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*If Veterans don't help Veterans, who will?*

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So I think the gentleman did have a good plan outlined. I was not one of those who thought he really had the right kind of a plan to start with, but I do concur in that now. His plan was to go out in the field and see everybody a week before we saw the top people, and then you could ask those questions, instead of going first to them and getting a briefing. The gentleman had the right plan.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman for his comments.

Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee, a member of the select committee.

Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

I, too, want to express my appreciation to the Speaker for having had the privilege of making this trip, the first one I have made abroad as a Member of Congress, being a member of the Committee on Rules which normally cannot travel even to Alexandria, and it is likely to be my last.

I was impressed very much by the chairman of our select committee. According to the stories I have heard regarding previous congressional groups going abroad, I understand it is always very, very difficult to keep a group pointed in the right direction and diligently pursuing the task they are sent over to pursue.

I can certainly say that our chairman of the select committee performed this role in a way which I consider in the highest order of leadership, energy, and devotion to the job at hand.

The allegation has been made that we were given the snow-job treatment in certain instances and that we sat in on too many briefings.

I defy any human being making any trip to South Vietnam without being caught up in a briefing or two.

Several of us went to an advance fire base near the DMZ. A fire base that had been constructed only 3 days before and had been in operation for only 3 days. It was manned by ARVN forces with a handful of American advisers.

There was in action at the time this 105 millimeter battery. They had one company out in the bush. It was supporting with artillery fire. What happens first on our arrival there? We were taken to the bunker of the ARVN major who was in charge of the battalion involved, a bunker dug down into the earth, and what were we given while the 105's were going off against the VC and the NVA? We were given a briefing. He had a chart and was prepared to give us a briefing. You cannot escape all of these briefings, but certainly every effort was being made to set an independent course, to find out what we wanted to find out, and to look into the things we wanted to look into.

Any personal requests I had of the chairman, whether it be to personally interview a recent North Vietnamese defector or whether it was a request to join a party going to Con Son Island was supported, and it was supported not only to the extent of approval, but to the extent

of backing up a request to the embassy that transportation facilities be provided.

So I want to express my appreciation to the gentleman in the well, who I considered handled this in a fashion that could well set a pattern for other congressional groups that go abroad.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman for his comments and for the support that he gave me as chairman of this committee and as the other 10 members did also.

Mr. HAWKINS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from California, a member of the committee.

Mr. HAWKINS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I use this opportunity first to thank the chairman of the committee for the very many courtesies extended to me. I have with great restraint averted any charges of any member of the committee being given a "snow job." Certainly I think the committee worked diligently enough to ascertain facts, and should not be labeled as having whitewashed anything. At all times I want to say the chairman of the committee cooperated with me, and I feel that I had full opportunity to do whatever I wanted to do, the same as did the other members of the committee.

I have, heretofore, sought to clarify the difference in my findings with those of the majority of the select committee in a substantial difference in the kind of witnesses we interviewed. Typical of those upon whom my findings are based were such groups as students, religious leaders, and political opponents of the Thieu-Ky regime as opposed to relying heavily on the military and the American Embassy.

I also found a vast resource of information and "leads" among the many Americans representing volunteer organizations, included among these were such groups as the American Friends Service Committee, the National Council of Churches, and the Mennonite Missionaries in Vietnam.

Two false impressions have been spread since our reports were made: one that prison reform at Con Son was our main concern; and second, that in exposing human torture in South Vietnam we endangered our American prisoners of war.

Actually Con Son was merely one fact in a series of findings which we reported as symptomatic of a government that remains in power by a system of political repressions, religious persecution, civil corruption, and military power. Improving conditions at this prison, while essential, will not in itself change a corrupt and evil system.

Also, it was natural that those who sought to suppress the facts would seize the American prisoner-of-war issue as their defense, especially since many people assumed that the prisoners at Con Son were Communist. Such misguided souls reasoned that it was all right to treat Communist that way in retaliation.

The facts, however, are otherwise. The political prisoners we reported were almost without exception, not Communist but indigenous South Vietnamese im-

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 peace and opposing a corrupt government.

Of even greater importance than prison conditions is the brutal treatment by the police of the native population most of whom happen to be non-Communist. Total repression of civil liberties in South Vietnam is Government policy. Those arrested on suspicion are beaten into confessing and sent to prison without trial.

Because of the limited time available to fully explore this aspect of our investigation, my report did not deal, as it properly might have, with the subject of Antri. This is the method created by an executive decree for holding without trial up to 2 years and renewable, anyone suspected of being a Communist, a Communist sympathizer, or what amounts to being publicly for peace.

In South Vietnam, the terms "Communist," "neutralist," and "pacifist" are interchangeable. A member of the National Assembly, Ho Ngoc Ceu, whom we interviewed, estimated that almost 50,000 such political prisoners are now in jails, over 7,000 of whom are at Con Son.

In the ferocity of the war itself, we seem to have overlooked the fact that what started in Vietnam as the struggle of its people for independence and self-determination somewhere along the way became an ideological war between the United States and the Peoples' Republic of China.

The shortcoming of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia lies not in opposing communism if that is what the people of these countries also desire, but in our involvement in the internal affairs of other nations without regard for what the people really want.

Thus, we are a party to suppressing the many nationalists groups that might create a popular government that would offer a non-Communist solution to South Vietnam's problems. But apparently we are committed to opposing all opposition, internal or external, to the military dictatorship of the present regime.

This policy is self-destructive. Our bombs, firepower, and rockets have devastated the landscape and crated social disintegration.

The Saigon Government can only remain in power because of our military might but is unpopular because of it.

We are, therefore, troubled when we address ourselves to the individual components of an unpopular government such as the military dictatorship of Thieu-Ky. Will such programs as Vietnamization, pacification, and land reform work?

The answer was best given by Thieu Thien Hoa, Rector of the Buddhist Institute, whom I interviewed in Saigon, when he said the success of such programs depended on the government that administers them. In the hands of an evil regime the best of programs will fail. Only a government which is popular, one that is not corrupt, or controlled by an outside power can succeed in making government work in behalf of the people.

I am convinced the South Vietnamese people believe their only hope of achieving real independence and self-determination is the total withdrawal of the U.S.

military at the earliest possible time. And, in this hope, I believe more and more Americans are in agreement. For Americans, the war has become a nightmare. Only now are many of us beginning to see what it is doing to our economy, the disunity being created among our people, and the effect it is having on our youth. Above all, we should be concerned with what our involvement in Asia is doing to human life and social justice.

As the world's most powerful military power we can with dignity become its most powerful force for peace.

Pertinent material follows:

**U.S. POLICIES DESTROYING INDOCHINA,  
STANFORD BIOLOGISTS WARN**

United States military strategy in Southeast Asia is producing such devastating, long-term environmental damage in Vietnam that a crippled land will be the "legacy of our presence," a group of Stanford University biologists warned today.

The study team, which included graduate students, post-doctoral fellows and faculty members of Stanford's Department of Biological Sciences, made public its findings on the ecological effects of the Indochina war in a conference held at the Sheraton-Palace hotel. The report, entitled "The Destruction of Indochina—A Legacy of Our Presence," was published by California Tomorrow, statewide environmental organization.

"This study falls within the scope of our concerns," California Tomorrow noted, "for we will be unable, while pursuing the dirty business it portrays, to turn our wealth and creative energy to our massive domestic problems, prominent among which are those involving the environment—of California and the nation."

The report detailed the intensive defoliation and cropland-destruction programs employed by U.S. forces in Vietnam which claim to be justified in terms of saving lives of the U.S. and South Vietnamese troops fighting for the sake of the people of South Vietnam.

"However," the report adds, "in view of the permanence of the environmental damage being produced by U.S. military operations in Southeast Asia, it is impossible to identify the benefit to the people living there or to their descendants."

Noting that the report is primarily concerned with ecological damage, the authors also point to other damaging results of these warfare tactics.

It says: "The military is transforming a basically rural agrarian society into an urban nightmare which is economically dependent on the continued presence of the United States. America and its allies have forcibly transported people from hamlets into refugee camps located in and near cities, and have driven many more off their ancestral lands by bombing and defoliation."

"In the past ten years Saigon has grown from a city of 250,000 to become one of the world's largest.

"It now has 3,000,000 people and is the world's most densely populated city. The extremely rapid influx into the cities and surrounding camps has created massive problems in housing, feeding and providing medical care for the refugees."

In an introductory statement, co-author Donald Kennedy, professor and chairman of the Department of Biological Sciences at Stanford, comments that the "central question is now a simple one. How can we claim to be acting on behalf of people when our action itself is prohibiting a future for them?"

The authors forecast that "when the fighting has finally ended, the suffering and hardship will have only begun, for our actions in Vietnam have severely upset the environment and greatly reduced the ability of the land to support its people.

"The defoliation of vast areas of forest and agricultural land by poisonous and teratogenic (fetus-deforming) herbicides, the saturation bombing and extensive burning, the deliberate destruction of crops with resulting starvation, malnutrition and disease—these we have introduced to Southeast Asia and to the list of available techniques for waging war."

The report concludes:

"The devastation we have already caused is a monstrous legacy for those we call our friends. The environment, the social organization, the very future of Vietnam have been so severely mortgaged by action supposedly on her behalf that an American policy of immediate and permanent cessation is clearly the most effective aid we can now give."

**NOTE TO EDITORS.**—In addition to Professor Kennedy, other authors of the report are Professor Colin Pittendrigh, biology department; Howard Edenberg, graduate student in molecular biophysics; Patrice Morrow and Bruce Bartholomew, graduate students studying physiological ecology of plants; Lawrence Gilbert and Edward Merrell, graduate students in population biology and ecology; Peter Cohen, post-doctoral fellow in molecular genetics; Matthews Bradley, graduate student in developmental biology; and Patricia Calderola and Paul Grobstein, graduate students in neurophysiology.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
Washington, D.C., July 13, 1970.

THE PRESIDENT,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As a member of the House Select Committee on United States Involvement in Southeast Asia, I have submitted supplemental views to the House on my findings including conditions we found at the South Vietnamese Correctional Center known as Con Son. Since the United States contributes financial aid, although modest, to this facility and because of the United States involvement as an ally with the government of Vietnam, this matter is of direct interest to me and to our position in world affairs. I wish, therefore, to respectfully report my findings to you for whatever executive action you think appropriate.

I believe the subject matter of this inquiry has been at times not seen in its full perspective. Prison reform per se, although desirable, was not our primary objective. Con Son is merely symptomatic of political oppression and suppression that in South Vietnam prevents freedom of expression and self-determination. Because of this, such programs as Vietnamization and Pacification receiving our direct assistance are jeopardized which in turn affects the withdrawal of American military forces.

To merely address ourselves to correcting prison conditions, although desirable, is not enough. The full range of governmental programs and policies that our government supports should be re-examined.

Also the issue of Con Son has become identified with the prisoner of war issue. In my report and personal statements, I have at no time sought to convey the idea that we had interviewed or found in this particular prison communist prisoners of war. Such prisoners, if in this Center, we were told would only be there because of subsequent criminal offenses. We had no way of verifying this as a fact.

Those persons we did interview indicated to us that they were South Vietnamese political prisoners and not prisoners of war. This I believe to be true since prison officials corroborated these statements.

I do believe, however, that our American prisoners of war may be somewhat affected by the fact that inhumane treatment of political prisoners on the part of South Vietnam

weakens our side in its insistence on a moral code for the other side to which we ourselves do not subscribe in the conduct of a government which we support. And, I strongly condemn those who would emotionalize this issue in order to rationalize a continuation of war.

In making public the facts we found at Con Son and elsewhere, I did so in the strong belief that our government in assuming the leadership of exposing and moving to stamp out political oppression and torture no matter by whom committed can better insure improved treatment of Americans held by the enemy, and eventually achieve a more viable and stable government for the Vietnamese.

Personally, I found communist strength in South Vietnam very limited. In such a strong force as the Buddhist, for example, the dominant spirit was one of nationalism, self-determination, and independence of all outside forces, including both imperialism and communism.

But in the government's policy suppressing such voices of religious leaders, students, disabled war veterans, and political opponents . . . with United States support, we have given the people the hard choice of communism or war rather than an alternative of national patriotism with peace.

I urge you to take immediate executive action in support of a thorough inquiry in these matters by competent and judicious authorities. I enclose my full report to the House of Representatives for your consideration, and I assure you of my readiness to assist our government in whatever way I can to address the wrongs committed and to speed up both our military withdrawal as well as the safe return of Americans held by the enemy.

Respectfully yours,

AUGUSTUS F. HAWKINS,  
Member of Congress.

Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for his remarks. I might say I did receive full cooperation from the gentleman. As I said, we did have disagreement on certain parts of the report.

I would like to say concerning Con Son prison, it was the feeling of two members that it should probably have been stated in the summary report in detail, but it was the feeling of the majority of the committee members that discussion in great detail of conditions found in only one section of only one South Vietnamese prison might have dangerous implications as far as North Vietnamese treatment of prisoners of war were concerned. It was further felt the North Vietnamese might seize upon the treatment of South Vietnamese political prisoners as a propaganda tool. It was a deep and abiding concern for the plight of captive U.S. servicemen which pervaded the final decision of the committee, so this as a matter of opinion I might say.

When Congressman ANDERSON and Congressman HAWKINS reported to me about what had been found at Con Son prison that Thursday afternoon, I immediately got in touch with Ambassador Berger, the assistant to Ambassador Bunker, and asked for an investigation. The next morning, before boarding the plane back to the States, I talked to Ambassador Bunker. I assured him of the committee's concern and he told me there would be an investigation.

After arriving back in the United States, I called, and also the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. ADAIR) of the committee, called Mr. Hannah's office. He

directs U.S. aid. We talked with two people in Mr. Hannah's office. We were assured we would be given reports as to what had been done on this situation. The committee wants Con Son prison corrected. I have taken action to see that this is done. However, we were concerned by what might happen in making Con Son a strong issue in the report as far as American prisoners of war were concerned.

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from New York, a member of the select committee.

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's yielding to me. I notice there are other colleagues who were not on the committee who wish to take part in this colloquy, so I will try to be brief.

I should like to express, in behalf of the minority members on the special committee, our appreciation to Chairman MONTGOMERY for the fact that he did permit those of us who went to Vietnam and to other parts of Southeast Asia with him the opportunity to do, or to suggest, nearly anything we had in mind which might advance our mission.

I did not personally seek assignment to this particular committee. One of the reasons why I did not was that I had some reservations about whether or not such a committee could get a free, independent and objective look at the situation in Vietnam, and I believe if anyone looks back at the experiences of other factfinding groups one would have to have some reservations along those lines.

However, it does seem to me, in retrospect, I say to the gentleman in the well, that under his leadership and in the manner by which he let us go our ways—singly at times, in pairs sometimes or as members of teams—we got as good an overall view of the whole situation in Vietnam as anyone could hope to have under all the circumstances.

There has been some criticism, and I suppose that criticism was inevitable, that we had too many military briefings. The fact of the matter is that we are deeply involved militarily, not only in Vietnam but in many parts of Southeast Asia, as well, so that certain military briefings were essential.

But I believe if one would count up the number of other contacts the committee made, or that individual members of the committee made, one would find those other contacts and other discussions whereby we obtained different points of view besides that of the military, would outnumber the military briefings we also had.

So, Mr. Speaker, speaking specifically for the gentleman from Indiana, ROSS ADAIR, who was supposed to be here this afternoon and, so far as I know is still trying to get here but probably will miss the special order he had for later on, I should like to express our thanks to the chairman of our select committee, and I believe for all the minority members, for the manner in which he permitted us to get the best possible and most objective look we could at the situation in Vietnam.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman for his remarks.

Mr. HANSEN of Idaho. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to another member of the committee, the gentleman from Idaho (Mr. HANSEN).

Mr. HANSEN of Idaho. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I should like to join my colleague in expressing my personal appreciation for the manner in which our distinguished chairman led the committee during the course of its inquiry in Southeast Asia.

I believe it is fair to note that this committee was unique. So far as anyone can recall, no committee has been created by the House of Representatives for a purpose such as that set forth in the resolution which established this committee. Therefore, in a large measure we were plowing new ground. There was no well defined format. There were no accepted rules of procedure.

I had many of the reservations that have been voiced here today. But, in looking back I believe the chairman in particular did an excellent job in developing the method of operation and the approach that was calculated to yield the kind of information which could be of greatest value to us in the discharge of our duties here in the House of Representatives.

I would also like to express my appreciation to the other members of the committee. The committee's work was characterized by a spirit of true bipartisanship and cooperation. There was never any attempt by anyone to force his own ideas or conclusions onto anyone else. There was a genuine determination to search for truth in the face of rather difficult circumstances. In my judgment, the primary role of the committee was not to make short run decisions, but rather to assist the House of Representatives in the long run in fulfilling its constitutional responsibility in the making of decisions and the shaping of policy in the area of foreign affairs.

We have become increasingly and painfully aware in the last few months and years of the very heavy commitments this country has made in Southeast Asia—commitments of both manpower and money. We have become heavily and deeply engaged in a remote part of the world. Many of these commitments were made without prior consultation with or approval by Congress. Unfortunately, in many respects, the role of the Congress has been a diminishing role in the conduct of foreign affairs whereas it should be a very important part of the work of the legislative branch of the Government. Within Congress itself the House of Representatives has been somewhat derelict in exercising its constitutional responsibilities in that area. Therefore, it makes sense for a committee such as this to be created and dispatched to a part of the world which has claimed so many American lives and so much of our treasure. It makes sense that we try to go there to gain first-hand information which can guide us in the future.

I believe there is often a tendency to dwell on mistakes made in the past. I could take several more hours here talking about some horrendous mistakes that have been made in Southeast Asia, but

it does no good except to the extent that our knowledge of those mistakes can be a guide to future actions and help us avoid the same kinds of mistakes in the future. In this respect I felt that the work of the committee was useful and can be even more useful in the future.

Mr. Speaker, I might also make some personal observations about some of the things I saw. While we tried to avoid a large number of formal briefings, we did obtain most useful information during the course of some briefings. Military information is pertinent to the mission. The fact that we did not seek lengthy formal briefings, at least in my judgment, should carry with it no implication that we expected to receive inaccurate information in those briefings. In talking to some of the military people in the field I think the way we set about our mission created in some an impression that we felt any information that could come to us by way of briefings would be incorrect. From my point of view at least, I would like to correct the record on that. The cooperation which we received, at least in the areas I visited and the small groups that I took part in from our military and diplomatic officials and others was excellent. I will say that we are very fortunate with the high caliber of some of the military officers and diplomatic officials we have representing this country in the nations of Southeast Asia. I cannot pay high enough tribute to the men who are over there risking their lives every day for something that for the most part they think is worthwhile.

There are very few benefits that can come from a tragic involvement such as the war in Southeast Asia. However, I believe we can point to one benefit that will accrue to this country. That is the caliber of the young men who have been in that part of the world who will be coming back by the thousands and hundreds of thousands, to take their places as citizens of this country, to go back to the college campuses, to assume positions of leadership in the country and hopefully to come to Congress and bring to this body the benefit of some of the experience which they have gained in the course of their service in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Speaker, I think the primary purpose of our mission was to try to identify in some way the role that this country should play in Southeast Asia in the coming years.

I was impressed with the great potential of the countries of Southeast Asia. They have large human resources, they are rich in terms of natural resources, and they have a great deal in common; they have common opportunities and they have common problems. But insofar as the U.S. role in Southeast Asia is concerned, I think if I could use one word to describe it I would say it should be "limited" and it should be dependent upon the demonstrated ability and willingness of the countries of that part of the world to cooperate and to become masters of their own destiny; to make an effort for themselves otherwise no amount of help we can furnish will be of any lasting value. However, the main impetus and main thrust has to come from the

countries themselves. This would be the central theme that ought to guide our future actions and involvement in Southeast Asia in the coming years.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman for his comments.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BINGHAM. I thank the gentleman from Mississippi for yielding.

First of all, I would like to say that I have read the committee report as well as the separate views. I am tremendously impressed with the fact that under the leadership of the chairman obviously this committee worked very hard and very efficiently. I think it is remarkable that the work was done so quickly and that this report was produced almost immediately upon the committee's return.

I would like to ask one or two questions, one a general question.

I notice that in the supplemental views submitted by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. HAMILTON) the views which I read with great admiration, he starts out by saying:

You find in Vietnam evidence to support the point of view you have when you arrive. The complexity and the variety of Vietnam is such that the hawk and the dove will each observe, investigate and leave assured of the wisdom of the view he had when he arrived.

I would like to know if the chairman of the committee would share that observation by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. HAMILTON)?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I would not exactly share those views and I thought Mr. HAMILTON—I have not closely read his report—went further to say that maybe some of his views had been changed somewhat and that he thought it was a worthwhile trip. I do not exactly interpret it to the effect that he said you could not change your views when you arrived and you would have the same views when you left.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, that is the way he starts his comments.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. That is true, but I do not think he concludes his comments in that fashion.

Mr. BINGHAM. The gentleman from Indiana does have further remarks and that is true. I would like to ask a question about Cambodia. Certainly, I recall the chairman in his initiation of this resolution recognized the fact that the major emphasis of the mission should be the search and destroy missions into the sanctuaries in Cambodia by South Vietnamese and American troops. I was curious to look at the sections of the committee report dealing with Cambodia to find very little, really, in the way of evaluation of the Cambodian operations. For example, I find nothing in the committee report to sustain the contention of the President that these operations were necessary for the protection of American lives. There is nothing to indicate that they could not have been undertaken by the South Vietnamese

Army. In fact, I notice in the separate views of the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. SMITH) he expressed the view that these operations in Cambodia while successful, could have been undertaken by the South Vietnamese Army alone without the participation of U.S. troops.

I wonder if the chairman would comment on that point?

I wonder if the chairman would comment on this?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I think perhaps the gentleman is right, maybe we should have had more details on Cambodia. There was some information that was classified as far as air strikes, so that the committee did gain some information pertaining to the 7th Air Force operations in Cambodia that are not included in the report because it was classified.

We are flying a limited number of missions now in Cambodia, less than we flew up to June 30.

I might say that the general consensus of the committee as to Cambodia, was that the next 2 months are a critical time as far as Phnom Penh is concerned, whether the city falls to the Communists or not. That was the general consensus of the committee that there was no request for U.S. American ground troops by any of the officials of Cambodia. It was the feeling of the committee, that there was no need to send U.S. combat ground forces into Cambodia.

However, the committee did feel small arms, communications equipment, jeeps, trucks and some artillery support weapons, would help and this equipment was needed at once. We learned in the report that when the Cambodians received this equipment they distributed it in an orderly manner.

But perhaps the gentleman is right, that maybe we should have given more consideration to this subject.

Mr. BINGHAM. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. If the gentleman will yield, I think one of the things about Cambodia that one must realize, speaking as one who spent at the most 4 days there, and the only reason I am rising at this time is that we cannot be definite at this time.

For instance, I found to my surprise, and I did not know this before I went there, that about 100 percent of the supplies in the sanctuary areas, that were supplying the forces in South Vietnam, came through the port of Sihanoukville. So I do not think we can be definite at this time as to whether this was a great success until some time has passed, until we find whether or not Sihanoukville is opened again to the Communists, and if they are able to again use the port and transport the supplies back into these areas, and that possibly the Cambodian action represents maybe only a few months' delay, but they still will be able to replenish the supplies. So I do not think you can be absolutely definite at this time as to whether this was a success.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, as I understand it from the statement the committee concluded that the Cambodian op-

erations could have been undertaken by South Vietnamese troops without active U.S. participation.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. I think I made it very clear, as a matter of hindsight, which is always better than foresight, that I concluded after talking with our men who work with the ARVN, that they found the ARVN were in much better shape to undertake this operation than they had realized for undertaking this action, and I think that was so.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, first of all I want to compliment the gentleman in the well, the chairman of this committee, for taking the initiative to organize such a mission to Vietnam.

I was very much interested in the report, and especially the emphasis that the committee was placed upon the importance of the economy of South Vietnam, in the ultimate outcome of the struggle.

I wonder whether or not any members of the committee were briefed on the extent of our assistance program, the commercial import program, or inquired of AID about other aspects of our program—who might be able to answer a question or two about this aspect of our past efforts at economic stabilization.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Yes, several of our members, the gentleman from New York (Mr. ROBISON) and also the gentleman from Idaho (Mr. HANSEN) wrote part of the report on the economy of South Vietnam.

Mr. WOLFF. I have been trying to get some answers from AID about certain nefarious dealings. Maybe these gentlemen have the answers. I have tried to find out from AID how many firms who generally do business with AID, who supply AID commodities, how many firms were guilty of any type of indiscretion in their dealings and the final disposition of these cases. I received a list from AID some months back, on which there were some 175 firms that had either been disbarred, debarred, or that were subject to prior review, some in amounts of up to \$1 million in kickbacks, and for false certifications, another one for \$194,000, another one for half a million dollars. No record of final disposition was forthcoming however. No record of how many dollars the U.S. taxpayer was cheated out of, or why these firms were not brought to account for their unscrupulous dealings. After questioning AID I find that I got a list back from them of only 14 of the 175 cases on which any adjudication had been made.

I was wondering whether we are still doing business with some of these firms? I have asked this question many times even to the Director of AID for Vietnam in hearings before the Far East Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee and to this day nobody seems to be able to give me the answers.

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Speaker, this gen-

tleman from New York cannot give the answer either, but I will say to my colleague with respect to the specific interest he has left that one thing the select committee did before leaving for Vietnam was to circularize all of our colleagues asking them if there was some specific item or special area of concern to them that they would like to have us make inquiry into.

I do regret that, insofar as what the gentleman from New York (Mr. WOLFF) now brings out, that this was not something that came to our prior attention.

Mr. WOLFF. We are continuing to give aid to South Vietnam. One of the recommendations made in the report and it is a fact that we will have to continue to bolster the South Vietnamese economy. Naturally, we will have to bolster the economy of South Vietnam in order to establish a viable state.

But if we permit wrongdoings like this to go unchallenged, I do not think we will be able to bolster their economy or their government. We will set as an example the continued reward for cheating the United States and perpetuate the rampant corruption.

One particular case in point is a pharmaceutical firm which back in 1967 was found guilty of kickbacks amounting to \$1 million. The Vietnamese who received those kickbacks is still in Vietnam running around quite free because the Vietnamese Government failed to prosecute him. And we condone this—the cheating of our Government.

What are we doing in order to get the Vietnamese Government to live up to their obligations?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I am not sure that I have the answer.

Does the gentleman from Iowa who has just returned desire to speak on this question?

Mr. SCHWENDEL. I do not have the answer I want for the gentleman.

Maybe I should identify myself in this connection. I headed a group of volunteers to Vietnam 2½ years ago composed of one other Congressman, myself, two political scientists, one of them who is very well known, Mr. Griffin formerly of the Library of Congress and more recently of American University where he headed the Foreign Language Service School. He has always had an avid interest in Asia.

There were two businessmen, an Iowa farmer and a distinguished lady from Iowa, and two ministers of the gospel. Also the Negro mayor of Springfield, Ohio, that made up our committee.

We were asked by the President of the United States to go back a second time on tour and make our observations on the operation as we saw it before and visit the places where we had been before and to make comparisons.

That we have done and returned and we are in the process of writing our report.

In regard to this specific question, regretfully almost nothing has been done in this regard. We had done a lot in the area of corrections. But it is pretty difficult to deal with this over there. However, it was not too impossible, and this is one of the shortcomings we do speak

of in our report. At present this does not have this type of report now, but we will have something to that point when our report is made.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. May I say to the gentleman from New York to comment further on his question we were concerned that we saw too many American civilians in Vietnam, especially in Saigon. We saw no reason why we could not start reducing the number of American civilians even if it involved contractors.

This was of concern to the committee. We have taken most of the American soldiers out of Saigon, but we do have American civilians all over the place.

Mr. WOLFF. The point I am making is the fact that I do not think any amount of Vietnamization is going to help us unless and until we root out the corruption that exists in the government there.

If we are not going to do anything about it, and I have made several requests to Ambassador Bunker to no avail, and continue to condone outright thieving, we will never bring law or order to Vietnam or any place else for that matter of fact.

All the lives we have given—the money we have spent, will be to no avail because the image of America will continue that we condone leadership and individuals who are stealing us blind—who are in cahoots with a corrupt way of life that offers no alleviation to the depravity of communism.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from New Hampshire.

Mr. CLEVELAND. As one of the co-sponsors of the resolution that launched your committee on its very interesting travels, I have been following your reports and comments with much interest. I want to commend you and the members of the committee for the rapid manner in which you carried out the duties assigned to you by the House.

There has been some criticism of your effort as you know. We are now debating a Congressional Reorganization Act. I think if some of our committees acted as promptly and responsively as did yours, the hue and cry for congressional reform might not be quite as loud as it is now across the land.

Speaking of congressional reform, I wondered if you had any opportunity during your travels to speak to some of the members of the Assembly in Vietnam, or members of the representative governing body in Cambodia.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Yes, we met with the Speaker of the House of the General Assembly of South Vietnam, Congressman ROBISON, and Congressman HANSEN and Congressman ANDERSON talked to South Vietnamese Senators and also Representatives, and we also met with members of the House Assembly in Cambodia.

Mr. CLEVELAND. I have not had an opportunity to read your final report. Are there references to those meetings in that final report?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Yes, there are such references.

Mr. CLEVELAND. The reason I raise the point is I believe sometimes Mem-

bers of this House and perhaps the American public fail to realize those countries do have representative bodies. During my last trip to Vietnam I spoke with several members and was impressed that after a very short period of time, that they had had with representative government, those members impressed me as anxious to fulfill their duty. They were not rubberstamps, and they were quite interested in the work and, indeed, needed guidance and reassurance from representatives such as ourselves.

To your knowledge, did the South Vietnam's Assembly have knowledge of these prison conditions, for example, that were referred to earlier in this discussion?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I would like to ask the gentleman from Tennessee to answer that question. He talked to the chairman of the Interior Committee of the General Assembly of South Vietnam, who has jurisdiction over these prisons. He could comment further.

Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee.

Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. Congressman HAWKINS, I, and others did talk with the chairman of the Committee on Interior in the Lower House of the South Vietnamese Assembly. He was very much aware and concerned relative to the allegation of "tiger cages" and treatment of that nature. We met with him. We met the night of the day we visited Con Son, just prior to our early morning departure. I can relate to you that he was appreciative of the fact that finally these conditions can be confirmed, that they have been seen. He appealed to us to do all we possibly could to bring their existence and the conditions therein to the attention of the American people and to our own Congress, and he indicated that he would report the following morning to the members of his committee.

As I am reminded, there have been some hearings going on within his committee on this very subject, on the subject of prison reform.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from New Hampshire.

Mr. CLEVELAND. I am very interested in this subject, and I just want to confirm that the South Vietnamese Assembly was aware of these conditions and was holding hearings on them.

Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. They were aware of the allegations of these conditions. Apparently they had not yet been able to produce any direct, first-hand evidence of their existence. They were aware of the accusation.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I might further answer the gentleman's question about the General Assembly by saying it might be a little different from our House of Representatives in that they have a more rapid turnover than we do of members of their Congress—about two or three of their members are killed by the Communists each year.

Mr. CLEVELAND. A good point and it fortifies my conviction that we in the House should be doing more to help them

with their efforts and deliberations to make representative government work in South Vietnam. I have long urged this and feel it would be helpful to a successful Vietnamization program.

Mr. FLOWERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. FLOWERS. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the distinguished gentleman from Mississippi for his leadership and outstanding work on this select committee. I also had the opportunity of visiting Southeast Asia at about the same time this committee did and would like to share a few of my own observations.

From fire base Mo less than a mile from the North Vietnamese sanctuary known as the fish hook, I saw elements of the 2d Battalion, 1st Air Cavalry Division, pulling back from Cambodia on June 30, the final day set by President Nixon. There was much evidence of success, and the officers and men seemed near unanimous in applauding the action. The weapons and materiel captured should bring more flexibility in Vietnamization, hopefully allowing a faster rate of withdrawal of American troops.

There is evidence of progress in many areas of the country since I was last there in August 1969. In the rich Mekong Delta area, for example, Government control has increased enormously and a relative degree of calm and prosperity has come to much of the countryside. Yet, in the vast mountainous areas and in the jungles, the Vietcong and North Vietnamese roam in small units and bands at will. Seeing is believing—and you really do have to see the country to believe how this could possibly be with such a large number of United States, South Vietnamese, and other friendly forces there.

I observed local elections in several areas and was amazed at the amount and freedom of participation by the people. The nation has a tradition of local government that is very strong, but a national democratic republic is something entirely new to them. They have made some significant advances toward a truly representative and responsive government, but they have much further to go in this regard. We should continue to use our influence toward this end.

Let us not make the mistake of trying to relate completely their government processes to our democratic system and institutions. From the time of our independence, we have known no other way. America was born into a democratic tradition, but such is completely new to them and they are not yet ready.

However, I do feel that we are in the position to continue pressing the South Vietnamese Government for much needed reforms and responsiveness to the needs and wishes of all segments of their people. The military battle may be on the decline, but the economic and political war rages on. In my judgment, the ultimate survival of the Republic of Vietnam depends on successful action in all three of these areas.

As for Cambodia, there is one single thought uppermost in my mind after

meeting with leading Government officials in Phnom Penh on July 3, and talking with U.S. Embassy people and others. That thought being—they want to do it for themselves.

These proud and fiercely independent people tucked away in a corner of the Asian Continent just want to remain neutral and independent in their own way.

In my judgment, we have an opportunity to help them do just that—at very little relative cost to us—and no further direct involvement of U.S. troops. In the meantime, we could reap the added bonus of greater stabilization of the situation in the southern half of the Republic of Vietnam.

Notwithstanding what you may have read or been led to believe, the Lon Nol government of Cambodia does not appear in danger of being toppled. Increased military pressures from the North Vietnamese and Vietcong could change this at any time, but the government gains strength each day as its army becomes better trained and equipped.

Another myth that should be exploded is that the government overthrew Prince Sihanouk through some hook or crook and that it is neither representative nor the legitimate government of this nation of 7 million. The fact of the matter is that the only change in leadership has been the removal of Sihanouk as chief of state by the duly elected and constituted National Assembly by a unanimous vote. Let us not forget that he had become chief of state by action of this same assembly.

Lon Nol was Prime Minister under Sihanouk and remained in the same position after the March 18 action. All other top government officials did likewise. But they came finally to the realization that the only way they could fully assert their independence against the North Vietnamese and Vietcong was to take the action they did.

A massive U.S. aid program is not desired or desirable, nor from all indications does it appear to be necessary. These people are not grabbing for all they can get from us, but honestly and sincerely seek economic and military aid to help them do the job in their own way for their own country.

They vitally need this help and I feel very strongly that they ought to get it.

(Mr. FLOWERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, we saw the gentleman from Alabama in Vietnam. This is the second time the gentleman has been to Southeast Asia and he has gained a very comprehensive knowledge on Indochina.

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I congratulate the gentleman on his report and compliment the committee on the objectivity, particularly in comparison to the Presidential committee that preceded the gentleman's committee.

May I also make a personal comment. This appointment as a chairman of a committee of the gentleman from Mis-

issippi was not only a reflection on the wisdom of the Speaker in selecting the gentleman, but it also strikes a blow for those of us who have maintained that the seniority system should not be an absolute around here. The gentleman has performed so well in this case that he is a prime example that the inflexibility of the seniority system on committees can stand some scrutiny.

However, I have only one question if the gentleman will permit me to phrase its context at some length. As I understood the President's theory in terms of the necessity of the incursion into Cambodia, it was to protect the flanks of the American Army as we withdrew from South Vietnam, to make possible our withdrawal without being jeopardized by flank attacks from the enemy. I have some problem in understanding that situation, given these facts. In the latest Pentagon figures I have seen there is indication that there are under arms in the South Vietnamese Army no less than 1,200,000 men with armor and with artillery and with air. I find opposing that 1,200,000 men is a force of not more than 240,000, which is the highest figure I ever have seen, comprised both of the VC and North Vietnamese, none of whom have armor or air or artillery.

I gather under the analysis of the President that is used to justify the incursion into Cambodia that the 1,200,000 South Vietnamese with armor, artillery, and air are insufficiently skilled, dedicated, or committed to protect a leisurely withdrawal of American forces against this 240,000 enemy without armor, air, and artillery. Was the gentleman's committee able to ascertain the correctness of those assumptions? Is the South Vietnamese Army 1,200,000 men, so inadequate that it is unable to protect our withdrawal over a period of a year's time or more from the enemy force of 240,000 Vietnamese and Vietcong?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Can I answer that question in this way?

I would say it was the general consensus of the committee that the Cambodian operation on the sanctuaries was a military success, and it probably delayed the enemy for at least 6 months.

In my personal opinion I think the big gain out of the Cambodian operation was that it gave the South Vietnamese the confidence they needed.

I personally think we should continue to withdraw Americans from South Vietnam even though we might have some setbacks but the withdrawal should be orderly. I think the Vietnamese can handle the situation and it should be up to the South Vietnamese now. We should bring the Americans home.

In my opinion the South Vietnamese Army, Air Force, and Navy are capable of handling the situation.

We met with a third secretary at the North Vietnam Embassy in Vientiane, Laos. They are a mean, tough enemy which uses guerrilla tactics. This is the reason why we cannot completely annihilate them.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, it would have been difficult for me to have understood any other approach except for one thing. When one flies over and sees the millions of acres of unused land, it is possible to realize how the North Vietnamese can strike at their own will at a place of their own choosing and then run back into the forest and nobody can find them.

One cannot match one man for one man under those kinds of circumstances. They must have about 10 to 1 or more on the South Vietnamese side.

The object was to rob them of their arsenal in the sanctuaries.

Mr. WALDIE. May I ask the gentleman another question?

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Yes.

Mr. WALDIE. Would, under the same rationale, it be a feasible action on our part to invade the Laotian sanctuaries?

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. I cannot answer that specifically. I say it is a different problem.

I will say it would be extremely difficult, if not almost impossible, to ever defend against the Laotian sanctuaries in the northern part of the country. Certainly that is where almost nobody lives. In that mountainous area it would take a huge army to defend that mountainous area. The South Vietnamese may be fighting up there for 20 or 30 years. But that does not mean the southern part of the country cannot be secured.

Mr. WALDIE. I have just one final question.

You mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, it was your belief it would not be desirable for American armies to be utilized to prevent a takeover of Cambodia by the Communists; did I understand you correctly?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. What I said was that I saw no reason for using American ground troops in Cambodia.

Mr. WALDIE. Is that because you believe the Cambodians can defend their own country?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Yes; I believe in the future we should take a real, good, hard look at wherever we use American troops in Southeast Asia, because there are some problems which develop when we bring in American troops.

I do say in some cases we should give financial aid and we should give military supplies. That pertains to the other countries over there also.

When we send in U.S. troops, the Communists turn it around and use it against us. They say that this government we are supporting has become a puppet government, and in some cases they are right.

Mr. WALDIE. Do I correctly understand that, under your theory, your belief is that the Cambodian people are able to defend themselves against the Communists than are the South Vietnamese?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I believe they need the South Vietnamese support. The South Vietnamese are there now. I do not believe they need American troops there. These two countries have common boundaries and common problems.

The Cambodians are known to have South Vietnamese help, and they are getting it now.

Mr. WALDIE. I have just a reservation. I will ask no more questions. I do have a reservation about the South Vietnamese who are not able to defend their own country without American troops, nor even able to protect American troops as we withdraw, going into Cambodia to defend Cambodia against Communist troops.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I generally believe we can have an orderly withdrawal and they can defend their own country and help Cambodia. However, the South Vietnamese will need some air support from us and also logistic support.

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for an observation?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ROBISON. I might remind our chairman, who has been discussing this subject of Cambodia with the gentleman, that I had reservations originally about the necessity for and the wisdom of the incursion into the Cambodian sanctuary areas. But the American soldiers who were taking part in that operation had no question about the need for it and the justification for it, as I discussed it with some of them. Their understanding was that every bullet which was captured or found in those hidden areas, and every mortar round which was captured or found, was one less bullet or one less mortar round to kill Americans and take American lives. For whatever this is worth, there was justification for it in their minds.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Before I yield, I would like to say that we had a very capable staff. We had some problems with one of the staff members—these things do happen—but we did have eight staff members. Seven of them were dedicated, and they worked very, very hard.

I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I thank the gentleman.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Speaker, to extend the time of the special order for another 15 minutes because I want to ask the distinguished gentleman from Mississippi a number of questions.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rules of the House, a special order cannot be extended for more than 1 hour.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Is there any way that time may be obtained to extend it for another 15 minutes?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I might say to the gentleman from New York that the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. ADAIR) had 1 hour, and he took that for the purpose of yielding time to other gentlemen like you who wish to ask questions. I do not know who has the next hour. Maybe the Chair could tell.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. If the gentleman would like to make a request after the other special orders have been completed, he can make the request for a special order.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. How many additional special orders are there between now and then?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Seven.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. How much time is

left on this special order? Is there sufficient time for two or three questions?

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask unanimous consent for 15 minutes after all other special orders have been granted. Then maybe we can continue. I have some questions, also. Many of these special orders will not be taken, and perhaps the gentlemen will stay.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

Mr. MILLER of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, may I ask how much time there is in those seven special orders?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Three hours and 55 minutes.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I imagine the gentlemen who have time in those special orders will probably let us have 15 minutes.

Mr. MILLER of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

There was no objection.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. HANNA).

Mr. HANNA. Mr. Speaker, I make the point here I hope we can discuss some of the economic problems associated with this matter. As the gentleman knows, I was coauthor of the resolution that sent the committee over. What I am concerned about is that we have blown holes all over that country and we have created fantastic problems with regard to the farmland. It will take a tremendous amount of time and work and money to get these farmlands back into production. I have seen holes 30 feet in diameter out there. They are trying to repair the damage to hospitals also that are full of injured people. People are just being taken out of the country and placed in the cities. We have created tremendous problems there. It has been said, with friends like this, who needs enemies. I hope we can discuss some of that.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I wonder if I might direct a number of questions to the distinguished chairman of the committee. The gentleman from Mississippi knows that I respect him and consider him a friend, and it is in that spirit that I raise these questions.

The first is this: If it is true, as you suggest, that the South Vietnamese are now ready to take over the fighting themselves, then is it not desirable for the United States to withdraw its forces in an orderly fashion as quickly as possible? That is to say, should there not be a commitment to finish our withdrawal by a fixed date so it is settled that we are not going to go back in, even if there are what the gentleman has called setbacks? Or if these setbacks became serious, would you favor our staying there longer or perhaps even sending more troops in? And if the latter is your position, just how bad do the setbacks have to be before you would suspend or reverse our withdrawals? In short, if ARVN is now able to take on the bulk of the fighting,

is it not simple commonsense for us to announce a terminal date for our involvement in the combat, and if we do not do that, do we not seriously increase the risk of being sucked back in if things do not go as the Thieu-Ky government wants them to go?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Well, I shall attempt to answer the question in this fashion: In our report we recommended that the withdrawals of American troops not be announced as to the date of such withdrawals, because the only one who really benefits is the enemy. We had off the record talks with correspondents over in Southeast Asia and they felt this is one thing that should not be done; they thought we should not have an advanced announced timetable. They said bring the Americans home and then announce how many you had brought home.

I would say to the second part of the gentleman's question, that there will be some setbacks in South Vietnam. But if they cannot make it now—the South Vietnamese—they might not be able to make it in 2 or 3 years from now. So I see no reason that we would have to rush troops back there from the United States. However, I will say to the gentleman from New York that we will have to continue to give the South Vietnamese some military equipment and some financial help. We are going to have to give them some air support—B-52 support. The committee felt that, really, the big problem facing the South Vietnamese was the economic situation; the pacification and Vietnamization programs were moving along but that the danger lies in the shaky ground on which the piaster rests. It is when the farmers find out that the piaster will not buy what they thought it would, that you will have the Thieu government in trouble.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, I would like to ask if he found any evidence to confirm reports that many Cambodians are very worried and unhappy about the presence of any Vietnamese, including South Vietnamese, within their borders? As the gentleman knows, it has been widely reported that the Cambodians feel that they most need protection against is the Vietnamese, and that the continued presence of the South Vietnamese Army in Cambodia may be viewed by Cambodians not as a protection but as a danger.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Yes; I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. I went into two of the villages and talked to the Cambodians in the villages. I found, without exception, this to be the case. They hate the North Vietnamese. They are not exactly in love with the South Vietnamese, but they are glad to have them there so long as they will help protect them from the North Vietnamese and then they want them out. That is the situation they are in.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, what happens then when we leave and when the South Vietnamese leave and the

North Vietnamese do not? Do we go back? I do not understand the scenario if that contingency arises, and it seems extremely likely that it will arise if our troops and the South Vietnamese troops are in fact going to withdraw and stay withdrawn sometime.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. They want the South Vietnamese to stay only so long as necessary to keep the North Vietnamese from taking them over.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, does he disbelieve reports of the incarceration of large numbers of Vietnamese in Cambodian prison camps, or does he agree that such camps exist and further complicate an already difficult situation?

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. I did not know any were in prison camps. The South Vietnamese were because their people that escaped when the North Vietnamese came into the towns and fled, they wanted to go anywhere to get out of it. They may have also just wanted to get out of an area where there is war going on. I do not know, but I think that was mainly the answer.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I am afraid I am imposing on the generosity of my friend the gentleman from Iowa, so I will be as brief as I can.

But I must say that I was horrified if not exactly surprised by these new disclosures of how this government that we have supported with 50,000 American lives treats people it does not like. I am ashamed to be allied to such a government—more accurately, to be yoked to such a government, not because our security demands it, as has been the case in other alliances with some brutal governments in the past but because, so we are told, this is a government defending "freedom."

I am deeply disturbed also by the almost casual reaction of our Government and in this body to the disclosure of these conditions. Has this war so dulled our national conscience that we can no longer cry out against horrors like these even—or maybe especially—when it is clear that we share responsibility for their perpetration?

But it is not only because I am appalled at conditions in Con Son that I am disturbed by this kind of reaction. I think halfhearted American protests about evils over which we have some control severely weakens our case against the mistreatment of American prisoners by North Vietnam. How can you demand humane treatment for American prisoners and at the same time all but yawn over inhumane treatment of Vietnamese prisoners—unless you assume that Americans are a sort of master race who must be treated according to different standards than Vietnamese, a double standard that many Asians already suspect we abide by?

Those of us who live in dread about how American POW's are being treated in North Vietnam—and I believe that includes all of us—should be grateful to our two very able and honorable colleagues, Mr. ANDERSON and Mr. HAWKINS, for bringing the situation at Con Son to light. It is not these courageous men who risk giving Hanoi an excuse to

mistreat American prisoners; it is, on the contrary, those who fail to protest the conditions they have exposed, those who refuse to join in the demand that conditions like these be terminated, that give such an excuse to Hanoi. Everyone should demand that all brutality against all prisoners be terminated. I am sure the distinguished chairman of the committee agrees such brutality should be stopped. Is this not precisely the occasion for all of us, whatever our views about other matters to join in a worldwide effort to stop the mistreatment of war prisoners everywhere?

I cannot believe that any of us who have friends or relatives imprisoned in North Vietnam—or anyone else who cares about the fate of these gallant Americans will fail to see how urgent it is that conditions in Con Son be changed, that those responsible for those conditions be removed from positions of authority and punished appropriately, and that those who concealed those conditions be disciplined. I wonder if the distinguished gentleman from Mississippi agrees that we tamper with the well-being of the American prisoners in North Vietnam by failing to respond to these revelations in this way.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I will briefly try to answer the question. I think it is really a matter of judgment how you approach the situation. We thought that the approach was to notify the proper authorities at once, and see if this bad situation could be corrected. And we were concerned that it could have some repercussions on the American prisoners of war. The majority of the committee felt that this situation at Con Son Prison should be corrected but we did not think Con Son should be the main focus of the report and we knew the Communists would use this bad condition at the prison to further mistreat American prisoners of war.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I thank the gentleman for his answer.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. I do not want any intimation taken, and I hope the gentleman did not mean to make it that the members of the committee were condoning what was going on over there. There was not one member of the committee who condoned what was going on over there. And within hours after it the chairman of the committee talked to the Ambassador over there, and to other people over there, and said "We want something done about this." This is not something that just came up a few days ago. It was done while we were still over there. As soon as they got back they talked to the people there to get something done. There was no condoning of this anywhere along the line.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I would certainly not imply that any Member of this body—or anyone else who saw conditions like those reported at Con Son—would condone them. What I am saying is that there are degrees of noncondonation. There are levels of protest. I would hope that there would be a unanimous and angry outcry of protest about these conditions, that we would all agree to do whatever is necessary to correct this situation at once or to end our association

with whoever makes it impossible to correct it.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. I would point out that the gentleman from California and the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. ANDERSON) who are two knowledgeable people were on nationwide TV on Monday before the report was filed, which was the proper way to do it and they were telling everybody.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. And I am praising them.

Mr. HAWKINS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HAWKINS. I merely want to echo what the gentleman from New York has said, and what our concern was in exposing these conditions and to point out one fact I think has not been clearly stated.

The American official U.S. aide who accompanied us to Con Son admitted to us that he knew of the existence of the tiger cages, and that is contained in the report which I made. Either it was incumbent upon him, if he did not know, or knowing, he was concealing the fact—and I think the latter is true because this was his admission.

It seems, therefore, that someone, some American officials were informed and had knowledge of these conditions and did not expose them.

I think while the members of this committee and certainly the Members of Congress are certainly clear on this issue, I think we must condemn those American officials including Frank Walton who had knowledge of these conditions.

Certainly, the members or someone at the Embassy should have had knowledge, and did not as such do something about these conditions before they were actually revealed.

## THE PERIL OF IGNORANCE

### HON. WILLIAM G. BRAY

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 14, 1970

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Speaker, I wish to insert at this time the revised and expanded version of a speech I made in Indianapolis in May 1970:

#### THE PERIL OF IGNORANCE

(By WILLIAM G. BRAY)

(Prepared for delivery for Armed Forces Day at Stouffer's Inn, Indianapolis, Indiana, May, 1970—Later revised and extended.)

Know the enemy and know yourself—in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. . . . When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.

Those ageless words spoken 25 centuries ago are a clear warning to us today. The bleaching bones of a hundred countries that either failed to heed them or failed then to act in their national interest and safety, stand as silent reminders of the truth Plato grimly wrote 300 years before Christ: "Only the dead have seen the end of war."

A glance at history's chronicles will show very, very few periods in the span of written

human history where there was not in some patch of the sky above the globe that "harry of midnight cavalry, riding the wind."

So, like it or not, any country that hopes to remain externally secure in a world in which the unprincipled and aggressive will prey upon the weak must keep itself spiritually, economically and militarily strong.

Just over a year ago I visited Tunis and spent a day searching for the ancient battlefield of Zama where in 200 BC the Roman forces under Scipio Africanus eliminated Carthage from the world. Carthage was so interested in her wealth, had become so greedy, so selfish that she forgot that the price of freedom is eternal vigilance. The Cathiginian became so intent upon the clicking of gold pouring into his tills, so enchanted with the roar of the growing commerce, so careless of his personal responsibility to serve his country that he could not hear Cato daily shouting in the Roman Senate: "Delenda est Carthago" (Carthage must be destroyed).

We do not need to go back 20 centuries to realize the danger and evil that can result from allowing blind trust, stupidity, and selfishness to wreck a civilization. It was less than 40 years ago that Chamberlain tucked his umbrella under his arm and went to Munich to appease Hitler and give him what Chamberlain did not have to give: the freedom of Czechoslovakia. Many of us still remember the wild cheering that followed Chamberlain's proud announcement: "We have attained peace in our time."

The sacrifice was so unnecessary. Hitler did not have the strength at that time to overrun Europe. All he needed was Chamberlain's surrender and this he received.

Now as then we have the "doom-shouters" who at the top of their lungs scream that we are drifting into a militaristic society and shriek incessantly of what this is doing to us as individuals and to use as a nation. During these last few weeks we have heard their hysterical shrieks of outrage that our President took the measures he had to take to protect our soldiers from an enemy who had taken sanctuary in a country that is trying to be neutral. These shouters, like Chamberlain, seem to have forgotten that freedom and liberty are expensive luxuries, but their alternative—slavery, can be even more expensive.

I recently read a book most complimentary to the great productive "know-how" of America. This book, the American Challenge, was written by J. J. Servan-Schreiber, a Frenchman. It clearly recognizes that the American inventiveness, engineering and productive capacity exceeds the wildest dreams of man. However, this story of our country's industrial, economic and financial strength also brought to me an awesome fear for the future of our civilization if we ever allow America and Americans to deteriorate physically, mentally and spiritually to the point where we can no longer capably control and utilize the tremendous material strength which we are able to produce.

#### HATRED, THE ORDER OF THE DAY

While reading this tribute to America's greatness, I was also reading in every paper of the violence of American youth. Not violence by the poor, the underprivileged, the working youth, but by our college youth who are the beneficiaries of the greatest freedom, the greatest opportunity, the highest degree of living and luxury ever enjoyed by any youth in history. The overwhelming majority of American youth today are fine, dedicated young people; but many of them do not realize the growing problem posed by the small but violent group of activists. Many tolerantly view these activists as just another group "doing their thing." In every paper in America we read of a segment of these youth spewing hatred on America and all that America stands for. At the same time they revel in praise of America's enemies. These

youths are joined and defended, and in many instances directed, by leftist professors who are being paid their salaries by American taxpayers.

We need to be informed as to the cause and purpose of these anti-American acts. In the words of Sun Tsu, let's dispel our "ignorance of the enemy." Only the naive doubt that much of the impetus and planning for the "hate America" campaign comes from our enemies abroad, but the real danger is from the enemy within our country.

There is a vast difference between dissent, which is the very essence of a democracy, and attempts to destroy our country by violence. To those violent ones, America is always wrong, our enemy is always right; peace is the surrender of the United States; and disarmament means disarmament by the United States. Let us face the issue squarely: the only act that our country could perform today that would bring this small but vicious and violent band of anti-American leftists back into the national structure would be the act of total surrender to Hanoi. And yet even this yielding would bring only a temporary calm while another anti-American "cause" was being established.

By the philosophy of the violent activist, throwing a rock or a golf ball spiked with nails calculated to blind or maim a policeman is "legal dissent," but reaction by the police or other law enforcement officials to protect themselves or other innocent victims is "repression" by "Fascist pigs."

One of the goals of this violence is to destroy the ROTC (Reserve Officers Training Corps). Scores of ROTC buildings on college campuses have been bombed or burned. The ROTC is not a part of so-called "militarism." No students are required to be members of ROTC. The ROTC is an adjunct of the concept of the citizen soldier (a soldier in war and a citizen in peace) which has enabled the United States to remain strong and yet unmilitaristic through its 164 years of existence. Why should these youthful, activists attempt to destroy the ROTC, which they in no way are forced to join or work with?

Back of all this violence is the goal of destruction of this country, for to maintain an adequate armed force to protect America, the ROTC is necessary. Violent students never protest the enormous armed forces of Russia and Red China or any other enemy of the United States. No acts of aggression by Russia, Mao's China, North Vietnam or North Korea can rate a word of criticism in the "hate-America" campaign.

Another target of this destruction has been the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), the foreign intelligence arm of the United States. Why is New Left violence directed against the CIA? Without knowledge of enemy activities America would be helpless to defend herself against foreign aggression. Without knowledge of the enemy, our country would be in the position of the magnificent Samson, about whom the blind English genius, John Milton, wrote so feelingly and agonizingly:

*Eyeless in Gaza, at the mill with slaves,  
O loss of light, of thee I most complain!  
What boots it at one gate to make defense,  
And another to let in the foe? . . .*

What, then, is the principal goal of the New Left? The goal is clear: The only end that they will accept is the defeat of this country by Hanoi.

#### HATRED OF THEIR COUNTRY—PRAISE OF ITS ENEMIES

Student rioters do not express a word of criticism of the vicious Secret Police of the Soviet Union, the KGB, but they express nothing but hate and vituperation for the CIA. The murder of millions and the indescribable brutality of the Soviet Secret Police, the Cheka of Lenin, the NKVD of Stalin that directed the purges of the 1930's and the Katyn Forest Massacre, and the KGB of today are ignored.

There is no criticism of murder and starvation by the Soviets, or of the denial of freedom to millions in Russia and her satellite countries. The brutal enslavement of Hungary and Czechoslovakia do not rate a word of rebuke.

These proponents of violence among our youth are dedicated to hatred—hatred of fathers, schools, fellowmen and their country. The flags they carry are the red flag of Communism, the black flag of anarchy and the Viet Cong flag. The flag they defile is the Stars and Stripes, the flag of their own country.

Violent students do not raise a word of protest against Viet Cong invasion of neutral Cambodia to use as a sanctuary to launch attacks against South Vietnamese and Americans. Yet these same activists scream against the "establishment" when American troops, at the request of the Cambodian government, entered that country to drive out the Viet Cong invaders and save the lives of their fellow Americans. The New Left is not only bitterly opposed to the United States assisting the South Vietnamese in maintaining their freedom; they oppose with equal hate any plan whereby the local South Vietnamese can retain this freedom by their own effort. Difficult though it is to understand, the goal of this violence, not realized, however by many of those participating, is a Communist takeover and victory.

These youths who plan to destroy the "establishment" feign friendship with Black youths. In actual fact, they have proved by word and deed that they have only contempt for the Blacks and desire from them only their assistance against the "establishment."

In 1968 violent student riots brought Columbia University, which had formerly been one of our great universities, to her knees, all in the alleged interest of civil rights. The excuse used was that the Morningside Gym was being constructed at a location that should be used for the Blacks of Harlem. In a speech later before the Harvard Chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), Mark Rudd, President of SDS and now a fugitive from justice, said that he "didn't even know where the Morningside Gym was" yet he led that riot. Later in the same speech Rudd said that there was only one issue in the confrontation: "whether or not American universities should be destroyed." In the May 19, 1968, issue of the New York Times, Rudd admitted:

"I was never really attached to civil rights. There was too much idealization of Negroes. I have always felt a tremendous barrier between me and Blacks."

Mike Klonsky, secretary of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), has stated:

"The civil rights movement was finally buried with Martin Luther King's assassination."

Although the Blacks, individually and through organizations such as the Black Panthers, have at times worked with the New Left in acts of violence, they have a different motivation: while the violent white students would destroy the government and society, the Blacks want a greater share in that government and society. Violent methods which they pursue are wrong and self-defeating, but their goals are at least more understandable.

The New Left in the United States and the New Left of every other free country attack embassies and desecrate flags of all countries that are free. What do these violent youth want? It is not a democracy. The "gods" they worship—Che Guevara, Mao Tse-tung, Fidel Castro—all dedicated their lives to destruction of democracy.

The "free speech movement" (1964-1965) was launched at the University of California at Berkeley, the university at that time with perhaps the highest degree of freedom of speech and action of any university in any country in the world. The real purpose was

to wreck the school and to deny freedom of speech to all who disagreed with the organizers of the "movement."

Violent students would change that great declaration of Voltaire to Helvetius:

"I disapprove of what you say, but will defend to the death your right to say it."  
"I disapprove of what you say and I will fight to your death to destroy your right to say it."

The New Left has nothing but contempt for labor and the betterment of labor conditions. This summer the youthful activists are renewing their efforts to take over organized labor, as they temporarily cease their campus violence during vacation and join summer labor forces while the schools are closed.

Another of the "gods" of the New Left is Professor Herbert Marcuse, who has only hostility for organized labor. As Professor Marcuse states it, American labor has provided our economy with the products needed and desired to such a degree that it dulls the "lust for revolution." The New Left is dedicated to the destruction of free labor in America and is proceeding toward that goal. To realize his goals, Professor Marcuse would restrict free assembly and free speech to those who espouse causes which he determines to be right.

Those who would destroy America are few in number, but it should be remembered that Mark Rudd stated initially he had fewer than 150 followers when he wrecked Columbia University in 1968; Lenin had fewer than 14,000 followers, when he took over Russia, and a relative handful goose-stepped Hitler into power.

#### ORGANIZED HATRED

Where and when was this hatred of school, society and government spawned? It is always present in some segments of society, including youth. In years past this feeling has been referred to as the "sons" who hate their fathers." However, the current hate campaign received a great and organized boost in the violence planned and engendered by the misnamed "freedom of speech movement" at Berkeley in 1964 and 1965. This violence was organized and directed by various leftist groups, including Communists, leftist faculty members and non-students.

This philosophy, however, received its greatest single impetus at the Labor Day weekend convention of the National Conference for New Politics held at the Palmer House in Chicago in 1967.

Present at this meeting were representatives of approximately 300 leftist organizations: Communists of many breeds—Marxists, Soviet and Chinese. There were Trotskyites and Castro and Che Guevara Communists. Also present were anarchists, sexual perverts, arsonists, thieves, hippies and drug addicts. The meeting was one of disorder, hatred and violence. The theme was hatred—hatred of America, hatred of America's heritage, hatred of fathers, hatred of schools, hatred of everything for which America stands.

Columnist Victor Riesel described the meeting:

"It was like entering the Gates of Hell and finally coming out on the other side."

Baltimore Sun columnist Gerald Griffin said:

"This political mess attempted at Chicago is as ugly as it is poisonous."

There was no united organization formed at the Palmer House meeting, but out of this inferno did emerge a clear understanding of what these people are against: they are against America and want destruction of her institutions, especially her educational system. Their ruling passion is "hate America."

From this meeting the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) emerged as the leading organization for the hate America conclave. At a later convention the SDS was

split by a disagreement and the ultra-violent Weatherman branch of the SDS came into being. The Weatherman branch, in meetings in Cuba and later in Flint, Michigan, concentrated on plans for launching increased violence—plans which have since been carried out. A variety of mobilization committees have added their part to the "hate America" theme.

What part is Russia, Red China, Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea, and other Communist countries, as well as the Communist Party in the United States, playing in this planned hatred of America in the directing of the organized violence on the campus and in the streets of America? Activists of the anti-American New Left do make visits to these Communist countries where they receive encouragement and issue statements through the news media—statements filled with hatred for America and preaching its overthrow and destruction. Both these visiting anti-Americans and the Communist leaders desire the overthrow of America. However, these anti-American activists envision a type of government far different from that which presently exists in Communist countries.

The violent student is against all government and law and controls or direction—the Communist type of government is exactly the opposite. Not only is the individual regimented as to government, but to his economics, political and personal life. These Communist countries and the Communist Party in America do make use of the New Left to destroy our democracy, so that in the ensuing chaos and anarchy they will be able to seize control and establish Communist control.

After Lenin and Trotsky seized control in Russia in December 1917, Trotsky turned his artillery on the anarchist headquarters in Moscow and quickly destroyed not only the anarchists but all Russians who demanded the freedom they had been promised by the Communists before they seized control.

The strongest and most bitter criticism expressed against the Communists, destroying the freedom and liberty that they espoused before seizing control, have been written by ex-Communists themselves, such as: Emma Goldman, 1869-1940; Alexander Berkman, 1870-1936; Peter Kropotkin 1842-1921.

It is interesting that Lenin before gaining control in Russia, used the college youth to promote anarchy and destroy government in Russia similar to the same actions being taken by the leaders of the New Left in the United States today. A letter written by Lenin from Paris on October 18, 1905 (this was twelve years before he finally seized control) instructed:

"... Go to the youth, gentlemen! That is the only remedy! ... Go to the youth. Form fighting squads at once everywhere, among the students and especially among the workers. Let groups be at once organized of three, ten, thirty persons. Let them arm themselves at once as best they can, be it with a revolver, a knife, a rag soaked in kerosene for starting fires ... Do not make membership in the party an absolute condition—that would be an absurd demand for an armed uprising.

"The propagandists must supply each group with brief and simple recipes for making bombs ... some may at once undertake to kill a spy or blow up a police station, others to raid a bank ... Let every group learn, if it be only by beating up policemen ..."

Why should the enemies of America at home and abroad wish to destroy this country, its heritage and all its potential? Is it that America is in error in building freedom and dignity, or is it that these enemies would destroy our country because of America's success and greatness? To obtain a true answer to these questions is most important to