietnam after the French withdrew. It was because this Nation hoped to encourage the development of a popular, stable, and democratic government which would help to lead all southeast Asia toward lasting peace. Historical, political, social, religious, and sectional factors have prevented this development. The original assumptions are no longer valid. We have become increasingly unwelcome everywhere in southeast Asia. Our presence seems to deepen, rather than to relieve, the bitterness and hostility of the people. It was only 10 years ago that the Vietnamese defeated a French Army of nearly half a million men. Will the same battles occur again?

Can we win in Vietnam? Mr. President, we know that our Nation has sufficient fire power to destroy the entire world. We also know that you do not wish to call upon this awesome power. How can we possibly win and yet prevent a widening of this conflict? How can we win in Vietnam with less than 30,000 advisers when the French could not win with an army of nearly half a million fighting both north and south of the present dividing frontier?

Is it worth the cost? The French defeat in Indochina cost them 172,000 casualties. Yet, before their final bloody defeat at Dien Bienphu, the French generals and diplomats spoke with the same toughness and optimism, the same assurances we now hear from our leaders.

The French had overwhelming numbers and fire power but they lost in Vietnam because they lacked the support of the population. Do we face the same prospect, or are there facts which the public does not know which show our situation to be clearly different?

Mr. President, we are aware that you have secret information which cannot be shared with us. But could such information completely refute the picture of events and the political insights provided to us by serious newsmen who have been in the area for years?

All we can see is a seemingly endless series of demonstrations and riots in Saigon and Hue, of military coups, of threats and challenges to the dignity of our Ambassador and our other representatives by the very men we seek to sustain in power.

We have lost the initiative in Vietnam. A few guerrillas can trigger American reactions that widen the war. The events of the past weeks are leading step by step along the path to war with China.

Would it not be both prudent and just to take the initiative toward peace in Vietnam? If we are not to widen the war beyond all conscience, as reasonable men we must initiate negotiations while there is still time.

Anderson-Newton Theological School; Herbert Gezork, ethics (plus four signers, Feb. 16).

Boston University: Irwin E. Chase, psychiatry; William A. Hire, psychology; Francis Johnson, chemistry; Philip E. Kubzansky, psychology; Louis Lowy, social work; S. Joseph Nemetz, medical school; Irwin I. Portner, medical school; Henry N. Rosenberg, medical school (plus 24 signers Feb. 16).

Brandeis University: Stanley Deser, physics; Harry Rand, psychiatry (plus 55 signers, Feb. 16).

Bryn Mawr College: Warner Berthoff, English; Paul R. Brass, political science; T. R. S. Broughton, Latin; Fredericka de Laguna, anthropology; R. B. De Boff, economics; Mary Dunn, history; Alice F. Emerson, political science; Rosalie Hoyt, physics; Mabel Lang, Greek; Richard Latimore, Greek; Gertrude Leighton, political science; A. K. Michels, Latin; Eleknor Pauken, Spanish; Robert Paten, English; Kyle Phillips, archeology; Eugene Schneider, sociology; Laurence Stapleton, English.

Drexel Institute of Technology: Joel Balsham, English; William Hollis, English; David Holtz, English; Sol M. Kipnes, chemistry; Samuel S. McNeary, mathematics; James A. Richards, Jr., physics; Eugene J. Rosenbaum, chemistry; Cecil O. Smith, Jr., history; J. W. Smith, sociology; John A. Taylor, physics; Stanley A. Wasson, history.

Haverford College: Edwitt Bronner, history; Dean Burnham, political science; John Cary, German; Aldo Caselli, Italian; Thomas D'Andrea, psychology; William Davidson, physics; Paul Desjardins, philosophy; Alfred Diamant, political science; Irving Finger, biology; Lewis Green, astronomy; Elizabeth Green, biology; Theodore Hetzel, engineering; Dietrich Kessler, biology; Lewis Kosman, philosophy; Wallace MacCaffrey, history; Sidney Perloe, psychology; Melvin Santer, biology; Ralph Sargent, English; Alfred Satterthwaite, English.

Harvard University: Sidney Alexander, medical school; Daniel S. Bernstein, medical school; Martin A. Berezin, medical school; Donnell W. Boardman, medical school; Louis S. Chase, medical school; Sidney Coleman, physics; Lincoln H. Day, public health; Daniel Deykin, medical school; Frank R. Ervin, medical school; Sanford Gifford, medical school; Lester Grinspoon, medical school; George Grosser, medical school; Calvin Leeman, medical school; Sidney Levin, medical school; John E. Mack, medical school; Jack H. Mandelson, medical school; David L. Rabin, public health; Peter Reich, medical school; Samuel Silverman, medical school; Harold J. Stein, medical school; Myron Stocking, medical school; Anna K. Wolf, medical school; Stephan Thernstrom, history; Norman E. Zinberg, medical school (plus 42 signers, February 16).

Institute for Advanced Study: Felix Gilbert, history; Harold Chernias, classics.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Nesmyth C. Ankeny, mathematics (plus 66 signers February 16).

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(Institutional affiliation for purposes of identification only.)

If you approve of this statement, write on wire President Lyndon B. Johnson, White House, Washington, D.C.

This open letter was published and signed as an advertisement in the New York Times of February 16, 1965, by some 400 faculty members of universities and colleges of the Greater Boston area. Because of the interest and support it aroused, it was circulated again, chiefly in the Philadelphia-Princeton-New Brunswick area and is being republished as an advertisement paid by the signers. Comments and contributions toward cost should be sent to Ad Hoc Committee for Open Letter on Vietnam, 552 Ewing Street, Princeton, N.J., Prof. Arno J. Mayer, chairman; Prof. Paul Tillett, treasurer.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 28, 1965]
OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON VIETNAM

We, as members of the academic community, feel impelled to raise publicly with you, Mr. President, the question of our Government's present policy toward South Vietnam. We ask you to reconsider our present course of action in view of the following facts:

We are intervening unilaterally in support of a succession of undemocratic regimes that are opposed by a majority of the South Vietnamese people.

We are waging an immoral and inhumane war that has brought untold suffering to the people of South Vietnam.

Our recent air attacks on North Vietnam intensify the danger that a local conflict will develop into a major war.

It is maintained that the United States is protecting a popularly supporter government against foreign subversion. We maintain, Mr. President, that the evidence available to the Congress and to the public does not support this interpretation of the Vietnamese conflict.

The fact is that the United States is maintaining regimes which are not supported by the bulk of the rural population. How else explain a situation in which 35,000 Vietcong regulars have been able to make increasing gains against a Government army of over 200,000 men together with 23,000 American "advisers"? The close-range attacks on Bien Hoa and Pleiku indicate the lack of support by neighboring villagers for the Saigon government.

What has our policy meant for the people of South Vietnam? Only a small minority of the people profits from the \$600 million in foreign aid we send annually to South Vietnam. The peasantry of Vietnam has been terrorized. The country, once one of the most prosperous areas of southeast Asia, is being devastated by the napalm bombing of peasant villages, by the unbridled strafing of the countryside by American-supplied aircraft, by the detention and mass transfers of the South Vietnamese people. Prisoners are being tortured in South Vietnam. It does not seem likely that this could be done without the knowledge of American officials.

What effect has our policy had on U.S. prestige abroad? By supporting dictatorial military regimes in South Vietnam we have undermined confidence in our professed belief that nations should be allowed to develop their own destinies free from outside interference. Although we pledged to respect the Geneva accords of 1954, we have violated those agreements by supplying troops and weapons to South Vietnam. We have belied our adherence to international law by refusing to submit the dispute to an international conference, such as the parties to the Geneva accords or one of the bodies of the United Nations.

Our justification for intervention in South Vietnam has been that we are preventing the spread of communism in southeast Asia. The effect of our policy, however, has been

to alienate both the neighboring countries and our allies.

As recent events have shown, the longer the war in South Vietnam continues, the greater are the chances of escalation. Our air and sea attacks upon North Vietnam have not appreciably altered the situation in the south, but they have succeeded in increasing the danger of a major conflagration on the continent of Asia and of nuclear war.

When 81 percent of the American people, according to a recent Gallup poll, indicated they were in favor of a conference with the leaders of southeast Asia and China in an effort to reach a peace agreement, must we continue any longer along this dangerous path?

Mr. President, we urge you to consider another course of action:

We ask that you bring an end to the investment of American men and money in the war in South Vietnam.

We ask you to seek a negotiated settlement by every possible means in order to create an independent, neutralized government and to bring about the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

We ask you to lay the problem immediately before an international body and to put an end to our unilateral and illegal actions.

We urge you, Mr. President, to take immediate action to end the war in South Vietnam. The longer we persist in our present policy, the fewer will be the alternatives open to us.

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This letter is being published as an advertisement paid by the signers. Comments

and contributions toward cost will be welcomed and should be sent to: University Committee To Protest the War in Vietnam, Post Office Box 115, Woodside, New York, 11377.

(Institutional affiliation for purposes of identification only.)

If you approve of this statement, we urge you to reprint it, in whole or in part, in other newspapers, and write or wire: President Lyndon B. Johnson, White House, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Ronald Glassman, chairman; Dr. Myriam Miedzianogora, secretary; Dr. Stanley Deutsch, cotreasurer; Miss Dal Greenblatt, co-treasurer.

EXHIBIT 2

[From the New York Times, Feb. 2, 1965]

MR. NIXON'S TOTEM POLE

Looking at the present situation in South Vietnam, former Vice President Nixon insists that the United States must "avoid being forced into negotiation when at the bottom of the totem pole." Mr. Nixon's prescription is to forget about negotiation and fight harder, throwing into the battle everything "short of atomic weapons." Mr. Nixon does not say so; but this policy, if followed single-mindedly, would turn a comparatively small war into a much bigger one—one that would involve an enormously expanded investment in American blood and resources.

Apparently Mr. Nixon thinks we are at the bottom of the totem pole in South Vietnam because things have not been going too well recently: because the people of South Vietnam seem to be increasingly war weary; because the changes of government in Saigon are abrupt and kaleidoscopic; because the Vietcong guerrillas seem to be able to penetrate easily into our lines; because our Vietnam allies do not seem to wish to fight as hard as we would like them to.

These are discouraging factors. But to assume that they put the United States at the bottom of the totem pole is to look at that symbol from a mistaken angle. The United States has an immense concentration of naval and air power close to the coast of southeast Asia. It is capable of expanding that power many times over. This fact, with the potential consequences it implies, is well understood in North Vietnam. It is well understood in Moscow. It is well understood, despite all talk of paper tigers, in Peking. And once we recognize how well it is understood, in all these and other places, we can take a more realistic view of who is where on the totem pole.

The United States has amply proved, and is continuing to prove, its ability and its determination to stay in South Vietnam as long as present circumstances require it to do so. This is not the question which Secretary General Thant and President de Gaulle and other advocates of negotiation now wish to explore; they know the answer to this question. What they wish to explore is whether matters have not reached a point at which it will be possible to set up a system of adequate international guarantees to protect South Vietnam against outside aggression.

There is every common sense reason why this possibility should be promptly and thoroughly investigated. An agreement to do so would surrender nothing; it would open up the possibility for determining whether the goal of effective neutralization of South Vietnam, now being sought by arms, could be achieved by diplomacy.

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, let me reply briefly to the Senator from Alaska by saying that he is correct in stating that the Korean situation is not the same as that in South Vietnam. We were deeply involved in Korea. We were

involved to the extent of sustaining well over 100,000 casualties in Korea, as I recall.

The South Koreans are wonderful and brave people, and fought very hard; but the fact is that the South Vietnamese have borne a much heavier proportion of the burden of the fighting and the dying in South Vietnam than the South Koreans did in Korea.

The record in South Vietnam shows that the South Vietnamese people, on the basis of their military performance, do support us.

The Senator from Alaska also mentioned the United Nations, and asked why we do not invite them in. I have wondered about that for a long time. I questioned the State Department for several years, as to why the United Nations was not invited in. There is an excellent answer: There is no basis for the United Nations to settle this controversy unless the U.N. is willing to recognize the invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam Communists. Aggression has come from outside the country, from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Our Ambassador to the U.N., Adlai Stevenson told the U.N. when he submitted our documented case proving this aggression that we will get all of our armament out of South Vietnam when this aggression from the north stops.

Second, during the past week, the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, has somewhat prejudiced the position of the United Nations so far as the Secretary General himself coming into the action to arbitrate is concerned.

Third, the United Nations Assembly, as everyone knows, is now paralyzed because of its financial situation. It is unable to meet. At its only meeting this year it took one vote on a procedural question and then adjourned until fall. There is serious question as to whether it will be able to act for the remainder of this year.

The Security Council is paralyzed by a Soviet veto.

Finally, any dispassionate, objective person would have to agree that the United States is not in a position of strength in South Vietnam at the present time. This is not the time to negotiate. This is not the time to bargain. Our position in South Vietnam is weak. We should be realistic enough to realize that fact, and act upon that basis.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I join my colleagues in praising the fine statement by the Senator from Wisconsin. As he shall see from my statement, we are in practical agreement on this subject.

SOUTH VIETNAM—U THANT SHOULD GO

Mr. President, on February 17, President Johnson stated very clearly and succinctly our purpose and objective in South Vietnam. He said:

That purpose and that objective is to join the defense and protection of the freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled, and that is directed from outside their country.

We have no ambition there for ourselves. We seek no wider war. But we must all understand that we will persist in the defense

of freedom and our continuing actions will be those which are justified and those that are made necessary by the continuing aggression of others.

These actions will be measured, and fitting, and adequate. Our stamina, and the stamina of the American people, is equal to the task.

On February 25, Secretary of State Dean Rusk issued a prepared statement amplifying the policy statement of the President. The key points of this statement are as follows:

1. The nations of southeast Asia have a right to live in peace, free from aggression directed against them from outside their borders. This is a point of vital importance to the safety and the very existence of a hundred smaller nations all over the world.

2. North Vietnam, in callous disregard of the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962, has directed and supplied the essential military personnel and arms for this aggression, aimed at the imposition of a Communist regime by force.

3. The position of the United States toward threats to the peace in southeast Asia has been made clear many times, going back to 1954, when President Eisenhower wrote to the President of South Vietnam that our offer of assistance was to enable South Vietnam to maintain "a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

4. The key to peace in southeast Asia has been repeated over and over again. It is the readiness of all in that area to live at peace and to leave their neighbors alone. Those who are not leaving their neighbors alone know exactly what it means—the illegal infiltration of military personnel and arms cannot be described as "leaving your neighbor alone."

5. Compliance with the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962 can establish peace.

6. What is still missing is any indication that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors. The absence of this crucial element affects the current discussion of negotiation. A negotiation aimed at the acceptance or the confirmation of aggression is not possible.

I repeat here today what I have said ever since our retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam. I fully support President Johnson in his actions of firmness, and I fully support his policy statement of February 17 and the policy statement of Secretary Rusk to which I have just referred.

Indeed, I would go a step further than the Secretary and say that not only must Hanoi indicate that it is prepared to stop what it is doing to its neighbors in South Vietnam, but it must also bring back the many thousands of guerrillas and infiltrators to North Vietnam, where they belong, before negotiations begin. This would not preclude a period of a truce during which these people, along with their war materiel, are pulled back to North Vietnam. Perhaps this is implied when the Secretary says that "negotiation aimed at the acceptance or the confirmation of aggression is not possible," but I think it should be clearly stated. Also, it should be made clear that any period of a truce or cease-fire cannot be used as a ruse for the North Vietnamese to consolidate their positions in South Vietnam—let alone improve them.

On February 27, the State Department issued a white paper on Vietnam setting forth a full and up-to-date sum-

mary of the massive evidence establishing North Vietnam's responsibility for the aggression against South Vietnam—evidence which has been presented to the International Control Commission.

The "white paper" points out that the war in Vietnam—and note that it uses the word "war"—is a new kind of war; a totally new brand of aggression against an independent people who want to make their own way in peace and freedom; that a Communist government has set out deliberately to conquer a sovereign people in a neighboring state; that South Vietnam is fighting for its life against a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the Communist regime in Hanoi—an aggression which has been going on for years.

The evidence shows that the hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Vietnam was trained in North Vietnam and ordered into South Vietnam by Hanoi; that the key leadership of the Vietcong, the officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians, political organizers, and propagandists have come from North Vietnam and operate under Hanoi's direction; that the training of essential military personnel and their infiltration into South Vietnam is directed by the military high command in Hanoi; that many of the weapons and much of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Vietcong have been sent into South Vietnam from Hanoi; and that war materiel from Communist China and other Communist states has been channeled through North Vietnam for the Vietcong army.

The evidence shows that these attacking forces remain under the military discipline of Hanoi after they enter South Vietnam, and that increasingly the forces sent into South Vietnam are native North Vietnamese.

The infiltration rate has been as follows, and these are minimum figures:

Year:	Minimum
1959-60.....	1,800
1961.....	3,700
1962.....	5,400
1963.....	4,200
1964.....	4,400

Thus, since 1959, nearly 20,000 Vietcong officers, soldiers, and technicians are known to have entered South Vietnam under orders from Hanoi, and probably 17,000 more infiltrations were made. It is now estimated that the Vietcong number 110,000, comprising the "hard core" of all Communist forces in South Vietnam.

Of particular interest in the statement in the "white paper" that "clearly the fundamental cause of the war was not provided adequately for the defense of South Vietnam against Hanoi's open aggression," that further details for evidence were agreed upon between the United States and South Vietnam, and that the air strikes against North Vietnam were made as a "limited response fitted to the situation that produced them."

I have been asking ever since our Government's position. Foreign Minister in regard to his government's attitude toward the United States. That a policy of "retaliation" might sound good, but if it

really is not reasonably firm, it would be misinterpreted by the Communists as a sign of weakness. That is what has happened in Vietnam, and I am encouraged that the State Department has faced up to this fact. Whether or not the air strikes on North Vietnam are indeed fitted to the aggression by the Vietcong, only time will tell. I hope that they are. I am concerned that Hanoi may interpret this new policy of firmness as merely an interlude in what has been a policy of accommodation rather than a change in the policy of accommodation. If Hanoi misreads the policy intentions of our President and the Secretary of State, things will get worse before they get better. More lives will be lost—American as well as Vietnamese. More devastation will come to North Vietnam, and probably to Hanoi itself. Concern is being expressed over the possibility that Red China will send troops to North Vietnam and Laos for eventual use against South Vietnam. I suggest that this possibility will be in direct proportion to our failure to continue a policy of firmness, as distinguished from a policy of accommodation. That is why it is so important that not one sign of a return to the unfortunate accommodation policy be shown; and it will not be shown as long as the present policy of the President and the State Department are steadfastly adhered to. They will continue to have my full support as long as they follow this policy.

And while I am on this point, we must trust that Peiping will understand that the privileged sanctuary policy which prevailed during the Korean war went down with the bombs on North Vietnam.

I have not been particularly concerned over the reaction in some capitals to our change from a policy of accommodation to one of firmness. After all, there has been general satisfaction to let the United States and South Vietnam bear almost all of the cost of repelling the aggression by North Vietnam. Too many of these capitals have long been following a policy of accommodation, exchanging ambassadors with Red China, failing to pay their obligations to the United Nations, accepting our foreign aid, and influencing our foreign policy. Words like "peace," "negotiations," "settlement," and "restraint" are expedients which seem to blind them to the evidence of aggression and to their moral responsibility in the family of nations to help put a stop to it. We may hope that our clear and steadfast adherence to a policy of firmness will persuade them to our cause.

What does concern me, however, is the attitude and statements of Mr. U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations.

On February 24, the day before Secretary Rusk's policy statement, Mr. U Thant told a news conference that he had proposed a secret peace plan to end the war in South Vietnam. It was reported that he was unusually critical of American policy in southeast Asia and suggested that there would have been no Communist intervention had the United States stayed out of South Vietnam, supporting his contention by using his own country, Burma, as an example. He said that the Burmese Communist un-

background had never received any outside help because the Burmese Government had not itself asked for any outside help in fighting the Communists. "Not one precious American life has been lost in Burma," he was quoted as saying. "Not one precious American dollar has been spent in Burma in the form of military assistance in the last 17 years."

Is it not strange that Mr. U Thant had no words of condemnation against North Vietnam for its acts of aggression? Why did he not condemn the violations

North Vietnam of the Geneva pacts of 1954 and 1962? Just because his own Government in Burma did not seek military assistance from the United States, does he deny the right under the SEATO Treaty, of South Vietnam to ask the United States for help against Communist subversion? Does he deny that the Communists in Burma, in South Vietnam, in Cuba, are controlled by Peiping the Kremlin? Do his statements sound like those of a representative of the United Nations, whose charter says: "We the peoples of the United Nations have determined to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained."

And for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors.

Does Mr. U Thant believe that North Vietnam has been acting like a "good neighbor"?

I invite attention that the Geneva agreement of 1954 provided among other things as follows:

Article 5. To avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities, all military forces, supplies, and equipment shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within 28 days of the present agreement's entry into force.

Article 6. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

Article 17. (a) With effect from the date of entry into force of the present agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions, and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons and armored vehicles, is prohibited.

I invite attention that the Geneva agreement of 1962 provided among other things as follows:

The parties undertake that:

(a) they will not commit or participate in any way in any act which might directly or indirectly impair the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos; (b) they will not resort to the use or threat of force or any other measure which might impair the peace of the Kingdom of Laos; (c) they will refrain from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos; * * * (1) they will not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

I note from the World News Digest that last July 8, Mr. U Thant proposed reconvening the 1954 Geneva Conference to negotiate an end to the war in Vietnam. What good does he think this

world to when North Vietnam has violated the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962?

On last August 6, following a conference with President Johnson, Mr. U Thant told reporters that he believed the UN Security Council was currently in no position to be "usefully employed in a settlement" of the problem, being hampered by the nature of the dispute and by the fact that Hanoi is not a member of the UN.

With respect to Mr. U Thant's statement, "Not one precious American dollar has been spent in Burma in the form of military assistance in the last 17 years," I note from the February 24 issue of the Davenport, Iowa, Times-Democrat that the Allen and Scott Report refers to a secret \$9 million arms program furnished by the United States to Burma; and, I might add, for fiscal year 1964 we furnished \$1.5 million in foreign aid of a nonmilitary nature.

I find Mr. U Thant's behavior one-sided, prejudiced, ungrateful, superficial, and unrealistic. How can he command the trust and respect so necessary for the performance of his duties? He should resign.

Let me remind Senators that last August 7, by a vote of 88 to 2, the Senate passed the southeast Asia resolution, following the retaliatory raids on North Vietnamese PT boat bases ordered by President Johnson as a result of attacks on our destroyers in the Bay of Tonkin. This resolution was approved without a single negative vote in the House of Representatives.

It states:

That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

I do not criticize the sincerity of my two colleagues who voted against this resolution; and their continued criticism is completely consistent with their vote at that time. But what I am wondering about are the statements of some of those Senators who voted for this resolution which, in light of the evidence, hardly represent support for the President in his action to put a stop to Communist aggression in South Vietnam. It is these statements which might collectively be interpreted by Hanoi as a "sign" that the United States is not going to be as steadfast in pursuing the President's policy as we must be. We simply cannot be inconsistent about this matter.

It will not do to contend that we are following the wrong course of action just because there are frequent changes in the Government of South Vietnam. Our

previous policy of accommodation has contributed to this. When we were asked for help to stop Communist aggression, it would be only natural that the South Vietnamese expected that help to be effective. It was not effective, and one cannot blame the people for becoming disillusioned. Ambassador Taylor's indication that the morale of the people improved following our attacks on North Vietnam bears out this point. These people wish to be left alone, but if they are not left alone by North Vietnam, and if it appears that the United States is not going to take sufficient action to put a stop to it that the Vietcong will win, it is understandable why a good many of these troubled people would wish to be on the side of the winner. Costly airstrikes against the privileged sanctuary of North Vietnam have been designed to persuade Hanoi that we mean business, and if aggression continues, more of the same can be expected. Hanoi must be persuaded that any gain from continued aggression will be more than offset by its losses. No one in the Pentagon whom I know is saying that airstrikes against guerrillas will stop them. But there are other targets besides guerrillas. They may have to be destroyed before the cost of continued aggression is brought home to the Communist regime in Hanoi.

In the final analysis, the war in Vietnam is a test of the wills of the people of the United States and those of the Communist world, particularly in Hanoi and Peiping, as of the moment. The moral fiber, the character, the patience of our people to break the Communist will to win in this area are involved. Ours is a truly moral cause—completely in consonance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles which have caused millions of freedom-loving people to turn to the United States for leadership in the cause of peace with justice and respect for the dignity of man. We must not fail to provide this leadership. Let me say, in behalf of our President, that great leadership does not always mean the most popular leadership. What is important is the righteousness of the cause and the perseverance of a leader to see it through. Neville Chamberlain was, undoubtedly, popular for the moment following the Munich agreement. Winston Churchill was not always popular; but he will go down in history as the finest leader the world has known in our time.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following be placed in the Record:

Statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on U.S. position in southeast Asia, from the Washington Post of February 26, 1965:

Partial text of the U.S. white paper on Vietnam, from the Washington Evening Star for February 27:

"How Our Far Eastern Policy Led to Vietnam," a recent speech by William P. Bundy, published in the Washington Sunday Star for February 28.

An excerpt from the article written by the distinguished columnist, William S. White, entitled "Negotiation—U Thant's View on Vietnam," from the Washington Post of February 26.

An excerpt from the article written by the distinguished columnist, Roscoe Drummond, entitled "Red Aggressor—Evidenced Against Hanoi," from the Washington Post of February 26.

An article written by Louis B. Fleming of the Los Angeles Times and published in the February 25 issue of the Washington Post, entitled: "Thant Proposes Secret Peace Plan To End Vietnam War."

An article written by Columnists Allen and Scott and published in the Davenport Times-Democrat for February 24, entitled "Arms Aid for Burma Is Questioned by Congress."

Remarks of NBC Correspondent David Willis on "Three-Star Extra" program of February 25.

Comments of "Three-Star Extra" editor in chief, Ray Henle, on the same program of February 25.

Excerpt of Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, July 20, 1954.

Excerpt from the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, July 23, 1962.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 25, 1965]

THANT PROPOSES SECRET PEACE PLAN TO END VIETNAM WAR

(By Louis B. Fleming)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.—Secretary General U Thant has proposed a secret peace plan to end the war in South Vietnam, he told a news conference today.

He hinted that the proposal has gone to the Governments of Communist China and North Vietnam, which are not members of the United Nations, and confirmed that it had been sent to President Johnson.

"Up to this moment, the results of these consultations and discussions have not been conclusive," he observed.

Thant was unusually critical of American policy in southeast Asia during the news conference. He suggested that there would have been no Communist intervention had the United States stayed out of South Vietnam.

STABILITY CALLED NEEDED

He asserted that the American public does not know the facts, adding: "In times of war and of hostilities the first casualty is truth."

But he emphasized for the first time that he was not advocating an immediate withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. The troops could not be withdrawn until stability had been established, he said, tacitly rejecting Communist demands that the troops be withdrawn as a precondition for negotiations.

He warned that the chances for a settlement grow dimmer with each passing day, adding that no one can be sure that negotiations or a conference would succeed, "but it is worth trying."

The Secretary General said he had sent "concrete ideas and proposals" to the interested parties, but that "it would not be helpful at this stage to reveal even parts or some features of the negotiations I have conducted."

He left the impression that he still favors: An informal, secret dialogue between the principal parties as a preliminary to any formal meeting. He first put this idea forward in a press statement February 12.

A reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, which would work out the terms of a political settlement, presumably pointing to a nonaligned status for South Vietnam. He first specifically appealed for such a conference last July.

Thant refused to say whether he had received any response to his February 12 public appeal for preliminary consultations. The question had asked specifically whether he had heard from Peiping and Hanoi.

U.N. ROLE LIMITED

He said it is not likely that the United Nations Security Council can play a useful role in the dispute. The principal obstacle is that "more than two parties directly concerned in the question are not members of this organization." He referred to Communist China and the two Vietnams.

The Secretary General used the example of his own country, Burma, to support his contention that Communist intervention in South Vietnam came only as a response to American intervention.

He said the Burmese Communist underground had never received so much as a single rifle from outside forces because the Burmese Government had not itself asked for help in fighting the Communists.

"Not one precious American life has been lost in Burma," Thant said. "Not one precious American dollar has been spent in Burma in the form of military assistance in the last 17 years."

In the official text of the news conference, the word "precious" was eliminated from both sentences.

Thant also asserted that no arms had gone from North Vietnam to South Vietnam before the American intervention after the Geneva Conference.

[From Three-Star Extra]

PRESIDENT AUTHORIZES NO NEGOTIATIONS

The President has no sympathy for the views of U.N. Secretary General Thant on Vietnam. The White House says the President has not authorized, and is not contemplating, any negotiations, nor are there any proposals for negotiations before the President.

Yesterday Secretary Thant said he had sent concrete ideas and proposals to the interested parties. The White House says nothing has been received. Mr. Thant is in effect offering himself as a go-between. But yesterday Mr. Thant indicated his belief that American intervention is the whole cause of the trouble.

As an example to others, he held up the conduct of his own country, Burma, which lives cautiously in the shadow of its aggressive neighbor, Red China. Mr. Thant observed that no precious American lives had been lost in Burma and no precious American dollars had been spent in Burma—a sneering comment that in itself makes him most unsuitable as a go-between.

Mr. Thant revealed his awareness that he had blundered by having the word "precious" deleted from the official U.N. transcript of his news conference. Mr. Thant implied in this conference that the U.S. administration is not telling the truth about Vietnam to the American people; but to issue a deliberately inaccurate transcript of his own conference hardly qualifies Mr. Thant to make any such criticism of others.

The situation as of today is that U.N. Secretary General Thant thinks the heart of the Vietnam problem is to find a face-saving way for the United States to withdraw, while the President says the real task is to get the Communists to stop their aggression. Between these two positions, there is no common ground. As Secretary of State Rusk said this afternoon, a negotiation aimed at the acceptance or the confirmation of aggression is not possible.

It would appear that U.N. Secretary General Thant has delivered a very serious blow to the prestige and the effectiveness of the world organization. His comments on the situation in Vietnam, on which you have heard Mr. Willis' report, not only ignored the facts but put Mr. Thant in a position of bias against the United States and the funda-

mental principles of the organization which he heads.

The United Nations already has been robbed of much of its powers for keeping the peace of the world by the recent actions of Russia and her satellites. By creating an impasse in the U.N. through her refusal to pay up on her past dues, the Soviets have immobilized all of the organization's peace-keeping machinery. They have created a situation in which the U.N. can move only when they [the Soviets] agree to the action.

That has left the U.N. with nothing but its prestige as an instrument for maintaining order around the world. And now that its weapon has been blunted by Mr. Thant himself.

Over the years the United Nations has been operating under very difficult circumstances in a world under increasing threats from Communist aggression. In this situation it could have made some limited contribution to world peace through the maintenance of posture of neutrality and fairness. By his own words, Mr. Thant now appears to have disqualified himself as a spokesman for those principles. From now on he speaks as the neutralist with heavy leanings toward the Communist world.

[From the Times-Democrat, Feb. 24, 1965]

ARMS AID FOR BURMA IS QUESTIONED IN CONGRESS

WASHINGTON.—Congressional probers are adding Burma to their growing list of foreign aid programs they want President Johnson to review carefully.

With the government of General Ne Win moving closer to Communist China, members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee are questioning the wisdom of continuing a secret \$9 million arms program to that socialist regime.

The legislators, headed by Representative H.R. Gross, Republican of Iowa, are demanding that the weapons be halted until the United States obtains a written guarantee from Burma that they won't be used against the United States or to help Communist subversion in Thailand.

Although the State Department has refused to publish details of the Burma arms aid program, its confidential documents show it is very similar to the aid given neighboring Cambodia, which is now using the U.S. arms to help the Communist Vietcong in South Vietnam.

Since Burma borders Thailand, now being threatened by Peiping, Representative Gross and the other lawmakers want to make sure the mistake made in Cambodia won't be repeated in Burma.

According to the committee's findings, the United States has furnished General Ne Win's government more than \$5 million in arms and equipment to improve and strengthen its 46,000 paramilitary force.

Since the initiation of the secret arms deal in 1960, more than 1,000 motor vehicles and motorcycles, 1,700 bicycles and 50 small patrol craft have been turned over to the Burmese troops.

As in the Cambodia aid program, a countrywide communications systems was set up with U.S. equipment, linking all of Burma's military forces with a central headquarters in Rangoon.

Another \$4 million worth of supplies are either en route or being programmed for shipment to Burma this year. Its paramilitary troops are being trained in the latest counterinsurgency methods both in the United States and at U.S. installations in the Pacific.

In addition to this military assistance, the United States is helping finance General Ne Win's road to socialism with a number of major economic programs.

One of the largest is the construction of a 132-mile, two-lane highway from Rangoon to Mandalay. When finished, this road will

connect with one leading all the way to the order of Communist China. The United States is providing \$10 million for this controversial project.

Another \$4 million is going to improve Burma's inland waterways fleet. The United States already has turned over 47 barges and other vessels to the Burmese, with more coming.

An additional \$4.8 million is for the expansion of the government's lumber industry. With this aid, the Burmese have purchased six sawmills and reequipped seven others. To help launch a controversial land reclamation program, the United States is giving Burma more than \$3 million to develop its land and water resources.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 26, 1965]

STATEMENT BY RUSK ON U.S. POSITION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Secretary of State Dean Rusk issued the following prepared statement yesterday at his news conference.)

The nations of southeast Asia have a right to live in peace, free from aggression directed against them from outside their borders. This is not an empty theory, it is a point of vital importance to the safety of, indeed, the very existence of more than a hundred smaller nations all over the world. North Vietnam, in callous disregard of the Agreements of 1954 and 1962, has directed and supplied the essential military personnel and arms for a systematic campaign of terror and guerrilla action aimed at the overthrow of the Government of South Vietnam and at the imposition by force of a Communist regime. The evidence of North Vietnam's direct responsibility for this aggression has been repeatedly presented by the Government of Vietnam, the U.S. Government, and the International Control Commission. A full and up-to-date summary of the evidence establishing this responsibility will be available within a very few days.

B. The attitude of the United States toward threats to the peace in southeast Asia has been made clear many times and in the most serious and formal ways:

(a) by the ratification of the Manila Pact in February 1955, which includes South Vietnam as a protocol state; (This treaty was approved by the Senate by a vote of 62 to 1.)

(b) by a decision of President Eisenhower in 1954, set forth in a letter to the President of South Vietnam: "The implications of the agreement concerning Vietnam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

"The purpose of this offer to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

(c) by the joint resolution of the Congress of the United States, passed in August 1964 by a combined vote of 502 to 2, which stated, among other things:

"That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

"The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

"The United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

(d) by the statement of President Johnson on the occasion of signing that joint resolution:

"To any armed attack upon our forces, we shall reply.

"To any in southeast Asia who ask our help in defending their freedom, we shall give it.

"In that region, there is nothing we covet, nothing we seek—no territory, no military position, no political ambition. Our one desire—our one determination—is that the people of southeast Asia be left in peace to work out their destinies in their own way."

4. It has been stated over and over again that the key to peace in southeast Asia is the readiness of all those in that area to live at peace and to leave their neighbors alone. There is no mystery about that formulation; those who are not leaving their neighbors alone know exactly what it means. It is an obligation under the 1954 Agreements, under the 1962 Accords on Laos, and under general international law. The illegal infiltration of military personnel and arms cannot be described as "leaving your neighbor alone."

5. There have been negotiated settlements in southeast Asia, the most recent one as late as 1962. Those several agreements were intended to establish peace in that area; compliance with them by all concerned can achieve that result.

6. Since the Geneva Conference of 1962, the United States has been in active and continuous consultation with other governments about the danger created by aggression in southeast Asia. It has been discussed in the United Nations, in the SEATO and NATO Councils, and on innumerable occasions directly with other governments through diplomatic channels. We have had direct discussions with almost every signatory of the Agreements of 1954 and 1962. What is still missing is any indication that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors. The absence of this crucial element affects the current discussion of "negotiation." Political channels have been and are open and a considerable number of governments are actively interested in keeping them open to explore the possibilities of a peaceful solution. But a negotiation aimed at the acceptance or the confirmation of aggression is not possible. A negotiation which simply ends in bitterness and hostility merely adds to the danger.

7. Let me remind you that on February 17 the President said:

"As I have said so many, many times, and other Presidents ahead of me have said, our purpose, our objective there is clear. That purpose and that objective is to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country.

"We have no ambition there for ourselves. We seek no dominion. We seek no conquest. We seek no wider war. But we must all understand that we will persist in the defense of freedom, and our continuing actions will be those which are justified and those that are made necessary by the continuing aggression of others.

"These actions will be measured and fitting and adequate. Our stamina and the stamina of the American people is equal to the task."

Let me conclude by reaffirming, still once more, that the central object of American policy and action is peace in southeast Asia and the safety of the independent states in that region. Many of the peoples of that area have been subjected to 25 years of turmoil and violence; they are entitled to peace. We should much prefer to use our resources as a part of an international effort to assist the economic and social development of the peoples of that area than to have them diverted into the harsh necessities of resisting aggression.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 26, 1965]

NEGOTIATION?—U THANT'S VIEW ON VIETNAM (By William S. White)

With a rarely matched twisting of the truth, but at least with a certain insolent candor, Secretary General U Thant of the United Nations has now openly become an apologist and propagandist for Communist aggression in southeast Asia.

U Thant has now trumpeted as revealed truth, and without hesitation or qualification, the whole basic Communist line that the war in South Vietnam was only a little homegrown contest involving two sets of local boys until dreadful old Uncle Sam intervened to assist the anti-Communist government of that country. He has called upon us to negotiate and to withdraw ourselves as soon as possible.

In the process, he has rewritten 10 years of history, annulling 10 years in which the Communist government of North Vietnam has undeniably and consistently directed and supplied and commanded a tireless and savage invasion of South Vietnam in endless violation of agreements made in 1954 at just such negotiations as are now being so pressed upon us.

Thus, with U Thant's now unhidden recruitment to them, those forces seeking to blackmail or persuade the United States into abandoning its commitments in South Vietnam and to out and run are at last complete. And what a pretty company they make for any American to travel with.

Thant, the Soviet Union, and Charles de Gaulle of France—this is the splendid trinity that, whatever the intention in individual cases, is taking actions to remove the American presence in Asia, to stultify an American effort against pillage and murder of signal honor and decency, and to open all southeast Asia to the faceless hordes of Communist China.

And it would all be done under definitions that only Thant and the Communists can understand: If Communist forces invade or infiltrate a country, the resulting fighting is only local and nobody is intruding anywhere. If anti-Communist forces respond to an independent country's appeal for help against marauders, then this is not only intervention but also quite unacceptable intervention.

Even the precious little band of Democratic Senators that has been crying for weeks for negotiation—even though it is perfectly plain that negotiation at this stage would be outright surrender to aggression—may find itself a bit unhappy with the international associates it now has.

When the Soviet Union pushes us toward negotiation—again, at this stage, before we could possibly negotiate from strength in South Vietnam—is it really likely that this would be in the interests of the United States? When Charles de Gaulle of France pushes us toward negotiation, is it really likely that this would be in the interests of the United States, considering that Charles de Gaulle for years has been attempting to break down American influence all over the world?

Is it not odd that U Thant should feel free to interfere in this matter anyhow, since neither North Vietnam, the aggressor state here, nor Communist China, its master, is even a member of the organization for which he speaks?

And does the Democratic splinter in the Senate know that, according to word to me from a distinguished allied Ambassador, it has already succeeded in convincing the diplomatic community here that the majority party of this country is not behind the President in Vietnam? The fact that this estimate is absurdly wrong and that a vast majority of both parties backs the President

does not cure the measureless harm that has been done to American interests by the Democratic splinter.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 26, 1965]

RED AGGRESSOR: EVIDENCE AGAINST HANOI
(By Roscoe Drummond)

The United States is ready to submit to the United Nations Security Council or any other proper body, massive and mounting proof that the war in South Vietnam is armed and directed from Hanoi.

The evidence is now fully prepared for use by the Government at the right moment.

It rests on captured arms, captured documents, testimony of Communist defectors and interrogation of North Vietnamese prisoners of war.

It proves that the aggression against South Vietnam is inspired, commanded, controlled, and supplied by the Communist regime in Hanoi.

This evidence shows a systematic violation of the frontier that Hanoi agreed to respect in the Geneva agreements of 1954 and in the Laotian agreement of 1962.

This evidence makes North Vietnam the procuring force in the attempt to overthrow the Government of South Vietnam and, in the words of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, "the mainspring of the whole Vietcong effort."

Here is a good cross section of the information that documents the role Hanoi has played from the beginning:

Infiltration: From 1959 to 1964, Hanoi sent 19,000 military personnel across the border to wage war against South Vietnam. This figure comes from cross-checked reports from prisoners, defectors, and secret documents. There is substantial information that 15,000 additional infiltrators entered South Vietnam during this period. In guerrilla warfare, 20,000 guerrillas can be equal to a regular army of 200,000 to 300,000.

Vietcong leadership: Most officers, the key cadres and the technicians for hard-core Vietcong units operating in South Vietnam are from North Vietnam.

Arms supplies: Large and increasing quantities of weapons are entering from outside. One captured Vietcong said that his entire company had recently been supplied with modern Chinese weapons. A Vietcong arms cache contained recoilless rifles and ammunition, carbines, detonating fuses, 110 pounds of TNT, fuses for mortar shells, and other arms. Their identifiable sources were: North Vietnam, Red China, East Germany, and Hungary.

Another massive cache was seized last week. Included in the capture were 1,000 Russian-made carbines, 800 Red Chinese rifles, several hundred Soviet submachine-guns, anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, and grenades.

Supposedly the source of manufacture of these weapons is to be obliterated. Captured documents reveal instructions from Hanoi directing the infiltrators to remove all markings from their munitions. The infiltrators themselves start out from near Hanoi in North Vietnamese uniforms and change into South Vietnamese uniforms at the frontier.

The admission: Hanoi has officially declared that its army is the instrument of the class struggle to liberate South Vietnam. It has said that it is the brain and the factor that decides.

The thanks: The Vietcong have several times thanked Hanoi for its armed support.

No deviation: The Vietcong Communists have never once deviated from the Hanoi party line.

This is the evidence that caused the three-nation International Control Commission (India, Canada, with Communist Poland dissenting) to report that "beyond any reason-

able doubt North Vietnam has sent arms and men into South Vietnam with the aim of overthrowing the legal government."

This is the evidence that has caused the United States to conclude that the Hanoi regime is in full strategic control of every action by the Vietcong and is providing the major share of its equipment and supplies.

[From the Washington, D.C. Evening Star, Feb. 27, 1965]

PARTIAL TEXT OF THE U.S. WHITE PAPER ON VIETNAM

(Following is a partial text of the State Department's white paper on Vietnam.)

South Vietnam is fighting for its life against a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied and controlled by the Communist regime in Hanoi. This flagrant aggression has been going on for years, but recently the pace has quickened and the threat has now become acute.

The war in Vietnam is a new kind of war, a fact as yet poorly understood in most parts of the world. Much of the confusion that prevails in the thinking of many people, and even many governments, stems from this basic misunderstanding. For in Vietnam, a totally new brand of aggression has been loosed against an independent people who want to make their own way in peace and freedom.

In Vietnam, a Communist government has set out deliberately to conquer a sovereign people in a neighboring state. And to achieve its end, it has used every resource of its own government to carry out its carefully planned program of concealed aggression. North Vietnam's commitment to seize control of the south is no less total than was the commitment of the regime in North Korea in 1950. But knowing the consequences of the latter's undisguised attack, the planners in Hanoi have tried desperately to conceal their hand. They have failed, and their aggression is as real as that of an invading army.

This report is a summary of the massive evidence of North Vietnamese aggression obtained by the Government of South Vietnam. This evidence has been jointly analyzed by South Vietnamese and American experts.

THE EVIDENCE

The evidence shows that the hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Vietnam were trained in the North and ordered into the South by Hanoi. It shows that the key leadership of the Vietcong, the officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians, political organizers and propagandists have come from the North and operate under Hanoi's direction. It shows that the training of essential military personnel and their infiltration into the South is directed by the military high command in Hanoi.

The evidence shows that many of the weapons and much of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Vietcong have been sent into South Vietnam from Hanoi. In recent months, new types of weapons have been introduced in the Vietcong Army for which all ammunition must come from outside sources. Communist China and other Communist states' ammunition have been primarily channeled through North Vietnam.

The hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Vietnam are men trained in North Vietnam. They are ordered into the South and remain under the military discipline of the military command in Hanoi. Special training camps operated by the North Vietnamese Army give political and military training to the infiltrators. Increasingly the forces sent into the South are native North Vietnamese who have never seen South Vietnam.

White paper text

The infiltration rate has been increasing. From 1959 to 1960, when Hanoi was establish-

ing its infiltration pipeline, at least 1,800 men and probably 2,700 more moved into South Vietnam from the North. The flow increased to a minimum of 3,700 in 1961 and at least 5,400 in 1962. There was a modest decrease in 1963 to 4,200 confirmed infiltrators, though later evidence is likely to raise this figure.

MORE THAN 7,400 IN 1964

For 1964, the evidence is still incomplete. However, it already shows that a minimum of 4,400 infiltrators entered the South and more than 3,000 others probably were sent in.

There is usually a time lag between the entry of infiltrating troops and the discovery of clear evidence they have entered. The fact plus collateral evidence of increased use of the infiltration routes suggest strongly that 1964 was probably the year of greatest infiltration so far.

Thus, since 1959, nearly 20,000 Vietcong officers, soldiers, and technicians are known to have entered South Vietnam under orders from Hanoi. Additional information indicates that probably 17,000 more infiltrators were dispatched to the South by the regime in Hanoi during the past 6 years. It is reasonably assumed that still other infiltration groups have entered the South in which there is no evidence yet available.

It is now estimated that the Vietcong number approximately 35,000 so-called hard-core forces, and another 60,000 to 80,000 loose forces. It is thus apparent that infiltrators from the North—allowing for casualties—make up the majority, and probably the overwhelming proportion, of the so-called hard-core Vietcong. Personnel from the North, in short, are now and have always been the backbone of the entire Vietcong operation.

CASE HISTORIES

Following are individual case histories of North Vietnamese soldiers sent by the Hanoi regime into South Vietnam. They are one of an illustrative group. They show that the leadership and specialized personnel for the guerrilla war in South Vietnam consists largely part of members of the North Vietnamese armed forces trained in the North and subject to the command and discipline of Hanoi.

Dan was a Vietcong major, commander of the 60th Battalion. Disillusioned with fighting his countrymen and with communism and the lies of the Hanoi regime, he surrendered to the authorities in South Vietnam on February 11, 1963.

At the age of 15 he joined the revolutionary army (Vietminh) and fought against the French forces until 1954 when the Geneva accords ended the Indochina war. As a regular in the Vietminh forces he was moved to North Vietnam. He became an officer in the so-called People's Army.

In March 1962, Major Dan received orders to prepare to move to South Vietnam. He had been exposed to massive propaganda in the North which told of the destitution of the peasants in the South and said that the Americans had taken over the French role of colonialists. He said later that an important reason for his decision to surrender was that he discovered these propaganda themes were lies. He found the peasants more prosperous than the people in the North. And he recognized quickly that he was not fighting the Americans but his own people.

With the women of his unit, Major Dan left Hanoi on March 23, 1962. They traveled through the Laos corridor. His group joined up with the Vietcong first regiment in Central Vietnam.

The 35-year-old major took part in 45 actions, and was wounded once in an unsuccessful Vietcong attack on an outpost. As time passed, he became increasingly discouraged by his experience as a troop commander of the Vietcong. Most of all, he said, he was

red of killing other Vietnamese. After several months of soul searching, he decided to surrender to the authorities of the Republic of Vietnam. He has volunteered to do anything to serve the national cause of South Vietnam.

VO THOI

Sgt. Vo Thoi (Communist party alias Vo Yen) was an assistant squad leader in the 22d Vietcong Tay Son 22d Battalion. On the night of October 7, 1963, his unit attacked

Tuong village in Binh Dinh Province, after overrunning the village, Vo's company was assigned to set up an ambush against a public of Vietnam troops rushing to defend the village. In the ensuing fight, Vo was seriously wounded. He was picked up by local farmers and turned over to the authorities.

Vo's life and experiences were similar to those of thousands of Vietcong. Born in Quang Ngai Province in 1932, he went through 5 years of school and then worked on his parents' small farm. During the war against the French, he joined the Viet Minh forces. When the fighting ended, he was transferred to North Vietnam with his unit, 210th Regiment. He remained in the North Vietnamese Army until 1960 when he was sent to work on a state farm in Nghe An Province. In September 1962, Vo was told he must join the newly activated 22d Battalion. The members of the battalion came from provinces in South Vietnam, from Quang Tri, Phu Yen. But it was not an ordinary battalion; two-thirds of its members were officers with ranks up to senior captains.

The group was put through an advanced training course that lasted 6 months. It included combat tactics for units from squad company and the techniques of guerrilla and counter guerrilla fighting. There were heavy doses of political indoctrination.

On March 5, 1963, the 22d Battalion was ordered to move south. They were transferred in trucks from Nghe An Province to Quang Hai in Quang Binh, just north of the 17th parallel. From there the unit was moved westward to the Laotian border. When the more than 300 men began walking the south following mountain trails in Laos and the Vietnam border area. They marched by day, rested at night. Every 5th day, they stopped at a way station for a full day's rest. One company dropped off at Thua Thien Province. Vo and the remainder of the group marched on to Pleiku Province. Two fully armed companies from a neighboring province were assigned to the battalion. The assignment given to the Tay Son Battalion was to harass strategic hamlets in the Ba Lan district of Binh Dinh, to round up cattle and rice, to kill or kidnap cadre of the government forces, and to recruit local youth for service with the Vietcong.

NATIVES, TOO

Native North Vietnamese military personnel:

The Communist authorities in Hanoi are now assigning native North Vietnamese in increasing numbers to join the Vietcong forces in South Vietnam.

Vo Thanh Vinh was born in Nghe An Province in North Vietnam in 1936. He was captured by South Vietnamese forces on May 5, 1964. He described himself as a military security officer. He infiltrated into South Vietnam in April 1964 with a group of 4 police and security officers from North Vietnam.

Another native North Vietnamese captured in the south was Vietcong Private First Class Vo Quyen. His home was in Nam Dinh Province. He was a member of the 2d Battalion of the North Vietnamese Army's 9th Regiment. He said the entire battalion had infiltrated into South Vietnam between February and May last year. He was captured in an action in Quang Tri Province on July 4. He told interrogators that the bulk of his unit was composed of young draftees from North Vietnam.

Le Pham Hung, also a private first class, was captured on July 7 in Thua Thien Province. He is a native of Nam Dinh in North Vietnam. He had been drafted for military service in May 1963. His unit was the 324th Division. His group, consisting solely of 90 North Vietnamese draftees, infiltrated into South Vietnam in May 1964. He reported that another company of North Vietnamese entered the south at the same time as his unit.

A former member of the 90th Vietcong Battalion reported that his unit had been reinforced by native North Vietnamese troops earlier this year. Le Thua Phuung, an information cadre, surrendered to government forces on April 23, 1964. He said that the 90th Battalion had received 80 North Vietnamese replacements in February.

A medical technician named Hoang Thung was captured in Thua Thien Province on July 4, 1964. He said he had infiltrated into the south in late 1963 with a group of 200 Vietcong, the majority of whom were ethnic northerners, 120 of them draftees.

These reports destroy one more fiction which the authorities in Hanoi have sought so long to promote—that the fighting in the south was a matter for the South Vietnamese. They underline Hanoi's determination to press its campaign of conquest with every available resource.

INTELLIGENCE

The heart of the Vietcong intelligence organization is the central research bureau in Hanoi. Communist agents are regularly dispatched from North Vietnam, sometimes for brief assignments but often for long periods. Many of these agents move into South Vietnam along the infiltration trails through Laos. But others are carried by boats along the coasts and landed at prearranged sites. A special maritime infiltration group has been developed in North Vietnam and its operations are centered in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces just north of the 17th parallel.

In July 1962 a North Vietnamese intelligence agent named Nguyen Viet Duong began training to infiltrate South Vietnam. A native southerner, he had fought against the French and had gone to North Vietnam after the war ended. Selected for intelligence work, he was assigned to the central bureau in 1959.

After a period of intensive instruction in radio transmission, coding and decoding, and other skills of the intelligence trade, he was given false identity papers and other supplies and was transported to the South. His principal task was to set up a cell of agents to collect military information. He flew from Hanoi to Dong Hoi. From the latter port, the maritime infiltration group took him by boat to South Vietnam. That was in August 1962.

In January 1963, Luong reported to Hanoi that he had run into difficulties. His money and papers had been lost and he had been forced to take refuge with Vietcong contacts in another province. Another agent was selected to go to South Vietnam. One of his assignments was to contact Duong, find out details of what had happened to him, and help Duong reestablish himself as a Vietcong agent. The man selected for the task was Senior Capt. Tran Van Tan of the central intelligence organization.

Tan had already been picked to go to the South to establish a clandestine Vietcong communications center to maintain contact with Hanoi. Helping Duong was one of his secondary assignments. After intensive preparations, Tan was ready to move to South Vietnam in March. He was transferred to an embarkation base of the maritime infiltration group just north of the 17th Parallel.

FISHERMEN

He was joined by three other Vietcong agents and the captain and three crewmen

of the boat that would take them south. Each was given false identity papers to conform to their false names. They also were provided with fishermen's permits, South Vietnamese voting cards, and draft cards or military discharge papers. The boat captain received a boat registration book, crew lists, and several South Vietnamese permits to conduct business. The agents had to become familiar with simple boat procedures so they could pass as fishermen.

The expedition left the embarkation port on April 4. In addition to the four agents, the boat carried six carefully sealed boxes. These contained a generator, several radios, some weapons, and a large supply of South Vietnamese currency. They also carried some chemicals and materials for making false identification papers. Their destination was a landing site on the coast of Phuoc Tuy Province.

Soon after leaving North Vietnam, the Vietcong boat encountered high winds and rough seas. On April 7, the storm became violent. The boat threatened to capsize. Strong northeasterly winds forced it ever closer to shore. Finally, the boat captain, Nguyen Xit, ordered that the six boxes be thrown overboard. This was done and the boat then was beached. The eight men decided to split up into pairs and try to make contact with Vietcong forces. They buried their false papers and set out. Six of the eight were captured almost immediately by authorities in Thua Thien Province. The other two were taken several days later.

Student propaganda agents

The student population of South Vietnam is an important target group for Vietcong propagandists. These agents seek to win adherents for the Communist cause among young workers, students in high schools and universities, and the younger officers and enlisted men in the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

Typical of the agents sent into South Vietnam for this purpose is Nguyen Van Vy, a 19-year-old native of the Vinh Linh district in North Vietnam, just north of the demilitarized zone. He was a member of a Communist Party youth group in his native village. He was recruited for propaganda work in the south in the fall of 1962. He was one of 40 young persons enrolled in a special political training course given by the Communist Party in his district.

PHASE 1

The first phase of the training consisted of political indoctrination.

Those who successfully completed the first phase were selected for the second level of training, the so-called technical training phase. In this, the trainees were given their mission in the south.

Vy was told he should infiltrate into South Vietnam and then surrender to the authorities, describing himself as a defector who was "tired of the miserable life in the north." He was to say he wanted to complete his schooling which was impossible in the north. He was told to ask to live with relatives in the south so he could go to school. Once his story was accepted and he was enrolled in a school, he was to begin his work of propagandizing other students.

He was assigned to work under an older agent to whom he had to report regularly. A third member of the team was a younger man who was to assist Vy. The three were to infiltrate into South Vietnam separately and to meet here at a rendezvous point.

At first, Vy was to do no more than observe his fellow students carefully, collecting biographical data on them and studying their personalities and capabilities. He was then to select those he thought might be most influenced by Communist propaganda, and try to make friends with them.

THE TARGETS

Once he had selected targets, he was to begin to influence them favorably toward

the north and to implant Communist propaganda. He was responsible then for bringing into his organization those he had influenced effectively. These individuals were to be given their own propaganda assignments to work on other students.

Students who wanted to evade military service in the Government forces were considered prime targets. Where possible, Vy was to help them get to North Vietnam. He was also told to make contact with any students who were suspected of Communist activities. These, too, were to be helped to escape to North Vietnam. Any useful information concerning developments in the south or military activities were to be reported through his superior, Nguyen Van Phong.

In case he became suspect, he was either to make his own way back to North Vietnam or to go into the jungle and try to contact a Vietcong unit.

Vy entered South Vietnam on January 2, 1963, by swimming across the Ben Hai River. He encountered an elderly farmer who led him to the local authorities in Hai Gu. There he told his story but it was not believed. He then admitted his true mission.

THE SOURCE

When Hanoi launched the Vietcong campaign of terror, violence and subversion in earnest in 1959, the Communist forces relied mainly on stocks of weapons and ammunition left over from the war against the French. Supplies sent in from North Vietnam came largely from the same source. As the military campaign progressed, the Vietcong depended heavily on weapons captured from the armed forces in South Vietnam. This remains an important source of weapons and ammunition for the Vietcong. But as the pace of the war has quickened, requirements for up-to-date arms and special types of weapons have risen to a point where the Vietcong cannot rely on captured stocks. Hanoi has undertaken a program to reequip its forces in the South with Communist-produced weapons.

Large and increasing quantities of military supplies are entering South Vietnam from outside the country. The principal supply point is North Vietnam which provides a convenient channel for materiel that originates in Communist China and other Communist countries.

An increasing number of weapons from external Communist sources have been seized in the south. These include such weapons as 57 mm. and 75 mm. recoilless rifles, dual-purpose machineguns, rocket launchers, large mortars, and antitank mines.

A new family of Chinese Communist-manufactured weapons has recently appeared in Vietcong hands. These include the 7.62 semiautomatic carbine, 7.62 light machinegun, and the 7.62 assault rifle. These weapons and ammunition for them manufactured in Communist China in 1962 were first captured in December 1964, in Chuong Thien Province. Similar weapons have since been seized in each of the four corps areas of South Vietnam. Also captured have been Chinese Communist antitank grenade launchers and ammunition made in China in 1963.

CASE IN POINT

On February 16, 1965, an American helicopter pilot flying along the South Vietnamese coast sighted a suspicious vessel. It was a cargo ship of an estimated 100-ton capacity, carefully camouflaged and moored just offshore along the coast of Phu Yen Province. Fighter planes that approached the vessel met machinegun fire from guns on the deck of the ship and from the shore as well. A Vietnamese air force strike was launched against the vessel and Vietnamese Government troops moved into the area. They seized the ship after a bitter fight with the Vietcong.

The ship, which had been sunk in shallow water, had discharged a huge cargo of arms,

ammunition, and other supplies. Documents found on the ship and on the bodies of several Vietcong aboard identified the vessel as having come from North Vietnam. A newspaper in the cabin was from Haiphong and was dated January 23, 1965. The supplies delivered by the ship—thousands of weapons and more than a million rounds of ammunition—were almost all of Communist origin, largely from Communist China and Czechoslovakia as well as North Vietnam. At least 100 tons of military supplies were discovered near the ship.

A preliminary survey of the cache near the sunken vessel from Hanoi listed the following supplies and weapons:

Approximately 1 million rounds of small arms ammunition.

More than 1,000 stick grenades.

Five hundred pounds of TNT in prepared charges.

Five hundred antitank grenades.

Two thousand rounds of 82-millimeter mortar ammunition.

Five hundred rounds of 57-millimeter recoilless rifle ammunition.

More than 1,000 rounds of 75-millimeter recoilless rifle ammunition.

One 57-millimeter recoilless rifle.

Two heavy machineguns.

Two thousand 7.95 Mauser rifles.

More than 100 7.62 carbines.

One thousand submachineguns.

Fifteen light machineguns.

Five hundred rifles.

Five hundred pounds of medical supplies (with labels from North Vietnam, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Soviet Union, and other sources).

The ship was fairly new and had been made in Communist China. Documents aboard the ship included three North Vietnamese nautical charts (one of the Haiphong area and one of Hong Gay, both in North Vietnam, and one of the Tra Vinh area of South Vietnam). The military health records of North Vietnamese soldiers were found. The man had a political history sheet, showing he was a member of the 338th Division of the North Vietnamese Army.

POWER LINES

Military affairs of the Vietcong are the responsibility of high command of the People's Army of North Vietnam and the Ministry of Defense, under close supervision from the Lao Dong Party (North Vietnamese Communist Party). These responsibilities include operational plans, assignments of individuals and regular units, training programs, infiltration of military personnel and supplies, military communications, tactical intelligence, supplies, and the like. The six military regions are the same as those of the Vietcong political organization.

The hard core of the Vietcong military organization is the full-time regular unit usually based on a province or region. These are well-trained and highly disciplined guerilla fighters.

The size of the Vietcong regular forces has grown steadily in recent years. For example, the Vietcong have five regimental headquarters compared with two in 1961. And the main Vietcong force is composed of 50 battalions, 50 percent more than before. There are an estimated 139 Vietcong companies. Hard-core Vietcong strength now is estimated at more than 82,000 whereas it was less than 20,000 in 1961.

Supporting the main force units of the Vietcong are an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 part-time guerrillas. They are generally organized at the district level where there are likely to be several companies of 50 or more men each. These troops receive only half pay which means they must work at least part of the time to eke out a living.

THE CRA

Below the irregular guerilla forces of the district are the part-time, village-based guerillas. They are available for assignment by

higher headquarters and are used for harassment and sabotage. They are expected to warn nearby Vietcong units of the approach of any force of the legal government. They provide a pool for recruitment into the Vietcong district forces.

A key element in the Vietcong effort is an elaborate organization in Hanoi called the Central Research Agency (CRA—Cục Nghiên Cứu Trung-Uông). Though it handles Hanoi's intelligence effort on a worldwide scale, the main focus of its operation is on South Vietnam. The research agency is able to draw on the intelligence capabilities of both the Lao Dong Party and the North Vietnamese armed forces for information, personnel, and facilities.

The CRA reportedly operates under close personal scrutiny of Ho Chi Minh himself. Some of the top officials in the Hanoi government reportedly sit on its directing committee, including Premier Phan Van Dong, Deputy Premier Truong Chinh, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap.

The headquarters of the CRA in Hanoi divided into six main sections, not including a special code unit. The six sections are responsible for administration, cadres, communications, espionage, research and training.

CRA headquarters directs a number of special centers for overseas operations. Each such center maintains intelligence channels to overseas areas. It operates through special units at Haiphong and at Hongay.

A second special center is responsible for Vietcong intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos. A third center handles activities along the "demarcation line," the border with South Vietnam. The unit is based in Vinh-Linh in southeast North Vietnam. This center is responsible for sending agents and supplies to the south by sea.

Inside South Vietnam, the Vietcong has a large intelligence network. Some of its units are responsible for receiving and sending on agents arriving from the north. They feed and give instructions to groups infiltrating into South Vietnam. They take delivery of equipment and supplies received from the north and relay them to Vietcong units in the south.

Many Vietcong agents have been captured in the city of Saigon. They have exposed the extensive effort by the CRA to penetrate the Republic of Vietnam government agencies, foreign embassies, and other specialized organizations.

Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese intelligence operation in support of the Vietcong is one of the most extensive of its kind in the world.

AND NOW

Today the war in Vietnam has reached new levels of intensity. The elaborate effort by the Communist regime in North Vietnam to conquer the south has grown, not diminished. Military men, technicians, political organizers, propagandists and secret agents have been infiltrating into the Republic of Vietnam from the north in growing numbers. The flow of Communist-supplied weapons, particularly those of large caliber, has increased. Communications links with Hanoi are extensive. Despite the heavy casualties of 8 years of fighting, the hard-core Vietcong force is considerably larger now than it was at the end of 1961.

The government in Saigon has undertaken vigorous action to meet the new threat. The United States and other free countries have increased their assistance to the Vietnamese Government and people. Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited Vietnam in 1964, and he promised the Vietnamese: "We shall remain at your side until the aggression from the north has been defeated, until it has been completely rooted out and this land enjoys the peace which it deserves."

President Johnson has repeatedly stressed that the U.S. goal is to see peace secured in

southeast Asia. But he has noted that "that will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace."

Though it has been apparent for years that the regime in Hanoi was conducting a campaign of conquest against South Vietnam, the government in Saigon and the Government of the United States both hoped that the danger could be met within South Vietnam itself. The hope that any widening of the conflict might be avoided was stated frequently.

The leaders in Hanoi chose to respond with greater violence. They apparently interpreted restraint as indicating lack of will. Their efforts were pressed with greater vigor and armed attacks and incidents of terror multiplied.

Clearly the restraint of the past was not providing adequately for the defense of South Vietnam against Hanoi's open aggression. It was mutually agreed between the Governments of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States that further means for providing for South Vietnam's defense were required. Therefore, air strikes have been made against some of the military assembly points and supply bases from which North Vietnam was conducting its aggression against the South. These strikes constitute a limited response fitted to the aggression that produced them.

Until the regime in Hanoi decides to halt its intervention in the South, or until effective steps are taken to maintain peace and security in the area the Governments of South Vietnam and the United States will continue necessary measures of defense against the Communist armed aggression coming from North Vietnam.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Sunday Star, Feb. 28, 1965]

HOW OUR FAR EASTERN POLICY LED TO VIETNAM

(This explanation of American policy in Vietnam was made by William F. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, in a recent speech in Washington, Mo.)

The first question requires a look at history.

Even when the Far East was much more distant than it is today, we Americans had deep concern for developments there. Americans pioneered in trade and missionary effort with China and in opening up Japan to Western influence. In 1898 we became in a sense a colonial power in the Philippines, but began almost at once to prepare the way for independence and self-government there—an independence promised by act of Congress in 1898 and achieved on schedule in 1946. By the 1930's, we had wide interests of many types in the Far East, though only few direct contacts in southeast Asia apart from the individual Americans who had served over decades as political advisers to the independent kingdom of Thailand.

Events then took a more ominous turn. We became aware that the ambitions of Japanese military leaders to dominate all of Asia were a threat not only to the specific interests of ourselves and other Western nations, but to the peace of the whole area and indeed of the world. China, in which we had taken a lead in dismantling the 19th-century system of foreign special privileges was progressively threatened and large parts overrun. We ourselves were finally attacked at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. We responded to aggression by conducting with our Allies a major Pacific war that cost the United States alone 272,700 casualties and over a hundred billion dollars.

OUR BASIC STAKE

In the end Japanese militarism was defeated, and the way apparently cleared for

an Asia of free and independent national states that would be progressively freed of colonialism, that need threaten neither each other nor neighboring states, and that could tackle in their own way the eternal problems of building political and economic structures that would satisfy the aspiration of their peoples.

That kind of Far East was a pretty good definition of our national interests then. It is equally valid today. We cared about the Far East, and we care today, because we know that what happens there—among peoples numbering 89 percent of the world's population, with great talent, past historic greatness and capacity—is bound to make a crucial difference whether there will be the kind of world in which the common ideals of freedom can spread, nations live and work together without strife, and—most basic of all—we ourselves, in the long run, survive as the kind of nation we are determined to be. Our basic stake in the Far East is our stake in a peaceful and secure world as distinct from a violent and chaotic one. But there were three great flaws in the 1945 picture after the defeat of Japan.

1. In China, a civil war had been raging since the 1920's between the Government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist movement. After a brief and edgy truce during the war against Japan, that civil war was resumed in circumstances where the Government had been gravely weakened. We assisted that Government in every way possible. Mistakes may have been made, but in the last analysis mainland China could not have been saved from communism without the commitment of major U.S. ground and air forces to a second war on the Asian mainland. Faced with a concurrent threat from Soviet Russia against Europe and the Near East, we did not make—and perhaps could not then have made—that commitment. And there came to power on the mainland, in the fall of 1949, a Communist regime filled with hatred of the West, with the vision of a potential dominant role for China, but imbued above all with a primitive Communist ideology in its most virulent and expansionist form.

KOREA ACTION ANALYZED

2. In Korea, a divided country stood uneasily, half free and half Communist. With our military might sharply reduced after the war, as part of what may have been an inevitable slackening of effort, we withdrew our forces and reduced our economic aid before there was in existence a strong South Korean defensive capacity. With Soviet backing, North Korea attacked across the 38th parallel in June 1950. With the Soviets then absent from the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. was able to condemn the aggression and to mount a U.N. effort to assist South Korea. The United States played by far the greatest outside role in a conflict that brought 157,880 U.S. casualties, cost us at least \$18 billion in direct expenses, and in the end—after Communist China had also intervened—restored an independent South Korea, although it left a unified and free Korea to be worked out in the future.

In retrospect, our action in Korea reflected three elements:

A recognition that aggression of any sort must be met early and head on, or it will have to be met later and in tougher circumstances. We had relearned the lessons of the 1930's—Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia.

A recognition that a defense line in Asia, stated in terms of an island perimeter, did not adequately define our vital interest—that those vital interests could be affected by action on the mainland of Asia.

An understanding that, for the future, a power vacuum was an invitation to aggression, that there must be local political, eco-

nomie, and military strength in being to make aggression unprofitable, but also that there must be a demonstrated willingness of major external power both to assist and to intervene if required.

3. In southeast Asia, finally, there was a third major flaw—the difficulty of liquidating colonial regimes and replacing them by new and stable independent governments. The Philippines became independent and with our help overcame the ravages of war and the Communist Huk rebellion. The British, who had likewise prepared India and Burma and made them independent, were in the process of doing the same in Malaya even as they joined with the Malaysians in beating back a 12-year Communist subversive effort. Indonesia was less well prepared; it gained its independence, too, with our support, but with scars that have continued to affect the otherwise natural and healthy development of Indonesian nationalism.

LEADERSHIP FALLS TO COMMUNISTS

French Indochina was the toughest case. The French had thought in terms of a slow evolution to an eventual status within some French union of states—a concept too leisurely to fit the post war mood of Asia. And militant Vietnamese nationalism had fallen to the leadership of dedicated Communists.

We all know the results. Even France was unable to defeat the Communist-led nationalist movement. Despite last-minute promises of independence, the struggle inevitably appeared as an attempt to preserve a colonial position. By 1954, it could only have been won, again, by a major U.S. military commitment, and perhaps not even then. The result was the settlement at Geneva. The accords reached there were almost certainly the best achievable, but they left a situation with many seeds of future trouble. Briefly:

1. North Vietnam was militantly Communist, and had developed during the war against the French an army well equipped and highly skilled in both conventional and subversive warfare. From the start, North Vietnam planned and expected to take over the south and in due course Laos and Cambodia, thinking that this would probably happen by sheer decay under pressure, but prepared to resort to other means if needed.

2. South Vietnam had no effective or popular leadership to start with, was demoralized and unprepared for self-government, and had only the remnants of the Vietnamese military forces who had fought with the French. Under the accords, external military help was limited to a few hundred advisers. Apart from its natural self-sufficiency in food, South Vietnam had few assets that appeared to match those of the north in the struggle that was sure to come.

3. Cambodia was more hopeful in some respects, more remote from North Vietnam, with a leader in Prince Sihanouk, a strong historical tradition, and the freedom to accept external assistance as she saw fit. From the start Sihanouk insisted, with our full and continuing support, on a status of neutrality.

4. Laos, however, was less unified and was left under the accords with a built-in and legalized Communist presence, a disrupted and weak economy, and no military forces of significance.

ACTION STARTED IN 1954

Such was the situation President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles faced in 1954. Two things were clear; that in the absence of external help communism was virtually certain to take over the successor states of Indochina and to move to the borders of Thailand and perhaps beyond, and that with France no longer ready to act, at least in South Vietnam, no power other than the

United States could move in to help fill the vacuum.

Their decision, expressed in a series of actions starting in late 1954, was to move in to help these countries. Besides South Vietnam, and more modest efforts in Laos and Cambodia, substantial assistance was begun in Thailand.

The appropriations for these actions were voted by successive Congresses, and in 1954 the Senate likewise ratified the Southeast Asia Treaty, to which Thailand and the Philippines adhered along with the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan. Although not signers of the treaty, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia could call on the SEATO members for help against aggression.

COMMITMENT WAS MADE

So a commitment was made with the support of both political parties, that has guided our policy in southeast Asia for a decade now. It was not a commitment that envisaged a U.S. position of power in southeast Asia or U.S. military bases there. We threatened no one. Nor was it a commitment that substituted U.S. responsibility for the basic responsibility of the nations themselves for their own defense, political stability, and economic progress. It was a commitment to do what we could to help these nations attain and maintain the independence and security to which they were entitled—both for their own sake and because we recognized that, like South Korea, southeast Asia was a key area of the mainland of Asia. If it fell to Communist control, this would enormously add to the momentum and power of the expansionist Communist regimes in Communist China and North Vietnam, and thus to the threat to the whole free world position in the Pacific.

Let us look at Vietnam from the beautiful city of Saigon. I visited Saigon in December of 1963 with five of my colleagues, and spoke at length with Gen. Paul D. Harkins, commander of our Military Assistance Advisory Group, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, and many of our American military and businessmen in the area. The most striking thing about Vietnam is the fact that it is the richest agricultural area in the world. The experts have said that sufficient food can be produced in this area to feed almost all of Asia. This territory in the southern portion of Vietnam also permits guerrilla forces to live off the land without a constant resupply to sustain their activities in the field. The area is abundant in geese, ducks, and of course the staple commodity—rice.

During the early phase of the Vietnamese operation against the Vietcong, our military adviser initiated a policy wherein all of the villages of the country were organized and defended in a unique manner. Instead of letting the farmers fall prey to small marauding bands of Vietcong, each town was fortified. The valuables were placed in a warehouse or hut in the center of town, and at the first sign of an attack, the villagers would retreat to this redoubt, and a radio call for help was sent to the nearest army force whose immediate response was guaranteed through the use of helicopters and other high-speed aircraft, in conjunction with paratroop operations. When the war was virtually won in the north the Vietcong were starved out, but in the south they could rely upon the overabundance in the Mekong Delta to support their operation, hence their success in the Saigon area.

HAD TO STOP WAR

The war has been further complicated by the very complex situation within the country. You can imagine the problems our advisers had with the turnover of governments. The American advisers had to get military advice to the proper authorities, and to determine who was in power very often caused a cessation of combat operations, with the

enemy. In effect, the war would stop while the heads of government and the key leaders in the army were changed, and this meant a complete retraining program by the American mission of all military unit heads as well as political subdivision chiefs.

Probably one of the hallmarks of our mission in Vietnam has been the extreme patience of our American advisers, from our Ambassador and military commanders, down to the valiant Americans who spill their blood along with their Vietnamese comrades. The situation to say the least is vexatious but we must always keep our eyes on our strategic role—that of thwarting these Communist advances.

We will be successful. The Vietnamese will win their struggle. However, the road to victory never has been easy. The future may call for more intensive strikes at the base and source of Communist power and aggression in North Vietnam. The borders of South Vietnam may have to be sealed to prevent the flow of reinforcements and war material to the subversive Communist army. The 1,800 miles of coastline must be patrolled and the potential for resupply of North Vietnamese operations on the sea be destroyed.

The American people stand firm behind their President and behind the principles of freedom everywhere.

AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIETNAM, JULY 20, 1964

(The Geneva agreements theoretically ended the war between French Union forces and the Vietminh in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. These states were to become fully independent countries, with the last named partitioned near the 17th parallel into two states pending reunification through free elections to be held by July 20, 1964. The United States and Vietnam are not signatories to these agreements.)

CHAPTER I—PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCA-TION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

Article 1

A provisional military demarcation line shall be fixed, on either side of which the forces of the two parties shall be regrouped after their withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army of Vietnam to the north of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south.

The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as shown on the map attached (omitted).

It is also agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established on either side of the demarcation line, to a width of not more than 5 kilometers from it, to act as a buffer zone and avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities.

Article 2

The period within which the movement of all the forces of either party into its regrouping zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be completed shall not exceed 300 days from the date of the present agreement's entry into force.

Article 3

When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a waterway, the waters of such waterway shall be open to civil navigation by both parties wherever one bank is controlled by one party and the other bank by the other party. The Joint Commission shall establish rules of navigation for the stretch of waterway in question. The merchant shipping and other civilian craft of each party shall have unrestricted access to the land under its military control.

Article 4

The provisional military demarcation line between the two final regrouping zones is extended into the territorial waters by a

line perpendicular to the general line of the coast.

All coastal islands north of this boundary shall be evacuated by the armed forces of the French Union, and all islands south of it shall be evacuated by the forces of the People's Army of Vietnam.

Article 5

To avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities, all military forces, supplies, and equipment shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within 25 days of the present agreement's entry into force.

Article 6

No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

Article 7

No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Joint Commission.

Article 8

Civil administration and relief in the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be the responsibility of the commanders in chief of the two parties in their respective zones. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the demilitarized zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be determined by the respective commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed at any one time a figure to be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission or by the Joint Commission. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be determined by the Joint Commission. No one else shall carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

Article 9

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as limiting the complete freedom of movement, into, out of or within the demilitarized zone, of the Joint Commission, its joint groups, the International Commission to be set up as indicated below, its inspection teams and any other persons, supplies or equipment specifically authorized to enter the demilitarized zone by the Joint Commission. Freedom of movement shall be permitted across the territory under the military control of either side over any road or waterway which has to be taken between points within the demilitarized zone when such points are not connected by roads or waterways lying completely within the demilitarized zone.

CHAPTER II—PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE GOVERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT

Article 10

The commanders of the forces on each side, on the one side the commander in chief of the French Union forces in Indochina and on the other side the commander in chief of the People's Army of Vietnam, shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Vietnam by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces.

Article 11

In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina, the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout all parts of Vietnam, in all areas of hostilities and for all the forces of the two parties.

Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the cease-fire order down to the lowest echelons of the combat-

ant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the cease-fire shall take effect completely and simultaneously for the different sectors of the country as follows:

Northern Vietnam at 8 a.m. (local time) on July 27, 1954.

Central Vietnam at 8 a.m. (local time) on August 1, 1954.

Southern Vietnam at 8 a.m. (local time) on August 11, 1954.

It is agreed that Peiping mean time shall be taken as local time.

From such time as the cease-fire becomes effective in northern Vietnam, both parties undertake not to engage in any large-scale offensive action in any part of the Indochinese theater of operations and not to commit the air forces based on northern Vietnam outside that sector. The two parties also undertake to inform each other of their plans for movement from one regrouping zone to another within 25 days of the present agreement's entry into force.

Article 12

All the operations and movements entailed in the cessation of hostilities and regrouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion:

(a) Within a certain number of days after the cease-fire agreement shall have become effective, the number to be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission, each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines (including river- and sea-mines), booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substances placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements and other hazards to the free movement of the personnel of the Joint Commission and its joint groups, known to be present after the withdrawal of the military forces, shall be reported to the Joint Commission by the commanders of the opposing forces;

(b) From the time of the cease-fire until regrouping is completed on either side of the demarcation line:

(1) The forces of either party shall be provisionally withdrawn from the provisional assembly areas assigned to the other party.

(2) When one party's forces withdraw by a route (road, rail, waterway, sea route) which passes through the territory of the other party (see article 24), the latter party's forces must provisionally withdraw three kilometers on each side of such route, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering with the movements of the civil population.

Article 13

From the time of the cease-fire until the completion of the movements from one regrouping zone into the other, civil and military transport aircraft shall follow air-corridors between the provisional assembly areas assigned to the French Union forces north of the demarcation line on the one hand and the Laotian frontier and the regrouping zone assigned to the French Union forces on the other hand.

The position of the air-corridors, their width, the safety route for single-engined military aircraft transferred to the south and the search and rescue procedure for aircraft in distress shall be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission.

Article 14

Political and administrative measures in the two regrouping zones, on either side of the provisional military demarcation line:

(a) Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Vietnam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present agreement;

(b) Any territory controlled by one party which is transferred to the other party by

the regrouping plan shall continue to be administered by the former party until such date as all the troops who are to be transferred have completely left that territory so as to free the zone assigned to the party in question. From then on, such territory shall be regarded as transferred to the other party, who shall assume responsibility for it.

Steps shall be taken to ensure that there is no break in the transfer of responsibilities. For this purpose, adequate notices shall be given by the withdrawing party to the other party, which shall make the necessary arrangements, in particular by sending administrative and police detachments to prepare for the assumption of administrative responsibility. The length of such notices shall be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission. The transfer shall be effected in successive stages for the various territorial sectors.

The transfer of the civil administration of Hanoi and Haiphong to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall be completed within the respective time limits laid down in article 15 for military movements.

(c) Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties.

(d) From the date of entry into force of the present agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district.

Article 15

The disengagement of the combatants, and the withdrawals and transfers of military forces, equipment and supplies shall take place in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, equipment and supplies of the two parties shall be completed within 300 days, as laid down in article 2 of the present agreement;

(b) Within either territory successive withdrawals shall be made by sectors, portions of sectors or provinces. Transfers from one regrouping zone to another shall be made in successive monthly installments proportionate to the number of troops to be transferred;

(c) The two parties shall undertake to carry out all troop withdrawals and transfers in accordance with the aims of the present agreement, shall permit no hostile act and shall take no step whatsoever which might hamper such withdrawals and transfers. They shall assist one another as far as this is possible;

(d) The two parties shall permit no destruction or sabotage of any public property and no injury to the life and property of the civil population. They shall permit no interference in local civil administration;

(e) The Joint Commission and the International Commission shall insure that steps are taken to safeguard the forces in the course of withdrawal and transfer;

(f) The Trung Gia Military Commission, and later the Joint Commission, shall determine by common agreement the exact procedure for the disengagement of the combatants and for troop withdrawals and transfers, on the basis of the principles mentioned above and within the framework laid down below:

1. The disengagement of the combatants, including the concentration of the armed forces of all kinds and also each party's movements into the provisional assembly areas assigned to it and the other party's provisional withdrawal from it, shall be completed within a period not exceeding 15 days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective.

The general delineation of the provisional assembly areas is set out in the maps annexed to the present agreement.

In order to avoid any incidents, no troops shall be stationed less than 1,500 meters from the lines delimiting the provisional assembly areas.

During the period until the transfers are concluded, all the coastal islands west of the following lines shall be included in the Haiphong perimeter:

Meridian of the southern point of Kebao Island

Northern coast of the Ile Rousee (excluding the islands), extended as far as the meridian of Campha-Mines

Meridian of Champha-Mines.

2. The withdrawals and transfers shall be effected in the following order and within the following periods (from the date of the entry into force of the present agreement):

Forces of the French Union	Days
Hanoi perimeter	80
Haiphong perimeter	100
Haiphong perim.	300

Forces of the People's Army of Vietnam

Ham Tan and Xuyenmeec provisional assembly area	80
Central Vietnam provisional assembly area—first installment	80
Plaine des Jones provisional assembly area	100
Point Camau provisional assembly area	200
Central Vietnam provisional assembly area—last installment	300

CHAPTER III—BAN ON INTRODUCTION OF FRESH TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMS AND MUNITIONS, MILITARY BASES

Article 16

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited.

It is understood, however, that the rotation of units and groups of personnel, the arrival in Vietnam of individual personnel on a temporary duty basis and the return of Vietnam of individual personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Vietnam shall be permitted under the conditions laid down below:

(a) Rotation of units (defined in paragraph (c) of this article) and groups of personnel shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in article 1 of the present agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in article 2.

However, under the heading of individual personnel not more than 50 men, including officers, shall during any 1 month be permitted to enter that part of the country north of the provisional military demarcation line on a temporary duty basis or to return there after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Vietnam.

(b) "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or groups of personnel by other units of the same echelon or by personnel who are arriving in Vietnam territory to do their overseas service there;

(c) The units rotated shall never be larger than a battalion—or the corresponding echelon for air and naval forces;

(d) Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis, provided, however, that in any one quarter neither party shall introduce more than 15,500 members of its armed forces into Vietnam under the rotation policy.

(e) Rotation units (defined in paragraph (c) of this article) and groups of personnel and the individual personnel mentioned in

this article, shall enter and leave Vietnam only through the entry points enumerated in article 20 below:

(f) Each party shall notify the joint commission and the international commission at least 2 days in advance of any arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Vietnam. Reports on the arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Vietnam shall be submitted daily to the joint commission and the international commission.

All the above-mentioned notifications and reports shall indicate the places and dates of arrival or departure and the number of persons arriving or departing.

(g) The international commission through its inspection teams, shall supervise and inspect the rotation of units and groups of personnel and the arrival and departure of individual personnel as authorized above, at the points of entry enumerated in article 20 below.

Article 17

(a) With effect from the date of entry into force of the present agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons and armored vehicles, is prohibited.

(b) It is understood, however, that war material, arms, and munitions which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up after the cessation of hostilities may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same type and with similar characteristics. Such replacement of war material, arms, and munitions shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in article 1 of the present agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in article 2.

Naval craft may perform transport operations between the regrouping zones.

(c) The war material, arms, and munitions for replacement purposes provided for in paragraph (b) of this article, shall be introduced into Vietnam only through the points of entry enumerated in article 20 below. War material, arms, and munitions to be replaced shall be shipped from Vietnam only through the points of entry enumerated in article 20 below.

(d) Apart from the replacements permitted within the limits laid down in paragraph (b) of this article, the introduction of war material, arms, and munitions of all types in the form of unassembled parts for subsequent assembly is prohibited.

(e) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least 2 days in advance of any arrivals or departures which may take place of war material, arms, and munitions of all types.

In order to justify the requests for the introduction into Vietnam of arms, munitions, and other war material (as defined in paragraph (a) of this article) for replacement purposes, a report concerning each incoming shipment shall be submitted to the Joint Commission and the International Commission. Such reports shall indicate the use made of the items so replaced.

(f) The International Commission, through its inspection teams, shall supervise and inspect the replacements permitted in the circumstances laid down in this article, at the points of entry enumerated in article 20 below.

Article 18

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Vietnam territory.

Article 19

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present agreement, no military base under the control of a foreign state may be established in the regrouping zone of either party; the two parties shall insure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.

Article 20

The points of entry into Vietnam for rotation personnel and replacements of material are fixed as follows:

Zones to the north of the provisional military demarcation line: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen;

Zone to the south of the provisional military demarcation line: Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tanchau.

CHAPTER IV—PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES

Article 21

The liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of Vietnam, French and other nationalities captured since the beginning of hostilities in Vietnam during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Vietnam shall be liberated within a period of 30 days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective in each theater.

(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All prisoners of war and civilian internees held by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to their country of origin, place of habitual residence, or the zone of their choice.

CHAPTER V—MISCELLANEOUS

Article 22

The commanders of the forces of the two parties shall insure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present agreement are suitably punished.

Article 23

In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the commander of the forces of either party shall, within a specific period after the entry into force of the armistice agreement, permit the graves service personnel of the other party to enter the part of Vietnam territory under their military control for the purpose of finding and removing the bodies of deceased military personnel of that party, including the bodies of deceased prisoners of war. The Joint Commission shall determine the procedures and the time limit for the performance of this task. The commanders of the forces of the two parties shall communicate to each other all information in their possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party.

Article 24

The present agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the demilitarized zone and the territory under the military control of the other party, and shall

commit no act and undertake no operation against the other party and shall not engage in blockade of any kind in Vietnam.

For the purposes of the present article, the word "territory" includes territorial waters and airspace.

Article 25

The commanders of the forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Joint Commission and its joint groups and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of the functions and tasks assigned to them by the present agreement.

Article 26

The costs involved in the operations of the Joint Commission and joint groups and of the International Commission and its inspection teams shall be shared equally between the two parties.

Article 27

The signatories of the present agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for insuring and observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The commanders of the forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to insure full compliance with all the provisions of the present agreement by all elements and military personnel under their command.

The procedures laid down in the present agreement shall, whenever necessary, be studied by the commanders of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

CHAPTER VI—JOINT COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

28. Responsibility for the execution of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

29. An International Commission shall insure the control and supervision of this execution.

30. In order to facilitate, under the conditions shown below, the execution of provisions concerning joint actions by the two parties, a Joint Commission shall be set up in Vietnam.

31. The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the commanders of the two parties.

32. The presidents of the delegations to the Joint Commission shall hold the rank of general.

The Joint Commission shall set up joint groups the number of which shall be determined by mutual agreement between the parties. The joint groups shall be composed of an equal number of officers from both parties. Their location on the demarcation line between the regrouping zones shall be determined by the parties whilst taking into account the powers of the Joint Commission.

33. The Joint Commission shall insure the execution of the following provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities:

(a) A simultaneous and general cease-fire in Vietnam for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

(b) A regroupment of the armed forces of the two parties.

(c) Observance of the demarcation lines between the regrouping zones and of the demilitarized sectors.

Within the limits of its competence it shall help the parties to execute the said provisions, shall insure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the application of these provisions, and shall endeavor to solve such disputed questions as may arise between the parties in the course of executing these provisions.

34. An international commission shall be set up for the control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland.

It shall be presided over by the representative of India.

35. The international commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States. The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen, Courane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangol, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tranchau. These points of location may, at a later date, be altered at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, or of the International Commission itself, by agreement between the International Commission and the command of the party concerned. The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering the land and sea frontiers of Vietnam, the demarcation lines between the regrouping zones and the demilitarized zones. Within the limits of these zones they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfillment of their tasks (provision of personnel, placing at their disposal documents needed for supervision, summoning witnesses necessary for holding enquiries, ensuring the security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams, etc.) They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation, and communication as they may require. Beyond the zones of action as defined above, the mobile teams may, by agreement with the command of the party concerned, carry out other movements within the limits of the tasks given them by the present agreement.

36. The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the proper execution by the parties of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill the tasks of control, observation, inspection, and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and it shall in particular:

(a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the two parties, effected within the framework of the regroupment plan.

(b) Supervise the demarcation lines between the regrouping areas, and also the demilitarized zones.

(c) Control the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees.

(d) Supervise at ports and airfields as well as along all frontiers of Vietnam the execution of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, regulating the introduction into the country of armed forces, military personnel, and of all kinds of arms, munitions, and war material.

37. The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible either on its own initiative, or at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

38. The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, their investigation, and their observations, furthermore, they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the conclusions of each member shall be submitted to the Commission.

39. If any one inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the International Commission shall be

informed; the latter shall study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation, or removal of the threat of violation.

40. When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation to be given to some provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

41. The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in article 42. If the votes are divided the Chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may formulate recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, in order to insure a more effective execution of that agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

42. When dealing with questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, namely:

(a) Refusal by the armed forces of one party to effect the movements provided for in the regroupment plan;

(b) Violation by the armed forces of one of the parties of the regrouping zones, territorial waters, or air space of the other party;

The decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

43. If one of the parties refuses to put into effect a recommendation of the International Commission, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 42, it shall submit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference in all cases where its activity is being hindered.

44. The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indochina in order that it should be able to fulfill the tasks provided for in article 36.

45. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam shall act in close cooperation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos.

The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for coordinating their work and for relations between them.

46. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam may, after consultation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos, and having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Laos, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.

47. All the provisions of the present agreement, save the second subparagraph of article 11, shall enter into force at 2400 hours (Geneva time) on July 22, 1954.

Done in Geneva at 2400 hours on the 20th of July 1954 in French and in Vietnamese, both texts being equally authentic.

For the commander in chief of the People's Army of Vietnam.

Vice Minister of National Defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

For the commander in chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina.

Brigadier General DELZIEU.

DECLARATION OF THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS, JULY 23, 1962

(The 1954 Geneva accords provided for the withdrawal of Vietnamese Communist forces from Laos and for the reintegration of the Pathet Lao into the national community. However, it was not until 3 years later that the Pathet Lao, having achieved important concessions from the Royal Lao Government agreed to the reunification and ostensibly to the dissolution of Pathet Lao forces. In 1959, the Pathet Lao reverted to the use of force and by spring of 1961 won a series of military victories and were in a position to take over the country. In 1961 a de facto cease fire was achieved under the government of Prince Boun Oum and the Geneva Conference to settle the Lao question convened, which finally resulted in agreement in 1962, by which a coalition government would be established, all foreign troops and military personnel withdrawn, and the use of Lao territory for "interference in the internal affairs of other countries" was prohibited.)

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Vietnam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, whose representatives took part in the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-62;

Welcoming the presentation of the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, and taking note of this statement, which is, with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos, incorporated in the present declaration as an integral part thereof, and the text of which is as follows:

"The Royal Government of Laos,

"Being resolved to follow the path of peace and neutrality in conformity with the interests and aspirations of the Laotian people, as well as the principles of the Joint Communiqué of Zurich dated June 22, 1961, and of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 in order to build a peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic, unified, and prosperous Laos,"

"Solemnly declares that:

"(1) It will resolutely apply the five principles of peaceful co-existence in foreign relations, and will develop friendly relations and establish diplomatic relations with all countries, the neighboring countries first and foremost, on the basis of equality and of respect for the independence and sovereignty of Laos;

"(2) It is the will of the Laotian people to protect and insure respect for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of Laos;

"(3) It will not resort to the use or threat of force in any way which might impair the peace of other countries, and will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries;

"(4) It will not enter into any military alliance or into any agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos; it will not allow the establishment of any foreign military base on Laotian territory, nor allow any country to use Laotian territory for military purposes or for the purposes of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, nor recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO.

"(5) It will not allow any foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos in any form whatsoever;

"(6) Subject to the provisions of article 11 of the protocol, it will require the with-

drawal from Laos of all foreign troops and military personnel, and will not allow any foreign troops or military personnel to be introduced into Laos;

(7) It will accept direct and unconditional aid from all countries that wish to help the Kingdom of Laos build up an independent and autonomous national economy on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of Laos;

(8) It will respect the treaties and agreements signed in conformity with the interests of the Laotian people and of the policy of peace and neutrality of the Kingdom, in particular the Geneva agreements of 1962, and will abrogate all treaties and agreements which are contrary to these principles.

"This statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos shall be promulgated constitutionally and shall have the force of law.

"The Kingdom of Laos appeals to all the states participating in the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, and to all other states, to recognize the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of Laos, to conform to these principles in all respects, and to refrain from any action inconsistent therewith.

Confirming the principles of respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos and noninterference in its internal affairs which are embodied in the Geneva agreements of 1964;

Emphasizing the principle of respect for the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos;

Agreeing that the above-mentioned principles constitute a basis for the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question;

Profoundly convinced that the independence and neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos will assist the peaceful democratic development of the Kingdom of Laos and the achievement of national accord and unity in that country, as well as the strengthening of peace and security in southeast Asia;

1. Solemnly declare, in accordance with the will of the Government and people of the Kingdom of Laos, as expressed in the statement of neutrality by the royal government of Laos of July 9, 1962, that they recognize and will respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos.

2. Undertake, in particular, that

(a) they will not commit or participate in any way in any act which might directly or indirectly impair the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos;

(b) they will not resort to the use or threat of force or any other measure which might impair the peace of the Kingdom of Laos;

(c) they will not attach conditions of a direct interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos;

(d) they will not attach conditions of a political nature to any assistance which they may offer or which the Kingdom of Laos may seek;

(e) they will not bring the Kingdom of Laos in any way into any military alliance or any other agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with her neutrality, nor invite or encourage her to enter into any such alliance or to conclude any such agreement;

(f) they will respect the wish of the Kingdom of Laos not to recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO;

(g) they will not introduce into the Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel in any form whatsoever, nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the introduction of any foreign troops or military personnel;

(h) they will not establish nor will they

in any way facilitate or connive at the establishment in the Kingdom of Laos of any foreign military base, foreign strong point or other foreign military installation of any kind;

(i) they will not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries;

(j) they will not use the territory of any country, including their own for interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos.

3. Appeal to all other states to recognize, respect, and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence, and neutrality, and also the unity and territorial integrity, of the Kingdom of Laos and to refrain from any action inconsistent with these principles or with other provisions of the present declaration.

4. Undertake, in the event of a violation or threat of violation of the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult jointly with the Royal Government of Laos and among themselves in order to consider measures which might prove to be necessary to insure the observance of these principles and the other provisions of the present declaration.

5. The present declaration shall enter into force on signature and together with the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, shall be regarded as constituting an international agreement. The present declaration shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory states and to all the other states of the world.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present declaration.

Done in two copies in Geneva this 23d day of July 1962 in the English, Chinese, French, Laotian, and Russian languages, each text being equally authoritative.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, as in executive session, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the nomination of Luther L. Terry, of Alabama, to be Surgeon General of the Public Health Service for a term of 4 years, which was reported by me earlier today from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the clerk will state the nomination.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Luther L. Terry, of Alabama, to be Surgeon General of the Public Health Service for a term of 4 years.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination of Luther L. Terry to be Surgeon General of the Public Health Service for a term of 4 years? The nomination was confirmed.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of the nomination.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the President will be notified forthwith.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

On request by Mr. HILL, and by unanimous consent, the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. MCGEE. Mr. President, the Members of this body have been making significant contributions, it seems to me, in their willingness to discuss the many ramifications concerning Vietnam which bother not only this country but also the world at large.

It was on the 17th of February, I believe, that the marked increase in the tempo of the discussions on this issue began. On that occasion, the distinguished senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and the distinguished junior Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN] made known their thoughts.

We have had a very protracted colloquy on the implications of their suggestion, that we negotiate now. A consequence of that long colloquy has been the further development and, may I say, sophistication of the discussion of this question. Over this weekend one notes that a number of things have come to a head.

In making my own remarks I advocated that in the United States we make certain that no one on the other side misunderstands our intentions, that we get much tougher, that we seal off the border of South Vietnam, and call the hand there.

Over the weekend there has been much discussion of the statement by Soviet Premier Kosygin. We cannot know its full meaning, but we can see the range of what is implied and make our selections.

I would suspect that his remarks are met best by the explanation that he is seeking to get the initiative back from Peiping, to which it had been lost in recent weeks, and that they are aimed more at Peiping than they are Washington. To the extent that they may have been addressed to Washington we see the same kind of language being employed that was employed by Stalin at the time of the Berlin crisis, and that was employed when Khrushchev threatened us in Cuba.

We gave our answer then, and it is imperative that we likewise be prepared to give the same answers today; namely, that we will stand and see it through.

A part of that answer has already been given by Secretary of State Rusk, in restating our basic position in southeast Asia, in which he left no doubt, as to where we stand; namely, that as long as the Reds continue to violate the border between South and North Vietnam, we will not go to the bargaining table with them. We have said again that intransigence, belligerence, aggression, and terror are not suitable credentials for entrance to honorable negotiations between nations. Just this weekend the State Department presented overwhelming evidence to show the nature of the new brand of aggression.

I do not agree that all the guerrillas could be called back by Hanoi, even if Hanoi wanted to pull them all back, because many thousands of them could not be found.

As I have suggested several times in recent days, I believe we should announce that the cessation of the act of infiltration across the Vietnam border by the forces—regular or irregular—of North Vietnam, and that the cessation of ac-

tive, logistical support for the Communist forces in South Vietnam, is a prerequisite for any negotiation on our part. I repeat my contention that our determination to stick to this standard should be reinforced, if necessary, by systematic air attacks upon selected targets in North Vietnam, beginning with smaller tactical targets and working up, again if necessary, to the larger industrial targets which make up Hanoi's potential to wage war.

The situation in Vietnam has many of the qualities of the situation that existed in Czechoslovakia some 25 years ago.

It was present in Berlin on another occasion. This is the common denominator that makes our position in South Vietnam synonymous with the position that the West was confronted with in Munich and in many other areas and that led to the rise of Mr. Hitler and Mr. Mussolini in the 1930's.

During the debate, much has been said about war hawks and pacifists. To those who have used these expressions, let me say that the quickest way to war or the inevitable way to war is to continue to equivocate in this situation or to seek the least unfortunate terms that will allow us to ease out of our commitment in this area, because the going is tough and dirty, and all alternatives are unpleasant.

If there is such a bird as a "war hawk"—someone who deliberately wants a war now—he should realize that the quickest way to get one is to permit the present situation along the borders to continue, with the Communists always keeping the initiative, and to let the dictators in North Vietnam and the dictators in Peking think that by continuing their actions they can force us to go home. Our President has determined to stay. We are determined to stand and to see things through. The Communists think we are going to get out. They have convinced themselves that time is on their side and that if they continue to strike, continue to press, we will fold up our tents and go home.

So long as they have serious doubts about our sticking it out, they will persist in prodding and pushing, to hasten the day of the American pullout.

I know of no situation that could be more irresponsible than to permit that kind of policy to continue.

Our President has seen fit to draw the line and to draw it firmly and to make it clear that we do not intend to pull out and that we do not intend to forfeit this area to the forces from the north.

Mr. President, there is a second road to war. It is a longer path by far, but it is just as certain in its horrendous consequences, should it ever be traveled. That is the road that would lead to the surrender of this area to the Chinese. This in my judgment would completely unbalance the political forces in that part of the world. It is the unbalancing of these forces, the world's balance of power, that throughout the history of mankind has led to big wars, both in our time and in the days of old.

Therefore, if we were to withdraw, if we were to negotiate our way out of this area that holds the balance of Asia in

its grip, we would find the tides reversed and turning against us. There is no question that the tides have been running our way in the 20 years of the cold war. To put these rich resources at the disposal of a land with too many people and too few resources, would clearly contribute to an imbalance in that quarter and would invite the next step, over a longer period of time, which is a war to redress that imbalance.

Southeast Asia's resources are rich enough as to have been the reason for Japan's starting World War II. There is no reason to think that their potential to buttress power is altered even in the nuclear age. If southeast Asia is to be forfeited to mainland China, this is sufficient to alter the balance of power in Asia and the world against our national interest. And from the view of history, a world that finds its spheres of influence between its great powers unbalanced soon finds itself at war—a big war.

Therefore, if we are to keep peace in the world, American policy must direct itself toward both of these sobering threats. The first is met by taking the initiative in clarifying our intentions and taking the initiative from Hanoi. To make sure that we not stumble into war, it is important that we clear the air—thus, the basis for my request to our Government for a carefully calculated announcement spelling out American prerequisites to useful negotiations.

To thwart a second possibility of war, it requires that we draw a firm line across southeast Asia to match the line that has already been drawn all the way from Eastern Europe to Central Asia—a line which we would hold firmly against the aggressors to the north. These joint objectives of our policy give us the best chance to avoid war and even a chance to win peace in eastern Asia. While it is fraught with risks and great costs, the alternatives are even worse.

Again, let me state that I am well aware of the risks that we must take—they haunt me and should haunt every American. But they are as nothing compared to the risk inherent in inaction. For history shows only too clearly that an aggressor's appetite is not satisfied by peace offerings of small chunks of the territory he is seeking; it is only whetted and encouraged. Certainly there are big risks involved in the course I suggest, but they are only the risks that will someday have to be faced. To postpone them is only to increase their potential for world destruction.

Nor should we be dissuaded by the local conditions of the civil war, which has provided the soft spot now under Communist probe. It is deeply regrettable that the Government of South Vietnam is unstable and undemocratic, but we are not committed to preserve the political stakes of whichever general happens to be in power at the moment. But what we are committed to preserve is that same illusive condition for which free men have struggled, worked, fought, and died for many centuries—human freedom, or the chance to obtain that freedom. We will not give the Vietnamese freedom. We cannot give them

freedom. But we will give them a chance to be free. We will not preserve freedom in the Philippines or in Malaysia, but we will provide these nations with the opportunity to maintain their freedom and their national identity. We cannot choose the spot on which we will defend freedom or the conditions by which the conflict will be waged. Wherever freedom, or the chance for freedom, is threatened, there is where we must go, and there is where we must stand.

Too often in periods of crisis we spend our energies in the academic exercise of trying to decide which conflicts affect Western civilization and which do not. There is a simple answer to this question in this era of aggressive Communist exploitation of weakness and instability. All conflicts, all wars, anywhere on this earth, pose a real and direct threat to Western civilization. These conflicts should be eliminated by negotiation, if that is possible, or by force, if all else fails.

And we must also accept the realities of existence in our world which are hard and unpleasant realities, but realities nonetheless. And they are that we cannot expect a perfect solution to these conflicts, and that a workable solution may leave a nation divided for the immediate future. These divisions now exist in Berlin, in Korea, and will probably exist in Vietnam. In historical perspective they are not permanent; but, for the moment, they are a compromise that we can live with in the hope that the future will provide a more rational means of settling these differences. And negotiations, once begun, may do very well to settle for a divided Vietnam.

We will negotiate—indeed, at some time we must negotiate—but that time is not now. At the present moment our task must be to set the record straight, to make clear to those whose ambitions lead them to threaten the peace and the security of freemen, that we accept the challenge, that we stand firm, that we will take the risk involved. Let us accept this risk now in the hope and expectation that it will enable us to accept then the equally great risk of establishing peace in this troubled area through the rule of reason and understanding rather than through terror and the force of arms.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD at this point an article published in the New York Times of Sunday, and also an article published in today's Washington Daily News, which report that the United States is landing a force of Marines in Vietnam for the purpose of sealing off the 17th parallel.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Feb. 28, 1965]
BRITISH WARY ON CALL FOR VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS

LONDON, February 28.—Officials here are not persuaded that the publicized peace moves by President de Gaulle will be helpful in working toward a settlement in Vietnam.

They fear that the talk about negotiations may obscure what they regard as the central

problem: How to assure that any political settlement reached can be enforced on the scene.

The point is made that there once was a political settlement—the Geneva agreement of 1954—but that its terms have been violated by Communist infiltration from North to South Vietnam. The need, therefore, is to find a realistic way of seeing that agreements are observed.

For these reasons British officials see the necessity for continuing American air attacks in North Vietnam. They think a real settlement can come only if North Vietnam is persuaded that the price of trying to take over the south is too high.

The important thing, as one official put it, is for the West to leave any conference table convinced that South Vietnam will be left alone.

The support for continuing air strikes is conditioned on one factor—that the strikes be aimed specifically at northern support of the Vietcong guerrillas in the south. General bombing of North Vietnam would be another matter.

SOVIET INFLUENCE CRUCIAL

It is agreed that the Soviet Union has a crucial part to play in the shaping of any settlement. Only if Moscow believes that the risk is getting too high in the Vietnam fighting will the time be ripe for negotiations, officials say.

One element that gives concern about General de Gaulle's activity is the possibility that it may be premature. Government officials do not think publicized peace moves are particularly helpful now.

The attitude in the British Government seems to be close to the American position, as far as that is known. It is a hard-boiled attitude, based on the belief that negotiations in Vietnam cannot be a cover for a handover of the south to the Communists without endangering the Western position in Asia generally.

It continues to surprise many observers that a labor government is taking so firm a line. The Government is doing so despite restiveness in the Labor Party's leftwing.

The leader of the conservative opposition, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, said today that he thought a political solution in Vietnam would be desirable. Then he added:

"But I must say, America is taking the right position on the question of negotiations now. There is no basis for a conference unless we have the certainty that there would be a way to police what the conference decides."

[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News, Mar. 1, 1965]

FIRM ACTION URGED IN VIETNAM: DEMOS BACK L.B.J. IN CONGRESS

Democratic Congressmen, armed with a State Department "white paper" documenting the Communist war against South Vietnam, gave strong backing today to President Johnson's Vietnam policy.

Senator WILLIAM E. PROXMIER, Democrat, of Wisconsin, said in a speech prepared for Senate delivery that Mr. Johnson's Vietnam policies offer "the best chance for us to achieve an enduring peace in this enormously complex situation."

He said it would be "a grim mistake" to attempt to negotiate a settlement if the Communists have not shown "by their actions that they want peace and will end the aggressive conduct that prevents it."

In opposing premature negotiations, Senator PROXMIER said, "Perhaps the worst outcome of all would be a conference that ended in failure. The war would resume without even the glimmer of hope that the possibility of peace talks always offers."

LONG SPEAKS OUT

Senate Democratic Whip RUSSELL B. LONG, of Louisiana, said the United States should

"do whatever is necessary to win * * * and if Communist China comes in, we will take them on, and if Russia wants to deal herself a hand, we will go ahead, but there will be no sanctuary."

Senator GALE MCGEE, Democrat, of Wyoming, called on the United States to take the initiative with more aggressive policies.

Representative CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Democrat, of Wisconsin, chairman of the House Far East Subcommittee, said the United States has issued North Vietnam an ultimatum, in effect, to withdraw from South Vietnam or face destructive military consequences.

He said North Vietnam must be forced to realize that none of its territory is immune from attack as a privileged sanctuary.

Senator MCGEE said, "I believe we should now go a step further" by increasing bombing of North Vietnam if that is needed.

Senator LONG said bombing North Vietnam would serve notice that the United States intends to win "and that we don't propose to stop by letting them call the rules and make us fight on their terms, that we propose to do some of this fighting on our own terms."

MINORITY REPORT

A top House Republican today labeled President Johnson's Great Society plan a blueprint for an all-powerful, one-party Government.

Representative MELVIN R. LAMB, Republican, of Wisconsin, chairman of the House Republican conference and principal author of the 1964 GOP national platform, also assailed Mr. Johnson's conduct of foreign affairs. He predicted the administration would seek a negotiated end to the war in Vietnam and that this would lead to a Communist takeover.

He said Republicans know that communism respects strength and seeks accommodation only for its own purposes. But he said the administration apparently will seek eventually to negotiate itself out of South Vietnam.

In a speech prepared for House delivery, Representative LAMB said the painfully small Republican minority in Congress would continue to speak its piece, and with the voice of a moral majority.

"Though we do not win rollcall votes, we can win for America the all-important second look that may save us from blindly accepting a Great Society that might be just another great mistake, just another great scheme, just another great debt, accepted without due consideration," he said.

Representative LAMB's major address was seen by Republicans as a sort of minority state of the Union message as well as a call to arms to the Republican ranks.

He said Republicans will oppose some of Mr. Johnson's proposals, and offer alternatives to others.

EULOGIES OF THE LATE SENATOR ENGLE OF CALIFORNIA

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The hour of 2 o'clock having arrived, the legislative business of the Senate will be suspended, pursuant to Senate Resolution 81, adopted February 23.

The clerk will read the resolution.

The resolution (S. Res. 81) was read, as follows:

Resolved, That on Monday, March 1, at 2 o'clock postmeridian, the legislative business of the Senate be suspended to permit the delivery of memorial address on the life, character and public service of Honorable Clair Engle, late a Senator from the State of California.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CLAIR ENGLE: A EULOGY

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, last July 30, 1964, it was my sad duty to announce to the Senate the death of a distinguished American statesman, our beloved friend and late colleague from California, U.S. Senator Clair Engle.

Clair Engle was a man of high courage and unique ability. Forceful, colorful, articulate, and persuasive, he faithfully served the people of California and the Nation during all of his adult lifetime.

The Senate had a sweet fondness and a real respect for him, which reflected the continuing esteem in which he was held by all who knew him.

Clair Engle was a Californian in every sense of the word. He was born in Bakersfield on September 21, 1911. His grandfather Engle, who was of German-English descent, had fought in the Mexican War under Gen. Zachary Taylor, emigrated to California in search of gold in 1849, and ended up as a cattle rancher. Clair's father, Fred J. Engle, worked variously as a cattle rancher, school-teacher, lawyer, and railroad man. His mother, whose maiden name was Keeran, was of Irish heritage and also descended from California pioneers.

In a State where most of the people are newcomers, Engle's third-generation status—on both sides of the family—made him a Californian indeed.

At the age of 6 months, Clair moved with his family to northern California. They settled in the small town of Red Bluff, which even today numbers only 7,000 in population. Red Bluff is within sight of Mount Lassen, the only active volcano in the United States. Years later, the Saturday Evening Post was to note that it was no coincidence that Engle grew up near the only active volcano in the country, because in adulthood he became the only active volcano in the U.S. Congress. I like that. I think, perhaps, Clair did too.

Clair Engle experienced the typical childhood of boys living close to the western frontier. He learned to saddle and ride a horse and rope a calf almost as soon as he learned to read and write and add. At Red Bluff High School, he played basketball, won election as a class officer, and was a ferocious fighter, even though he was younger and smaller than nearly all of his classmates. That capacity to stand up and fight for the right stood the people of my State in good stead years later, when he fought their battles in the Congress.

Engle's penchant for fighting led him to take up boxing in high school and college. Noticing that most amateurs were "right hand crazy," Engle made a practice of opening doors and lifting heavy objects from the ground with his left hand. His efforts to make himself a southpaw puncher paid off. He could